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ABSTRACT
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Twentieth-century re-interpreted eschatology introduces a paradigm for Christian
ethics that engenders significant divergence among Christian ethicists in the way its
application influences moral theory. These divergences indicate the need to clarify the
issues revolving around its methodological application in order to bring credible structure
for applying the eschatological paradigm in Christian ethics.
A set of analytical distinctions and procedural suggestions in this study provide an
extensive framework for comparatively observing where ethicists begin, move, and end
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in terms o f using eschatology as paradigm in their moral theory: (1) role and function of
t

paradigms, (2) levels o f paradigm operation (macro, meso, micro), (3) levels in ethical
structure (philosophical/theological bases, principles, area rules), (4) three principles of
verification (role o f Scripture, community, and the nature of social involvement), and (5)
three conceptually interwoven and complementary components o f the paradigm
{already/not yet, reign o f God, horizon o f future). A correspondence is proposed between
the levels of paradigm operation and the ingredients in ethical structure. A complex
interplay is indicated between the paradigm’s components and the principles of
verification which highlight the methodological nuances the paradigm elicits.
Mott and Ogletree were selected because they represent the latter phase of
twentieth-century re-interpreted eschatology and its application toward moral theory.
Their projects elucidate the complex nature and subtle interplay between the various
ingredients involved in using eschatology as paradigm and the ever-present
presuppositions o f those seeking to apply it—illustrating what happens if you take the
eschatological paradigm and apply it this way or that way. Their diversity suggests that
the question o f the use o f eschatology in Christian moral theory remains open. Their
respective orientation to Scripture shows considerable contrasts with respect to
consistency, specificity, and relevancy of eschatological paradigm application. Their
projects suggest that the question o f the role of Scripture alone gives promise of bringing
stability to the use o f the eschatological paradigm in Christian ethics. The paradigm
functions best when expressing biblical ethics rather than moral philosophy.
Perspectives for using eschatology as paradigm are proposed along with its
relation to other paradigms in Christian moral theory and directions for further study.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Re-interpreting Eschatology
Twentieth-century theology has generated a significant “re-interpretation o f
eschatology,”1and the implications for Christian ethics have been momentous.2
Traditional theology had generally defined eschatology as “the study o f last things,”3 but
developing insights from the ongoing debate over the theme o f the kingdom of God have
significantly broadened theological understanding o f eschatology.
The metamorphose taking place in eschatology since Ritschl persuasively
identified eschatology with ethics in the Kingdom of God and made it central to his
'See Millard J. Erikson’s “Introduction to Eschatology,” in Christian Theology
(Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1985), 1149-1165; and Somen Das, “A Theology o f
the Future and Christian Ethics,” Bangalore Theological Forum 15 (May-August 1983):
63-86.
2Brian V. Johnstone, “Eschatology and Social Ethics: A Critical Survey of the
Development of Social Ethics in the Ecumenical Discussion," Bijdragen 37 (1976): 4785; Das, 63-86; Carl E. Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics: Essays on the Theology and
Ethics o f the Kingdom of God (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1974), 7-25.
3Douglas Ezell, “Eschatology and Ethics in the New Testament,” Southwestern
Journal o f Theology 22 (Spring 1980): 75. Traditional views included a sterile
dogmaticism, a focus on apocalyptic calculations, narrow hopes of salvation for one’s
own soul, and a marked contrast between this world and the age to come, between time
and eternity.

1
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2
systematic theology has resulted in the forging o f an eschatological approach to theology1
and the spawning o f a number o f eschatological schools.2 In the process, the theological
trend o f this century in both systematics and biblical studies has de-historicized
eschatology (where eschatology has a timeless ahistorical character and becomes in effect
“eschatology sans eschaton")3 and de-eschatologicalized history (where the meaning o f
history lies always in the present and the eschaton is viewed as a post-temporal reality).4
Thus, for some, history and time came to have no real meaning for eschatology and
ultimately for ethics. This de-historicized approach to eschatology has turned full circle,
however. A radically eschatologicalized understanding of history and a radically
historicized understanding of eschatology have emerged where the future is seen as
ontologically prior to the present and the past, and where the horizon of universal history
‘See Braaten’s chapter “A Future-oriented Method in Theology," in Eschatology
and Ethics. 26-42, as well as his thoughts on “doing theology as eschatology," idem, The
Future o f God: The Revolutionary Dynamics of Hope (New York: Harper and Row,
Publishers, 1969), 17-32; Erickson, 1150-1151; and James M. Childs, “The Imago Dei
and Eschatology: The Ethical Implications of a Reconsideration of the Image o f God in
Man within the Framework of Eschatological Theology" (Th.D. diss., Lutheran School of
Theology at Chicago, 1974), 294.
2These include Schweitzer’s “thorough-going (consistent) eschatology," C. H.
Dodd’s “realized eschatology," John A. T. Robinson’s “fully inaugurated eschatology,"
William Manson’s “spiritualized apocalyptic eschatology,” Rudolph Bultmann’s
“existential eschatology," and Wolfhart Pannenberg and Jurgen Moltmann’s “proleptic
eschatology.”
3Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 8-12.
4Childs, 347-357,259-295. See also Braaten’s chapter, “The Quest for the
Meaning o f Eschatology,” in Eschatology and Ethics. 7-25; Erickson, 1154; and Rudolf
Bultmann, History and Eschatology: The Presence o f Eternity (New York and Evanston:
Harper and Row, 1962), 155.
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is fused by a historical reality that is prior to its present. Some are finding a new
temporal view o f reality.1 History and time again have profound significance for
eschatology and ethics.
Within these broad developments, eschatology has been restricted to existential
categories. Eschatology has been politicized and secularized. It has been articulated as
encompassing the whole history of Jesus Christ. And it has been restricted exclusively to
the person o f Jesus Himself.2 For some, eschatology has become the whole of theology.
Or, more correctly, the whole of theology has become eschatology.3
This re-interpretation of eschatology has been propelled by the historiophilosophical and socially pragmatic strength o f Marxism and dialectical materialism,
which has literally forced Christian theologians to focus upon the future.4 In particular,
Ernst Bloch’s Das Prinzip Hoffnung ("The Principle of Hopei, which represents Marxism
and dialectical materialism as the world’s hope for a better future, has had an evocative
‘Childs, 259-295. Moltmann and Pannenberg are foremost in articulating this
eschatological vision o f reality (ibid., 288, 282). For both, reality is perceived as
historical thus bringing profound potential for the ethical relevance of eschatology.
2Erickson, 1149-1165; Adrio Konig, The Eclipse o f Christ in Eschatology:
Toward a Christ-Centered Approach (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 1989), 32-47; and Das, 63-86.
3Karl Barth says, “If Christianity be not altogether thoroughgoing eschatology,
there remains in it no relationship whatever with Christ” fEpistle to the Romans [London:
Oxford University Press, 1950], 314). And Jurgen Moltmann writes, “From first to last,
and not merely in the epilogue, Christianity is eschatology" (Theology of Hope: On the
Grounds and the Implications of a Christian Eschatology [New York:
HarperSanFrancisco, 1991], 16). For Moltmann, theology begins with eschatology, so
that everything is thought out from that future.
4Erickson, 1151.
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impact on twentieth-century Christian theologians who have felt challenged to set forth
an alternative, superior basis for hope.1 The geopolitical upheavals through two world
wars, together with the rise o f the Third World, the apparent lack of solutions for
escalating social exigencies, exacerbating environmental problems, unparalleled
technological advances, and the rapid increase in human knowledge have influenced the
focused attention on eschatology and the quest for its meaning.2 Likewise, issues of
revelation together with higher-critical methods in biblical studies have provided a
theological context for both the rediscovery and re-shaping of eschatology in this
century.3

Eschatology as Paradigm for Ethics
Through it all, eschatology has become a very morally “pregnant word1'—relating
to the cross event, pointing to the future, and shaping the present.4 As a result, the
pendulum has swung from eschatology as being disjunctive, and even opposed to
'Unfortunately, though, not without being significantly influenced by Marxism
and dialectical materialism’s view of history and social philosophies. See Ernst Bloch,
Das Prinzip Hoffnung (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1959).
2Erickson, 1150-1152. It was the sense of hopelessness and helplessness in post
war Europe that propelled Moltmann’s passionate views in his Theology of Hope. See
Braaten’s discussion o f "The Phenomenon of Hope-Man” in The Future of God. 33-57.
3Johnstone, 52; Norman R. Gulley, “The Battle for Biblical Eschatology in the
End Time,” Journal o f the Adventist Theological Society 1, no. 2 (1990): 22-36.
4Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 12-14; Nils A. Dahl, “New Testament
Eschatology and Christian Social Action," The Lutheran Quarterly 22 (November 1970):
375; Ezell, 75.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

5
Christian ethics,1to the place where eschatology is now seen by some as even providing
the “key" to Christian ethics.2 Where once most Christian theologians and ethicists
generally ignored the connection between eschatology and ethics,3 some are now
intentionally seeking to place the roots of Christian ethics into the ground of biblical
eschatology where they supposedly belong.4
'After all, it has been implied, eschatology deals with “last things" of history and
an other-worldly future, whereas ethics deals with moral problems of life in a thisworldly present. They do not seem to fit together nicely. This has been especially true in
the arena o f Christian social ethics, for social ethics is glaringly this-worldly present,
dealing with structures and patterns of the here and now, whereas eschatology has
traditionally been concerned with the final things o f history and an apparently other
worldly future. The fact that the future kingdom appears more unlike than like the
present order has tended to create a regression from the social and political opportunities
to create a better future for all mankind now and a withdrawal into the personal space o f
religious other-worldliness and emotionalism. See Ray C. Petry, “Christian Eschatology
and Social Thought," Theology Today 5 (July 1948): 184; Das, 69; Braaten, Eschatology
and Ethics. 8,106.
2Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 105-122; C. R. H. Preston, “From the Bible to
the Modem World: A Problem of Ecumenical Ethics," Bulletin of the John Rvlands
University Library 59 (1976-77): 174-180.
3Braaten. Eschatology and Ethics. 106. This theological disconnection between
eschatology and ethics has been true for both liberal and conservative
theologians/ethicists.
4Ibid., 105. Key examples include: Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the
Kingdom of God (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), idem, Ethics (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1981); Moltmann, Theology of Hope: idem, The Wav of Jesus Christ:
Christologv in Messianic Dimensions (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1990); Braaten,
Eschatology and Ethics: idem, The Future of God: George Eldon Ladd, A Theology o f
the New Testament (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1975);
Wolfgang Schrage, The Ethics of the New Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1988); Stephen Charles Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982); Thomas W. Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983); and John Howard Yoder, The Politics of Jesus
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1972), idem, The Priestly
Kingdom: Social Ethics as Gospel (Notre Dame, IN: University o f Notre Dame Press,
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In effect, eschatology has emerged as a “new paradigm” in contemporary
Christian moral thought. As a paradigm, it is influencing both foundational and applied
ethics.1 And, not surprisingly, it is indicating new directions for social ethics as well.2
The word “paradigm” is used here as an organizing idea or thought structure around
which an approach to ethics is shaped and articulated. Christian moral thought has
always been forcefully shaped by paradigms. H. Richard Niebuhr used “the responsible
self1 paradigm as an integrating and persistent theme in his ethical thought and teaching.3
The “rationality of divine command" paradigmatically integrates C. F. H. Henry’s
Christian personal ethics.4 Barth’s paradigm for theological ethics (also divine
command) is “the immediacy o f the Word of God."5 And “Aya7rr|" provides the
1984). See selected bibliography for journals and other notable projects.
'See my selected bibliography for works on eschatology and ethics.
2It appears that the “re-interpretation of eschatology” has taken place against the
backdrop of the debate over Christian social action, with the latter being the greatest
beneficiary (or victim) o f particular explications of the eschatological paradigm (see
Johnstone, 47-85; Dahl, 375; Das, 63-86). While the eschatological paradigm has been
developed primarily with social ethics in view, it should, in principle, provide a single
point of departure for both personal and social ethics (see Braaten, Eschatology and
Ethics. 120). The implications o f the twentieth-century reinterpretation of eschatology
has included political, social, personalistic, and universal characteristics (see Paul Tillich,
Systematic Theology, vol. 3 [Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1963], 358-359.
3H. Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self: An Essav in Christian Moral
Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963), 6.
4Carl F. H. Henry, Christian Personal Ethics (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 1957). See also, Gagriel Fackre, “Carl F. H. Henry,” in A Handbook o f
Christian Theologians, ed. Dean G. Peerman and Martin E. Marty (Nashville: Abingdon
Press, 1989), 601.
5KarI Barth, Ethics (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 3-61.
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integrating thematic for Ramsey’s biblical deontology.1
Paradigms are “a way o f looking at something.”2 They serve as “interpretive
models," “explanatory models," “models for understanding.”3 But they are more than
mere “conceptual systems.” Paradigms also act as “molds" or “clamps” which shape and
direct thinking in clearly defined directions.4 They inform methods and the principles of
solution. They are an important part o f the “theory-praxis discussion."5 When new
scientific, theological, or moral hypotheses and theories emerge, they often do so as new
'James M. Gustafson, “Christian Ethics,” The Westminster Dictionary of Christian
Ethics (1986), 87-91. Other significant paradigms molding Christian ethics and ethical
method include: Lehmann’s “What is God doing in history?” (Paul L. Lehmann, Ethics in
a Christian Context [New York: Harper & Row, 1963], 74-101); Schweitzer’s “interim
ethics” (John Macquarrie, “Interim Ethic," The Westminster Dictionary of Christian
Ethics [1986], 307); Rauschenbusch’s “kingdom o f God" (Walter Rauschenbusch, A
Theology for the Social Gospel [Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1987], 131); Birch &
Rasmussen’s “Kotvovia" or “community” ethics (Bruce C. Birch and Larry L.
Rasmussen. Bible & Ethics in Christian Life [Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1989], 17-34);
Brunner’s “biblical personalism” (Paul G. Schrotenboer, “Emil Brunner,” in Creative
Minds in Contemporary Theology, ed. Philip Hughes [Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 1969], 119-120. See also, Walter G. Muelder, “Personalism,” The
Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics (1986), 469-470; Moltmann’s “theology of
hope" (Moltmann, Theology of Hope. 8-11); and J. A. T. Robinson’s “centrality of
situation” (J. A. T. Robinson, Christian Morals Today [Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1964]).
2Peter A. Angeles, “Paradigm,” Dictionary of Philosophy (New York: Bames and
Noble Books, 1981), 203.
3Hans Kting and David Tracy, Paradigm Change in Theology: A Symposium for
the Future (New York: Crossroad, 1989), 7.
4Ibid., 8.
sIbid., 9.
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models o f interpretation or “paradigms” which replace previously accepted ones.1 They
arise from a ''paradigm change’ (rather than a sudden ‘paradigm switch’), as part of an
extended process that is often more revolutionary than evolutionary, and which does not
always appear the most rational.2
For Christian ethics, paradigms provide a moral “frame of reference” from which
moral thinking is organized or articulated. The emergence, then, o f eschatology as a new
paradigm in Christian ethics represents a significant shift in conceptualizing and
articulating Christian moral responsibility. This conceptual shift comes because,
theologically, the characteristic o f re-interpreted eschatology (as expressed in gospel
proclamation) is that o f dialectic between present and future.3 There is an “eschatological
in-the-meantime” and “eschatological endtime.”4 This dialectic generates an
“eschatological ethics.”5 Eschatological ethics simply means that the God of the end-time

'Ibid., 7.
2Ibid.
3Schrage, 19.
4John E. Alsup, “Eschatology and Ethics in Paul,” Austin Seminary Bulletin:
Faculty Edition 94 (November 1978): 50.
5As opposed to an “interim ethics," “emergency ethics,” “apocalyptic ethics,”
"ethics o f parousia-delay,” or a “counter-parousiacal ethics.” See Amos N. Wilder,
Kervgma- Eschatology and Social Ethics (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 20;
Schrage, 30-37; and Graydon F. Snyder, “Apocalyptic and Didactic Elements in 1
Thessalonians,” The Society o f Biblical Literature: Book of Seminar Papers 1 (1972):
233-234. One’s ethic rides on how the reality of the kingdom o f God is interpreted
(Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 116), and the kind o f eschatology chosen as a model
(Robin Scroggs, “The New Testament and Ethics: How Do We Get from There to Here?”
Perspectives in Religious Studies 11 [Winter 1984]: 85). The basic outline of the
overlapping o f the two ages and the proleptic presence of the future in Jesus’ person and
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is at work in the present where people hear, believe, and live—accomplishing His endtime will and word o f promise.1 The eschatology articulated has roots in “present
reality.”2 It brings present requirement in view o f the future. This is the genius of
eschatological ethics. As a present reality, it has profound moral implications and
contemporary force for ethics. The new paradigm claims to allow for the dynamic
merging of the other-worldly and future with the this-worldly and present in a way that
permits real connection between requirement and action.
Numerous Christian ethicists have been inspired by three highly suggestive
models within this eschatological paradigm: (1) the reign o f God,3 (2) the already/not yet
dialectic,4 and (3) the horizon o f the future.5 The eschatological perspective o f these three
models has given rise to creative ethical reflection. Each of these models is in fact a
component part o f the eschatological paradigm. Each is highly paradigmatic in itself.
Each has been used by theologians or ethicists as “the” paradigm for expressing
work is key. See also. Braaten. Eschatology and Ethics. 122: Ronald Russell,
“Eschatology and Ethics in 1 Peter.” The Evangelical Quarterly 47 (April-June 1975): 84.
Braaten asserts that the eschatological kingdom of God determines the “goal,” the “norm,”
the “motive," and the “context” of ethical decision. These are determined by the reality of
the kingdom o f God being proleptically present in a definitive way in the person and
activity o f Jesus (Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 110).
'Alsup, 50.
2Scroggs, 91.
3Ladd, 57-69; Mott, 82-106.
4Ladd, 50-69; Schrage, 19, 20.
5Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 14-25; Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom
of God. 51-71, 103-143; Ogletree, 177-180.
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twentieth-century re-interpreted eschatology. For purposes o f clarification, this study will
be referring to these three models ( the reign o f God, already/not yet, and horizon o f the
future) as “components” of the eschatological paradigm which help express and interpret
the “eschatological paradigm” itself.1 Together, like a three-stranded cord, they form a
comprehensive eschatological paradigm for contemporary Christian ethics. In addition,
the “eschatological paradigm" is understood here as being the overall integrating theme
generated by the New Testament eschatological Kingdom of God.
O f these three paradigm components, the already/not yet dialectic appears to be
the primary point o f reference around which both the reality and religious/moral impact
o f the eschatological Kingdom of God find expression.2 The reign o f God and horizon o f
the future components are closely nuanced dimensions (or issues) integrated within this
already/not yet dialectic. This dialectic gives rise to the question of the moral
implications evident from the horizon o f the coming future, as well as to those moral
implications highlighted by the reality of the reign o f God, which has already broken into
the present. Viewed oppositely, the reign o f God and horizon o f the future components
explicate the crucial realms where the moral implications of the already/not yet dialectic
are both indicated and need to be worked out for everyday life. Together, these three
'For an interesting discussion on “dominant paradigms" and “quasi-paradigms,”
see Karl Erik Rosengren, “Paradigms Lost and Regained,” in Rethinking Communication.
vol. 1 Paradigm Issues, ed. Brenda Dervin et al. (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications,
1989), 21-39. See also, Kiing and Tracy, 9 passim for discussion on “macromodels,”
“mesomodels,” and “micromodels."
2Schrage, 19.
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components form primary points o f reference for Christian ethicists working within an
overarching eschatological paradigm for moral reflection and application.

The Problem of Eschatological Paradigm
in Christian Moral Theory
While there is general agreement among Christian ethicists as to the broad
implications that the eschatological paradigm brings to Christian moral thought, an
investigation of contemporary Christian ethics reveals significant divergence in the way
application of the new paradigm appears to influence moral theory and to nuance ethical
method.1 For example, while a number of Christian ethicists heartedly assume that
eschatology provides a foundation for Christian ethics, some will suggest that it in no
way provides any actual or specific content for Christian ethics, while others will hold
that specific content is in fact furnished.2 For some ethicists, eschatology evokes only
broad ultimate Christian norms o f love and justice.3 Others find in eschatology “middle
axioms” that are neither too general nor too particular.4 Then there is the proleptic nature
of the eschatological vision, which is seen as affirming an ethic o f change over that o f
'For a survey o f the divergences of impact the eschatological paradigm appears to
have on moral theory and ethical method, see Johnstone, 47-85; Dahl, 374-379; Das, 6386; E. Clinton Gardner, “Eschatological Ethics," The Westminster Dictionary of Christian
Ethics (1986), 201-205; Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 7-25; and Ogletree, 175-206.
2Johnstone, 56.
3Das, 86.
4Ibid.
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order—thus placing strong emphasis on social and political action.1 The ties between
eschatology and social action are viewed either as indirect and subtle, manifold and
complex, making it necessary to draw analogies and to make inferences, or articulating
very concrete direct application to specific contemporary social issues.2 There is
divergence, too, over whom the moral implications of the eschatological vision speak to.
Are they meant exclusively for the Christian community? Is there any application for the
world at large? Or is relevance for the world found only as inferences/extensions from
the paradigm’s consequences within the Christian community?3
These divergences in the way the eschatological paradigm appears to impact
'Johnstone, 48, 56.
2Dahl, 375-376.
3Further divergences include models of eschatology reflecting revelation “from
above” or “from below," as well as those that link an immanent understanding of the
Kingdom with a progressive, evolutionary view of history and those that stress the
transcendent quality o f the Kingdom as above all history. For some, the reign o f God is
the primary paradigm for eschatological ethics (e.g., Mott, 82-106; idem, A Christian
Perspective on Political Thought [New York; Oxford University Press, 1993], 109-112.).
For others it is the dialectical dynamic of the horizon o f the future, or ontological priority
o f the future (e.g., Ogletree, 175-205; Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God:
idem, Ethics: Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics: idem, The Future o f God: Moltmann,
Theology o f Hope: idem, The Wav of Jesus Christ: idem, The Crucified God: and Yoder,
The Politics o f Jesus: idem, The Priestly Kingdom: idem, “Ethics and Eschatology," Ex
Auditu 6 [1990]: 119-128). The distinction needs to be noted here between futurists who
see the kingdom o f God as a purely future phenomenon, not yet manifested in the world
o f ongoing history, and dialectic eschatology, while still partly futurist, is represented by
those thinkers who claim that the future is emerging into the present (see discussion by
Ogletree, 177 passim). Those named here fall into the latter category and appear to press
the ontological priority of the future, the horizon of the future, or an open future, with its
moral implications for the present over the other nuances of the eschatological kingdom.
Finally, others work from the more generalized dialectical already/not yet perspective
(e.g., Schrage, 18-40; Ladd, 57-134).
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moral theory imply that the issue o f its methodological application still needs exploring.1
The question remains open as to precisely how the eschatological paradigm impacts (or is
adjusted by) the process of moral reflection in the task of doing Christian ethics.
Stephen Charles Mott2 and Thomas W. Ogletree3 are two contemporary Christian
ethicists who illustrate this critical question o f divergence implicit in the impact that the
eschatological paradigm is eliciting on moral theory. Sharing a common Wesleyan
tradition, both Mott and Ogletree are concerned about the gap between the disciplines of
biblical studies and Christian ethics. They both undertake the task o f bridge building.4
They both articulate the importance of community in moral reflection. And they both
consciously work within the new eschatological paradigm in order to accomplish their
'Johnstone, 55. The issue o f the impact o f eschatology on ethical method has
been an important one throughout the “re-interpretation of eschatology" process. This is
expressed in the works of major theologians/ethicists and doctoral dissertations, i.e.,
Amos N. Wilder, “Eschatology and Ethics in the Teaching of Jesus" (Ph.D. diss., Yale
University, 1933); Theron M. Chastain, “The Relations of Eschatology and Ethics in
Christianity” (Ph.D. diss., Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1939); Max Lynn
Stackhouse, “Eschatology and Ethical Method: A Structural Analysis of Contemporary
Christian Social Ethics in America with Primary Reference to Walter Rauschenbush and
Reinhold Niebuhr” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1965); and Norman Paul Jacob
Metzler, “The Ethics of the Kingdom” (Ph.D. diss., University of Munich [Germany],
1971).
2Mott has been Professor of Christian Social Ethics at Gordon-Conwell
Theological Seminary, is currently pastor of the Cochesett United Methodist Church in
West Bridgewater, Massachusetts, and a member of the General Board o f Church and
Society o f The United Methodist Church.
3Ogletree is Dean and Professor o f Theological Ethics at the Divinity School at
Yale University.
4AIlen Verhey, “On Using Scripture in Ethics,” The Reformed Journal 34, no. 10
(October 1984): 24.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

14
bridge-building task.1
The problem is that, even as Mott and Ogletree are building from a common
theological heritage, a common concern for bridging the disciplines of biblical studies
and Christian ethics, a common sense o f the importance o f community in moral
reflection, and a common eschatological paradigm, they produce different interpretations
with respect to moral theory.2 This can be observed particularly in the way that
methodological issues like the role of Scripture, the role o f Christian community, and the
nature o f social involvement factor in their eschatological ethics. Mott’s methodology
exhibits an evident topical approach to moral theory where Scripture is asked
contemporary ethical questions, and where he creates direct and specific application from
Scripture to contemporary social exigencies.3 Ogletree’s methodology, however,
articulates evocative deontological themes and brings into focus the reflective
imaginative Christian community as pragmatically authoritative in ethical methodology
and through which social issues become addressed.4
The eschatological paradigm has clearly impacted differently their moral theory.
'Ogletree is recognized as “standing in a developing tradition of reflection on the
importance of eschatology for ethics" (Peter Sedgwick, “Recent Christian Ethics,”
Scottish Journal o f Theology 41 [August 1988]: 398), and actively uses eschatological
themes in his Yale class lectures in “Basic Christian Ethics” as well as his published
works. Mott, too, has actively used eschatological themes in his Gordon-Conwell
graduate class lectures in “Christian Ethics and Social Change,” as well as in much o f his
published works.
2Verhey, 24-27.
3Ibid., 25.
4Ogletree, 175-205.
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So we are pressed with questions. Do they approach the question of eschatology and
ethics differently? Is the eschatological paradigm sufficient in itself, or does it require or
assume something broader as an ultimate statement o f an ethical system? Do Mott and
Ogletree perceive differently the ways in which issues significantly related to moral
theory (the role o f Scripture and community, and the nature of social involvement) find
expression within, are formed by, or influence the eschatological paradigm? Is the
eschatological paradigm generating mutually incompatible or rather complementary
attitudes towards these important issues in moral theory? Additionally, there is the
question o f foundations and presuppositions: Is the eschatological paradigm (or their
orientation to it) rooted in philosophy, philosophical ethics, moral agenda, biblical
theology, or the community (tradition)?

Purpose of the Study
This dissertation seeks to address the problem of the role eschatology plays as
paradigm in approaching Christian ethics (i.e., the impact that the eschatological
paradigm has on shaping moral theory). Specific within this context, the purpose o f this
dissertation is to explore and evaluate the methodological application o f eschatology as
paradigm for developing and/or articulating Christian moral theory. It focuses on the
interplay o f eschatology as a methodological tool and the ethical system that results from
it. It analyzes the eschatological paradigm’s presuppositional structure on the basis of
which some contemporary Christian ethicists have developed their moral theory. It
assesses the reasons for the variety of applications and conclusions the eschatological
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paradigm seems to bring as a proposed foundation for Christian moral theory.
The ultimate purpose is to determine whether the eschatological paradigm, in
spite o f the various ways in which it has been understood and applied, still holds promise
as the starting point for a comprehensive approach to moral theory. This study explores
whether the eschatological paradigm can produce a methodological integration.1 Is it
focused and coherent enough to produce an ethical system? Is it broad enough to include
the significant contemporary issues in Christian moral life? Since every paradigm has
limits, what does it leave out, or what does it not facilitate in moral theory?
‘Several dissertations have examined the links between eschatology and ethics in
the projects o f key theologians. Especially important are: Philip LeMasters, “The Import
of Eschatology in John Howard Yoder’s Critique o f Constantinianism” (Ph.D. diss., Duke
University, 1990); Lynn Evans Mitchell, Jr., “Two Ages and Two Communities: The
Implications o f an Eschatological Duality for Development o f a Social Ethic" (Ph.D.
diss., Rice University, 1979); Ramesh Paul Richard, "Hermeneutical Prolegomena to
Premillennial Social Ethics” (Th.D. diss., Dallas Theological Seminary, 1982); Douglas J.
Schuurman, “Creation, Eschaton, and Ethics: The Ethical Significance of the CreationEschaton Relation in the Thought of Emil Brunner and Jurgen Moltmann" (Ph.D. diss.,
University o f Chicago, 1988); Stackhouse, “Eschatology and Ethical Method: A
Structural Analysis o f Contemporary Christian Social Ethics in America with Primary
Reference to Walter Rauschenbusch and Reinhold Niebuhr”; and Robert Gary Watts,
“Realistic Hope: The Influence of Eschatology on the Social Ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr
and Jurgen Moltmann” (Ph.D. diss., McGill University, Montreal, 1981). Even though
there have been dissertations on various aspects o f the impact of eschatology for
Christian ethics, only Max Lynn Stackhouse’s “Eschatology and Ethical Method: A
Structural Analysis o f Contemporary Christian Social Ethics in America with Primary
Reference to Walter Rauschenbusch and Reinhold Niebuhr” is focused primarily on the
impact of the methodological application of eschatology on moral theory per se as
envisioned in this dissertation. This work was done nearly thirty years ago while the re
interpretation of eschatology was still in process (though nearing completion). While
laying an important base for this project, it does not relate to what has been taking place
since the 1970s, or how an eschatologically influenced moral theory and ethical
methodology have more fully developed or plateaued.
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Research Methodology and Limitations
To accomplish this objective, this dissertation approaches the problem of the
methodological application o f eschatology as paradigm in Christian moral theory through
a case study of Stephen Charles Mott and Thomas W. Ogletree. It describes and analyzes
their contrasting moral theories, and evaluates them by the results of their application of
the eschatological paradigm. That they come to the application o f the paradigm with
different presuppositions, methodology, and concerns in moral theory is assumed. The
purpose o f this study is to see how eschatology as paradigm either adjusts or mediates
these differences in resulting moral theory.
These two representative ethicists have been chosen because they explicitly
develop their moral theory in the context of the eschatological paradigm, and because
they are recognized as creative and original in their application o f the paradigm in ethical
method. Their projects are shaping the use of eschatology as paradigm in contemporary
Christian ethics.1 In addition, Mott and Ogletree are in open dialogue with other scholars
'Writing in the early 1970s, Carl Braaten noted the fact that “the eschatological
approach in theology today is represented by a small, but hopefully not insignificant,
minority o f professional theologians. That viewpoint broke into the headlines in the
middle sixties under the title o f ‘theology of hope.’ And like every fad it took its brief
turn at being advertised as the wave of the future. Now a decade later we know that the
magic spell of catchwords like 'hope’ and 'future’ has been broken. The cultural wave on
which the theology o f hope was allegedly riding has already crashed on the reefs of
‘future shock’ and Taw and order’" (Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 7). What Braaten
said about the eschatological approach in theology in the seventies could be said about
the eschatological approach in ethics as well, although with different periods of time in
view. The ethical implications o f eschatology have naturally followed the theological.
The heightened interest (a fad?) in eschatology and ethics of earlier years has likewise
plateaued or become more measured or assumed, but a minority o f professional ethicists,
including Mott and Ogletree, have consciously continued to develop the eschatological
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in their field, and show an interest in ethical issues beyond the borders of their particular
tradition.1
Since Mott and Ogletree clearly belong to the eschatological movement in
Christian ethics, it will be assumed that theirs is a paradigmatic approach to moral theory.
This assumption implies that the eschatological paradigm (as with any paradigm which
identifies, structures, and determines methodology) has become for Mott and Ogletree
their ethical method.2
With reference to methodological procedure in this dissertation, several angles
have been adopted from which to approach this study. First, there is a description of
Mott’s and Ogletree’s concept o f eschatology as paradigm for developing and/or
thematic in/for Christian ethics. Braaten himself is an example of someone (in the
seventies) doing serious ethical reflection with the implications of eschatology (basically
Americanizing the Pannenbergian view and being foundational or theoretical in
perspective). A decade later, Mott and Ogletree both demonstrate their interest in the
eschatological paradigm for Christian ethics, and in the process begin to reveal more
precisely the impact that the application o f eschatology as paradigm has on moral theory
and ethical method. That they have included the eschatological paradigm in their
projects, suggests they are consciously extending a discussion some may have assumed
was adequately cared for in another period o f time. This is significant for this
investigation of the methodological application o f eschatology as paradigm for
developing and/or articulating moral theory. The ability for the new paradigm to prevail
in Christian ethics is proportional to the adequacy of its practical explication in terms of
moral theory.
'Numerous books, articles, and reviews by (on) Mott and Ogletree are available as
primary resources for this dissertation. See selected bibliography for Mott and Ogletree.
At this point, no in-depth treatment o f the methodological application of eschatology as
paradigm for the development and/or articulation o f moral theory exists for either Mott or
Ogletree.
2See above, p. 7, for discussion o f how paradigms, according to Kiing and Tracy,
work methodologically (e.g., how they inform methods and the principles o f solution).
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articulating Christian moral theory, as well as how they go on to apply the paradigm
methodologically in their projects. This description also includes how Mott and Ogletree
interplay the ethical nuances of the three components o f the paradigm (reign o f God,
already-not yet, horizon o f the future), and which component becomes for them the basic
expression for the paradigm itself.
Second, there is analysis of the implications o f Mott’s and Ogletree’s application
o f the paradigm by considering their use of Scripture and Christian community, as well as
the nature that social involvement assumes in their moral theory. This is done for three
reasons:
I.

Scripture and the Christian community are used most widely as sources in

Christian ethics (i.e., they focus the question o f authority in ethical method),1while the
nature of social involvement has become a defining consequence or application o f ethical
method/systems (i.e., a contemporary indicator o f the validity and relevance of an ethical
system).2
'Sources o f authority for traditional Christian ethical foundations include
Scripture, Christian community (church), conscience, and personal experience. Only the
first two are applicable for the purpose of this study. See Robert McAfee Brown’s
chapter “Authority: The Achilles’ Heel of Protestantism" in his The Spirit o f
Protestantism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 171-185; John Brunt and
Gerald Winslow, “The Bible’s Role in Christian Ethics,” Andrews University Seminary
Studies 20 (Spring 1982): 3-21; Miroslav M. Kis>, “The Word of God in Christian Ethics,"
Journal o f the Adventist Theological Society 4. no. 2 (1993): 199-20; idem, “Biblical
Interpretation and Moral Authority,” Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 6, no. 2
(1995): 52-62; James M. Gustafson, “The Place of Scripture in Christian Ethics: A
Methodological Study," Interpretation 24, no. 4 (October 1970): 430-455.
2The nature o f social involvement has been selected as a defining consequence of
ethical method because it has been an integral part o f the twentieth Century “re-
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2.

There has been a “crisis o f authority” in Christian ethics with regard to the

role that Scripture and community play in developing and/or articulating moral theory.1
Running parallel to this “crisis o f authority” has been a “crisis of relevance” with respect
to the nature o f Christian social involvement. Marxism has consistently pressed the
validity of Christian moral theory on this one issue.2 Eschatology as paradigm in
Christian moral theory appears to answer both these crises in Christian ethics. Thus the
issues o f Scripture, community, and social involvement are significant in determining the
soundness o f eschatology as paradigm for Christian moral reflection.3
3. Various approaches exist for establishing the relationship of Scripture4 or the
interpretation o f eschatology” process/dialogue, and remains a significant contemporary
issue o f "eschatopraxis” in Christian ethics (see Johnstone, 47-85; Dahl, 375; Das, 63-86).
'Brown, 171-185; and Brunt and Winslow, 3-21.
2See Geoffrey W. Bromiley, “Eschatology: The Meaning of the End,” in God and
Culture: Essavs in Honor of Carl F. H. Henrv. ed. D. A. Carson and John D. Woodbridge
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1993), 73; Hans Schwarz,
"Eschatology," in Christian Dogmatics, ed. Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 545 passim; Helmut Thielicke, The Evangelical
Faith (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1982), 3:379 passim; Herbert
Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).
3Issues o f Scripture, Christian community, and the nature of social involvement
are significant components o f Christian ethical method. They should also play significant
roles as components of a Christian eschatological paradigm’s influence on ethical
method.
“Typologies for Scripture’s role in Christian ethics include: providing revealed
morality (where Scripture is absolute authority and biblical ethics equals Christian
ethics); a witness about God or His will (where Scripture becomes the Word o f God via
personal encounter through witness); a source of moral images (where one is confronted
with relative impressions of moral facts and values); a shaper of moral identity (where the
character o f the moral actor is shaped, and the Christian mind is formed for moral
decision making); a resource for normative reflection (where the Bible as the Word of
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believing community1to Christian ethics. Various viewpoints exist as well for defining
the appropriate nature of Christian social involvement.2 These very divergences provide
God is ultimate authority through which norms are provided either as specific rules or as
general principles or presuppositions); etc. See Walter C. Kaiser, “The Use o f the Bible
in Establishing Ethical Norms,” in his Toward Old Testament Ethics (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan Publishing House, 1983), 39-56; Kis, “The Word o f God in Christian Ethics,”
199-208 and “Biblical Interpretation and Moral Authority,” 52-62; Gustafson, 430-455;
Brunt and Winslow, 3-21; David K. Clark and Robert V. Rakestraw, eds., “The Use of
the Bible in Ethical Judgments,” in Readings in Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids: Baker
Books, 1994), 179-182; John Frame, “The Word of God and Christian Ethics,” in
Readings in Christian Ethics, ed. David K. Clark and Robert V. Rakestraw (Grand
Rapids: Baker Books, 1994), 183-184; and Richard N. Longenecker, New Testament
Social Ethics for Today (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company,
1984), 1-9.
'The role that the Christian community plays in moral formation has been
seriously explored ever since the Reformers subordinated both the individual’s
conscience and ecclesial authority to Scripture. The emergence o f approaches to
Scripture that divest it of its authority has elicited increasing emphasis on the importance
o f the Christian community as the proper context for ethical decision. Various
perspectives have been articulated including: (1) Christian ethics is community ethics
(where Scripture shapes the perspectives, dispositions, and intentions of the faith
community as the moral reference point and the ongoing socializing agent for the moral
life; here ethics is always in process in the context of community, and while the Bible is
not ruled out in the decision making process, it is not the sole source of norms); and (2)
the reflective imaginative Christian community as pragmatically authoritative in ethical
methodology (where deontological themes from Scripture have provisional and qualified
status while the community articulates them anew with full sensitivity to the concrete
understandings and meanings at play within the community). See Birch and Rasmussen,
17-34; and Ogletree, 182-205.
2The nature of Christian social involvement in Christian ethics runs the gamut
from total non-involvement to that o f revolution. For some, Christian ethics is purely
personal ethics, and Christian involvement in the world is primarily evangelistic. For
others, Christian ethics assumes social activism. Some find direct application from the
moral themes o f Scripture to contemporary social exigencies in the world at large, while
others find Christian ethics speaking to the world only by analogy to developments
within the early Christian communities themselves. For a discussion of the issues see
Carl F. H. Henry, The Uneasy Conscience o f Modem Fundamentalism (Grand Rapids:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1947).
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a rich context for exploring the impact that eschatology as paradigm has on the
development o f Christian moral theory. They enable one to determine more specifically
how the eschatological paradigm influences (or is influenced by) presuppositions
regarding Scripture, community, and social involvement.
For these reasons, these three significant issues evident within contemporary
Christian moral dialogue are excellent tools for this inquiry and, accordingly, become for
this study’s analysis “principles o f verification." While they are not the only principles
current in the developments within Christian ethical method,1they are basic, significant,
and recurring concerns. Because o f their significance within contemporary Christian
moral dialogue, they provide the necessary limitations this study must delineate.
The third angle in this methodological procedure is evaluation. Since evaluation
needs criteria in order to assess strengths and weaknesses, the evaluation o f Mott’s and
Ogletree’s application of eschatology as paradigm includes the following points of
reference:
1.

There is the “level” o f moral reflection and application on which eschatology

as paradigm operates (or is perceived to operate) in their projects (i.e., the macro, meso,
'Other methodological principles in contemporary Christian ethics include the
nature o f man, christology, the integration of or correspondence with traditional
philosophical ethical categories (deontology, teleology, perfectionist [the implications of
self in action]), the role o f the sciences (psychology, sociology, anthropology), etc. This
study will be limited to the principles of the role of Scripture, the role o f Christian
community, and the nature o f social involvement because they are basic to both Christian
ethics in general, and to Mott and Ogletree’s projects in particular.
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or micro level).1 The question o f “level" enables one to clarify how concretely the
paradigm (or its components) is able to:
a. speak to contemporary ethical exigencies
b. nuance Mott’s and Ogletree’s use of Scripture and community, and the
nature that social involvement assumes in their projects, and
c. influence the interplay of the ethical nuances o f the paradigm’s
components (or predilection of one component as the basic expression for the
paradigm itself).
2.

There are the implications of the data from this analysis of the role Scripture,

community, and social involvement play in the application o f eschatology as paradigm in
their projects. The “principles o f verification" allow evaluation of:
a. how effectively eschatology as paradigm answers the crisis of “authority"
and “relevance" in Christian ethics, and
b. whether the paradigm influences, or is influenced by, presuppositions
regarding Scripture, community, and social involvement. They enable one to ask
'Kiing and Tracy suggests that paradigms (models) can serve on a macro, meso, or
micro level, bringing solutions to broad global theological or philosophical issues,
problems in intermediate areas, as well as detailed specific situations (Kiing and Tracy, 9,
10). Ethicists distinguish between four ingredients when structuring an ethic, i.e.,
theological or philosophical bases, underlying principles that can be applied to various
areas o f activity, directive moral rules that apply to various areas o f life, and particular
concrete cases (see, Arthur F. Holmes, Ethics: Approaching Moral Decisions [Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1984], 50-51). This study is suggesting here that, in the
order given, there can be correspondence between an eschatological paradigm operating
on the macro, meso, or micro levels, and the bases, underlying principles, and area rules it
informs respectively, in structuring an eschatological ethic.
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the question of foundations and presuppositions: Is the eschatological paradigm
(or one’s orientation to it) rooted in philosophy, philosophical ethics, moral
agenda, biblical theology, or the community (tradition)?
3.

There is the consistency with which the “principles of verification,” the

paradigm’s “level" o f operation, and the ethical nuances o f the paradigm’s components
are used, interrelated, and nuanced in methodological application and in its resulting
contemporary moral theory.
The above outlined methodology for accomplishing the objectives o f this study
thus proposes the presence o f a complex set o f interacting variables in the application of
the eschatological paradigm toward Christian moral theory. A diagrammatic overview of
these interacting variables is provided in figure 1. Here is shown the subtle interplay that
this study suggests exists between the eschatological paradigm and each o f the areas
impacting the question of its application to moral theory, i.e., principles o f verification,
levels o f reflection, components in relation to the primary model o f the Kingdom of God,
etc. It also shows the important role that the biblical materials should play in the equation
in terms o f (1) bringing shape to the reality o f the Kingdom of God as the primary model
for the eschatological paradigm, (2) providing the key theological images (components)
that give rise to the moral implications o f the Kingdom of God, and thus the
eschatological paradigm, (3) shaping one’s presuppositions regarding the principles of
verification, and (4) how the biblical materials operate at all three levels o f ethical and
paradigm reflection.
This study is concerned primarily with the methodological application of
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eschatology as paradigm for the development and/or expression of Christian moral
theory, and not with ethical methodology per se. Mott’s and Ogletree’s projects are
analyzed and evaluated only as they provide clear cases that illustrate the issues
concerning eschatology as paradigm which this study explores. While this study
discusses the role and practical function of Scripture and the Christian community as well
as the nature o f social involvement within the eschatological paradigm, it does not deal
with issues of inspiration and revelation, nor the question o f the authority o f Scripture per
se. Nor is this study concerned with ecclesiology or specific ethical issues o f social
involvement.

Definitions
The proposed interacting variables in the application o f eschatology to moral
theory require an understanding o f their respective meaning in the equation. For this
reason, the following terms are defined as used in this study. They are listed
alphabetically.
Area Rules: Moral rules that apply to various areas of life; one o f the ingredients
in the structure o f ethical theory.
Bases: The most fundamental level of philosophical or theological
presuppositions which outline the basis for structure in ethical theory; one o f the
ingredients in the structure o f ethical theory.
Components: The three theological images which the Kingdom o f God (primary
model), together with its other supporting models, project within the eschatological
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paradigm, i.e., already/not yet, reign o f God, horizon o f the future. They are conceptually
interwoven and complementary. They provide a framework that, at least in theory, can
embrace the range o f possible conceptions of the Kingdom o f God. Like a three-stranded
cord, they form a comprehensive eschatological paradigm for contemporary Christian
ethics.
Eschatological-Oriented Ethics: An ethics that takes shape under the themes and
presuppositions o f eschatology, where eschatology has priority and determines the
contours and nature o f ethics.
Eschatological Paradigm: The overall integrating theme generated by the New
Testament eschatological Kingdom of God and its three components, already/not yet,
reign o f God, and horizon o f the future.
Eschatology sans Ethics: An eschatology that no longer has sufficient form or
content to evoke sustained, meaningful ethical reflection or does not transparently
explicate implications for moral life.
Ethical-Oriented Eschatology: An eschatology that takes shape because o f the
presuppositions, agendas, and needs of ethics, where ethics has priority over eschatology
and uses eschatology for its purposes.
Ethical Structure: Structuring ethical theory includes four ingredients or levels of
moral reasoning, i.e., cases, area rules, principles, and bases.
Ethics sans Eschatology: Christian ethical systems that either surrender the vital
connection between ethics and biblical eschatology, or whose foundations eclipse
eschatology as a substantial resource.
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Kingdom of God: The primary biblical model linking eschatology as paradigm
and the array of biblical models that elucidate it.
Levels o f Paradigm Operation: The conceptual levels on which paradigms can
operate, i.e., macro, meso, micro.
Macro Level: The conceptual level of paradigm operation which brings solutions
to broad, global, theological and philosophical issues.
Meso Level: The conceptual level of paradigm operation which brings solutions
to problems in intermediate areas o f theological and philosophical concerns.
Micro Level: The conceptual level of paradigm operation which brings solutions
to detailed specific situations or areas.
Model: A sustained and systematic metaphor or organizing image which gives a
particular emphasis and which enables one to notice and interpret certain aspects of some
reality not fully understood. Well-constructed models are simple and clear enough to be
grasped more or less intuitively; yet they have a logical or, better, an analogical relation
to some larger reality. The emphasis here is towards “disclosure” rather than “picturing,”
toward “mental models” o f systems rather than “scale models” or “working models.”
Paradigm: A way o f looking at something, an interpretive model that informs
methods and principles o f solution. Paradigms provide an interpretive framework, a basic
metaphorical strategy in which a given discipline does its work. While models and
paradigms together share the essential quality of being “ways o f looking at things,” a
paradigm encompasses and interprets a larger, more comprehensive conceptual picture
and uses models to explicate aspects of that larger picture or envision that larger picture
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as a whole. Paradigms set limits on the range of acceptable models. Paradigms are more
comprehensive than models. While all paradigms are models, not all models are
paradigms.
Paradigm Role and Function: Paradigms can be viewed from two broad
perspectives: (1) as facilitating specific moral principles which then need to be translated
and applied towards new situations, or (2) as facilitating inner moral formation which
shapes people ethically. The first is primarily conceptual while the second is
motivational.
Primary Model: Models that are clearly primary in terms of structural
relationships within a given range o f images and which have the ability to both engender
and organize a network o f models, assemble subordinate images together, and scatter
concepts on a higher level. Paradigms can rise or fall or shift according to primary
models and the subordinate models which support and enrich them. For New Testament
eschatology, the Kingdom o f God is the primary model linking eschatology as a
paradigm and the array o f models that would elucidate it.
Principles: The most inclusive and ultimate ethical concepts which are universal
and exceptionless, and which can never give way to something more inclusive or
expedient; one o f the ingredients in the structure of ethical theory.
Principles of Verification: This study’s tools for evaluating how effectively the
eschatological paradigm answers the crisis of authority and relevance in Christian ethics
during this century, and the presuppositions on which the eschatological paradigm is
framed by given ethicists. These principles of verification include the role of Scripture,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30
the role o f community, and the nature of social involvement.

Outline of the Study
In the context o f the methodological and procedural steps delineated above, it is
important for this study to present, first, an understanding o f the main theological
perspectives and broad ethical implications of the twentieth-century re-interpreted
eschatology. Thus, chapter 2 explores the historical-philosophical background to the
current eschatological paradigm in Christian ethics. It also identifies and explicates the
broad ethical nuances o f the paradigm’s components. Its purpose is the discovery of
basic perspectives and trends in the interpretation and application o f eschatology as
paradigm for developing and/or expressing moral theory in Christian ethics that have
crystallized through the 1970s. From this vantage point one is able to understand what
Mott and Ogletree are doing as participants in the developing tradition of the
eschatological movement in Christian ethics. The chapter looks to the 1970s for the basic
crystallized eschatological paradigm, and to the 1980s and 1990s for clearer
methodological application of the paradigm in moral theory.
Chapters 3 and 4, then, describe and analyze the impact that the eschatological
paradigm has had (is having) on the projects of Mott and Ogletree. These chapters focus
particularly on how the paradigm is working in terms of their use o f Scripture,
community, and social involvement. They examine how Mott and Ogletree nuance the
three ethically evocative components of the eschatological paradigm. They thus analyze
the theoretical interpretation o f the role and function of eschatology in their respective
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approaches to moral theory.1
Chapter 5 consists of a comparison, evaluation, and critique of Mott’s and
Ogletree’s projects. It explores the basic structures and components o f their
interpretation in order to explicate the paradigmatic role that eschatology plays when
applied to Christian moral theory.

It also evaluates the methodological implications

which demonstrate that “this is what happens if you take the eschatological paradigm and
apply it this way or that way.” Finally, chapter 5 concludes with implications and brief
suggestions arising from this study for the application o f the eschatological paradigm in
Christian moral theory.
'To accomplish this, this study needs to deal with the salient aspects of Mott and
Ogletree’s eschatology; the relationship of the eschatological paradigm to their ethical
method as a whole; their presuppositional approach to and use of Scripture and how this
integrates into or is adjusted by the eschatological paradigm; the relationship they
perceive between eschatology and ecclesiology; and the practical/theoretical shape their
project brings to personal and social ethics, e.g., how implications from their
methodology come into play in representative contemporary ethical situations—thus
validating, calling into question, or elucidating where the eschatological paradigm
concretely leads.
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CHAPTER 2

TWENTIETH-CENTURY RE-INTERPRETATION OF ESCHATOLOGY
AS PARADIGM FOR CHRISTIAN ETHICS

Understanding the application of eschatology as paradigm for Christian ethics
begins first with the question o f “what" —What eschatology is in view? Thus, the
purpose o f this chapter is to set forth the principal theological and philosophical
characteristics—insofar as they illumine the ethical perspectives—o f twentieth-century re
interpreted eschatology. This outline of the principal characteristics of re-interpreted
eschatology includes a summary and critical survey of the development of eschatology as
a new paradigm for Christian ethics in twentieth-century theology. It also includes an
evaluative description o f the paradigm’s implications for Christian moral theory as it
crystallized through the 1970s. Special attention is paid as well to: (1) the perceived
moral nuances o f the paradigm’s components; (2) the theoretical level on which the
paradigm appears to operate; and (3) the general preliminary implications with respect to
the “principles of verification." This chapter’s review of the principal characteristics and
ethical perspectives o f twentieth-century re-interpreted eschatology enables one to
analyze and evaluate Mott’s and Ogletree’s application of the paradigm as participants in
the eschatological movement in Christian ethics.

32

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

33
It should be noted that the historical survey in this chapter is purposely brief and
somewhat generalizing in scope. Nevertheless, it provides an accurate picture of the
broad issues and trends apparent in the eschatology/ethics relation throughout Christian
history leading up to the 1970s. Since the scope o f this study does not lend itself to
detailed analysis through each period, or for each theologian named, the reader is
encouraged to refer to the bibliographic material cited for the fuller picture.

Eschatology and Ethics Before the
Twentieth Century
Eschatology has experienced varying degrees of theological interest and relevance
during the history o f Christianity. Unlike other Christian doctrines that became defined
and refined through theological controversy because they were assumed as being
conspicuously central to Christian faith and experience, major debates over eschatology
were few in number.1 There has never been a period of Church history in which
'Erickson, 1149-50. McKim, however, writes that “eschatological controversies
have been numerous and protracted in the history o f Christianity" and that “some church
groups have come into existence solely because o f their own eschatological
understanding and their time table o f specific future events" (Donald K. McKim,
Theological Turning Points: Major Issues in Christian Thought [Atlanta: John Knox
Press, 1988], 152). What is being suggested here is not the frequency or protraction of
eschatological controversies, but the overall theological weight and relevance they have
carried in comparison to the other major issues which the Church has debated through the
centuries (e.g., the Trinity, Christology, Ecclesiology, the nature o f man, Soteriology,
sources o f authority [Scripture & Tradition], and the sacraments & the nature o f the
Lord’s supper). Pelikan suggests that, during the post-apostolic era, differing
eschatological views, such as millenarianism, were seen as neither orthodox nor heretical,
but permissible opinions among others within the range o f permissible opinions (Jaroslav
Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition [100-600]. vol. 1 The Christian
Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine [Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1971], 125, 129).
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eschatology was “the center" of Christian thought.1 The broad periods that can be
distinguished in the history of eschatological thought yield modest, generalized
developments at best.2 Only since the nineteenth century has eschatology received the
kind o f attention that denotes its relevance as a principal, formative thematic in Christian
theology and ethics.
It is understandable then, that one looks in vain for a solid, sustained discussion of
the relationship between eschatology and ethics before the twentieth century.3 The
'L. Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing,
1972), 662.
2This statement should not depreciate, however, the importance of what is referred
to here as “modest generalized developments" in eschatological thought. Developments
in eschatological thought dovetailed significantly with other spiritual and moral issues
within Christian history. McKim outlines developments in eschatological thought in four
broad periods: eschatology in the New Testament, early eschatology, Reformation
eschatology, and later or modem developments. For McKim, Augustine becomes the
focal point around which pre- and post-developments in early eschatological thought are
measured. Luther and Calvin become key for measuring developments within
Reformation eschatology (McKim, 151-165).
3A n exception, however, may be found in Augustine’s City of God fNPNF 2:1511), and in a lesser degree Calvin’s Institutes (L C £ 20:3.6-7). Holwerda suggests that
Calvin’s eschatological vision is articulated more clearly and forcefully in the appropriate
Biblical commentaries than it is in his Institutes, and that the positions developed in the
Institutes need the light of the commentaries to be fully appreciated. Together, they
articulate a complementary “pull view” of history to that of his “push view” (i.e., the
theological taproot o f the sovereignty of God and His predetermining will). See David E.
Holwerda, “Eschatology and History: A Look at Calvin’s Eschatological Vision,” in
Readings in C alvin’s Theology, ed. Donald K. McKim (Grand Rapids: Baker Book
House, 1984), 340. Likewise, Luther’s recurring thematic o f “two kingdoms” articulates
a consistent eschatological vision with clearly defined moral implications. See Luther’s
introductory argument to his Lectures on Galatians. LW 26:4-12; idem, Temporal
Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed. LW 45:81-129: idem, The Sermon on
the Mount. 21:3-294; idem. LW 13:194-195; idem, LW 42:38: idem. LW 45:91-93:
idem, LW 46:69-99; and Paul Althaus, The Ethics of Martin Luther (Philadelphia:
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traditional pattern has been to view eschatology as dealing with the “last things” of
history and an other-worldly future, and to view ethics as dealing with moral problems of
life in a this-worldly present. Their organic tie has been either overlooked or ignored.
This has produced, in effect, an “eschatology sans ethics” and an “ethics sans
eschatology.” The term “eschatology sans ethics” is used here to designate an
eschatology that no longer has sufficient form or content to evoke sustained, meaningful
ethical reflection, or does not transparently explicate implications for moral life.1 The
term “ethics sans eschatology” is used to refer to Christian ethical systems that either
surrender the vital connection between ethics and biblical eschatology, or whose
foundations eclipse eschatology as a substantial resource.2 Both concepts are broad
paradigms used here to display trends in the eschatology and ethics dialogue throughout
Fortress Press, 1972), 43-82. See also, Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 106.
‘Eschatology is never really free of ethics, however. Eschatology as a “world
view" always generates an ethic to go along with it (see Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics.
20; Steven Charles Mott, “The Use of the Bible in Social Ethics II: The Use o f the New
Testament: Part II, Objections to the Enterprise,” Transformation [July/September 1984]:
20-21; and Alan Geyer, “Toward an Ecumenical Political Ethics: A Marginal American
View," in Perspectives on Political Ethics, ed. Koson Srisang [Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press, 1983], 135). A survey o f the transformations that have
taken place within eschatological thought through the history of the Christian church
shows ample evidence that Christian ethics has always been influenced or changed
accordingly, and that, more by default than by intent.
2It should be noted here that many ethicists have a functional eschatological vision
even if they do not call it by that name—even if it is not a biblical eschatological vision.
To the degree that they attempt to construct a model of “the good" based on the
fragmentary ethical possibilities in history or attempt to find a trans-historical point of
reference from which judgments of good and evil in history can be made, they are being
influenced by a larger ethical view of reality that can be loosely termed eschatological
(Stackhouse, 282).
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Christian history. Eschatology is never really free o f ethics. Nor is ethics really ever free
o f an eschatology.
The biblical witness concerning Christian eschatology exhibits an essential bi
polarity. The End has come! The End has not come!1 In other words, eschatology is
fulfilled and yet it is not fulfilled. This bi-polarity is articulated primarily through the
biblical imagery o f the “kingdom of God” which is both present and future in the person
and work o f Jesus Christ,2 and whose dimensions of present and future create a tension
between the “already” and the “not yet.” Thus, the New Testament Christian community
felt that it lived in a crucial “meanwhile,” or “interim period." This vivid eschatology
inevitably influenced Christian ethical thought and conduct.3
The early Christian Church continued to express this eschatology in its literature4
'1 Pet 1:3-5,20; Acts 3:20-21; Matt 12:28; Mark 14:62; 1 Cor 1:4-9; Heb 6:4, 5;
10:36-39; 9:28; Gal 1:4; etc. William Manson, “Eschatology in the New Testament,” in
Eschatology . Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional Papers No. 2 (London: Oliver and
Boyd, 1957), 7.
2Mark 1:15; Matt 6:10; 12:28; Luke 19:11; etc.
3Acts 2:14-47; 4:32-37; 1 Pet 1:3-21; Titus 2:11-14; Col 3:1-4:6; Rom 13:11-14;
1 Thess 3:11-4:12; etc. See also, Waldo Beach and H. Richard Niebuhr, Christian Ethics:
Sources o f the Living Tradition (New York: Ronald Press, 1955), 50.
4Apocalyptic imagery and eschatological motivation are expressed in the popular
literature o f the early Christian centuries: Hennas, The Shepherd “Commandments” 2
(ANF. 2:20); idem. “Similitudes” 7-10 (ANF. 2:38-55); Epistle of Barnabas 15 (ANF.
1:146); Trenaeus Against Heresies 2.22.2.5.25-36 (ANF. 1:390,553-567); Clement
Epistle to the Corinthians 23-30 (ANF. 1:11-13); Polvcarp Epistle to the Philippians 2
(ANF. 1:33): Justin Martyr Dialogue With Trvpho 52. 110 (ANF. 1:221,253,254);
Tertullian A gainst Marcion 4.39 (ANF. 3:414-417).
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and creeds.1 Early Christian thought and conduct continued to be carried on in this
awareness o f the power which had changed, was changing, and would change the worldorder.2
While this eschatological fervor and corresponding moral seriousness were not

'The “Apostles’ Creed," “Nicene Creed,” and “Creed o f Chalcedon" each affirm
the reality o f Christ’s second advent, moral reckoning, and the life of the world to come.
“And he shall come again with glory to judge both the quick and the dead: whose
kingdom shall have no e n d . . . and we look for the resurrection of the dead; and the life
o f the world to come” (Philip Schaff, The Creeds o f Christendom [New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1919], 28). The “rule of faith" (the oldest term used by the ante-Nicene fathers,
Irenaeus, Tertullian, etc.) was a vibrant dynamic in early Christian moral thought and
action. See Irenaeus Against Heresies 1.10.1-3 fANF. 1:330-332); Tertullian Against
Heretics 13,14,20-22 fANF. 3:249-250, 252-253); Ignatius To the Magnesians 11 fANF.
1:63-64). The creeds continued to speak o f the coming o f Christ in both the past and
future tense and served to counterbalance any oversimplified resolution o f the already/not
yet in either direction (Pelikan, 127). The Christian ordinances of baptism and the Lord’s
supper likewise affirmed eschatological perspectives (Pelikan, 126-127; W. H. Lampe,
“Early Patristic Eschatology," in Eschatology. Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional
Papers No. 2 [London: Oliver and Boyd, 1957], 21-23).
2The other-worldly “world view” o f early Christian eschatology produced a high
indifference to present-worldly values and external structures and forged the Church’s
ethical spirit of a self-conscious community and fellowship o f believers, over against the
world. Orientation to a positive goal of divine consummation, as expressed in the return
o f Jesus and the promised future of the re-created earth, dispelled the pessimistic fatalism
and excessive hedonism that affected much of the pagan world. A higher estimation of
the bodily life and its significance, as expressed in the hope o f the resurrection, ran
counter to both excessive asceticism and bodily abuse. Resurrection hope gave dignity
and moral worth to temporal behavior—deeds done in time and history and body.
Awareness of the approaching judgment curbed to some degree both materialistic
indulgence on the one hand and irresponsible cruelty on the other. The promise o f eternal
life prevented shortsighted concentration on the achievements, pleasures, and rewards of
this life. It cast a new light on death—which included a readiness for martyrdom rather
than moral or spiritual compromise. See, Beach and Niebuhr, 47, 50; Bromiley, 69-71.
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sustained throughout the history o f the Christian Church,1their broad themes and
implications for ethics were nevertheless picked up and nuanced by several of the
Church’s prominent thinkers and movements. For example, Augustine’s ethical theory
was set within the eschatological worldview and philosophy o f history that he spells out
in his influential Citv o f God.2 Luther’s intense eschatological consciousness was a
rediscovery o f the tension that had been lost between our present state and our hope for
the future along with the implications that that tension had for personal and social ethics.3
Puritan eschatological emphasis, which was rooted in a historicist hermeneutic of Daniel
and Revelation, taught that hope was an essential element in Christian faith which, in

'Pelikan puts it succinctly when he writes, “What the texts do suggest is a shift
within the polarity o f already/not yet and a great variety of solutions to the exegetical and
theological difficulties caused by such a shift. These included the reinterpretation of
biblical passages that had carried an eschatological connotation, the reorientation of
ethical imperatives toward a more complex description o f the life of faith and love within
the forms of the present world, and the reconsideration and eventual rejection of certain
types o f apocalyptic expectation that could claim ancient sanction but were no longer
suited to the new stage in the development o f Christian eschatology. Here too, it is
important to see the elements o f continuity as well as the elements of change" (Pelikan,
124, emphasis supplied; see also, Beach and Niebuhr, 50-51).
2Augustine Citv o f God. 4.1-34: 12.5-8; 14.1-4, 13,28; 19.12-17; 20.7-9. See
Beach and Niebuhr, 110.
3"The world runs and hastens so diligently to its end that it often occurs to me
forcibly that the last day will break before we can completely turn the Holy Scriptures
into German” (Martin Luther to Melanchton, on June 2, 1530, Briefe. 5.35, as cited in T.
F. Torrance, “The Eschatology o f Faith: Martin Luther," in Kingdom and Church: A
Study in the Theology o f the Reformation [Fair Lawn, NJ: Essential Books, 1956], 20).
See Luther’s introduction to his Lectures on Galatians. LW 28:4-12; idem, LW 49:216;
idem, LW 50:220, 245; V. Norskov Olsen, “The Christian Hope in the Reformation of
the Sixteenth Century," in The Advent Hope in Scripture and History, ed. V. Norskov
Olsen (Washington, DC: Review and Herald Publishing Association, 1987), 115-118;
Schwarz, 505; and Torrance, 7-72.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39
turn, encouraged the believer along the path o f sanctification.1 And the hermeneutic of
nineteenth-century Millerite premillenialism (historicist) and Dispensational
premillenialism (futurist) again resisted the dismissal of biblical eschatology and its
import for ethics by reviving the New Testament tension of living between the now/not
yet.2

Eschatology Sans Ethics
A reversal of eschatology and ethics began with the deep epochal shift in the
relation between the church and the world for which Constantine has become symbol.3
The vivid eschatology and corresponding moral seriousness of the early Church had
already become blurred as the influence from Hellenistic philosophies and thought
categories began structuring the focus and language of Christian theology.4 With
Constantine, not only is there a new meaning for the word “Christian,” but a radically new
'See Bryan W. Ball, “Eschatological Hope in Puritan England,” in The Advent
Hope in Scripture and History, ed. V. Norskov Olsen (Washington, DC: Review and
Herald Publishing Association, 1987), 144,146; Peter Toon, Puritans. The Millennium
and the Future o f Israel: Puritan Eschatology 1600 to 1660 (London: James Clarke & Co.,
1970), 23-41.
2The precision o f Millerite hermeneutics, while producing a significant and
specific moral response, effectively made it difficult for people to live normal lives. And
while Dispensational hermeneutics tended to fortify slipping behavioral standards, its
theoretical possibilities produced an ambiguity that did not initially produce a new clearly
articulated Christian lifestyle. See Timothy P. Weber, Living in the Shadow o f the
Second Coming: American Premillennialism 1875-1982 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan,
1983), 43,46, 51,48; Henry, Christian Personal Ethics. 550.
3Yoder. The Priestly Kingdom. 135-137.
4Schwarz, 503; Bromiley, 77.
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eschatology, and a new ethics as well.1 The distinction between the Church and the
Kingdom o f God now blurs, because the “millennium” runs its course with secular events,
and cultural change involves eschatological change.2 Distortions and reconstructions of
eschatology inevitably followed,3 until by the sixteenth century only some pietistic and
Radical Reformation circles continued to maintain the vivid eschatological hope of
Scripture.4 The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries brought a general spiritualizing of
‘Yoder. The Priestly Kingdom. 135-137.
2A virtual post-millennial understanding o f Christ’s reign elicited a Christian
culturalization o f every sphere of life and society. The assumed gradual progress o f the
Kingdom/Church on earth pushed thought o f the final consummation and visible return of
Jesus into a hazy background (Bromiley, 77-78; Schwarz, 504; Yoder, The Priestly
Kingdom. 137-139).
3Apocalyptic imagery became useful as threats of judgment to prod Christians to
repent and lead lives devoted to good. Through the sacrament of penance, and an
increasingly elaborated system of purgatory, the cosmic dimension of eschatology
receded and an existential component gained. Salvation as the end of history was
replaced by salvation at the end o f individual history. Sharing this attitude, mysticism
urged union with the divine through immediate communion. This eschatological
individualism met a forceful challenge in Reformation realism which brought focus again
to the hope of the “last day" when Jesus would come. A century later, however, this
revived intense hope was again diminished or abandoned with emphasis returning
to the personal certitude of salvation. See, Bromiley, 77-79; Richard K. Emmerson, “The
Advent Hope in the Middle Ages,” in The Advent Hope in Scripture and History, ed. V.
Norskov Olsen (Washington, DC: Review and Herald Publishing Association, 1987),
106-110; Schwarz, 504-506; Olsen, 115-131.
“Friedmann writes that, “There was simply no room left for a meaningful
eschatology within the late Lutheran and post-Lutheran theology. The only place such
ideas were kept alive and had a legitimate function was the left way of the Reformation,
or, as we all now call it, the Radical Reformation; Anabaptism and related movements”
(Robert Friedmann, The Theology o f Anabaptism (Scottdale, PA: 1973), 102; see also,
Schwarz, 506.
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eschatology which either eliminated it as a relic o f a past world view1or made it to
provide a frame for sociopolitical transformation o f the world.2
Left stripped o f its metaphysical aspect, liberal and speculative eschatology no
longer engendered a meaningful ethic. Eschatology was seen as non-essential to the
biblical structure o f theology and ethics.3 This neutralization of eschatology through the
‘Schleiermacher brought eschatology to a new low point by not ascribing to it the
same importance or “value” as his discussion of other dogmatic themes which he
considered relevant for the human consciousness (Friedrich Scleiermacher, The Christian
Faith [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1948], 703-707). Kant posited the eschaton as the
organization o f the human race according to the laws of virtue (Immanuel Kant, The
Critique o f Judgment [New York: Hafiier Press. 1951], 286, 292-298, 327-339). The
Ritschlian school saw in the Kingdom o f God an immanent goal of history (i.e., a
religious/moral end which would mean the spiritual government of the world) (Albrecht
Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation: The Positive
Development o f the Doctrine [Clifton, NJ: Reference Book Publishers, 1966]).
Schweitzer’s teachings that Jesus’ death was the despairing renunciation of the
eschatological future, not only stripped away the eschatological as unacceptable and
unrealistic, but drove a formidable wedge between eschatology and modem ethics as well
(Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus [New York: Macmillan Company,
1948], 223-270; Frederick F. Bruce, “Eschatology." Baker’s Dictionary of Theology, ed.
Everett F. Harrison [Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1960], 191-192; Henry, Christian
Personal Ethics. 550). See also Thielicke, 3:379-382; Schwarz, 506.
2Humanistic beliefs in progress (the theory of evolution, and Hegelian and
Marxist concepts o f dialectical and linear progress) further engendered a secularized
eschatology and an eschatologized secularism (Bromiley, 80, 82; Thielicke, 3:380, 381).
As noted above, the Ritschlian school saw in the kingdom of God an immanent goal o f
history, a religious and moral end which would mean the spiritual government o f the
world (Schwarz, 506).
3At the same time, while holding to both eschatology and ethics, Dispensational
theology initially erected a cleavage between eschatology and ethics by pushing them
both into the future. Here Christ’s kingdom ethics would become dramatically relevant
only in the future eschatological era, thus dampening the need for present social action
and changes in fallen social structures (Henry, Christian Personal Ethics. 551; Weber, 65104). Likewise, failed Millerism played into the hands o f liberal and secular cynicism
regarding a literal historical eschaton and any ethics that it might engender.
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history o f the Christian church produced an “eschatology sans ethics.” Braaten capsules it
succinctly, “We can hardly expect ethics to bear fruit where no seeds of the kind have
been sown by the systems o f theology which they presuppose.”1

Ethics Sans Eschatology
The imminence of the parousia was an unchallenged article o f early Christian
belief, but it coexisted in Christian minds with many other convictions and teachings.2 A
host o f theological themes, normal interests of life, moral apologetics, and Hellenistic
influences together vied as focus for Christian moral reflection. As the fervor o f
eschatological expectation diminished and the Church experienced unprecedented moral
exigencies.3 Along with these real life moral situations, a tendency towards both
moralism4 and asceticism arose.5 The eschatological dualism o f the apostolic Church
'Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 106.
2Herbert Hensley Henson, Christian Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936),
43.
3E.g., dealing with apostasy and combating worldliness in its own midst along
with the compromises and laxity which were inevitable as the Church made its way into a
pagan culture. In addition there was the need to discover the mind of Christ upon
unexplored issues (e.g., wealth, slavery, Church and Society, Church and State, military
service, capital punishment, etc.). See R. E. 0 . White, Christian Ethics: The Historical
Development (Atlanta: John Knox Press. 1981), 13-80.
4The preoccupation of the first Christian centuries with ethics finds expression in
literature addressed to those outside the church as moral apologetic, and to those inside
the Church, as moral training for Church membership fDidache. in The Apostolic
Fathers, ed. Michael W. Holmes [Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1989], 145-158;
Clement Epistle to the Corinthians [ANF 1:1-21]; Epistle of Mathetes to Diogenetus
[ANF 1:23-30]; Clement o f Alexandria, Elucidations. Exhortation to the Heathen, and
The Instructor [ANF 2:163-298]). The readiest way for the Church to preserve itself from
contamination was to try to codify the Christian ethic. See, White, 26-51; Beach and
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(living between two ages) gave place to the metaphysical dualism o f the ascetics (living
between two worlds), which in turn gave place again to the social dualism of monasticism
(living between two types of society—religious and secular).1 In the process, eschatology
no longer vitally conditioned the content or form o f Christian ethics. Rather, moral
philosophy (Augustine),2 moral theology (Aquinas),3 theories of atonement (Abelard),4
Humanist criticism (Erasmus),5 soteriology (Luther),6 the sovereign majesty of God
Niebuhr, 50-57.
5White, 81-92; Beach and Niebuhr, 55.
'White, 87.
2Augustine On the Morals o f the Catholic Church fNPNF 4:41-63); idem,
Enchiridion fNPNF 3:237-276); idem, Citv o f God fNPNF 2:1-511). See White, 93-113;
Frederick S. Carney, “The Structure of Augustine’s Ethic," in The Ethics of St.
Augustine, ed. William S. Babcock (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991), 11-37.
3Thomas Aquinas, “Virtue,” S I 23: la2ae.55-67; idem, On Law. Morality, and
Politics (selections from ST), ed. William P. Baumgarth and Richard J. Regan
(Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Company, 1988), 1-276; White, 124-135.
4Peter Abelard, Sic et Non (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); D. E.
Luscombe, Peter Abelard’s Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); White, 114123; Paul L. Williams, The Moral Philosophy of Peter Abelard (Lanham, MD: University
Press o f America, 1980).
5Desiderius Erasmus, The Colloquies of Erasmus (Chicago: University o f Chicago
Press, 1965); idem, The Praise of Folly (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913); idem, Christian
Humanism and the Reformation: Selected Writings of Erasmus, ed. John C. Olin (New
York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965); Ernst F. Winter, ed., Erasmus-Luther:
Discourses on Free Will (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1961); White, 136152.
6Luther, Treatise on Good Works. LW 44:21-114; idem, LW 35:10; Althaus, 324.
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(Calvin),1conscience and reason (Kant),2 subjectivism (Edwards),3 practical Christianity
and social concern (Wesley),4 etc., now nuanced Christian ethics.
One looks in vain for a solid sustained discussion of eschatology and ethics in any
o f the prominent minds in pre-twentieth-century Christian ethics.5 In fact, by the end of
the nineteenth century, Christian ethics for the most part had been secularized by
Liberalism.6 While still accommodating a certain “eschatology,” it tended
philosophically to divorce ethics from biblical eschatology.7
'Calvin, Institutes. LCC 3:7.1; White, 184-211; John Hesselink, “Christ, the Law,
and the Christian: An Unexplored Aspect o f the Third Use of the Law in Calvin’s
Theology,” in Readings in Calvin’s Theology, ed. Donald K. McKim (Grand Rapids:
Baker Book House, 1984), 179-191.
2Immanuel Kant, The Critique o f Practical Reason (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril,
1956); idem, Foundations o f the Metaphysics of Morals (New York: Liberal Arts Press,
1959).
Jonathan Edwards, “A Treatise Concerning Religious Affection,” in The Works
o f Jonathan Edwards, ed. John E. Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), vol.
2, part i, section 2, 99-124; White, 256-265.
4John Wesley, “The Use o f Money,” in The Works of the Rev. John Weslev. vol.
6, Sermons (London: Wesleyan Methodist Book Room, 1831), 124-136; White, 269-275.
5See White’s survey of the development of Christian ethics, and Beach and
Niebuhr’s development of major themes in Christian thought. While Forell includes
eschatology as a major thematic in his description of New Testament ethics, there is
hardly any mention o f it in his description of Christian ethics from the Early Christian
Fathers through Augustine (George Wolfgang Forell, History of Christian Ethics
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1979).
6Henry, Christian Personal Ethics. 551.
Tbid., 549.
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Twentieth-Century Re-interpretation
of Eschatology as the New Paradigm
for Christian Ethics
“Biblical eschatology however, has dominated twentieth-century theology more
than any other topic."1 The irony is that some of the very dynamics which brought virtual
destruction o f eschatology in the nineteenth century became the theological and ethical
catalyst for placing the eschatological thematic back into the center of modem theological
interest and inquiry.2 Ritschl’s pioneering emphasis o f understanding theology in an
ethical mode found commanding expression through his aggressive Kingdom o f God
theology.3 His thoroughly ethical-oriented theology necessitated that his Kingdom of
God accordingly be an ethical kingdom.4 Influenced by Kant and Schleiermacher’s
dualistic conception of the Kingdom of God as the highest good, Ritschl forged a new
conceptual bond between eschatology and ethics.5 The kingdom of God is both a divine
■Schwarz, 513.
2Thielicke, 3:379-384.
3Ritschl, 10-14, 511-513, 609-670. Ritschl insisted that all elements o f Christian
doctrine be doubly related, both to spiritual redemption and moral teleology (Diane M.
Yeager, “Focus on the Social Gospel: An Introduction,” Journal of Religious Ethics 18,
no. 1 [Spring 1990]: 3). It is a historical fact that Ritschl’s doctrine of the Kingdom of
God continues to be influential even in the present. See Das, 66.
4Ritschl himself uses the terminology “the ethical Kingdom of God” (Ritschl, 511512). See Metzler, 2.
5Ritschl, 11; Metzler, 2,13, 14,41-42, 71-74. Ritschl gave consummate
expression to a framework of dualistic understanding o f the kingdom o f God by
combining the two ideas of the Kingdom o f God as religious highest good to be
established by God himself and as ethical highest good gradually being realized in the
self-realizing activity o f men. Here eschatology was no longer simply equated with the
eschaton as solely the work of God, but was intimately bound up with Christian ethical
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gift and ethical task.1 It is the goal and motive o f human ethical action. Therefore, ethics
is led by the eschatological thematic.2
Through this process of ethicizing the Kingdom of God, the Kingdom o f God in
effect became uneschatological. It completely lost its futuristic dimension.3 Moreover,
Ritschal’s dualistic understanding of history and the kingdom of God contained an
inherent contradiction which posed definite problems for theology. How could man
realize through ethical action the eschatological Kingdom which would be established by
God alone? This inherent contradiction seemed to affirm that traditional theology was
correct in totally dissociating eschatology and ethics.4
Yet there was positive value to be seen in Ritschl’s bond of eschatology and
ethics.5 There was apparent, fundamental truth involved in his proposed organic bond.6
And since Ritschl so forcefully thrust the idea o f the Kingdom o f God upon the
theological world, eschatology could never again be viewed as an illegitimate offspring
of primitive Christianity or an appendage to dogmatics. The relationship o f eschatology

action in present human history as well.
'Ritschl, 13, 14, 669-670; Metzler, 202.
2Metzler, 202.
3Das, 67.
4Metzler, 2, 5.
5Ibid., 4.
6Ibid., 5.
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and ethics became thereby an inescapable issue for systematic theology.1 In response,
several waves of eschatological thought have ensued throughout this century as serious
attempts have been made to further refine and/or articulate the relationship between
eschatology and ethics.2 These waves of thought have been expressed within either of
two contrasting approaches to the eschatology/ethics question, i.e., ethical-oriented
eschatology and eschatological- oriented ethics.

Ethical-Oriented Eschatology
Some of this century’s waves of eschatological thought have been to make ethics
the determining factor in eschatology, i.e., ethical-oriented eschatology. Here
eschatology takes shape because of the presuppositions, agendas, and needs of ethics.3
Eschatology is understood in an ethical mode. It is seen as the normative dimension of
the ethical task.4 Rauschenbush, Bultmann, and Reinhold Niebuhr illustrate this approach
to the eschatology/ethics question.
'Ibid., 204.
2Yeager, 5.
3See James M. Gustafson, “Theology in the Service o f Ethics: An Interpretation of
Reinhold Niebuhr’s Theological Ethics," in Reinhold Niebuhr and the Issues of Our
Times, ed. Richard Harries (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1986), 2445. Chastain rightly suggests that we cannot always determine nicely whether ethics
determines eschatology or vice versa. Ethics and eschatology often develop along side of
one another in a way that they take their character from the basic philosophy of life which
underlies their given discipline. Their interrelation however, can be explored in order to
understand more fully the implications of their respective presuppositions and the
apparent priority they might receive in moral theory (Theron M. Chastain, “Eschatology
and Ethics," Review and Expositor 41. no. 3 [April 1944]: 237).
4Stackhouse, 2.
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While Ritschl engendered the ethics-oriented approach to eschatology, it was
Rauschenbusch who brought it into blatant, vivid focus. “We have a social gospel," he
declared. “We need a systematic theology large enough to match it and vital enough to
back it."1 “The social gospel needs theology to make it effective; but theology needs the
social gospel to vitalize it.”2 Theology needs periodical rejuvenation.3 Eschatology in
particular needs a thorough rejuvenation.4 The social gospel has the moral earnestness
and faith which exerts constructive influence on the doctrine of eschatology.5
The priority o f ethics over eschatology for Rauschenbusch is obvious.
Eschatology becomes, in effect, a hermeneutical device.5 The Kingdom o f God functions
as an interpretive device in that it represents first and foremost an ethical ideal which is
essentially a social ideal where sin becomes a social phenomenon ingrained in the superpersonal forces which pattern our lives in society.7 This Kingdom-ideal guides toward a
specific social ethical praxis and at the same time represents its utopian results.
Bultmann’s hermeneutical method exhibits a more subtle ethical-oriented

'Rauschenbusch, 1.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., 12.
4Ibid., 210.
5Ibid., 211.
5Reinhard L. Hutter, “The Church: Midwife of History or Witness o f the
Eschaton?" Journal o f Religious Ethics 18, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 28-31.
Tbid., 30,31.
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eschatology. His approach includes de-mythologizing the eschatological thematic and
linking existentialist philosophy with New Testament interpretation.' His
demythologizing simply discloses the existential meaning to the eschatological myths,
which in effect opens the way for ethics.2 While he sees an intrinsic connection between
eschatology and ethical demand, Bultmann implies that “Jesus was first an existentialist,
and only afterward an eschatologist."3 Here the priority o f ethics is explicitly asserted in
the existential preceding that o f eschatology in importance.

This is further affirmed in

his statement that “the only true interpretation of eschatology is one which makes it a real
experience o f human life.”4 Bultmann’s approach thus virtually absorbs eschatology into
ethics whereby eschatology becomes the whole of ethics.s The eschatological thematic
simply serves his existential, ethical purposes.
Reinhold Niebuhr’s moral theory likewise advances an ethical-oriented
'Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1958).
2Richard H. Hiers, Jesus and Ethics: Four Interpretations (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1968), 93.
3Bultmann affirms a unity between eschatology and ethics whereby each is
incomplete without the other in calling man to radical obedience in terms o f his Now as
the hour of decision for God. See Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus and the Word (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958), 52, 122, 129-131; idem, Theology of the New Testament,
vol. 1 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951), 15, 21; Hiers, 94, 99.
4Hans Wemer Bartsch, ed., Kervgma and Mvth: A Theological Debate (London:
S.P.C.K, 1957), 106.
sHenry, Christian Personal Ethics. 551-552. Das asserts that for Bultmann, ethics
essentially "becomes eschatology" (Das, 71).
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eschatology.1 For Niebuhr, theology (and thus eschatology) was always in the service of
ethics.2 He states that "[faith] illumines experience and is in turn validated by
experience.”3 This maxim about life was morally, socially, and politically relevant.4
And while theology and ethics for him were dialectically related, weight was clearly on
ethics. The basic eschatological themes o f Scripture were seen by Niebuhr as “symbols.”5
While he gives a very straightforward explanation of these so-called eschatological
“symbols," it is important to realize that not all of Niebuhr’s eschatology is as obviously
presented. In other theological writings, and certainly in his political writings for a
secular audience, Niebuhr seldom makes mention o f eschatology per se. In his ethical
writings, Christian eschatology is often implicit.6 Furthermore, the “symbol” of
'R. Niebuhr was always careful to point out that he was an ethicist concerned with
problems of action in history, and not a theologian interested in ideation (Stackhouse,
245).
2Gustafson, “Theology in the Service of Ethics,” 44. Niebuhr drew on Christian
doctrine insofar as it illumined the human ethical predicament, otherwise it had no a
priori value (Stackhouse, 244-245).
3Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation,
vol. 2 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964), 63.
4Gustafson, “Theology in the Service of Ethics,” 36.
s"The symbol o f the second coming of Jesus can neither be taken literally nor
dismissed as unimportant.” They (the return of Christ, the last judgment, and the
resurrection) serve as pointers to the character o f the eternal which finite minds cannot
comprehend. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny o f Man. 2:289-301 passim; Watts, 5-7.
6This is seen in his phrase “impossible possibility” and the development of his
psychological metaphor o f self within an overarching moral frame of reference in terms
o f a tension between the ideal and the actual. Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of
Christian Ethics (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 37; idem, The Self and the Dramas of
History (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1955); Watts, 7; Stackhouse, 2, 27, 238-
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eschatology enabled Niebuhr to express an ethical realism which takes into full account
the immoral nature o f social interaction, and at the same time articulate how the
“eschaton" brings ethical meaning to present social action.1 In so doing, Niebuhr uses the
eschatological thematic in a way that theologically coheres with his ethical and political
thought.2

Eschatological-Oriented Ethics
Weiss’s radical opposition to Ritschl’s bonding o f eschatology and ethics in an
evolutionistic, immanent, and cultural-ethical interpretation o f the Kingdom of God
served to bring renewed focus toward biblical eschatology and attempts to explicate it
theologically.3 This renewed biblical theological focus engendered waves of
eschatological thought that made eschatology the determining factor in ethics, i.e.,
eschatological-oriented ethics. Ethics would now take shape under the themes and
presuppositions o f eschatology. Ethics would be understood in an eschatological mode.
This approach can be seen in the works of Barth, Thielicke, Pannenberg, Moitmann, and
Braaten.
Barth drew the first broad (but clear) stokes towards eschatological-oriented ethics

247; Gustafson, “Theology in the Service of Ethics," 34.
'Watts, 203.
Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man. ix, 47-52, 289-301; Gustafson,
“Theology in the Service o f Ethics," 38.
3Johannes Weiss, Jesus’s Proclamation of the Kingdom o f God (Chico, CA:
Scholar’s Press, 1985); G. C. Berkouwer, The Return o f Christ (Grand Rapids: William
B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1972), 25, 26; Metzler, 205-295.
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in his now classic Epistle to the Romans. “If Christianity be not altogether thoroughgoing
eschatology,” he wrote, “there remains in it no relationship whatever with Christ.”1 While
his eschatological reaction to liberal excesses had been too strong (and existentialist), it
nevertheless raised eschatology to an unparalleled prominent position in systematic
theology.2 Theology would now be approached through eschatology. Ethics would
follow suit. “Human possibilities become ethical," Barth pressed, “only in the shadow of
the final eschatological possibility.”3 And “when . . . they [human possibilities] do stand
there [in the shadow of the final eschatological possibility], they become at once the only
possibility, for they are an urgent, compelling necessity.”4 Accordingly, “the way of
theological ethics” for Barth is through the eschatological thematic.5 While not yet a
fully developed eschatological-oriented ethics, it is nevertheless seminal.
Thielicke’s motto, “Theological ethics is eschatological or it is nothing,"6 clearly
expressed the maturing understanding of the meaning of the Kingdom o f God and the
'Barth. Epistle to the Romans. 314.
2Barth’s existential eschatology lost sight of the telos, the goal and end of history.
He later admits, however, to his own excesses and begins to bring adjustments to his
perspective. See the comparison of his exegesis of Rom 13:11 in Karl Barth, Church
Dogmatics, vol. 2, pt. 1 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936), 635, and idem, Romans. 500;
Berkouwer, 26-29.
3Barth, Romans. 449.
4Ibid., 449,498-502.
5For ethics Barth’s eschatological thematic is expressed under the rubric of God as
Redeemer, where the divine command is heard. Barth, Ethics. 52-61.
6Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics, vol. 1, Foundations (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1966), 47.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

53
importance of eschatology for the foundations o f Christian ethics. While following the
broad path outlined by Barth,1Thielicke went on to focus eschatology more clearly with
respect to its formative influence on ethics. In keeping with the New Testament witness,
He placed Christian ethics in the field o f tension between the old and the new aeons—
with its resultant continuity and discontinuity—and the question of how they intersect
within the individual moral agent.2 The theme of ethics became “walking between two
worlds,” a paradoxical "impossible possibility.”3
The most far-reaching proposals to recover the significance of eschatology for
Christian ethics have been advanced by Pannenberg, Moltmann, and Braaten.4 For them,
a complete reconstruction of the foundations o f ethics follows from the supposed “return"
to the fundamental categories of “hope" and "future" in eschatological thought.5 Here the
influence o f Bloch’s neo-Marxist philosophical hermeneutic of the ontological priority of
‘Ibid., 98-116; Geoffrey Bromiley, “Helmut Thielicke,” in A Handbook of
Christian Theologians, ed. Dean G. Peerman and Martin E. Marty (Nashville: Abingdon
Press, 1989), 550. While Thielicke followed Barth’s (and the dialectical school’s) strong
emphasis on the eschatological character o f the New Testament, and likewise placed
Christian ethics within that eschatological thematic, he disagreed with the dissipating of
eschatological expectation and non-historicity.
2Thielicke, Theological Ethics. 43-44.
3Ibid., 44,47.
4Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom o f God: idem, Ethics. 175-197;
Moltmann, Theology of Hope: Braaten, The Future of God: idem, Eschatology and
Ethics. Pannenberg and Moltmann are the key visionaries here. Braaten essentially
Americanizes Pannenbergian eschatological thought. See also Das, 74-86; Braaten,
Eschatology and Ethics. 108; Gardner, 204.
sBraaten. Eschatology and Ethics. 108, 12.
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the future— “the real genesis is not at the beginning, but at the end” — is worked over into
a broad theological metaphysics that posits reality as eschatological.1 “Christianity is
eschatology, is hope, forward looking and forward moving, and therefore also
revolutionizing and transforming the present.”2 Eschatology, then, is seen as determining
the goal, the norm, the motive, and the context o f Christian ethics.3 The result has been
termed “eschatological ethics,” “proleptic ethics,” or “eschatopraxis.”4 It is doing the
future now, ahead of time.5

Emerging Imagery for Eschatology and Ethics
Within the context o f the above two paths that the bonding of eschatology and
ethics have taken in our century, three significant models of the Kingdom o f God have
likewise emerged: (1) the already/not yet dialectic; (2) the reign o f God motif; and (3) the
horizon o f the future perspective.6 These three models have come to serve as conceptual
bridges to interpret the meaning of the Kingdom of God, and to resolve several tensions
‘Moltmann, Theology o f Hope. 9; Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 34, 37, 45,
46; Bloch, 1628.
2Moltmann. Theology o f Hope. 16.
3Braaten. Eschatology and Ethics. 122.
“Ibid., 6,110-111, 116-122.
5Ibid., 121-122.
6The reader should be reminded here that, at bottom, the eschatology/ethics
question within Christianity in our century has revolved primarily around the biblical
imagery o f the Kingdom o f God.
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and problems that are recognized as fundamental to the eschatology/ethics discussion.1
This study has further defined these three models as “components” of the eschatological
paradigm. The purpose for defining these three models as “components" has to do with
the interrelation of models, primary models, and paradigms in conceptual theory. This is
developed and explained under coming segments of this chapter, i.e., “Eschatology as
Paradigm” and “Components of Eschatological Paradigm.”

Tensions and Problems
The tensions and problems that the eschatology/ethics question raises with
respect to the Kingdom of God include the following fundamental concerns:
immanence/transcendence, Kingdom/history, future/hope, church/world,
principles/content, philosophical categories, and Christology. Together these tensions
'Numerous images have emerged through Christian history as conceptual bridges
to explicate the meaning of the Kingdom of God. Theoretically, the possibility of an
infinite number of models exists. Just eight of those possible images have been
insightfully outlined by Howard A. Snyder /Models o f the Kingdom [Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1991]). These include the Kingdom as: future hope, inner spiritual
experience, mystical communion, institutional church, countersystem, political state,
Christianized society, and earthly utopia. Snyder, however, correctly asks the question,
“Are all these really models of the Kingdom, or are some o f them rather models of
spirituality or o f the Christian life, unrelated to the question o f the Kingdom? For in
some o f the proposed models, kingdom language is scarcely found” (ibid., 18-19). The
point at issue for this study here is an important one. While all possible images of the
Kingdom may in one way or another provide an open window into the meaning of the
Kingdom of God, all may not provide a sustained and systematic metaphor for a
comprehensive understanding with respect to application in moral theory. Furthermore,
they all may not operate on the same level hermeneutically. Some images are evidently
primary in that they open the way for other images to operate or provide supplementary
imagery. This study takes the position that the images selected herein are of that primary
nature. They operate from the level of exegesis and theological foundations.
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and problems have comprised the major relevant concerns which a comprehensive
eschatological paradigm for ethics would need to satisfactorily balance and resolve.1
These tensions and problems are briefly explored before outlining the three models which
have emerged, in part, towards their resolution.

Immanence/transcendence
Eschatology and ethics are set between the two levels of immanence and
transcendence.2 The sphere o f eschatology for immanence is this-worldly present and is
realized by (or with the help of) human activity. It is evolutionary, cultural-ethical, and
marked by continuity. The opposite extreme o f transcendence focuses on an other
worldly future that is achieved by God and not man. It is cataclysmic, individualsoteriological, and marked by discontinuity.3 Eschatology as paradigm obviously would
'Snyder presents six fundamental tension points or polarities as central to the
mystery o f God’s reign, i.e., present versus future, individual versus social, spirit versus
matter, gradual versus climactic, divine \action versus human action, and the church’s
relation to the world (ibid., 16-18). The outline of tensions and problems which this
study proposes encompass those of Snyder and go beyond to include important issues
relevant to our concerns with regards to ethics (e.g., principles/content, philosophical
categories, and Christology).
2Johnstone, 50.
3This century’s renewed emphasis on eschatology as an integral part of the whole
of Christian theology brought with it a critical reaction to the immanent evolutionary
views o f the nineteenth century. This re-assertion of transcendence, however, tended to
again strain (or separate) the two lines of eschatology and ethics. Within the theological
current that emphasized transcendence, however, intentional effort was made to relate the
transcendent eschatological dimension to the world of man, ethical experience, and
political reality (ibid., 51). A “return” to nuanced immanental patterns would continue
to be an attraction for those focusing on a strong and direct social concern (ibid., 48).
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need to articulate theological/ethical balance between these two perspectives.

Kingdom/history
Closely linked to the problem o f immanence/transcendence is the relation
between the Kingdom and history. In other words, how does eschatology relate to
historical movement and the passage of time? Is the Kingdom here but not now
—historical and future? Or is it here and now—historical and present? Or not here but
now—above history and present? Or not here and not now—above history and future?1
The sphere and time o f eschatology—whether it is in history or outside o f history, past,
present, or future—has significant implications for ethics.2

Future/hope
The Kingdom/history dialogue has led toward the question of the future o f the
'Chastain, “Eschatology and Ethics,” 238.
2Ibid., 239. The issue revolves around the notion that ethics is concerned with the
“this-worldly and present” and not the “other-worldly and future" — that there is no ethics
beyond the here and now, beyond history and time. It follows that an eschatologically
founded ethic would in essence be an unreal ethic. For Christian ethics to be possible,
then, the Kingdom must in some way be here and now, historical. A theological
interpretation o f history or the Kingdom, then, is called for in order to link the
eschatological vision with the concrete history lived by men in a world of change and
social exigencies (Johnstone, 73). But while eschatology would need to affirm the reality
of the Kingdom o f God in history, it would need to do so in a way that would not equate
the Kingdom with the process of history or deny its (the Kingdom’s) future dynamic
(Johnstone, 63). An important methodological concern here is whether a specific concept
of history predetermines the eschatological outlook or whether the eschatological
perspective determines the view o f history (Hutter, 28).
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Kingdom and the future o f the world. At issue is an adequate hermeneutical bridge
spanning the eschatological horizon o f the biblical message and the orientation of modem
secular culture toward an open future.1 The Blochian neo-Marxist-influenced return to
the fundamental categories of “hope” and “future” in eschatological thought pressed the
need for a merging o f these respective horizons.2 The issue here is also the significance
o f present ethical action in the light of the coming future. In what way does the reality of
the future enter the present and exert moral influence?3

Church/world
The field o f operation for the moral implications of the eschatological Kingdom
are set within the dualities between the Church and world, and between the social and

‘Braaten, The Future of God. 18, 23,32.
2Ibid., 17-32; Pannenberg. Ethics. 175-197; idem. Theology and the Kingdom of
God. 51-71; Moltmann, Theology o f Hope. 15-36.
3Peters writes that one of the abiding questions being directed towards any
eschatological theory which takes temporal movement seriously is the issue of
disjunction and conjunction. Will the ultimate future be so radically different from the
present that there will be little or no continuity, i.e., disjunctive? Or will actions in the
present have significance for the reality yet to come, i.e., conjunctive? The former
(disjunction), it is proposed, would make present ethical actions irrelevant to God’s
future. Thus eschatology could not function as a sanction for intrahistorical ethics. On
the other hand, it is asserted that conjunction would allow present ethical actions to have
a determining impact on what will ultimately come. But this would come at the risk of
collapsing eschatology into history, and losing the divinely consummated Kingdom. It
follows, then, that an ethic based on eschatology must affirm both disjunction and
conjunction. And it must do so in a way that the future exerts moral influence on the
present. See Ted F. Peters, “Pannenberg’s Eschatological Ethics,” in The Theology of
Wolfhart Pannenberg. ed. Carl E. Braaten and Philip Clayton (Minneapolis: Augsburg
Publishing House, 1988), 246.
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personal.1 Overcoming these dualities presents a challenge for eschatology and ethics.
The issues revolve around the relationship between evangelism and social responsibility,
and whether Kingdom ethics is focused toward the Church or toward the future of the
whole world.2 Can eschatology articulate a worldview and life-view that embraces world
questions and societal needs, and do so in a way that all the spheres of human life and
action are included within the range of Christian responsibility? Is eschatology able to
merge the future o f the church and the future o f the world into a common moral horizon?3

Philosophical categories
The ability to find conceptual bridges between what the biblical texts say about
the moral life and the presumptions and questions o f philosophical ethics has been a
integral part o f the eschatology/ethics dialogue. This comes from the fact that dominant
philosophical conceptions of moral life have consistently influenced directions (or
'Chastain, “Eschatology and Ethics," 238-239; Johnstone, 54, 56.
2Does eschatology produce a pessimism that sets the Church against the world and
its fallen structures with evangelism of the individual as focus rather than social moral
renewal? Or is there an optimism that finds the Church as a community for the world, a
transforming agent o f the world? If the Church exists to serve the Kingdom in history,
how is it to be pointed toward the world? See Arthur P. Johnston, “The Kingdom in
Relation to the Church and the World,” in In Word and Deed, ed. Bruce Nicholls (Exeter:
The Paternoster Press, 1985), 109-132; Wolfhart Pannenberg, “The Kingdom o f God and
the Church,” Una Sancta (Christmas 1967): 3-27; Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of
Modem Fundamentalism.
3These questions revolve around the need for an eschatological perspective which
both denies the ultimate value of the present (thus opening it up to criticism and change)
and affirms the value o f the present as a valid field for Christian action. See Braaten, The
Future o f God. 23-32, 109-116; Pannenberg, “The Kingdom of God and the Church," 5;
and Johnstone, 57.
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response) in Christian ethics.1 The concern is whether an eschatologically informed
ethics can be reciprocally related to philosophical ethics in a way that it can: (1)
appropriate the categories which appear in the light o f philosophical analysis, and, at the
same time; (2) offer a comprehensive viewpoint which can overcome the contradictions
that classically cling to the various types of philosophical ethics?2 Furthermore, there is
the question as to what kind of ethic eschatology generates.3 Within this context o f
bridging eschatological ethics toward philosophical modes of moral thought, there is also
the question of the highest good (summum bonum) and what is right morally.4 Finally,
eschatology is being challenged to articulate an ontological foundation for ethics which
locates the point of convergence between the source of the good and the source of being.5
'I.e., teleology (consequentialism), deontology, perfectionism (virtue ethics),
situationalism (contextualism), etc.
2Das, 79, 65, 83; Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 105, 113,115-116.
3More specifically, is it a mixture of philosophical perspectives or does it provide
a dynamic perspective and methodology which is distinct from them? Or viewed
oppositely, what kind o f eschatology does Christian ethics need in order to adequately
resolve the various concerns raised by philosophical ethics? See Ezell, 81-87; Braaten,
Eschatology and Ethics. 105, 113,115-116.
4The summum bonum has to do with moral value and the ultimate worthwhile end
or goal o f living. In ethics, goodness has two main senses, i.e., moral goodness and
teleological goodness (which overlaps with eschatology). The question of “what is right”
has to do with moral obligation and refers to actions or conduct that is ethically correct.
It deals with behavior rather than overall ideals o f life. Eschatology is being challenged
with bringing unity to these questions whereas philosophical ethics has tended to set them
in competition. See Burton F. Porter, Reasons for Living: A Basic Ethics (New York:
Macmillan Publishing, 1988), vii, viii; Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 114; Peters,
241,245.
5In metaphysics the summum bonum (highest good) is the highest value or good in
a hierarchy of values or goods, where the subordinate values or goods are related
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Principles/content
The bridging o f eschatology toward the concerns and categories o f philosophical
ethics, as well as contemporary social exigencies, naturally raises the question o f
specificity and precision. How concrete is its ethical content?1 Can eschatology provide
a blueprint for social action or ethical behavior in the world? Or will it merely provide
moral imagery from which one draws analogies and makes inferences?2 How much o f
the eschatological vision is moral content, and how much is inspiration and motivation
toward vision-defined action?3 The answer to these questions is basic to ethical method
and application.

Christology
Finally, an understanding o f the relationship between eschatology and ethics is
linked inexorably with an understanding of the person and work o f Jesus. The New
Testament locates the Kingdom in Jesus’ person and ministry,4 thus forging a direct link
ontologically and derive their value accordingly. The point of such convergence for
Christian ethics is God. God determines both what is and also what is good, and Who
ultimately frames the nuances o f the eschatological paradigm that will define more
specifically the good and the right. Peters, 241.
'If eschatology generates deontological or teleological themes, or articulates the
summum bonum and what is right, how precise can it be?
2Johnstone, 56; Dahl, 375, 376.
3The questions here include, too, whether or not eschatology leaves us with
middle-axioms (which are neither too general nor too particular), proximate norms and
principles, or only horizontal ultimate Christian norms? Johnstone, 63; Das, 86.
4George Eldon Ladd, The Presence of the Future: The Eschatology o f Biblical
Realism (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1974), 138-148 passim.
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between Jesus and eschatology.1 It is a link where, some would say, eschatology includes
the entire history o f Jesus,2 and which sees eschatology as having proleptic presence in
Christ.3 The questions here revolve around the function of Christology in eschatological
ethics. Does Christology provide a paradigm for the good and the right within the
eschatological thematic? Does it provide a proleptic sample of eschatological fulfillment
in human existence? Can it bring some precision to determining what goals in life are
worth seeking and by what means?4

Already/Not Yet Dialectic
The “eschatological-oriented ethic" approach to the ethics question initially
opened the way toward greater biblical/theological precision with regard to the meaning
o f the Kingdom of God and the interpretation o f New Testament eschatology. The most
characteristic feature of this precision was found in the temporal tension between the
present and the future, i.e., the already/not yet dialectic.5 In this component, the
'See Konig, 1.
2Ibid., 5.
3Ezell, 78.
4Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 115.
5This study is outlining here just one developing and, subsequently, generally
accepted view within Protestant systematic theology. It is understood that the imagery
outlined here is not the only or unique way to see the Kingdom of God as expressed in
New Testament eschatology. However, it is this study’s position that Mott and Ogletree
assume it and worked within this viewpoint, and that Ladd, Schrage, and the other NT
theologians cited represent “givens” with regard to this important New Testament
eschatology imagery. Ladd, The Presence o f the Future: idem, A Theology of the New
Testament: Schrage, 19.
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simultaneity o f present and future is characteristic o f Jesus whose person and work brings
the effectual presence of the Kingdom into the realm o f historical reality.1 Since Jesus
proclaimed the coming of the Kingdom as a future event and at the same time anticipated
it in His person in a proleptic way,2 the Kingdom o f God has already come into history in
advance of its apocalyptic manifestation.3 In a unique and dynamic way then, the
Kingdom is and is not here. It is both present and future.4 Because of this, there is an
overlapping o f the two ages—this present age and the age to come—where believers live
“between the times.” The present old age goes on, but the powers of the new age have
erupted into the old age.5 Eschatology, then, has been inaugurated but not consummated.6
This already/not yet component recaptures the essential bi-polarity of the biblical
witness.7 Furthermore, it enables the required conceptual balance between the
'Schrage, 19, 20. Jesus did more than announce the advent of the Kingdom (Mark
1:15), He embodied it! Through His miracles, death, resurrection, and bringing o f the
Holy Spirit, He made God’s reign present in the world (H. P. Owen, “Eschatology and
Ethics in the New Testament,” Scottish Journal of Theology 15 [1962]: 369).
2A key term for some working within this imagery is “proleptic." Jesus is the sign
o f the proleptic presence of the future (Schrage, 19). There is a proleptic presence of the
eschatological kingdom in the person and work of Jesus (Braaten, Eschatology and
Ethics. 110; Schwarz, 515).
3Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament. 93.
4Ibid., 63. See Henry, The Uneasy Conscience o f Modem Fundamentalism. 53.
5Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament. 69.
6Ibid., 93.
7See above discussion, 33-39.
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immanental and transcendental realities o f the Kingdom.1 It facilitates clarification with
regard to the relation between the Kingdom and history. It also affirms that eschatology
cannot be isolated from Christology.2 The already/not yet must still be articulated more
precisely: (1) in what sense the Kingdom is here; (2) in what sense it is to be further
realized before the second coming o f Christ; and (3) in what sense it will be fully realized
at the second coming.3 Nevertheless, the already/not yet component presents broad
imagery for structuring theological and ethical implications of New Testament
eschatology.

Reign of God
Another characteristic feature of the growing biblical/theological precision in
New Testament eschatology came with the reign o f God component. The biblical
witness expresses diverse contexts in which the Kingdom of God theme appears. The
Kingdom is presented in: (1) an abstract meaning of reign or rule; (2) as the apocalyptic
future order; (3) as something present among men; and (4) as a present realm or sphere
into which men are now entering.4 Furthermore, there is the distinction between the
'Furthermore, the “already" and the "not yet” depend on each other and
presuppose each other. Assertions about the present point toward the coming fulfillment,
while claims concerning the future are grounded in their present anticipation and
initiation. Schwarz, 515.
2Ezell, 80.
3Henry, The Uneasv Conscience o f Modem Fundamentalism. 53.
4Ladd, The Presence of the Future. 123.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

65
Kingdom as the reign o f God and the Kingdom as the realm over which He reigns.1 The
reign o f God component is understood as defining the Kingdom primarily in its abstract
or dynamic idea o f reign, rather than the concrete idea o f the realm over which God
rules.2 It also posits God’s dynamic reign as the integrating concept for the diverse
nuances o f the Kingdom found in the biblical witness.
The reign o f God component has made it possible to understand how the
Kingdom can be both present and future, both inward and outward, both spiritual and
apocalyptic.3 It has made it possible, as well, to understand how the Kingdom can
manifest itself in two different ways (reign/realm), at two different times (present/future),
to accomplish the same ultimate redemptive end.4 Furthermore, this component is seen
as opening the way toward overcoming the dualities between the Church and the world,
and between the social and the personal.5 It reaches out over all spheres o f human life
and action so that the world, too, is clearly affirmed as the subject of God’s dominion.6
Yet this dynamic reign o f God invades the present age without transforming it into the

'Ibid., 124.
2Ibid., 128, 130; Johnston, 128.
3Ladd, The Presence of the Future. 42.
4Ibid., 139.
5Johnstone, 54.
6Ibid., 54, 67. See also William Adolf Visser ‘t Hooft, The Kingship of Christ:
An Interpretation o f Recent European Theology (New York: Harper, 1948), 11, 59.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

66
age to come.1 God’s "reign” still stands in total opposition to the world, its sin, and its
oppressive systems and materialism.2 While the full implications of the reign o f God
compoment must still be articulated, it nevertheless provides useful imagery for
structuring the theological and ethical ramifications o f New Testament eschatology.

Horizon of the Future
The third component model that has emerged in conceptualizing the bond
between eschatology and ethics is the horizon o f the future imagery. Biblical eschatology
by nature is future-oriented. It points beyond this life to something that is more ultimate
and complete—not mere spiritual survival only, but a final cosmic reconciliation which
encompasses a “new heaven and a new earth in which righteousness dwells.”3 Here the
Kingdom o f God is the Christian’s future hope. This hope naturally elicits a forwardlooking stance, a peering into the future, an imagining o f what will be.4 The practical
result for Christian ethics is that this gazing towards the horizon of “what is about to
come" inevitably influences present moral life.5
‘Ladd, The Presence o f the Future. 149.
2At bottom, God’s reign in the world is one in which He rules not only
providentially in history to call a people to Himself from out o f the world, but where He
rules also in the church and through the lives o f believers for the world (Johnston, 127,
125).
32 Pet 3:13; Rev 21:1-8.
4Rom 8:18-25; Heb 11:8-16.
51 John 3:1-3; 2 Pet 3:11-13; Col 3:lf.; Heb 12:18-28; Titus 2:11-14; Matt 24:4551; 25:31-46.
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The horizon o f the future component is seen as facilitating this leaping forward in
imagination toward what lies ahead—until that “not yet” evokes powerful images which
bring moral value and meaning back to the present. Furthermore, it is a component that,
for some, represents the future’s potential for bringing hermeneutical, epistemological,
and motivational value into the present.1 It affirms the reality that Christian hope leads to
Christian practice. And it is an invitation to Christian ethical consciousness in the light of
what lies ahead in the coming Kingdom.2
While the horizon o f the future component emerges naturally from the biblical
witness o f the moral reality o f the eschatological Kingdom of God, it has been nuanced
significantly by futuristic eschatology which posits that the essence of things lies in their
future.3 According to this view, since the essence o f things lies in their future, the
'Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 52.
2See Douglas J. Schuurman, Creation. Eschaton. and Ethics: The Ethical
Significance of the Creation-Eschaton Relation in the Thought of Emil Brunner and
Jurgen Moltmann (New York: Peter Lang, 1991); 1-12, 149-174; Childs, 347-360.
3Peter Kuzmic, “History and Eschatology: Evangelical Views,” in In Word and
Deed, ed. Bruce Nicholls (Exeter: The Paternoster Press, 1985), 149. Its philosophical
backdrop is the Blochian neo-Marxist-influenced hermeneutic of the ontological priority
o f the future—“the real genesis is not at the beginning, but at the end”—which is worked
over into a broad theological metaphysics that posits reality as eschatological (Braaten,
Eschatology and Ethics. 34, 37,45,46; Bloch, 16-28; and Moltmann, Theology of Hope.
9). The intent, o f course, is not to imitate or baptize Bloch’s messianic philosophy, but to
build a theology of hope and future (eschatology) on presuppositions of Christian
theology, where the God of promise and exodus—who is a God with future as His
essential nature—reigns unconditionally in the present because of and through the power
o f the resurrection of Jesus. Within this theology of hope, God is in Himself the power of
the future. He is the ultimate future. There is no future beyond God Himself. God in His
very being is the future o f the world. God has been the future of all past events. See
Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God. 61-63, 133; idem, Ethics. 190-193;
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ultimate future becomes the new paradigm o f transcendence whose power transforms and
brings about alteration in the conditions of history itself.1 Within this thinking, the notion
o f the horizon o f the future supposedly encapsules that sought-for hermeneutical bridge
that can help span the eschatological horizon of the biblical message and the orientation
o f modem secular culture toward an open future.2 It is a component whose imagery is
consciously aimed more directly at the secular world rather than being limited to the
church alone.3 The bottom line here is that the Kingdom is seen as the future of the entire
world and, as such, it defines the ultimate horizon for all ethical statements.4
Unfortunately the bipolarity o f the biblical teaching has been lost in much o f this
evangelical futuristic eschatology.5
The horizon o f the future component, however, remains a powerful figure for
Moltmann, Theology of Hope. 9,15-36.
'Das, 78.
2Modem secular culture’s orientation toward an open future assumes an
anthropology o f hope, and stresses the newness of that which lies in the future. Braaten,
The Future o f God. 25; Pannenberg, Ethics. 176.
3It seeks to find a common horizon between the biblical worlds of meaning and
those which make up our sense of reality. It facilitates the significance o f present ethical
action in the light o f the coming future in a way which avoids the disjunction/conjunction
dilemma. Peters, 241; Braaten, The Future of God. 23-32.
4This is predicated on the fact that, ultimately, it is God who determines the good.
He is the ultimate good when He is understood as relating Himself to our world in the
coming o f His rule (kingdom). Peters, 241; Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of
God. 74. 111.
5At bottom it has become a philosophy of hope more than a biblical apocalyptic
eschatology. Kuzmic, 149.
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structuring the theological and ethical implications of New Testament eschatology.1 And
like the already/not yet and reign o f God components, its full implications for our
eschatology/ethics question still need articulating.

Paradigm Synthesis Through the 1970s
The relationship between eschatology and ethics essentially remained problematic
through the first half o f the twentieth century.2 And while solutions to the tension and
problems were emerging, no final clarification of their relationship could be given even
by the 1970s.3 Yet, by the 1970s a twofold pattern had emerged with respect to the
eschatology/ethics question.4 First, eschatology was becoming increasingly recognized
for its potential as a paradigm for Christian ethics. Second, eschatology was being
viewed/articulated primarily through the three component models which have been
outlined above, i.e., already/not yet, reign o f God, and the horizon o f the future.

'The reader should remember that “it is not the future, only the futuristic, that
conflicts with the meaning o f eschatology” (Berkouwer, 31). And so there must be care
to articulate the nuances o f the horizon of the future within the sphere of biblical
eschatology rather than philosophical categories o f hope. In addition, this nuancing of
eschatology must be kept in balance with protology, as any ontological dynamics of
future cannot be divorced from those of creation (see Schuurman, Creation. Eschaton. and
Ethics. 1-12, 149-174; Childs, 347-360).
2Johnstone, 73; Henry, Christian Personal Ethics. 550. “A bias against the full
significance for ethics o f the Christian doctrine o f last things . . . continues to be a major
problem o f ethics in the mid-twentieth century,” says Henry (ibid.).
3Johnstone, 85.
4The resources for developing this section on “Paradigm Synthesis Through the
1970s” and the following section on “Implications for Moral Theory” are drawn, for the
most part, from theologians/ethicists representative of this synthesis period.
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Eschatology as Paradigm
The emergence of eschatology as a paradigm for Christian moral thought
followed the cultural wave on which the theology of hope was riding following World
War II.1 It developed as part of the concern towards how to get beyond the general
existentialism o f the post-war era and how to acquire future perspectives for building a
more just, more peaceable and more humane world.2 Hope took the place of apathy. The
1960s in particular were seen as years of hope, a new beginning and a turn to the future.
It included, too, the emergence of a post-holocaust theology, i.e., asking the question if
one’s theology could remain unchanged before and after Auschwitz (If this is the case, be
on your guard.), the need to do theology in conversation with the Jews, and a linkage with
other forms o f oppression.3
The emergence o f eschatology as a paradigm for Christian moral thought also
coincided with the discussion and development o f the use o f models and paradigms in
theology—specifically in discussing the Kingdom of God. Considerable literature on
'Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 7.
2Moltmann, Theology of Hope. 8.
3See Clark M. Williamson, A Guest in the House of Israel: Post-Holocaust Church
Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), vii-viii, 3-14, 252-254;
Emil L. Fackenheim, God’s Presence in History: Jewish Affirmations and Philosophical
Reflections (New York: New York University Press, 1970); Darrel J. Fasching, The
Ethical Challenge o f Auschwitz and Hiroshima: Apocalypse or Utopia? (Albany, NY:
State University o f New York Press, 1993); Eliezer Berkovits, Faith after the Holocaust
(New York: KTAV Publishing House, 1973); and Dan Cohn-Sherbok, Holocaust
Theology (London: Lamp Press, 1989).
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using models and paradigms in theology has developed since the early 1960s.1 And
models are increasingly employed today as a method o f theological exploration.2
Historically, this focus on models and paradigms in theology has mirrored the discussion
and changing place of models in mathematics and the natural and social sciences.3 As
with math and the sciences, the model method represents attempts in theology to describe
or to explore some biblical/theological reality not fully understood.4 Given this historical
'On the use of models in theology see Ian T. Ramsey, Religious Language: An
Empirical Placing of Theological Phrases (New York: Macmillan Company, 1963); idem,
Models and Mvsterv (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); Frederick Ferre,
“Mapping the Logic o f Models in Science and Theology,” The Christian Scholar 46
(Spring 1963): 9-39; William H. Austin, “Models, Mystery, and Paradox in Ian Ramsey,”
Journal o f the Scientific Study o f Religion 7 (Spring 1968): 41-55; Ewert H. Cousins,
“Models and the Future of Theology," Continuum 7 (Winter-Spring 1969): 78-91; Ian G.
Barbour, Myths. Models and Paradigms (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1974);
Sallie McFague, Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982).
2E.g., Avery Dulles, Models o f the Church (New York: Doubleday, 1987); idem,
Models o f Revelation (New York: Orbis Books, 1992); Paul S. Minear, Images of the
Church in the New Testament (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960); Snyder, Models
o f the Kingdom: John F. 0 . Grady, Models of Jesus (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
1981); Christian Duquoc and Casiano Floristan, eds., Models o f Holiness (New York:
Seabury Press, 1979); Raymond F. Collins, Models of Theological Reflection (Lanham,
NJ: University Press of America, 1984); Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for
an Ecological Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987); Stephen B. Bevans,
Models o f Contextual Theology (New York: Orbis Books, 1992).
3The widespread use o f the model method was not a matter o f chance. It grew,
rather, out o f a historical situation that called for methodology that was both open and
flexible, but which at the same time allowed for precision and clarity. It was based on the
assumption that reality is multi-dimensional and that there is a need for a variety of forms
to reflect it. See Cousins, 81; Barbour, 3-10 passim; Ramsey, Models and Mvsterv. 1-21
passim; Ferre, 9.
4The emphasis has been towards “disclosure” rather than “picturing," toward
“mental models" o f systems rather than “scale models” or “working models.” See,
Ramsey, Models and Mvsterv. 1-21; Barbour, 6, 30-34,49-70.
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situation in theological method, it is only natural that eschatology would become nuanced
accordingly.
It will be helpful at this point to note some important distinctions between the
nature and role o f models and that o f paradigms. “A model is, in essence, a sustained and
systematic metaphor,”1an “organizing image” which gives particular emphasis, enabling
one to notice and interpret certain aspects of some reality not fully understood.2 “Wellconstructed models are simple and clear enough to be grasped more or less intuitively; yet
they have a logical or, better, an analogical relation to the larger reality being
investigated."3 A paradigm, on the other hand, is comprehensive. It is an “interpretive
framework,” a “basic metaphorical strategy” in which a given discipline does its work.4
While models and paradigms together share the essential quality of being “ways of
looking at things” or "conceptual systems,” a paradigm encompasses and interprets a
larger, more comprehensive conceptual picture and uses models to explicate aspects of
that larger picture or envision that larger picture as a whole.5 Furthermore, a paradigm
‘McFague, Metaphorical Theology. 67.
2Barbour, 6-8, 29-70.
3Snyder, 20.
4McFague, Metaphorical Theology. 79-80. Kuhn asserts that a paradigm
embodies a set o f conceptual, methodological, and metaphysical assumptions (Thomas S.
Kuhn, The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions [Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1962]).
5While all paradigms are models, not all models are paradigms. McFague,
Metaphorical Theology. 80; Barbour, 8-11; 92-146.
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sets the limits on the range of acceptable models.1
Given this distinction between models and paradigms, it can be suggested that the
inherent metaphysical nature o f eschatology predisposes its performing a paradigmatic
role in theology and moral theory rather than that of a modeling role. In addition, the
inherent metaphysical nature o f eschatology necessitates supporting models for
elucidation. This is true not only for explication o f particular aspects of the
eschatological reality, but for envisioning it as a whole as well.
In the context o f the discussion and development o f the model method in
theology, together with the broader re-interpretation of eschatology in this century,
eschatology thus became recognized for its potential as a paradigm for theology and
moral theory. Eschatology became, for many, an “interpretive framework,” a
“metaphorical strategy" for doing theology and ethics. This is seen in the literature
developing during this time, and is expressed most clearly in the convergence o f ideas
regarding the role o f eschatology in theology and ethics through the mid-1970s.2
'Barbour, 124; McFague. Metaphorical Theology. 109.
Significant examples include: Moltmann, Theology of Hope ( 1965i:
Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom o f God (1969); idem, Ethics (1977); Braaten,
The Future o f God (1969); idem, Eschatology and Ethics (1974); Vemard Eller, The
Promise: Ethics in the Kingdom o f God (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970); Ladd, A
Theology and the Kingdom o f God f 19741: idem. The Presence of the Future ('1974'):
Herman Ridderbos, The Coming of the Kingdom (Philadelphia, PA: Presbyterian and
Reformed Publishing, 1976); Wilder, Kervgma. Eschatology and Ethics (1966); Yoder,
The Politics o f Jesus (1972); Thielicke, Theological Ethics (1966); Dahl, "New
Testament Eschatology and Christian Social Action," 374-379 (1970); Johnstone,
“Eschatology and Social Ethics,” 47-85 (1976); Owen, “Eschatology and Ethics in the
New Testament," 369-382; Childs, “The Imago Dei and Eschatology” (1974); Metzler,
“The Ethics o f the Kingdom” (1971); Stackhouse, “Eschatology and Ethical Method"
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Components of Eschatological Paradigm
By the 1970s eschatology was commonly being viewed/articulated through the
three significant models outlined thus far, i.e., already/not yet, reign o f God, and the
horizon o f the fu tu re.' As we have already noted, these three models have come to serve
as conceptual bridges to interpret the meaning o f the Kingdom of God, and to resolve the
(1965); Henry McKeating, God and the Future (London: SCM Press, 1974); Franklin
Sherman, ed., Christian Hope and the Future of Humanity (Minneapolis: Augsburg
Publishing House, 1969); and Ewert H. Cousins, Hope and the Future of Man
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972).
This study assumes that the surge of eschatology/ethics-oriented literature through the
1980s affirms the synthesis o f eschatology as a paradigm in the 1970s. Space does not
allow a full review here, but significant examples include: Bruce Chilton and J. I. H.
McDonald, Jesus and the Ethics of the Kingdom (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans,
1987); Webber, Living in the Shadow o f the Second Coming (1983); Yoder, The Priestly
Kingdom (1984); Das, “Theology of the Future and Christian Ethics,” 63-86 (1983);
Ezell, “Eschatology and Ethics in the New Testament," 72-95 (1980); Wilber B. Wallis,
“Eschatology and Social Concern," Journal of Evangelical Theological Society 24 (March
1981): 3-9; Christopher J. H. Wright, “The Use o f the Bible in Social Ethics: Paradigms,
Types and Eschatology,” Transformation 1, no. 1 (January/March, 1984): 11-20; Howard
A. Snyder, A Kingdom Manifesto: Calling the Church to Live Under God’s Reign
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1985); Schrage, The Ethics o f the New
Testament (1988); Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change (1982); Ogletree, The Use of
the Bible in Christian Ethics (1983); Philip J. Rossi, Together Toward Hope: A Joumev
to Moral Theology (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983).
'Not every theologian or ethicist has represented these component models with the
same language or wording. The theological nuances of the horizon o f the future, for
instance, have been expressed through such varied language as “theology o f hope," “the
future o f God," “theology o f promise," etc. Likewise, the reign o f God has been termed
as "divine kingship," “kingship of God,” “kingship o f Christ,” etc., and the already/not yet
as “between the times,” “between two aeons,” “the presence of the future,” “prolepsis,” etc.
It is important, too, to note that, since by this time the fundamental nuances o f each of
these component models were assumed as givens, they may not always play an equally
explicit role in a given theologian’s or ethicist’s project. That is why one component
model might be stressed significantly in a given project while the other two are hardly
mentioned at all.
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tensions and problems that are acknowledged as fundamental to the eschatology/ethics
discussion. Here, it is suggested, that these three models are in effect “models elucidating
the eschatological paradigm.” Models, as has been noted above, are “organizing images”
which give particular emphasis, enabling one to notice and interpret certain aspects of
some reality not fully understood. The models of the already/not yet, reign o f God, and
the horizon o f the future provide just that. They each give a particular emphasis, and
enable one to notice and interpret certain aspects of the larger eschatological paradigm.
It would be helpful at this point, however, to note the relationship that models
may have towards one another within an overarching paradigm. After all, the three
models we are focusing on here are not the only models that theologians or ethicists have
found useful in understanding the Kingdom of God and eschatology. In addition,
Scripture itself gives numerous models for the eschatological Kingdom. Why, then, have
these three models become commonly accepted points o f reference for viewing or
articulating Christian eschatology?
First, not all models are o f equal scope or status.1 While all models may
contribute important insight toward a larger picture, they may do so at different levels of
application or importance. They may manifest differing potential for bringing
hermeneutical, epistemological, or motivational value to the question at hand. Second,
some models are clearly primary in terms of structural relationships within a given range
of images. These primary models are capable of both engendering and organizing a
‘Ferre maps the logic o f models in terms of their type (degree o f concreteness),
scope (degree o f inclusiveness), and status (degree of importance) (Ferre, 13-23).
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network o f models. They both assemble and scatter. They assemble subordinate images
together and they scatter concepts on a higher level.1 Paradigms can rise or fall or shift
according to primary models and the subordinate models which support and enrich them.
For New Testament eschatology, the Kingdom o f God is the primary model linking
eschatology as paradigm and the array of models that would elucidate it.2 As indicated in
the introduction to this study, the “eschatological paradigm” is understood as being the
overall integrating worldview generated by the New Testament Kingdom of God.
With these distinctions in mind, it is further suggested that the already/not yet,
reign o f God, and horizon o f the future models most closely explicate the fundamental
‘Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourses and the Surplus of Meaning
(Fort Worth, TX: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 64; McFague, Metaphorical
Theology. 108-111; Dulles, Models of Revelation. 33-34; Snyder, 20.
2That is why any discussion of eschatology within a Christian context will
inevitably revolve around the notion of the Kingdom o f God. This century’s re
interpretation of eschatology has been fueled by its sustained biblical/theological focus on
the eschatological Kingdom o f God. See Snyder, 22-24.
While this study affirms the broad differentiations and relationships that are being
made between models, primary models, and paradigms in interpretation theory, there is
reluctance to include either metaphorical language or metaphorical interpretation. Both
Ricoeur’s and McFague’s projects highlight metaphorical language and metaphorical
interpretation in their interpretation theory. In particular, McFague defines the Kingdom
of God as the “root-metaphor" bridging the overarching eschatological paradigm and all
its supporting models (McFague, Metaphorical Theology. 109-111). Metaphors by
nature imply a double meaning where the relation between the literal meaning and the
figurative meaning is elusive, relative, and open to interpretation. Because of this, the
reality towards which the metaphor supposedly points becomes equivocal or even
paradoxical. Models and paradigms, however, assume a direct, clearly defined relation to
the reality which they express or interpret. Models and paradigms assume that reality as
truth or fact so that their agency likewise expresses reality, whereas metaphors always
leave that reality in question and open to interpretation. That is why this study prefers the
term “primary model” when referring to the Kingdom o f God. It assumes the Kingdom o f
God as a divine reality that can communicate objective truth about our human reality.
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meaning o f the Kingdom o f God as expressed by the array of models it (the Kingdom of
God) assembles and scatters as a primary model. In other words, these three models
provide the key theological images which the Kingdom of God, together with its other
supporting models, projects within the eschatological paradigm.1 Furthermore, these
three models are conceptually interwoven and complementary. They amount to a
framework that, at least in theory, can embrace the range of possible conceptions of the
Kingdom o f God. As such, they have potential for bringing hermeneutical,
epistemological, and motivational value to Christian eschatology as a paradigm for
theology and moral theory.
This study suggests, then, that like a three-stranded cord, these three models form
■Some might correctly ask, “What about the concepts of the ‘kingdom of grace,’
or the ‘kingdom o f glory’?” And “Where is the traditional theological/ethical emphasis
on the ‘indicative’ and ‘imperative’?” Furthermore, it might be asked, “Where are the
concepts o f judgment, reward, justification, and condemnation in the discussion here of
eschatology and ethics?” “In what way," it may be asked, “do the three component
models encapsule ‘key’ theological images over that of other important concepts which
we have traditionally found important?” First, this study is dealing with foundational,
methodological concerns with respect to moral theory. It is not outlining all the possible
themes apparent within Christian eschatology, nor does it need to. It is looking for those
foundational concepts which contemporary Christian ethicists have found useful in
opening eschatology most fully towards ethics. Second, these ethicists do not work in a
theological or biblical vacuum. To assert that these three component models are primary
in the context o f this century’s re-interpretation o f eschatology does not imply that other
concepts are not apparent or important or even useful, but rather that their expression has
found focus through these components. Third, these three models simply come to the
overall eschatological picture from a different angle that, in reality, is being expressed
through these other concepts. For instance, why and how does one make the distinction
between the “kingdom of grace" and the “kingdom of glory,” or determine that one is
present and the other is still coming? Is it not because of and through the reality of the
already/not y e ti And what of the indicative and the imperative? Do not both the reign o f
God and the horizon o f the future evoke the context for us to use this traditional ethical
terminology?
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the “components” o f a comprehensive eschatological paradigm for Christian ethics.1
They give rise to what has become termed by some as “eschatological ethics.” With these
distinctions and interrelation between models, primary models, and paradigms clearly in
mind, this study from now on refers to these three models as “components" of the
eschatological paradigm rather than mere “models” o f the paradigm.

Implications for Moral Theory
With the paradigm o f twentieth-century re-interpreted eschatology in view, the
question can naturally be asked as to its implications for Christian ethics. Answers to this
question are explored from three perspectives: (I) the specific ethical nuances that each of
the paradigm’s components imply; (2) the methodological nuances that the paradigm
evokes/expresses with regard to the three principles o f verification (role of Scripture, role
o f com m unity, and the nature o f social involvement); and (3) the theoretical level o f
moral reflection on which the paradigm appears to operate. Obviously, the perceived
'Dulles suggests that when working with types or models it is best to employ “a
relatively small number of types, all of which can be kept simultaneously in mind. The
typology will be more successful if the types are sharply delineated, so that their
differences are evident, and if each is capable o f being characterized by a single
orientation or metaphor that gives the key to the positions taken on a large number of
questions” (Dulles, Models o f Revelation. 26). These three component models most
closely explicate the fundamental meaning of the Kingdom of God as expressed by the
array o f models it assembles and scatters as a primary model. Whether they be biblical
models (as expressed in Christ’s parables o f four soils, tares, mustard seed, leaven,
treasure and pearl, etc.) or contemporary models constructed by theologians and ethicists
(as expressed by Snyder’s future hope, inner spiritual experience, mystical communion,
countersystem, political state, etc.) they are interpreted and/or facilitated within the
context o f these three fundamental images and what they express in relation to the
Kingdom of God. Furthermore, these three images provide the theological and
hermeneutical context that leads us toward Mott’s and Ogletree’s projects.
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moral implications of the paradigm may vary according to the unique perspectives of
differing theological traditions. For the purposes of this study, discussion is limited here
to that branch o f Protestant theology which has facilitated the paradigm’s synthesis, and
which has congealed the basic concepts assumed by Mott and Ogletree that are central to
most Protestant Christians.

Nuances of Paradigm’s Components
By way o f introduction, it might be helpful to note that each o f the paradigm’s
components generates specific ethical nuances. Within the paradigm, the already/not yet
dialectic appears as the primary point o f reference around which the reality and the
religious/moral impact o f the eschatological Kingdom o f God find expression.1 The
reign o f God and horizon o f the future, then, are closely nuanced dimensions (issues) of
the Kingdom of God that are integrated within this already/not yet dialectic. The
already/not yet gives rise to the question of the moral implications evident from the
horizon o f the coming future. In addition, it gives rise to the question o f the moral
implications highlighted by the reality of the reign o f God which has already broken into
the present. Viewed oppositely, the reign o f God and horizon o f the future motifs
explicate the crucial realms where the moral implications o f the already/not yet dialectic
are both indicated and need to be worked out for everyday life.2
'Schrage, 19.
2Moltmann and Pannenberg, however, appear to find their primary point of
reference for theology and ethics in the horizon o f the future component, while Ladd,
Hooft, and others find it in the reign o f God. One could conclude here that their works
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Already/Not yet
According to Ladd, the characteristic feature which the already/not yet brings to
Christian ethics is that ethics, like the Kingdom itself, stands in tension between present
realization and future eschatological perfection.1 It evokes an analogy between the
manifestation o f the Kingdom itself and the attainment of the moral righteousness of the
Kingdom. Perfect human righteousness, like the Kingdom itself, awaits the
eschatological consummation.2 In some sense it is attainable; in another unattainable. It
can be attained, but not in full measure.3 It is attainable qualitatively if not
quantitatively.4 In its essence, righteousness can be realized here and now, in this age,
because at bottom it is an ethics o f the inner life and assumes a radical, unqualified

actually illustrate the position being articulated in this study. Ladd, for instance, develops
very effectively the already/not yet motif before moving on toward the reign o f God. The
former leads towards the latter. Moltmann’s and Pannenberg’s focus on the future
essentially presupposes the already/not yet, and while not articulating it as such, assumes
it. Their position would not have contemporary relevance or clarity without it. In
addition, one should be reminded that Christian eschatology’s primary model is the
Kingdom o f God. Our orientation to either that o f reign or future comes because of the
biblical witness that the Kingdom is here and yet it is not here.
'Ladd, A Theology and the Kingdom o f God. 129. Ladd has congealed the basic
concepts regarding the already/not yet as has commonly been accepted by most
Protestant Christians as central to New Testament eschatology.
2Ibid. Perfect righteousness has been realized and revealed in the person and life
o f Jesus Christ, however. Justification brings His perfect righteousness to the believer,
now, in this age.
3Ibid., 131.
4Ibid., 130.
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decision for the Kingdom and Jesus Christ who embodies it.1
Braaten will add that the key concepts regarding the already/not yet are prolepsis
and approximation, participation and provisionality. Ethical actions are seen as real,
although never more than provisional representations and approximations of the
Kingdom’s ultimate qualities.2 In the overlapping of the ages then, ethical actions will
always be a paradox and in some way bring ambiguity in every act. This tension between
the ages for ethics is considered significant:
The proleptic structure o f eschatological ethics has a twofold edge. On the one
side, the futurity of the kingdom maintains a critical distance over against the
present, so that every human effort and every social form are revealed to be
imperfect and tentative approximations o f the future kingdom, giving no one any
ground for boasting before the Lord who judges all things. On the other side, the
presence o f the future kingdom in proleptic form offers a real participation in its
life, generating a vision of hope and the courage of action to change the present in
the direction o f ever more adequate approximations of the eschatological
kingdom.3
Furthermore, the already/not yet is regarded as bringing definitive imagery
through its perspective of the overlapping of the two ages.
1.

The overlapping of the ages is seen as affirming the continued reality of the

this-worldly present evil age.4 There is no hint that the present social order is to be

•Ibid., 129-133.
2Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 111.
3Ibid.
4The present evil age is seen as a self-contained life-context that is out o f sync
with and in opposition to the moral patterns of the age to come which has broken in. It is
an age whose evil social order calls for the reign o f God. It is an age that has its own god.
See Herman Ridderbos, Paul: An Outline of His Theology (Grand Rapids: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1975), 91-93.
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changed by the application of Kingdom ethics.1 Rather, the Kingdom has entered history,
but without transforming history. It has come into human society, but without purifying
society.2 The geography of this evil age is in "this world,” and is seen as including the
evil in the heart, the evil in social order, the evil in worldly powers, and the evil spiritual
powers that work through political and social bodies.3
2.

The overlapping of the ages is seen as affirming that Christian ethics is based

not on some future coming, but on the current presence of the Kingdom.4 The moral
perspective o f such ethics would be, then, not other-worldly, but this-worldly. According
to Schrage, it suggests a contemporary alternative ethic from that of the sinful praxis of

'Owen, 378.
2I.arfd- A Theology of the New Testament. 129. These are significant statements
about the presence o f the Kingdom. They guard against turning eschatology into an
ideology o f Christian social action, where the social present is under the demands o f the
social future in a one-to-one correspondence. They raise, too, the issue o f methodology
in terms o f how the eschatological Kingdom expresses its values in a fallen world. While
revolutionary in moral principle, it is not revolutionary in process. Finally, it safeguards
against inadequate ends and goals for Christian social ethics. The all-inclusive
redemptive context is maintained. In essence then, while the two ages overlap, "between
the times,” the things o f Caesar and the things o f God remain fundamentally independent
o f each other (Owen, 379). Furthermore, the eschatological Kingdom will always stand
in judgment upon all non-Christian solutions to the present moral order (Henry, The
Uneasy Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism. 42).
3Ridderbos, Paul: An Outline of His Theology. 91-93.
4Schrage, 29.
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the world.1 The point is that the future enters the present and exerts influence.2
3. The overlapping o f the ages is viewed as affirming that the powers o f evil have
been attacked and defeated. The Kingdom has entered into dynamic conflict with the
realm of Satan, and God’s reign is manifesting its powers in history and through the
church. The world, then, will feel the influence o f the Kingdom.3 This is seen as
legitimatizing and encouraging human moral effort and social action as authentic
approximations of the coming Kingdom. According to Henry, any implied futility of
trying to win all (the world) does not mean that it is futile to win some areas o f influence
and life.4
4. The already/not yet is perceived as calling Christians toward a conscious
“thinking between the times.” The fact that the individual moral agent or the Christian
Church finds itself in the moral tension and ambiguity that the already/not yet elicits
suggests there is need for a level o f moral reflection where Christians are consciously
engaged in sorting through the implications of that tension for everyday life.5

'Ibid., 46.
2Peters, 248. It is suggested that, when found, the Kingdom evokes participation,
with contemporary conduct appropriate to the coming age. The crucial point is seen as
the transformation o f the individual—a new heart, not a way of acting but a way o f being,
not works but character (Schrage, 43; Ladd, The Presence o f the Future. 292-294).
3Ladd, The Presence o f the Future. 303.
4Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism. 77.
5On the surface, the already/not yet appears to bring a mere broad outline for
moral theory and practice. And yet that seemingly inexplicit profile is considered
poignant and evocative with respect to Christian moral life. Like New Testament ethics
generally, the already/not yet appears more prescriptive and motivational than analytical
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Reign o f God
Defining the Kingdom through the dynamic idea of “rule" rather than the concrete
idea o f “realm” yields, for many, significant implications for moral theory (i.e., Christian
ethics is seen as the ethics o f the reign of God).1
1.

The reign o f God says something about the field o f Christian moral

responsibility. Is has already been noted how the reign o f God motif is viewed as proving
valuable in overcoming the dualities between the Church and the world, and between the
social and the personal. It has been noted, too, how the reign o f God is perceived as
reaching over all spheres o f human life and action so that the world, too, is clearly
affirmed as the subject of God’s dominion.2 This is understood as suggesting that the
present will o f God is made dynamically relevant to all men and all areas of human
existence, and that man and human existence everywhere is placed under the ethical
demand o f the reign o f God.3 Furthermore, the reign o f God is understood as providing a
single point o f departure for Christian personal and social ethics. It suggests that there
and descriptive with respect to practice (Schrage, 3,4). Yet there are clear points of
reference and guidelines within the New Testament witness that affirm that the
already/not yet implies specific content and criteria rather than abstract formal principles
(Schrage, 11).
‘Ladd, A Theology o f the New Testament. 128.
2Johnstone, 54.
3Ladd, The Presence o f the Future. 132,290; Johnstone, 54, 55.
Correspondingly, in principle at least, all spheres of human life and action are seen as
included within the range of Christian moral responsibility-including society and
politics. The phrase “in principle” is used because practically and functionally the ethics
of the reign o f God may be actually relevant only for those who have experienced the
reign o f God by submitting themselves to His rule.
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are not two strictly heterogeneous ethics (i.e., one for the realm o f personal relations, and
another for the secular realm o f social relations, structures and institutions).1
2.

The reign o f God is thought to reveal the essential nature and content of

Christian ethics. This is seen as coming through two perspectives: (1) the character of
God’s reign; and (2) the preaching and life of Jesus Christ. With respect to the former, if
the Kingdom is the reign o f God, then every aspect of the Kingdom must be derived from
the character and the action o f God.2 More specifically, as Ezell states, it is the character
o f the God who reigns that will determine the context of our eschatology and the
character o f our ethic.3 Here, it is suggested, lies the essential link between ethics and
eschatology—the nature, character, and action of God.4 The Kingdom as God’s rule will
be an expression of His will and values. His character and actions will have moral
authority and influence. Within this horizon o f God’s character, reign, and eschatological
activity in the present age, the essential nature of eschatological ethics comes into focus.
This focus comes because the reign o f God provides the answer to the question of what is
good—ultimately.5 Braaten asserts that the reign o f God presents us with the heart of a
'Braaten. Eschatology and Ethics. 120.
2Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament. 81. It is basilea tou theou. The
emphasis is recognized as falling on the third word, not the first. It is God’s kingly rule
that is in view.
3Ezell, 86.
“Ibid.
sBraaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 114. Jesus said, “But seek first His kingdom
even His righteousness, and all these things shall be yours as well" (Matt 6:33). Whether
one translates the kai here as adjunctive (also) or ascensive (even), God’s righteousness is

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

86
theory o f moral value which orients us toward ethical activity.1
The essential nature and content o f Christian ethics is further revealed through the
preaching and life o f Jesus Christ. Ladd asserts the impossibility o f detaching the ethics
of the reign o f God from the context of what Jesus preached and practiced.2 God’s
character, reign, and eschatological activity in the present age find concrete expression in
and through Jesus. One way o f defining eschatology, then, is by picturing the ultimate
fulfillment of the values of God revealed in Jesus Christ.3 In this connection,
eschatological ethics can be defined as the way in which the values revealed in Jesus
Christ are to be lived out in the present age.4 Jesus brings a proleptic sample of their
fulfillment in human existence.5
seen as a clear expression of His reign. To seek the one is to seek the other.
‘Ibid. It can be further asserted that the reign o f God provides us with specific and
concrete expressions of God’s righteous reign, e.g., mercy, love, justice, holiness, etc.
These concrete expressions of God’s character and eschatological activity bring more
than just paradigm and principle for the Christian moral agent to imitate and apply. They
both imply and exhibit specific moral behavior. As such they are expressions o f the
unconditional will o f God. Matt5:48; Eph4:32-5:2; 1 John 2:6; John 13:14, 15.
2Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament. 128.
3Ezell, 86.
4Ibid., 86-87. As with the expressions of the character and eschatological
activity o f God, the person and life of Jesus bring both paradigm and principle for the
Christian moral agent to imitate and apply (Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 115).
5This sample is tangible enough to bring concrete shape to the nature o f Christian
ethics between the times. As with the implications of the character and action o f God, it
can be further asserted that the paradigm and principles expressed through the life of
Jesus are far from moral abstractions. They are realities that draw one towards clearly
defined moral responsibilities. See Ezell, 85-87.
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The preaching of Jesus brings further concreteness to the shape o f eschatological
ethics. Here one is moved beyond somewhat generalized paradigm and principles
towards more clearly defined prescriptions, pronouncements, and commands. The
specific words o f Jesus are fundamental to living between the times. They express the
fact that we are not left to our human imagination as to how the reign o f God is to shape
Christian moral reflection or find practical expression in Christian moral behavior. They
determine whether or not the reign o f God is a reality in our own life.1 The reign o f God
which Jesus both preached and practiced is thus seen as providing the normative starting
point for Christian ethics.2
In summary, the characteristic feature o f eschatological ethics is viewed as the
ethics o f the reign o f God,3 and as such, according to Ladd, it will be an absolute ethics.4
It embodies the standard of righteousness which God demands of men in any age.s Here
is sufficient, specific content to bring concreteness in both visualizing and applying its
implications. In principle, then, this component o f the eschatological paradigm lends
both content and precision to Christian moral theory.
'Luke 8:4-15; John. 8:31; Matt 7:21-27.
2Braaten. Eschatology and Ethics. 105.
3Ladd. A Theology of the New Testament. 128.
4Ladd, The Presence of the Future. 290.
5Ibid., 291.
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Horizon o f the future
As noted above, the Kingdom o f God, as the Christian’s future hope, naturally
elicits a forward-looking stance, a peering into the future, an imagining o f “what will
be.”1 The practical results for Christian ethics is that this gazing towards the horizon of
“what is about to come” inevitably influences present moral life.2 This moral image of
what “will be” is seen as bringing contemporary definition to the “ought.”3 This view
from the future is seen as normatively determining the way we live in the present.4 The
present is seen as uniquely qualified by God’s own end-time purposes.5 Furthermore, the
image of the good which appears on the “horizon”6 of the future Kingdom of God is
'It is suggested that the dynamic language of the eschatological Kingdom of God
has the unique power to split our perceptions in two, so that in seeing what already exists
we can leap forward in imagination to perceive the fuller state which has not yet come
into being. This is further seen as the characteristic feature that the horizon of the future
brings to Christian ethics—leaping forward in imagination to what lies ahead until that
“not yet" evokes powerful images which bring moral value and meaning back to the
present. See Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 19.
21 John 3:1-3; 2 Pet 3:11-13; Col 3:lf; Heb 12:18-28; Titus. 2:11-14; Matt 24:4551; 25:31-46.
3In this way the horizon o f the future is perceived as bringing an essential
ingredient to Christian moral theory. For “ethics is not simply an argument about what
ought to be,” but “an almost uninterrupted argument about what is, what has been, and
what will be” (Geyer, 135).
4Kuzmic, 157.
5Alsup, 50.
6The term “horizon” is used because the proleptic presence of the Kingdom in
Jesus Christ together with the promises o f God and the coming of Holy Spirit is seen as
creating a larger vista of meaning with respect to the future. While the future has not yet
come, nor been grasped in its fullness, it is nevertheless present and can be seen as though
it were from a distance on the horizon. There is a horizon of meaning stemming from the
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understood as defining the ultimate horizon for all ethical statements.1
In the context of the already/not yet, the horizon o f the future is, therefore, seen
as a call to “being alive to God’s endtime work in the present.”2 Here ethics is identified
by its most important valuation: God is at work in you!3 Here ethics is seen as the “arena
where the God of the endtime is at work to accomplish endtime goals in the present."4
This component of the eschatological paradigm then, in its most basic biblical
orientation, is understood as an invitation to ethical consciousness and the discovery of
God’s end-time purposes for one’s life, the church, and society.s

coming future.
'Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God. 111.
2Alsup, 50.
3Ibid., 49.
4Ibid., 44. This would suggest for some that fundamentally eschatological ethics
is not an ethic o f morality based either deontologically, teleologically, or situationally.
Rather it is a relational ethic where we hear, believe, surrender to, and live God’s endtime will and word of promise through His presence in our lives. It is an ethic of the
realities o f God’s presence and reign (see Ezell, 85). There is a tendency, however,
towards identifying only general or ultimate Christian values and norms, rather than
specific concrete moral directions. It can be asserted that the biblical imagery of moral
states in the final consummation, together with the life and Word o f Jesus and the New
Testament picture of Christian lifestyle “between the times,” can bring substantial
normative specificity to what God’s end-time purposes are. Since the eschatological
consummation is in reality the restoration o f all things, the biblical perspective of
creation, imago dei, fall, and redemption can likewise facilitate meaning and specificity
to these purposes (Schuurman, Creation. Eschaton. and Ethics. 1-12, 149-174; Childs,
347-360). In this way Christian hope leads to Christian practice for which we are not left
to our imagination as to what it should include.
5Schuurman. Creation. Eschaton. and Ethics. 1-12, 149-174; Childs, 347-360.
What God is ultimately against we must stand against in His power. What God is
ultimately for we must stand for in His strength (Ezell, 95).
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These principal implications o f the horizon o f the future have been pushed further,
however, toward perspectives that see our view o f the future as a call to participation on
the journey toward the future.1 Here Christians are called to anticipatory living that
produces proleptic lifestyle.2 This future-oriented ethics becomes essentially
“eschatopraxis" (i.e., doing the future now ahead o f time).3 At bottom this means: (1) a
fundamental openness to the future o f new things;4 (2) that man is free towards
experiencing and facilitating that open future;5 (3) that Christian ethics should be an
ethics o f change that extends to the area of social relationships and societal structures;6
‘Kuzmic, 157.
2Ibid.
3Das, 81.
4Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 52.
5Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom o f God. 69.
6Kuzmic, 157, 158. This focus on change and an open future, which the horizon
o f the future is inferred to have, appears to open the way toward relativism. Gustafson
correctly noted the problem when he said: “The current celebration of the openness
toward the future is proper insofar as it recognizes that the God whose will one seeks to
discern for the future is the God who has willed in the past. Much of this celebration
refers primarily to human attitude in any case, and as such is insufficient to determine
what men ought to be doing in a particular instant. Attitude alone does not determine act.
To be open to the future is not to discern what one ought to do in it” (James M.
Gustafson, Theology and Christian Ethics [Philadelphia: United Church Press, 1974],
118). Gustafson also noted that “it is a theological interpretation o f ‘the world’ from
which a basic orientation toward life can be derived but which provides no significant
bases theologically, historically, or naturally for the guidance of human action” (James
M. Gustafson, Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective: Theology and Ethics, vol. I
[Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981], 48). Rendtorff states that “serious
reservations must be voiced against. . . attempts to form a normative eschatological
ethics, because the distinction between ethical criteria for human life and action and
religious goals that transcend human action could not and cannot be defined” (Trutz
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and (4 ) that future realities should motivate us to work toward their greater realization on
earth.1 The point is that, belief in the absolute future which God brings will not make one
indifferent to the present reality, but such an eschatological perspective enables and
empowers one to work in the world with seriousness and particularity.2 Christians surely
can initiate some significant changes in the world as they proclaim and live out the values
visualized on the horizon o f the future?
The intent in all this is to enable responsible Christian social action as well as
Rendtorff. Ethics vol. 1 [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986], 186).
This criticism o f specificity and concreteness has been vigorously debated. It is
asserted that the eschatological perspective stemming from the horizon o f the future does
not provide proximate norms and principles, but rather ultimate Christian norms o f love
and justice (Das, 86). The rubric of the ontological priority of the future is asserted as
obviating strict relativism both inside and outside theological ethics because it provides
“essential” evidence o f “the good” in the structures o f existence and as proleptically
present in Christ (Childs, 409-414). There has been discussion, too, about it providing
“middle axioms” which are neither too general nor too particular, but which provide a
conceptual bridge between the ultimate and proximate, and allow interplay between that
which is absolute and relative (Childs, 414-423; Das, 86). Some assert, though, that the
open-endedness that the “horizon of the future" is pressed towards cannot provide even
“middle axioms” (Das, 86). We need to appreciate, however, what this nuanced
perspective o f the horizon o f the future can provide us for ethical thinking and doing in
terms o f attitude and orientation. The challenge comes in keeping it in balance by the
specificity and concreteness which the biblical picture provides.
'Kuzmic, 158. On balance, this perspective of eschatological ethics is not
understood as the means o f producing the future Kingdom o f God, but only as an
annunciation, anticipation, and approximation. Eschatological ethics becomes the “signs
o f the coming Kingdom.” The coming o f the Kingdom in its priority and power is simply
seen as the possibility and invitation of doing God’s will on earth today (see Braaten,
Eschatology and Ethics. 110-111). The ambiguity of language used, however, can lead
toward confusion, and the views expressed have in fact blurred the distinction between
human and divine effort with regard to the coming of the Kingdom.
2Das, 83.
3Kuzmic, 158.
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evangelism. Yet, it has often been pushed beyond this broad orientation towards
philosophical and sociological perspectives which include liberation theologies' and other
revolutionary perceptions o f change.2 Here moral action in the light of the future is
social/political action which will bring about justice.3 Significant concerns naturally arise
in the context of this subtle shift from biblical specificity, priorities, and spiritual
dynamics o f Christian moral theory towards a more secular, philosophical moral theory
which works within a Christian context and uses Christian verbiage.

Principles of Verification
The methodological nuances that the paradigm evokes/expresses with regard to
the earlier stated three principles of verification—role o f Scripture, role of community,
and the nature o f social involvement—lend further insight into the implications that it has
for moral theory.4 Here one gets a sense for how effectively the paradigm answers the

'Peters, 263.
2Braaten, The Future o f God. 141-166; Moltmann, Theology o f Hope. 32-36, 304338. See also. Jurgen Moltmann. Religion. Revolution and the Future (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1969), 129-147, where he speaks of a revolutionary
consciousness.
3Das, 82. We work for political changes (however aggressively) in the light o f the
future because it involves the future of the essence o f humanity. The Kingdom is seen as
“pointedly political” (Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom o f God. 80) and hope for
the future as necessarily including “political hope" (McKeating, 62). See also
Pannenberg, Ethics. 133, 191; Robert W. Jenson, “Eschatological Politics and Political
Eschatology,” Dialog 8 (Autumn 1969): 272-278. This fusing o f the biblical
eschatological horizon with the philosophical horizon o f modem secular futurity
expresses the desire to directly aim Christian moral theory towards the secular world and
not toward the Church alone (Peters, 241; Braaten, The Future of God. 23-32 passim).
4See above, 18-24.
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crisis o f “authority” and “relevance" in Christian ethics. They can explore, too, whether
the paradigm influences or is influenced by presuppositions regarding these significant
issues within contemporary Christian moral dialogue. In addition, one is able to raise
questions o f foundations and presuppositions. In other words, is the eschatological
paradigm, or one’s orientation to it, rooted in philosophy, philosophical ethics, social
moral agenda, biblical theology, the community (tradition), or some hybrid of these?

Role o f Scripture
Issues of revelation and the use of Scripture have been at the very heart of the
eschatology/ethics dialogue. They have played an important part in both the re-discovery
and re-shaping of eschatology in this century.1 This can be observed from two
interrelated perspectives: (1) how Scripture and/or presuppositions regarding Scripture
'Johnstone, 52; Gulley, 22-36. The role of Scripture in the eschatology/ethics
question has been a checkered one throughout Christian history. Some readers may
wonder why this study has not made mention of either the Old Testament or Divine Law,
or made an issue of divine revelation much earlier in my account of the history of
theological ethics in relation to eschatology. By default, they may be saying, it is
conceding to an ethics that is searching for its ground outside the law and explicit
revelation of God. The fact of the matter is that that has been true for some involved in
the eschatology/ethics question. This survey, however, for the most part is merely stating
where others are. The majority of those working with Christian eschatology, however,
have perceived themselves as working in the context o f God’s revelation in Scripture.
Furthermore, the question of revelation or theological foundations is not the point of
question at this point in this study. It is dealing mainly with background issues here.
Questions of biblical and theological foundations are discussed in the evaluation in
chapter 5. At this point, however, it would be helpful to be aware that these issues exist
and perhaps ask the question as to which ideology stands behind the use of Scripture both
in the formation and application o f eschatology as paradigm; liberal theology (Bultmann),
neo-Marxism (Bloch), a hybrid of liberal/Marxist (Troeltsch), or conservative
Evangelical (Henry, Ladd), Catholic, etc.? The paradigm as conceived through the 1970s
has been influenced in part or whole by each.
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have influenced the paradigm’s development and subsequent ethical implications; and (2)
how the paradigm itself nuances the role Scripture and/or presuppositions regarding
Scripture in developing and/or articulating Christian moral theory. For the purposes of
this study, we will be exploring patterns and directions so as to understand the broad
picture regarding these issues through the 1970s. The terms Scripture/Paradigm and
Paradigm/Scripture are used respectively for the above two perspectives, both for
purposes o f differentiation and brevity.
The Scripture/Paradigm relation has paralleled closely the “eschatologicaloriented ethics7”ethical-oriented eschatology” approaches I have outlined above.1
Ethical-oriented eschatology has generally employed Scripture in a subordinated role
with respect to its development and in outlining issues, solutions, and praxis. It has
interpreted eschatology through a theology o f revelation “from below" in the function of a
theology o f experience in history.2 It has tended to be an inductive method which
proceeds from the context o f concrete ethical exigencies.3 Scripture in ethical-oriented
eschatology has often been merely a source of moral images or a shaper of moral identity
rather than an ultimate authority through which norms are provided either as specific
rules or as general principles or presuppositions. Here, too, Scripture has been employed
as sanction for making eschatology a chief warrant for social action.4
'See 47-54 above.
2Johnstone, 52.
3Ibid., 53.
4Dahl, 375.
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On the other hand, eschatological-oriented ethics has generally kept Scripture in a
prominent role with respect to its development and outlining issues, solutions, and praxis.
On a functional level, however, this prominence reflects multifarious views o f revelation
and disparate perceptions with regard to the actual role Scripture should/does play. The
dominant backdrop in the re-discovery and re-shaping of eschatology in this century with
respect to Scripture has been historical-critical theology.1 The most basic underlying
presuppositions informing this methodology evoke a practical “remoteness to the Bible"2
even while bringing apparent focus and illumination toward specified biblical texts or
themes.3
'Gulley, 22-30; Carl F. H. Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, vol. 2 (Waco,
TX: Word Books, Publisher, 1976), 283-305; idem, Christian Personal Ethics. 549-572;
Hutter, 36; Hiers, Jesus and Ethics: Dahl, 374-375; Paul S. Minear, “Christian
Eschatology and Historical Methodology,” in Neutestamentliche Studien fur Rudolf
Bultmann. ed. W. Eltester (Berlin: Alfred Topelmann, 1957), 15-23.
2Eta Linnemann, “Historical-Critical and Evangelical Theology,” Journal of
Adventist Theological Society 5, no. 2 (1994): 23.
3It is not within the scope o f this dissertation to discuss in depth the pros and cons
of historical-critical theology or methodology, but to simply outline broadly its link and
implications with respect to the Scripture/Paradigm question at hand. In addition, it is not
maintaining that historical-critical methodology has no positive results whatsoever to
show for its labors. Certainly many useful, detailed investigations have been produced.
The recognition of the importance o f eschatology in the New Testament is one such
example, as well as the huge strides toward understanding biblical thought in its own
terms (Linnemann, 29; Minear, 16). Nevertheless, those positive contributions are
usually impaired because they are closely connected with underlying presuppositions
which in effect subordinate Scripture and faith to reason and science.
For instance, its principles o f correlation, analogy, and criticism tend towards
disunity o f Scripture with a “culturally-conditioned" nature and which contains, but does
not equal, the Word o f God (see Richard M. Davidson, “Revelation/Inspiration in the Old
Testament: A Critique of Alden Thompson’s Tncamational’ Model,” in Adventist
Theological Society Occasional Papers, ed Frank Holbrook and Leo Van Dolson,
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The impact o f historical-critical theology can be seen in the “one-sided
eschatologies”1which either focus primarily on the past,2 the present,3 or the future.4
This one-sidedness can be seen as well in the eschatological Christologies that have
developed.5 Each of these eschatologies and eschatological Christologies projects images
of the history and the eschaton different from the one the Bible foresees. This century’s
revelation-and-history debate illustrates, too, the marginal way Scripture often actually
factors into the development o f the eschatological paradigm.6
[Berrien Springs, MI: Adventist Theological Society Publications, 1992], 106-110; and
Gerhard F. Hasel, Biblical Interpretation Today [Lincoln, NE: College View Press, 1985],
73-99). This approach essentially relativizes Scripture and influences the way Scripture
is actually handled (see Eta Linnemann, Historical Criticism of the Bible [Grand Rapids:
Baker Book House, 1990], 84-85). Furthermore, it views Scripture as “text” which
requires interpretation and allows critical reason to decide what is reality in the Bible and
what cannot be reality (see Linnemann, Historical Criticism of the Bible. 87-88; and
Gulley, 23-29).
‘See Gulley, 29.
2E.g., Dodd’s “realized eschatology.”
3E.g., Bultmann’s “existential eschatology.”
4E.g., Pannenberg/Moltmann’s “proleptic eschatology."
sE.g., Schweitzer and Barth, both who ultimately ended without eschatologies
themselves (see Gully, 26, 30).
6Henry, God. Revelation and Authority. 281-334. Some suggest, however, that
the paradigm New Testament eschatology brings to theology and ethics has actually
brought about some limits to the operation of historical-critical reasoning (Minear, 17).
Responsible studies o f New Testament eschatology are said to have produced great strain
on its presuppositions and methodology. Biblical attitudes toward time and history have
been outlined which not only claim to be true, but which also commend themselves with
increasing power. The entire historical-critical hermeneutical system, it has been said,
has thus been placed in question (Minear, 19-20). However, while Scripture appears to
be bringing supposed limits, these limits have not yet been satisfactorily delineated, nor
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Eschatological-oriented ethics, however, has also included some serious
exegetical and theological studies where Scripture has played a significant, formative role
in the paradigm’s development. This is reflected in this century’s revival of “biblical
theology” which sets forth the message of Scripture in its historical setting and which
seeks to expound its meaning in its own historical setting, and its own terms, categories,
and thought.1 Here the themes o f the already/not yet and the reign o f God have been
worked out with an exegetical and theological precision that has kept Scripture in the
forefront.2 In fact, these two paradigm components have proven invaluable in both
orienting and nuancing the developing eschatological paradigm. Their own biblical focus
as components o f the overarching paradigm has provided an important base for the
priority o f Scripture in the paradigm as a whole.3
With respect to Paradigm/Scripture—-how the paradigm nuances the role of
Scripture in developing and/or articulating Christian moral theory—some broad patterns
can likewise be noted.
have they produced sufficient reexamination of the historical-critical method itself
(Minear, 17). We would suggest that the literature during this period affirms the reality
that the Scripture/paradigm question remains in an unpredictable transition.
‘Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament. 19-33.
2This is represented most clearly in Ladd’s A Theology of the New Testament as
well as in the works o f Thielicke, Berkouwer, and Ridderbos.
3It has already been noted, however, how the horizon o f the future, while
reflecting an important biblical thematic, has been nuanced predominately by neoMarxist philosophy and hermeneutics. Because o f this, its potential for bringing a strong
Scriptural influence in the formation of the paradigm has been threatened and undermined
significantly.
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1. It can generally be asserted that an eschatological-oriented ethics will tend to
be more Scriptural than an ethical-oriented eschatology. The paradigm where Scripture
has been used only marginally, subordinate^, or pragmatically as sanction with respect to
its development, will naturally display marginal, subordinate, or pragmatic nuances with
respect to Scripture in its practical application for moral theory.
2. Just as the eschatological-oriented ethics approach shows diversity with respect
to the actual functional role of Scripture in the development of the eschatological
paradigm, one would expect that that same diversity be apparent in their respective
practical application o f Scripture for moral theory. This is just the case. The paradigm as
conceived and articulated from the standpoint of historical-critical theology appears to
use Scripture or influence the use o f Scripture in ways similar to those of the ethicaloriented eschatology approach. Scripture is relativized and used as a source o f ultimate
Christian norms, rather than an ultimate authority which can bring proximate norms and
principles.1 But where the paradigm has been conceived and articulated from the
standpoint o f biblical theology and exegesis, it appears to use Scripture or influence the
use o f Scripture in a way in which Scripture maintains an authoritative, assertive role in
the process of application. With respect to concreteness and specificity, historical-critical
theology and methodology evokes an approach which “wholly relativizes the past and the
present" and, hence, is “remarkably thin” when compared with the wealth of biblical

'Das, 86.
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specifics.1 The biblical theology and exegetical approach, however, appears to elicit a
clearer intentional dialogue with Scripture with respect to given social issues, solutions,
and praxis.
The role Scripture has played in the eschatology/ethics question—both in the
formation and application o f eschatology as a paradigm for theology and ethics—has been
a checkered one. Its role has been significantly influenced by various and often opposing
theological and ideological perspectives.2 As implied above, the Scripture/Paradigm and
Paradigm/Scripture questions during this time were seen as remaining in an
unpredictable transition.3 For some, the direction o f this transition was clearly seen as a
move away again from Scripture as being the fundamental frame of reference for both
doing ethics and reflecting on eschatology.4

Role o f Christian community
The Church sits conceptually at the very core o f the eschatology/ethics question.5
The role which it assumes in eschatological ethics has revolved around three fundamental
issues: (1) as a source o f moral authority; (2) the field of moral operation; and (3) its
'Henry, God. Revelation and Authority. 283-305.
2E.g., liberal theology (Bultmann), neo-Marxism (Bloch), hybrid liberal/Marxist
views (Troeltsch), conservative Evangelical (Henry, Ladd), Catholic, etc.
3Minear, 20.
4See Johnstone, 52.
5This is observable in the theologies of the principle participants in the
eschatology/ethics dialogue.
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linkage with the ethical needs/agenda of the larger human society. Related issues include
the dualities of Christian social and personal ethics, and the relationship between
evangelism and social responsibility in terms of mission.1 The role of the Christian
community is organically linked, too, with the question o f the nature of social
involvement.
1.

As with Scripture, the role of the Christian community has both influenced,

and been influenced by, this century’s emerging eschatological paradigm.
Rauschenbusch recognized early on that the most decisive fact in transforming the
substance o f primitive New Testament eschatology has been the Church itself.2 Decades
later, Dulles affirmed this fact by tracing more clearly how one’s ecclesioiogy clearly
influences one’s eschatology.3 During this century the paradigm’s implied ecclesioiogy
has often served as a barometer o f the adequacy o f the paradigm itself. In this respect,
too, presuppositions with regard to the Church’s authority (tradition and/or living
community) in relation to Scripture have had defining roles for the paradigm as well.4
'The discussion here o f ecclesioiogy has been intentionally limited to those areas
which illuminate most obviously the ethical perspectives o f the eschatological paradigm.
2Rauschenbusch, 222. See above, “Eschatology and Ethics before the TwentiethCentury,” 33-44.
3See Avery Dulles’ discussion of “Church and Eschatology” in Models of the
Church. 103-122. There are as many ecclesiologies in currency as there are
eschatologies, and the possible relationships are numerous. Dulles suggests the different
ways eschatology is influenced by the institutional, mystical communion, sacramental,
herald, and servant models o f the church.
4It appears that the issue o f the role of the Christian community as authority in the
eschatological paradigm has followed (mirrored) this century’s theological trends in both
ecclesioiogy and revelation/inspiration. See Avery Dulles, “The Church: Bearer of
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Correspondingly, how the Church’s “ethical nature” has been understood has
naturally depended on one’s own understanding of history, eschatology, and the
Kingdom.1 For some, the eschatological paradigm, in principle at least, is said to project
the doctrine o f the Church as beginning with the Kingdom of God, rather than with the
Church.2 In this way the eschatological Kingdom is seen as markedly imprinting its
implications on the moral reality and the role o f community.3 The result has been that
ecclesioiogy has become the servant o f eschatology. Ecclesioiogy has become a crucial
factor in articulating and expressing the moral implications evoked through the
eschatological paradigm.
Furthermore, the general trend in eschatology/ethics through this century has been
Revelation” and “Revelation and Eschatology," in Models of Revelation. 211-227, 228245. In these chapters Dulles outlines the complex relationship between the various
models o f the church (institutional, mystical communion, sacramental, herald, and
servant) and the various models o f revelation (doctrine, history, inner experience,
dialectical presence, and new awareness) together with their implications for eschatology.
'Hutter, 28.
2Pannenberg, “The Kingdom o f God and the Church," 8.
3See Ladd, “The Kingdom and the Church,” in A Theology of the New Testament.
105-119; Braaten, "The Prolepsis o f a New World-Church, in The Future o f God. 109MO. Ladd makes five basic points concerning the relationship between the Kingdom and
the Church: (1) the Church is not the Kingdom; (2) the Kingdom creates the Church; (3)
the Church witnesses to the Kingdom; (4) the Church is the instrument o f the Kingdom;
and (5) the Church is the custodian o f the Kingdom. Braaten suggests that the
eschatological character of the message which the Church transmits relativizes all its
structures, doctrines, or traditions. Nothing in and o f the Church can be exempt from the
criticism that emanates from the eschatological word of God’s Kingdom.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

102
to fuse the theological and ethical within the practice of the Church.' The result has been
that, functionally, the Church community has played an increasingly significant and
authoritative role. This has been true both in the frame o f reference with which the
eschatological perspective is being interpreted, and in the development o f moral theory as
the application o f the paradigm.2 In fact, the Christian community has emerged as a
principal source o f authority with respect to the praxis o f the paradigm for contemporary
ethical exigencies. The Christian community has become the norminative, creative
sphere where issues o f specificity and praxis with regard to the paradigm’s ultimate
Christian norms are both shaped and worked out conceptually.
2.

Organically linked with the above question of authority, the eschatological

paradigm is viewed as projecting the Christian community as its fundamental field of
moral operation.3 Whether this is so exclusively, principally, or initially has been
vigorously debated. For some, the proleptic impact o f the Kingdom belongs strictly to
the Church. For others, it belongs to the Church, for sure, but to the world as well.4
Nevertheless, the Christian community has been seen as the “product o f the powers o f the
'Johnstone, 84, 85,48. This locating of theological reflection within ethical
consciousness supposedly frees the Church from the limitations of pregiven, supposedly
normative for all, theological patterns. It also supposedly enables creative Christian
solutions to concrete questions o f moral responsibility.
2Ibid., 85.
3The “ekklesia” is the eschatological community called out from the “world.”
“The Church is not only a place where the great eschatological realities are announced. It
is itself an eschatological fact” (Visser ‘t Hooft, 96).
4Yoder and Pannenberg respectively (see Peters, 251-252).
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Age to Come,1 and as a society of men under the dynamic reign or kingly rule of God.2 It
has been viewed as the community of the Kingdom—those who enter it, live under it, and
are governed by it3 — and as such display in an empirical way the moral reality of God’s
invisible Kingdom.4
Furthermore, some have concluded that, if it is true that there can be no Kingdom
without a Church, then a “concrete social context" is intrinsic to the purposes o f the
Kingdom.5 Only as being somehow set apart from society as a kind of “counter-society"
of its own can the Church be the Church. Only thus can she act appropriately to her
ethical nature.6 For some this means that the Church is the heuristic location from
whence God’s acting in the world can be perceived.7 It also means that the Church
represents in its own social life (as a paradigmatic social-ethical reality) a prefiguration o f
'Ladd, A Theology o f the New Testament. 542.
2Ladd, The Presence of the Future. 262.
3Ibid.
4Ladd, A Theology o f the New Testament. 112.
Tbid., 119.
6John Howard Yoder, “The Otherness o f the Church," The Mennonite Quarterly
Review (October 1961): 286-296. “The Church’s responsibility to and for the world is
first and always to be the Church" (ibid., 293). “The visible distinctness o f Church and
world . . . was a particular, structurally appropriate way, and the most effective way, to be
responsible" (ibid., 287). See also Hutter, 33, on Rauschenbusch’s “socializing of the
soul” (Rauschenbusch, 99).
7Yoder. The Politics of Jesus. 159.
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the Kingdom.1 Furthermore, it is implied, through its common life, the Christian
community is guided in discerning what the Christian moral life entails.2 The Church is
enabled with regard to “practical moral reasoning” whereby particular moral choices are
worked through by means o f here-and-now thought processes. The ecclesiological
dynamics o f the eschatological paradigm have also been interpreted as having significant
ecumenical potential and imperative.3
3.

There is the question of the community’s linkage with the ethical needs/agenda

o f the larger human society. While it is generally accepted that the eschatological
community {ekklesia) is set apart as a distinct social organization, that fact has not been
seen as necessarily implying that the horizon o f the Church’s moral perception and action
is coextensive with that o f its organizational limits. On the contrary, the inherent nature
o f the Church in relation to the Kingdom is regarded as implying "the imperative o f
having as a limited organization a universal impact.”4 The essential nature of this
“universal impact,” however, is still an open discussion. For sure it includes that of
'Hutter, 45.
2LeMasters, 267. See also John Howard Yoder, “The Hermeneutics of
Peoplehood,” Journal o f Religious Ethics 10 (Spring 1982): 40-67, reprinted in The
Priestly Kingdom (Notre Dame, IN: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1984), 15-45.
3Johnstone, 48; Pannenberg, Ethics. 17. “From the beginning of the Ecumenical
Movement until our own day, this [eschatology] is the underlying theme to which we are
forced back again and again” (Visser ‘t Hooft, as quoted by Johnstone, 47).
4Hutter, 33. The truth is that the Church can only be understood completely in its
relation to the World (Pannenberg, “The Kingdom and the Church,” 3).
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prophetic witness and critic over against that of the world o f the secular community.1 But
some would go beyond and see the Church as having a shared moral experience and task
with the world of man outside its formal structures.2 They view eschatology as
delineating the Christian community as the transforming agent of the secular community.
They assert that there can be little doubt but that the eschatological Kingdom
unequivocally demands social responsibility.3
'Yoder affirms that the paradigm asserts that the Church is to speak to the World
in God’s name, not only in evangelism but in ethical judgment as well (Yoder, "The
Otherness o f the Church,” 287). See Henry, The Uneasy Conscience o f Modem
Fundamentalism. 76, 79; Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1968), 374-377; idem, Human Nature. Election, and History
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), 31,37, 67, 81.
2Johnstone, 84. It is maintained that while the Church and the World remain two
visible realities, they nevertheless have one and the same Lord (Yoder, “The Otherness of
the Church,” 287, 288). Visser ‘t Hooft asserts that “the Lord o f the Church is the Lord of
the World” (Visser‘t Hooft, 59). He further states that the “Church and world have . . . a
great deal in common. Both have the same Lord. Both live in the light o f the same
victory o f Christ over the powers o f sin and death
The Church is the inner circle, the
world the outer circle, but both together are the realm over which Christ is King” (ibid.,
119, 120); as well as, “the ‘Lord rules already outside as well as inside the Church and . . .
he uses the worldly powers for his purpose’" (ibid., 122). Pannenberg writes that the
Kingdom (through the Church) is as leaven in the world, and that because of this, there is
a shared future on the horizon. He sees the Kingdom of God as the future of the whole
world” (Pannenberg, “The Kingdom of God and the Church,” 4).
3The nature of that social responsibility, however, remains ambiguous. At this
point in this study, however, it can be noted that, for many, the paradigm definitely
evokes social responsibility. It can also be noted here that, for those who understand the
Church’s nature as essentially ethical, and its relation to the Kingdom as exclusively
functional, there is a tendency towards blurring the spiritual/moral dynamics of the
eschatological Kingdom with the social ethical needs/agenda of the world at large
(Hutter, 27-35). Additionally, it can be noted that there is danger that the man-centered
quality o f earlier Liberal theology—which had focused on humanity as a whole—may find
renewed expression through an eschatologically nuanced ecclesioiogy. If so,
ecclesioiogy in essence would be secularized! See Johnstone, 61.
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The components of the paradigm appear to bring varied but complementary
nuances with respect to the role of the Christian community. The already/not yet has
been recognized as affirming the reality that the Church has a dual character (i.e., that she
belongs to two ages).1 In doing so, this component asserts both the Christian
community’s moral uniqueness and moral distinctiveness over that of the larger secular
community. It does so in a way, however, that does not isolate the Church from the
world. This component is understood as well as affirming the Christian community as
the principal field o f operation for the outworking o f the moral implications o f the
Kingdom of God.
The reign o f God is thought to conceptually extend the moral parameters o f the
believing community more clearly toward that o f the larger world community. It does so,
however, with important qualification. (1) The supposed de facto reign exists in this age
only when men submit themselves to the divine rule.2 This would again affirm the
community o f faith as the principal field for the outworking of the moral implications of
the divine reign. (2) God’s dynamic reign invades the present age without transforming
it into the age to come.3 This implies that there are fundamental limitations or parameters
with regard to the actual moral role/impact the Christian community is to/will have in the
world as a socio-ethical entity. Nevertheless, God’s invading reign is understood as
'Ladd, A Theology o f the New Testament. 115.
2Ladd. The Presence o f the Future. 132, 137, 138.
Tbid., 149.
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concerned with the total man and with the conquest o f evil in whatever form it manifests
itself. This includes the evils that bring misery and suffering on the physical and social
level.1 Here the paradigm presents for the community an incipient theology which needs
closer study and attention.2
The horizon o f the future has been perceived as providing vision and motivational
value for both the moral reasoning and praxis o f the community. It is seen as a call to
ethical consciousness and application. In a sense, it is claimed, “everything in the Church
of Christ is dominated by the ‘not yet.’"3 To be in the Christian community is to be
oriented toward that final goal. The Church aims at that which comes afterwards.4 And
as this “horizon o f the future" is proleptically realized within the community—as a
paradigmatic social-ethical reality—it is both mirrored and illustrated through the
Christian community for the secular community. Thus the secular community is seen as
confronted with the moral dynamics of the horizon o f the future. Where the horizon o f
the future is perceived as encompassing both that of biblical eschatology and secular
futurology, the Christian community is challenged to take up, criticize, and advance the
futurological tendencies of the modem world within the horizon of an eschatological
concept o f the future.5
'Ibid., 303, 304.
2Ibid., 304.
3Visser ‘t Hooft, 98.
“Ibid., 99.
5Braaten, The Future of God. 27.
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Nature o f social involvement
The issue o f social involvement has likewise been an integral part o f this
century’s re-interpretation o f eschatology. It has been recognized as a significant
contemporary issue o f “eschatopraxis” in Christian ethics.1 During this century, there has
been a persistent inclination to find a this-age significance in the New Testament
eschatology and, therewith, the justification for a substantial social ethic.2 The problem
has been that, traditionally, the obligation of the Church to the world was seen as limited
to evangelism, intercession, and exemplification o f the true society as a model for
unregenerate society. Only the eschaton, it was thought, would deal with social ills,
structures, and patterns.3 Furthermore, there appeared to be little explicit teaching on
social ethics in the Gospels.4 Additionally, Christianity in the early part of this century
had essentially left eschatology behind as it entered the field of social ethics.5 In the
‘Johnstone, 47-85; Dahl, 375; Das, 63-86.
2Amos N. Wilder, “Biblical Hermeneutic and American Scholarship," in
Neutestamentliche Studien fur Rudolf Bultmann. ed. W. Eltester (Berlin: Alfred
Topelmann, 1957), 25.
3Wilder, Kervema. Eschatology and Ethics. 9.
4Ladd, The Presence o f the Future. 303. Ladd suggests that this may be due to the
fact that social ethics must be an outworking of a properly grounded personal ethics. See
Pannenberg’s discussion o f the individual in relation to the community, “Social
Predicament and Human Responsibility," in Human Nature. Election, and History. 28-41.
5Writing in 1953, Heinz-Dietrich Endland wrote, “Thirty years ago, if someone
had asked what the relevance o f eschatology was for social ethics, he would have
received a rather knowing smile and the retort that Christianity had fortunately gone
beyond eschatology into the field o f ethics." Eschatology was essentially left out o f the
horizon for Christian social ethics. See Heinz-Dietrich Wendland, “The Relevance of
Eschatology for Social Ethics,” The Ecumenical Review 5, no. 4 (July 1953): 364.
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process it secularized both the Gospel and the Church. There came, then, a recognized
need to have Christian social ethics both validated and balanced by a proper eschatology.1
But what shape or form should Christian social involvement thus take?
The moral implications o f the eschatological paradigm have seen three broad
models with respect to this question o f the Christian social involvement.
1. There is what has been termed the soft revolution. This is the more quiet
ministry o f practical mercy (e.g., child care centers, orphanages, nursing and health-care
establishments, schools, prison ministries, food kitchens, community services and welfare
programming, etc.).2 These ministries are seen as legitimate expressions of Christian
social concern and responsibility. They are part of the caring function of the Church.
Here social responsibility exhibits direct and visible involvement in the social concerns of
this present age. These quiet ministries o f mercy are viewed as serving the important role
o f a subsidiary, temporary substitute for the social-political community that is either
inadequate or uninterested in certain social needs and concerns.3
2. There is what has been termed the hard revolution. This includes a radical
activism where the Church aggressively engages the existing establishment.4 The goal is
"'Today we need to move in the opposite direction, away from a social ethic
which had its roots in a secular, autonomous, idealistic or humanistic outlook, away even
from a ‘Christian sociology’ back into the realm of eschatology” (ibid.).
2Braaten. Eschatology and Ethics. 153.
3Ibid., 153,154.
4This model includes the Christian community using power politics, public
protests, and revolutionary methodology against the existing establishment which either
creates or maintains social ills.
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political and social liberation.1 This hard revolution presses for transformation in the
foundations o f the social system—whether economical, political, moral, or religious.2 It is
driven by the perception that the social present is under the demands o f the social future.3
It is to be achieved as the eschatological community provides the new social pattern to
the present. Thus, eschatology becomes an aggressive transforming agent o f the world
through the eschatological community.
A gentler form of the hard revolution consists in taking up, criticizing, and
advancing the futurological tendencies in the modem world within an eschatological
concept of the future.4 This includes a “theology o f revolution" which posits the Church
as the agent ultimately responsible for the revolutionary consciousness that is emerging
around the world.s The Christian community is seen as the mediator who plays a creative
and healing role in the often tragic tension between the old and the new.6 This model
presents the Christian community with a choice. It can join the often wrenching forces of

'Peters, 256-264.
2Moltmann, Religion. Revolution and the Future. 131.
3I.e., “The society of the existing order must be patterned, now, after the
community of ‘that other’ order.” See Petty, 185.
4Braaten, The Future o f God. 27.
sIbid., 142-145. This responsibility for revolutionary consciousness is viewed as
coming through its gospel preaching. This theology of revolution seeks to help the
Church understand revolution, not to win a political contest as such, but because it cannot
escape responsibility for the outcome. It sees our century as a century of revolutions,
which the Church has both indirectly sponsored and is in need of guiding.
6Ibid.
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moral/social/political inertia and reaction, or it can cooperate with, encourage, and lead
those in society who hope and act for a better future for mankind on earth.1
3.

There is the model of social responsibility. Here, in addition to the caring

functions o f the soft revolution model, the eschatological community is called to express
its total opposition to all moral evils, whether societal or personal, both within its own
community and within the larger society.2 By dealing with moral issues rather than
political issues, this protest can be expressed in a fundamentally positive way.3 In
addition to this moral protest, there is the active involvement and personal influence of
individuals in the social arena itself.4 Both these means—moral protest and personal
influence—have the potential to affect significantly some areas of influence and life
‘Ibid., 161. There are obvious problems with both the soft and hard revolution
models. The former, while appropriate and significant, does not deal adequately with the
root moral and social evils o f which the problems it ministers toward are merely
symptomatic. The latter is delusive, and often expresses a radical theory that tends
toward secularizing Christian eschatology. It is often merely sanctioning the actions of
radicals and revolutionaries. This hard revolution model likewise pollutes social action
by giving it an apologetic twist, i.e., using Christian social action to prove the relevance
of Christianity (Dahl, 375). In addition, inadequate non-Christian ends and nonredemptive methodology are often uncritically accepted for pragmatic reasons (Henry,
The Uneasv Conscience o f Modem Fundamentalism. 30-34.). Finally, radical social
movements influenced by this model often oppose any emphasis on personal salvation
(Chastain, “Eschatology and Ethics," 238).
2Henry, The Uneasv Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism. 76, 79.
3Ibid., 76-81. This includes speaking out against moral evil rather than against the
existing political social order. It is affirming the importance of the social issues politics
takes on, but not the political system itself. It means raising moral concerns regarding the
process and methodology society and/or politicians use in addressing social concerns.
“Carl F. H. Henry, Evangelicals at the Brink of Crisis: Significance o f the World
Congress on Evanelism (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1967), 75,76.
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within the world.1 According to this model, Christians can surely initiate, share in, and
provide leadership over some significant changes in the world. They can effectively do
this only as they at the same time, both personally and as a community of faith, live the
values o f the Kingdom.2 These anticipated changes in social relationships and societal
structures are seen as nurtured through non-violent, non-revolutionary methods.3
Fundamental to this social responsibility model is the reality o f the Christian
community itself. Here is where the social moral implications of the Kingdom are seen
as first experienced and lived.4 The actions and decision o f the Church in the secular
realm are seen as simply expressing by analogy what the Church is and what it
confesses.5 In this way the believing community is seen as “the primary social structure
through which the eschatological Kingdom works to change other structures.”6 For some,
'As Henry correctly states, “The futility o f trying to win all does not mean that it
is futile to try to win some areas of influence and life” (Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of
Modem Fundamentalism. 77).
2Kuzmic, 157-158; Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism.
76-79.
3Yoder, The Politics of Jesus. 190,152. Yoder infers that, since the “new
humanity" o f the community was created by the cross and not the sword, the Church will
have a radical attitude towards society which will be free from violent and revolutionary
methodology. Visser ‘t Hooft affirms this when he states, “Christ rules through his Word
. . . His victories are spiritual victories. The Church has no right to claim any other power
or to use any other means of persuasion” (V isser‘t Hooft, 131).
4Yoder. The Politics of Jesus. 153-157.
5Visser ‘t Hooft, 146.
6Yoder, The Politics of Jesus. 157. Pannenberg writes that “human beings cannot
force the coming o f the Kingdom; they can only respond themselves to the call o f God’s
future and symbolize it in the present world." The Church as an effective sign o f the
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this social responsibility model is further predicated upon an all-inclusive redemptive
context for the Church’s assault upon global ills. This redemptive context offers not only
a higher ethical standard than any other system o f thought, it provides also in Christ a
dynamic to lift humanity to its highest level of moral achievement.1
Given the diversity o f views expressed in these three models o f social
involvement, it is apparent that the relationship between eschatological hope and social
ethics during the 1970s remained problematic.2 Application of the paradigm for social
moral theory still needed refinement. The paradigm’s potential for providing both
content and specificity with regard to Christian social responsibility still needed
clarification.3 There was no doubt, though, that eschatology had a productive
significance for social ethics,4 or that Christian social ethics must be constantly related to
eschatology.5 The problem lay with perceived ties between New Testament eschatology

Kingdom constitutes the alternative to the devious attempt to establish the Kingdom by
political action. The social moral integrity of the community has profound moral
influence before the world. See Pannenberg, Human Nature. Election, and History. 3031.
'Henry, The Uneasv Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism. 76.
2Johnstone, 73.
3Generally speaking the already/not yet component o f the eschatological paradigm
tends to mediate the kind o f balance which is found in the social responsibility model. In
principle the reign o f God and horizon o f the future components mediate this kind of
balance as well, but they have often been nuanced energetically towards evoking more
aggressive and unacceptable forms of social responsibility.
4Wendland, 365.
5Ibid„ 368.
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and social action. For some, those apparent ties were seen as indirect and subtle,
manifold and complex.1 For others, they were explicit and prominent, few in number and
straightforward.

The Level of Moral Reflection
At this point in the discussion, it will be helpful to briefly outline some related
issues with regard to the application o f eschatology as paradigm in contemporary
Christian ethics. These related issues include: (1) the theoretical level o f moral reflection
which the paradigm appears to elicit; (2) the meaning and function o f paradigm in moral
theory; and (3) the relation o f the eschatological paradigm to philosophical ethics.

Level o f moral reflection
On the one hand, ethicists distinguish between four ingredients when structuring
ethics: (1) theological or philosophical bases; (2) underlying principles that can be
applied to various areas of activity; (3) directive moral rules that apply to various areas of
life; and (4) particular concrete cases.2 On the other hand, paradigms can serve on a
macro, meso, or micro level. Paradigms can bring solutions to: (1) broad, global
theological or philosophical issues; (2) problems in intermediate areas, as well as (3)
detailed specific situations, respectively.3 On this basis, this study has suggested that a
'Dahl, 376.
2Holmes, 50-51.
3Kting, 9,10.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

115
correspondence exists, in that order, between the eschatological paradigm operating on
the macro, meso, or micro level, and the ingredients in the structure o f ethics. This
correlation can provide important insights toward clarifying issues o f application and
consistency o f methodology for the eschatological paradigm in moral theory. The
question o f “theoretical level” enables one to clarify how concretely the paradigm might
legitimately speak to contemporary ethical exigencies and/or influence the interplay of
the ethical nuances o f its components.
First, ethics always assumes a metaphysics.1 One’s perception o f reality, one’s
worldview, significantly affects moral attitudes and determines moral behavior. Through
the primary model o f the Kingdom o f God, our eschatological paradigm frames a world
view, a perception o f reality. As such, it is grounded in metaphysics.2 That is the
foundation on which it is possible to say that "eschatology generates an ethic to go along
with it,”3 that eschatology “in effect determines ethics.”4 Thus eschatology is seen as
confronting moral theory with a perceptual challenge of great importance.5 And because
each o f the eschatological paradigm’s components express an assumed metaphysics, it
'This is particularly true in Hebrew-Christian thought, which “historically, has
stood as a closely-knit world and life view. Metaphysics and ethics went everywhere
together, in biblical intent” (Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism.
38).
2This is true with any eschatology.
3Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 20.
4Owen, 370. Obviously, “everything depends upon the kind o f eschatology
chosen as the model” ( Scroggs, 85).
5Scroggs, 83.
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seems reasonable to consider these component models as belonging to the macro level of
paradigm operation.1
But what about the meso and the micro levels of paradigm that in ethics would
correspond to principles and rules? Is there sufficient specificity within the components
of the eschatological paradigm to include in itself also these levels o f moral reflection?
Or are the meso and micro levels left open to creative application on the part of the
community or Christian ethicist? Generally speaking, it is the metaphysical level (macro,
bases) toward which most theologians and ethicists have approached the eschatological
paradigm with respect to nuancing their application for moral theory. Its implicit
generality leaves ample room for constructing moral theory at the theoretical level of
ultimate Christian norms and creative open-endedness.2 Yet, some appear to read the
components o f the eschatological paradigm as tending additionally toward the “meso”
level o f moral reflection as well. They read the paradigm’s components as opening the
way toward identifiable content and reasonable specificity with respect to application for
moral theory (i.e., “area rules”).3
'This would be so in view o f the role that biblical concept o f the Kingdom of God
plays in creating a worldview. This would also correspond, then, to the
theological/philosophical base or presupposition level within the structure of ethics.
2Das, 86; Gustafson, Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective. 45,48.
3That is because the eschatological paradigm is being read within the larger
context o f Scripture, and the opinion that Scripture has a great deal more to say on the
basic elements o f our common life from an eschatological perspective than we might at
first think. This obviously overlaps with the question o f the role of Scripture in the
eschatological paradigm, and whether or not the specific, concrete moral application of
the Kingdom—on the micro or rule level—by Jesus’ life and preaching (as well as that of
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No doubt, this question o f the theoretical level of moral reflection is an important
issue. It determines the ultimate practicality o f the paradigm for moral theory. For
ultimately, to be practical, the eschatological paradigm must not only motivate, but
adequately direct (to some degree, at least) human activity.1 The moral agent must be
able to move beyond mere orientation to the arena o f action.2

The meaning and function o f paradigm
Closely related to the question of the theoretical level of moral reflection is the
meaning and function o f paradigm. Paradigm has already been generally defined in this
study as an organizing idea, or structure around which an approach to ethics is shaped and
articulated. Paradigms are “a way of looking at something.”3 They provide a moral
“frame of reference" from which moral thinking is organized and articulated. More
precisely, a paradigm can be viewed from two broad perspectives: (1) that o f an abstract
basic principle; and (2) that o f an imprinted inner gripping image.
1. For the first, a paradigm is “a particular case used to illustrate a general
the New Testament writers) —constitutes normative examples of how both eschatological
bases and principles are to be articulated in everyday life. Some working with the
paradigm sense a challenge toward serious reflection on and conversation with the
biblical witness in order to understand the comprehensiveness with which the
eschatological paradigm speaks to contemporary moral theory. It is a challenge that has
been felt by a growing number of ethicists as the paradigm’s general profile has
essentially crystallized and become endorsed. See Visser ‘t Hooft, 143-144.
'Ibid.
2Das, 86.
3Angeles, 203.
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principle.”1 It functions “as a model or example for other cases where a basic principle
remains unchanged, though details differ."2 Furthermore, it “is not so much imitated as
applied.”3 Here a “basic principle” that remains unchanged forms the link between
paradigm and the new situation to which it is applied.4
2.

The second perspective posits paradigm as a “personally and holistically

conceived image o f a model. . . that imprints itself immediately and nonconceptually on
the characters and action o f those who hold it."5 The point here is that paradigms can
become effective in shaping people ethically through their complete and direct impact on
the inner moral eye. A paradigm need not be reduced first to a set o f abstract principles
that must first be retranslated into life.6 This perspective sees a dynamic relationship
between paradigm and principles and law, where paradigm is in certain ways o f prior
ethical importance to those of law and principle.7 The point is not that the latter are
secondary, but that a paradigm by nature encompasses them, elicits them, affirms them,
mediates them, but not through reductionistic abstraction.
‘Wright, 16.
2Christopher J. H. Wright, An Eve for An Eve: The Place of Old Testament Ethics
Today (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1983), 43.
3Ibid.
4Waldemar Janzen, Old Testament Ethics: A Paradigmatic Approach (Louisville,
KY: Wesminster/John Knox Press, 1994), 27.
sIbid., 27, 28.
6Ibid., 27.
7Ibid., 30.
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These distinctions are helpful as we explore the way the eschatological paradigm
has been applied toward moral theory.1 Those approaching the paradigm from the first
perspective—that a paradigm is an abstract illustrating principle—have tended towards a
larger, sweeping, reductionistic process that results in considerable loss with respect to
actual biblical ethical yield.2 The macro/bases level often predominates. Content and
specificity are ambiguous and left to creative open-ended moral reflection. On the other
hand, those approaching the paradigm from the second perspective—that a paradigm
elicits an imprinted moral image—have tended to focus on the biblical reality of the
invading Kingdom. Here the person and message o f Jesus, together with the experienced
life o f the New Testament Church and apostolic instruction, yield significant moral
imagery.3 A comprehensive moral picture is projected, one which evokes both principle
and law—but in a nonreductionistic way.
Finally, one would expect that a paradigm created or composed of components
will find its moral specificity or abstraction through or from the moral clarity of those
components. By extension, the moral specificity or abstraction of a given component is
likewise determined by the moral clarity of the biblical witness with which it is defined.
If the eschatological paradigm is seen as built on only broad principles or generalized
'No doubt, individual theologians/ethicists have instinctively gravitated toward
one model or the other as a result of their own presuppositions and purposes. It is likely,
though, that this instinctive gravitation, and the distinctions in how paradigm affects
moral reflection, may not have been consciously apparent to them in the process.
2Janzen, Old Testament Ethics: A Paradigmatic Approach. 29.
3Here the biblical witness includes that of stories and written instruction.
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abstractions from Scripture, it will not be able to either produce moral specificity or bring
sustained focus toward Scripture in the context of its application in moral theory. On the
other hand, if the eschatological paradigm is seen as reflecting comprehensive
Scriptural/moral focus through the structuring of its components, it will tend toward
greater specificity/content in the moral images it evokes. In addition, it will elicit
sustained focus toward Scripture in the context of its application in moral theory.
Obviously, the meaning and function o f paradigm in the mind o f the theologian or ethicist
will significantly influence his perceptions of the potential application o f the
eschatological paradigm.

Relation to philosophical ethics
The discussion o f the relation of the eschatological paradigm to the categories o f
philosophical ethics has been held until now. It fits appropriately with this discussion of
the theoretical level and the meaning and function o f paradigm. The question has been
whether an eschatologically informed ethic can be reciprocally related to philosophical
ethics in a way that it can: (1) appropriate the categories which appear in the light o f
philosophical analysis—teleological (consequentialist), deontological, virtue
(perfectionist), situational (contextual), etc.; and (2) at the same time offer a
comprehensive viewpoint which can overcome the contradictions that classically cling to
the various types of philosophical ethics.1
No definitive answer to these questions has yet emerged with the eschatological
'Das, 79, 65, 83; Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 105, 113,115-116.
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paradigm except the "messy conclusion that eschatological ethics does not fit into either
o f the philosophical modes."1 At best, the eschatological paradigm is seen as providing a
dynamic perspective and methodology which is distinctive,2 or as a hybrid that
encompasses balancing elements o f each.3 For some, the underlying question is whether
the eschatological paradigm evokes an ethics that is oriented around morality or around
revelation.4 Parallel to this question—and nuancing it strongly—is the concern for a wide
moral frame o f reference which is both transcendent and objective.5 In addition, there is
the desire for Christian moral theory which avoids any connotation of rule and external
authority.6 For some this has to do with how the moral agent is gripped personally. For
others, it has to do with maintaining an open orientation toward future moral exigencies.

Summary Orientation
The principle theological and philosophical characteristics—as they illumine the
ethical perspectives—of twentieth-century re-interpreted eschatology have now been
reviewed. This outline of the principal characteristics of re-interpreted eschatology has
entailed a summary, critical survey of the development of eschatology as a new paradigm
‘Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 115.
2Das, 79.
3Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 116.
4Ezell, 83, 85. It should be noted that a revelation-oriented ethic does not
necessarily imply Scriptural priority in moral theory.
5Das, 83, 64,65.
6Ezell, 81-87.
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for Christian ethics. It has included, as well, an evaluative description o f the paradigm’s
implications for Christian moral theory as it crystallized in the 1970s. In the process, it
has explored briefly the checkered history o f the eschatology/ethics relationship before
the twentieth century. Here was found the development of an “eschatology sans ethics"
and an “ethics sans eschatology.” These anomalies express the essential blurring of the
vivid eschatology and corresponding moral consciousness of the early Church. Not only
has there not been a solid or sustained discussion of eschatology and ethics in any of the
prominent minds in pre-twentieth-century Christian ethics, but the dawn o f the twentieth
century found both Christian ethics and eschatology secularized by Liberalism and a
philosophical rift between the two.
The twentieth century, however, has witnessed a radical renewed interest in both
eschatology and the eschatology/ethics dialogue. So much so, that eschatology has
become a dominating theme in twentieth-century theology. In the process, overlapping
waves o f eschatological thought have generated varying shades of ethical-oriented
eschatologies and eschatological-oriented ethics. The search to adequately bond
eschatology and ethics came to revolve around several critical problems and tensions
which needed satisfactory synthesis. These included problems and tensions as viewed
from the perspectives of immanence/transcendence, kingdom/history, future/hope,
Church/world, philosophical categories, principle/content, and Christology.
By the 1970s three significant images had emerged as commonly accepted
conceptual bridges to explicate the fundamental meaning of the Kingdom o f God, and to
resolve the tensions and problems that were seen as fundamental to the eschatology/ethics
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discussion. It has been suggested that these three images—already/not yet, reign o f God,
and horizon o f the future—sue in effect component models elucidating the eschatological
paradigm in relation to its biblical primary model, the Kingdom of God. It is further
suggested that these images are like a three-stranded cord forming the components o f a
commonly accepted comprehensive eschatological paradigm for Christian ethics.
With this paradigm o f twentieth-century re-interpreted eschatology in view, its
implications for Christian moral theory were then briefly explored. This chapter
surveyed: (1) the specific ethical nuances that each o f the paradigm’s components appear
to imply; (2) the methodological nuances that the paradigm evokes/expresses with regard
to my three principles o f verification; and (3) the theoretical level of moral reflection on
which the paradigm appears to operate. In doing so, these implications have been
outlined as seen through the eyes of the principle participants in the eschatology/ethics
dialogue through the 1970s. This survey has been limited to that branch o f Protestant
theology which has facilitated the paradigm’s synthesis and which has congealed the
basic concepts believed to be assumed by Mott and Ogletree and central to most
Protestant Christians.
It has been found that each of the paradigm’s components generate forceful and
specific ethical nuances which are rich for application toward moral theory. It has been
also learned, however, that a challenge remains in determining how these moral nuances
are actually elicited and/or have themselves been cast with respect to moral theory. This
has become evident when viewed against the designated principles of verification and the
varied ways we have seen that theologians/ethicists have perceived them in relation to the
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divergent moral nuances projected through the paradigm. As we have seen, the possible
combinations o f implications for moral theory are both numerous and complex.
Furthermore, we have noted that adequately applying eschatology as paradigm toward
moral theory demands an understanding of the subtle dynamics of paradigm in relation to
models, primary models, and principles and laws.
This chapter’s survey has found that, while a commonly accepted comprehensive
eschatological paradigm had both emerged and crystallized through the 1970s, no final
clarification of the relationship o f eschatology and Christian ethics could yet be given.1
The eschatology/ethics question was still problematic in actual application. This is
especially true with respect to the implications regarding the principles of verification. In
fact, for some, eschatology remained one of those “slippery words” with a "multiplicity of
meanings” which at best is “ambiguous and makes for looseness o f expression and
thought.”2 This survey has revealed how the complex and subtle nuances of the paradigm
—both in itself and in relation to our principles of verification—can, indeed, evoke a
“slipperiness” in meaning. There is clearly the need for further refinement and
development o f the eschatological paradigm in relation to Christian ethics.3 Clearer
principles need to be outlined with respect to the carefulness in its use and consistency
'This is particularly true for the Christian social ethics as expressed in the
principle o f verification—the nature of social involvement.
2I. Howard Marshall, “Slippery Words: I. Eschatology,” The Expository Times 89
(June 1978): 264-269.
3Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 7; Johnstone, 85.
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with respect to its application.
This chapter is suggesting that this need for further refinement and development
does not lay in the paradigm per se, but in its application for moral theory. There is need
for further refinement and development in how its application for moral theory facilitates
and is facilitated by the role o f Scripture, the role of community, and the nature of social
involvement.1 Thus this study turns to Stephen Charles Mott and Thomas W. Ogletree.
As two ethicists standing in the tradition of this eschatological paradigm, they have
consciously incorporated and further developed the role o f the eschatological paradigm in
their moral theory. In doing so, they have been expressing greater refinement with
respect to application of the paradigm to moral theory. In the process, they can reveal
more precisely the impact that the application of the paradigm has had in contemporary
Christian moral theory and ethical method. In addition, this study looks over their
shoulders, as it were, and observes how they work their way through the subtle and
complex nuances expressed between the paradigm’s components and in relation to the
principles o f verification.
Before moving on to Mott and Ogletree, however, one more point for reference
should be suggested. I believe that this chapter’s review o f the principal characteristics
o f the eschatological paradigm in relation to its application to moral theory has shown the
important role that Scripture has played (or not played) in the discussion. It is my
'This chapter’s summary critical review of the eschatological paradigm has
affirmed the validity of the principles of verification. They are crucial areas of concern
and determine directions with regard to the paradigm and its application.
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opinion that the role of Scripture continues to be the most critical issue in the
eschatology/ethics discussion. Its importance has become obvious as ethicists make the
important transition from either formulating or understanding the eschatological
paradigm itself, to that of its actual application for moral theory. Mott and Ogletree
demonstrate that focus on Scripture, I believe, in that both their well-known works have
revolved around the question o f Scripture, eschatology, and ethics, i.e., Mott, Biblical
Ethics and Social Change, and Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics.
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CHAPTER 3

STEPHEN CHARLES MOTT’S USE OF ESCHATOLOGY
IN MORAL THEORY

Stephen Charles Mott’s use of eschatology in moral theory is set in the context o f
the conviction that “a vivid view o f the future and o f the imminence of the endtime,
including Christ’s return can be, has been, and should be a stimulus for social activism.”1
While the path from eschatology to social activism is obviously a direct one for Mott, he
has recognized that the “not so easy" hermeneutical problem o f actual, responsible
application o f that link demands methodological precision.2 Thus his project is more than

‘Stephen Charles Mott, South Hamilton, MA, to Larry L. Lichtenwalter, March
30, 1993, 2.
2The question of hermeneutics is a fundamental concern for Mott. His positions
have been critiqued as weak because they neglect particular hermeneutical problems or
because o f perceived faulty hermeneutics, e.g., Richard B. Hays, “Recent Books on New
Testament Ethics,” Quarterly Review 6, no. 4 (Winter 1986): 26; Dale Goldsmith,
Review o f Biblical Ethics and Social Change, by Stephen Charles Mott, Journal o f the
American Academy of Religion 51 (September 1983): 520; Allen Verhey, 24-27; Udo
Middlemann, “A Response to Stephen Mott,” Transformation 4, nos. 3 and 4 (JuneSept./Oct.-Dec. 1987): 36-40). In addition, Mott himself has directly approached the
question o f hermeneutics in major ways, e.g., “The Use of the New Testament for Social
Ethics,” Journal of Religious Ethics 15, no. 2 (Fall 1987): 225-260— an edited reprint o f a
1984 two-part series in Transformation 1, no. 2 (April/June 1984): 21-26 and 1, no. 3
(July/September 1984): 19-25, which has also appeared as a Grove Booklet on Ethics
with the title Jesus and Social Ethics (Bramcote: Grove Books, Grove Booklet on Ethics
55, 1984); idem, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible? A Study in
127
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a mere outline o f the contours o f an eschatology-inspired “social activism.” It is a
comprehensive “critique o f easy solutions.”1 It is a reaction “in general to liberal
optimism regarding history particularly under [Reinhold] Niebuhr’s influence and to the
neglect o f social content and implications of eschatology by conservative Christians."2 It
is an attempt to provide a biblical and theological framework through which, in part, the
eschatological paradigm can be responsibly applied to the diverse issues confronting
contemporary moral theory.
The purpose o f this chapter, then, is to explore Mott’s use of eschatology in moral
theory particularly as it concerns methodology toward application. In doing so I will: (1)
describe the way in which Mott both perceives and nuances the eschatological paradigm,
including his leitmotif with regard to the paradigm’s components; (2) outline the
methodological nuances that his application evokes/expresses with regard to my three
principles of verification (Scripture, Community, and nature of social involvement),
including a broad contour of his view o f the nature of social involvement; and (3) survey

Hermeneutics.” Bulletin o f the Association o f Christian Economists 13 (Spring 1989):719. In addition, his preface to Biblical Ethics and Social Change and introduction to A
Christian Perspective on Political Thought articulate hermeneutical issues. Both his
books divide into two sections, with the first providing theological and methodological
focus which becomes the framework for application towards specific issues in the second.
It is evident that the question o f hermeneutics has become more focused for Mott
following reviews upon the publication o f his Biblical Ethics and Social Change.
'Mott to Lichtenwalter, 2. Examples o f his critique of “easy solutions” can be
found in “The Use o f the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 225-260; idem, “Social
Ethics in America and the Possibilities o f History,” paper presented for Professor Harvey
Cox, April 10, 1967; idem, “The Politics o f Time” in A Christian Perspective on Political
Thought. 97-112.
2Mott to Lichtenwalter, 2.
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his application o f the paradigm’s ethical implications with respect to level of moral
reflection (paradigm— macro, meso, micro; and ethics— bases, underlying principles, area
rules) and social content. In the process it should become apparent what Mott means by
his evocative phrase, “social activism.”

Eschatological Paradigm and Ethics
Perceiving the Paradigm
Mott’s understanding o f eschatology fits the general contours of the
eschatological paradigm that this study has outlined as being commonly accepted in
contemporary theology by the 1970s.1 Each of the components o f the paradigm
{already/not yet, reign o f God, horizon o f the future) is thus evident in his thinking,
though not with equal explicit reference or precise terminology in his writings.

A lready/Not Yet
For Mott the “breaking in" of the reign o f God brings a “partial fulfillment” which
“will be characteristic o f history until the second coming of Christ.”2 There is thus a

‘His focused discussions o f eschatology are found in “The Long March o f God” in
Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 82-106; idem, “The Politics o f Time” in A Christian
Perspective on Political Thought. 97-112; idem, “How Should Christian Economists Use
the Bible? A Study o f Hermeneutics,” 15-16. Mott indicates that, personally, he early
moved from a dispensational, pre-tribulation position on eschatology, and although he has
not moved sharply away from a premillennial position, the millennium does not factor
sharply in his thinking. He attributes A. Berkeley Mickelsen’s views o f the reign o f God,
which according to Mott are similar to George Ladd’s, as being a significant influence
during his transitional and formative thinking on eschatology (Mott to Lichtenwalter, 1).
2"Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible? A Study of
Hermeneutics,” 15.
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“tension of the new and the old,”1a “between the times” reality in which the people of
God find the “dual challenge” of having a “normative glimpse of a perfect society.”
Along with this normative glimpse we have the “ongoing responsibilities in a world in the
midst o f which Christ has left us (John 17:18) — a society which is unable to live on that
renewed basis."2 “By faith we live in Christ’s victory, yet we must continue to struggle."3
In the context o f this already/not yet, Mott calls for a “realism” that captures “a deep
sense o f the depths and permanence o f human sin,” and which brings a “continual
reminder of the imperfection o f all human efforts."4 But this “awareness that we cannot
build a perfect society in history must not deflect us from the obligation to work for a
better society.”5 According to Mott, “God is not asking us to build eternal structures but
to accept our responsibility for God’s creation."6

'Ibid.
2Ibid.; Mott. Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 106.
3Mott. Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 18.
4Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 16; idem, A Christian
Perspective o f Political Thought. 26-41; idem, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 3-21.
Mott asserts that “despite the introduction o f the Reign of God into history with
Christ, not only God’s reign but also evil increase to the time of Christ’s return” and that
“the basic solution to history lies in the atonement o f Jesus Christ. Only at the end of
history is this work brought to completion in the reconciliation of all things with the
second coming o f Christ” (Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 99).
5Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 91.
6Ibid. In this context Mott states that “we would not think o f postponing personal
righteousness— sexual purity, for example— on the grounds that perfection will not come
until after the Second Coming.” He makes a similar comparison with respect to
evangelism, i.e., “Our task is to bring the message o f his love to every person, even if
only a remnant will be believers at the Second Coming” (ibid., 91).
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Reign o f God
Mott views the reign o f God as “a technical phrase for the idea of the rule of God
over history.”1 It is the “universal rule of the eternal God” with “transcendent demand”
which challenges present life in a comprehensive way and which includes every sphere of
life—personal, social, political, physical (the body), spiritual, and the material world
(creation).2 The point is that the Kingdom o f God is seen as impinging upon present
Christian conduct, and that the reign of God “provides a context for God’s universal
ethical concerns.”3 Thus we are confronted, “not with an ethics of preparation or of
waiting for the Reign," but with the “ethics of the present Reign of God."4 Furthermore,

‘Ibid., 83. In keeping with the eschatological paradigm, Mott writes that “the
Greek word basileia, which is used for reign or kingdom, means primarily the act o f
reigning rather than the place of reigning, thus in most cases should be translated as
reign, rule, kingship, or sovereignty, rather than its usual English rendering, kingdom”
(ibid.).
2Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 109-111; idem, Biblical
Ethics and Social Change. 99-105. Referring to James Gustafson, Mott writes that
“attention to the Reign of the sovereign God creates moral responsibility for all spheres of
life. We cannot do everything ‘but we cannot arbitrarily decide that something is outside
the scope o f Christian moral responsibility’” (Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change.
104).
While agreeing with Ladd’s balance of the present and future aspects of the reign
o f God, M ott is critical o f the apparent individualism o f his position regarding the
breaking in o f the reign, particularly the lack o f social emphasis and the lack o f emphasis
on its relationship to all of creation (Mott to Lichtenwalter, 1; idem, “How Should
Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 15-16).
3Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 231; idem, “How
Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 15.
4Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 89.
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"the demand o f God upon us now is intensified by anticipation of the future.”1 The
nearness o f the full manifestation of God’s reign gives urgency to the present. It “reveals
today as the day o f decision and action.”2

Horizon o f th e F uture
While Mott does not use the terminology horizon o f the future, the nuances o f this
paradigm component are nevertheless significant to his thinking. The inbreaking reign o f
God includes a corresponding “eschatological vision” which brings “a normative glimpse
of a perfect society," and which “presents a continuing critique of all that falls short of
it.”3 Here one is confronted with a “broad horizon o f what is intended for humanity and
indeed o f what is possible by God’s grace.”4 This “view o f the future provides new
reasons for decisive action in the present.”5 The reality of promise “draws the mind to the
future in creative and obedient expectation."6 “Such expectation produces a conduct of
life that conforms to the imminent hope.”7 When the future reign o f God is taken
seriously as a reality confronting the present, “human energies are stimulated for efforts

‘Ibid., 91.
2Ibid., 88.
3Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 15.
4Ibid., 16.
5Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 107.
6Ibid.
7Ibid., 110.
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to bring about change in the certainty o f the abiding meaning o f such labor.”1 We can
either open ourselves up to this “new and updated force in history”—which is seen as the
“force o f the future”—or cling to the increasingly outmoded past in selfish fear.2 For
Mott, “the coming of the Reign gives fresh substance, motivation, and power to the
political task o f changing the world in the direction o f God’s promises."3 However,
“along with the power of the future, there is also an eschatological reserve."4
This outline o f M ott’s use o f eschatology reveals how each o f the components o f
the eschatological paradigm are evident in his thinking, though not with equal explicit
reference or precise terminology. His understanding o f eschatology fits the general
contours o f the eschatological paradigm that this study has outlined as being commonly
accepted in contemporary theology by the 1970s. It is significant that Mott spends no
time laboring over whether or how eschatology is to be construed as normative for ethics.
He simply assumes that it is, and then proceeds to apply its implications for moral theory
accordingly.

'Ibid., 107.
2Ibid., 109.
3Ibid., 110.
4Ibid. Mott acknowledges that he has drawn heavily upon the Christian realists,
especially Reinhold Niebuhr, but also Paul Tillich and Eduard Heimann. Niebuhr had
a formative influence upon his own development that has continued (Mott, A Christian
Perspective on Political Thought, see “Acknowledgments”). It was Niebuhr who
increased his “appreciation o f the eschatological reserve which the more pessimistic side
o f eschatology gives.” For Mott then, “the solutions o f history do not lie in history;
eschatology puts in question illusions about human achievement and progress” (Mott to
Lichtenwalter, 2-3).
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Nuancing the Paradigm
Leitmotif
While Mott works within the general contours of the eschatological paradigm, he
clearly nuances the reign o f God component part over that o f the already/not yet and
horizon o f the future. Nearly every reference to eschatological themes falls within the
context o f this paradigm component. While, as we have seen, the already/not yet and
horizon o f the future perspectives are evident in his thinking, eschatology for Mott is both
viewed from and applied through the perspective of the reign o f God. The reign o f God
is Mott’s leitmotif for nuancing the eschatological paradigm.

Hermeneutical Nuances
As Mott’s leitmotif for nuancing the moral implications of the eschatological
paradigm, the reign o f God yields significant hermeneutical value:

Context fo r universal ethical concerns
The reign o f God “provides a context for God’s universal ethical concerns.”1 In
response to Christians in the Fundamentalist, liberal, and existential traditions who have
argued that the New Testament does not provide instruction for the ordering of social
relations,2 Mott posits an essential organic relationship between the Old and New
Testaments. It is a relationship which reveals God’s enduring ethical concerns for all of

'Mott, “The Use o f the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 231.
2Ibid., 226.
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human life and history and which is set within the horizon of the reign o f God.1 The
reign o f God provides a context for “God’s universal ethical concerns” in that “divine
actions are interrelated and God’s purpose in history has a unity."2 For Mott, “the Bible
does not teach independent ethical universals. God is the universal, and God’s acts
supply means and power for the ethics."3 What God does is significant. God’s reign
through history is paradigmatic. The various ethical materials o f the Bible are placed
within the history of creation, fall, redemption, and restoration of creation—each
representing an aspect of God’s restorative concerns.4 Using the rubric “The Long March
o f God,”5 Mott posits the reign o f God as one extended, relentless reassertion o f God’s
sovereignty to overcome the fall and to realize His purposes in history. It has been a long
march through the history of people, and powers, and institutions,6 but it has one goal.
God’s ethical concerns are universal. “The ethic of the Reign o f God is an ethic of the
restoration of God’s purposes for the creation.”7

’Ibid., 227-234; idem, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 7-19.
2Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 102.
3Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 11-12.
4Ibid., 8.
s"The Long March of God” is Mott’s title for his chapter on the reign o f God in
his Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 82-106.
6Ibid., 106.
7Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 16.
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Integrating concept o f history
The reign o f God “furnishes a concept o f history into which other New Testament
themes can be placed.”1 Some of the New Testament themes Mott has in mind include
the place o f status in society, the reality of social evil in the structures of the human
community as a whole, grace, love, justice, human nature, power, time, etc. The ability
to place diverse themes against a common backdrop can lend both coherence and
comprehensiveness to one’s moral theory. Given the right backdrop, diverse themes can
converge with compelling potency. While Mott indicates that he presents “a social
activism inspired in part by the present aspects o f the Reign,"2 the reign o f God
nevertheless provides the hermeneutical strategy which both holds his theory of social
activism together and gives it compelling potency. Organizationally, the reign o f God
thematic appears at key positions in Mott’s developing thought. He concludes the
theological orientation sections of his major works Biblical Ethics and Social Change and
A Christian Perspective on Political Thought with extended discussions o f the reign o f
God. In doing so, he consciously links each of the preceding themes to the dynamic
reality o f the reign o f God. Likewise, his discussion of hermeneutics with regard to the
normative character of biblical economic materials inserts the reign o f God thematic at

'Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 231. In viewing Mott’s
writings I would add, not just New Testament themes, but other significant biblical
themes which need integration in an overall moral theory.
2M ott to Lichtenwalter, 2 (italics supplied).
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key transition points in his developing thought.1 The reign o f God is not merely one of
the several emerging themes in Mott’s writings,2 it is a determinant ingredient in his
hermeneutic.

Elucidates centrality o f biblical justice
The reign o f God elucidates the centrality of biblical justice as “an attribute of
God and a major mandate o f Scripture."3 If the reign o f God is M ott’s leitmotif in
eschatology, biblical justice is his leitmotif for social ethics.4 Finding the Bible full of the

'Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 7-11, 15-16; idem,
“The Use o f the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 227-247.
2A s Stephen N. Williams seems to imply in “The Limits of Hope and the Logic of
Love on the Basis o f Christian Social Responsibility,” Tvndale Bulletin 40, no. 2
(November 1989): 262.

3Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 82-106; idem, A Christian Perspective
on Political Thought. 74, 112.
4In addition to major discussions on justice in both his Biblical Ethics and Social
Change and A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. Mott develops this theme in a
wide spectrum o f writing. See Stephen Charles Mott, “The Partiality of Biblical Justice,”
Transformation 10, no. 1 (January/April 1993): 23-29; idem, “Egalitarian Aspects of the
Biblical Theory o f Justice,” The American Society o f Christian Ethics 1978: Selected
Papers from the Nineteenth Annual Meeting, ed. Max L. Stackhouse (Newton, MA:
American Society o f Christian Ethics, 1978), 8-26; idem, “Human Rights and Christian
Thought,” The Reformed Journal 39, no. 6 (June 1989): 9-11; idem, “Lethal Force in the
Context o f a Theological Understanding of Power,” Comprendre 47 and 48 (1981): 6168; idem, “Justice,” Holman Bible Dictionary, ed. Trent C. Butler (Nashville: Holman
Bible Publishers, 1991): 827-829; idem, “The Contribution o f the Bible to Economic
Thought,” Transformation 4, nos. 3 and 4 (June-Sept./Oct.-Dec. 1987): 25-34; idem,
“Doing Justice Because Christ Is Coming Again,” Christian Social Action 7, no. 4 (April
1994): 35; idem, “Violence and Social Justice,” Christian Social Action 7, no. 5 (May
1994): 39; idem, “Limiting Personal Enforcement o f the Law.” Christian Social Action 8.
no. 1 (January 1995): 37; idem, “Hospitality to the Immigrant” Christian Social Action 8,
no. 2 (February 1995): 36; idem, “The People of God and the Social Justice o f the
Ancient Near East,” Christian Social Action 8, no. 6 (June 1995): 16; idem, “Roots of
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language o f justice,1and justice a chief attribute o f God,2 Mott affirms that “justice is very
important in the Biblical order of values . . . a central duty o f the child of God.”3 God’s
justice is paradigmatic.4 We Ieam justice from God.5 “Our justice corresponds to God’s
justice just as our grace corresponds to God’s grace and our love to God’s love."6 As
individuals or groups we can be channels of God’s justice.7
Mott further asserts that “it is methodologically necessary to look at the biblical
materials describing God’s social justice to develop the understanding of human
responsibilities injustice."8 This is where the reign o f God comes forcefully into play—
justice characterizes God’s reign,9 is an expression o f God’s reign,10 and the proclamation

Equality in Early Israel.” Christian Social Action 8, no. 8 (September 1995): 38; idem,
“Lazarus, Dives, and Affirmative Action,” Christian Social Action 8, no. 10 (November
1995): 37; idem, “The Pair of Social Justice and Welfare Reform,” Christian Social
Action 9, no. 1 (January 1996): 38; Esther Byle Bruland and Stephen Charles Mott, A
Passion for Jesus: A Passion for Justice fVallev Forge, PA: Judson Press, 1983).
'Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 59.
2Mott, “Egalitarian Aspects o f the Biblical Theory of Justice,” 9.
3Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 78.
4Ibid., 79.
sIbid., 80.
6Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 59.
7Mott, “Egalitarian Aspects o f the Biblical Theory o f Justice,” 12.
8Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 80.
9Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 85.
10Mott writes that “the dynamic character o f justice . . . reflects the philosophy of
history in which justice is an expression of God’s reign overcoming the rebellion o f the
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o f the reign o f God brings with it an imperative for justice.1 Hence, we are to seek not
only the Reign, but also the justice that belongs to it.2 The “long march of God,” then,
elucidates the centrality o f biblical justice:
Rather than merely an ethical principle, justice is made part of the story of God’s
provision—the fall of humanity, the coming o f Christ, and the final reconciliation
o f all things under the sovereign rule of God. We can then understand social
righteousness [justice] in the context of God’s patient toil to win back God’s lost
creation.3
By thus interpreting the reign o f God primarily through the category of biblical justice,
Mott facilitates his leitmotif for social ethics.

Incorporates social responsibility imperative
The reign o f God is “a central biblical concept which incorporates the imperative
for social responsibility into God’s goals in history.”4 This is a natural corollary o f
interpreting the reign o f God through the category o f biblical justice. Christian social

creation and finally emerging triumphant at the end o f history” (Stephen Charles Mott,
“The Contribution o f the Bible to Human Rights,” in Human Rights and the Global
Mission o f the Church, ed. A. Dyck (Cambridge, MA: Boston Theological Institute,
1985), 32.
'Mott. Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 97, 100.
2Interpreting Matt. 6:33 Mott writes, “First o f all seek the Reign and its justice”
(Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 104).
3Ibid., 82.
4Ibid. Mott indicates that Walter Rauschenbush and Herman Ridderbos proved
helpful in developing the social aspects of his interpretation of the reign o f God and the
continuity of the reign o f God with the Old Testament. They are seen however, as
enforcing certain directions in his thinking rather than originating them (Mott to
Lichtenwalter, 1).
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responsibility becomes an imperative because “justice presupposes God’s intention for
people to be in community."1 The concept of justice is part o f the way the Bible
understands the nature of society.2 It is something which concerns other persons. It is
“the basic norm for social behavior,"3 “a social norm, regulating the conduct of people in
association with one another,”4 “a socially active principle demanding responsibility on
the part of the people of God."5 The promise of the reign o f God is that of God’s
lordship, justice, and peace. As such “it is a public hope, not merely personal.”6 The
reign o f God breaking into history brings a new form of social existence and a demand
for justice,7 hence the imperative for social responsibility. The reign o f God, however, “is
not a social program, but faithfulness to its demands for justice necessitates social
programs and social struggle.”8 Mott is deeply interested in social ethics and social

'Mott, “Justice,” 828. “In Scriptures, to be human is to live in community”
(Mott, “Human Rights and Christian Thought,” 10).
2Mott, “The Use o f the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 242.
3Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 77.
4Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 74.
5Mott, “Egalitarian Aspects of the Biblical Theory of Justice,” 22.
6Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 110.
7Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 100; idem, “How Should Christian
Economists Use the Bible?” 15; idem, “The Use of the New Testament for Social
Ethics,” 231.
8Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 106. Mott further writes, “The people
of God as a whole share responsibility for justice in society, including the political
sphere” (ibid., 74).
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change. For Him Scripture yields rich social content towards facilitating those interests.1
By interpreting the reign o f God through the category o f biblical justice, Mott opens the
way for a Christian social responsibility that is rich both in content and motivation.2

Christology
In addition to these nuances within Mott’s use o f the eschatological paradigm,
there is the question of Christology. Christology does not play largely in Mott’s
eschatology except to communicate that Jesus is the way in which the reign o f God is
inaugurated and empowered in human history, e.g., through His life, death, and
resurrection.3 Jesus’ ministry and teachings, however, are viewed as paradigmatic.4 His
counsels are not wisdom maxims or legal commentary for a static society, but rather the
principles of conduct o f God’s reign emerging in concrete form.5 His actual deeds of
compassion for physical suffering are the evidence that He is “the agent of God’s Reign.”6

‘Mott, “The Use o f the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 227-231,241-243.
“The Bible contributes substantial content to the following structural components of a
social ethic, among others: justice, the nature of humanity, the concept of history, the
nature of society and groups, the understanding of power and property, and the purpose of
government” (ibid., 241).
2For Mott, “justice is a powerful motivator” (Mott, A Christian Perspective on
Political Thought. 74).
3There are only brief, but helpful, exposes of Christology by Mott: Biblical Ethics
and Social Change. 88-100; and “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 228238.
4Mott, “The Use o f the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 245.
5Ibid., 233.
6Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 92.
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His healing ministry,1the way He treated people,2 His sensitivity and partiality for the
weak, and His serving physical and social needs, together express the normative values of
the reign o f God.
It is significant for Mott that New Testament writers have interpreted new life in
Christ in continuity with the Old Testament social hopes and concerns.3 Jesus came to,
and was received by, humble people of the land who were looking for the manifestation
o f divine power to reverse the roles of possessors and the dispossessed by bringing in
social and economic justice. Mott suggests that, for Jesus, the Old Testament was an
important component of His culture. Its writings supplied an anthropology and social
perception that was expressed in the meaning o f His ministry and teaching.4 When Jesus’
social tradition is thus recognized, the concept of justice (which is rooted in the Old
Testament) can be more clearly identified with His life and ethic.5
Functionally, the role o f Christology in Mott’s eschatological leitmotif—reign o f
God—largely facilitates his leitmotif for social ethics (justice).6

'Ibid., 91-94.
2Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 234-237.
3Ibid., 228.
4Ibid., 230.
5Ibid.
6While treating the canon as a vast theological unity, Mott has been critiqued as
offering no extended sketches o f the ethics of the different New Testament writers (Hays,
25). The weight o f Mott’s focus is clearly toward Old Testament theological and moral
reflection in an anthropological and sociological context. One does not read Mott long
without being impressed with the fact that he/she is becoming immersed in the culture
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Summary
While Mott works within the general contours of the eschatological paradigm, he
clearly nuances the reign o f God component part over that o f the already/not yet and
horizon o f the future. The reign o f God thus becomes his leitmotif for nuancing the
moral implications o f the eschatological paradigm. These hermeneutical nuances include
(1) providing a context for God’s universal ethical concerns; (2) furnishing a concept of
history into which other New Testament themes can be placed; (3) elucidating the
centrality o f biblical justice as an attribute o f God and a major mandate o f Scripture; and
(4) incorporating the imperative for social responsibility into God’s goals in history.
Finally, Christology does not factor largely in his view o f eschatology except to facilitate
his leitmotif for social ethics, i.e., justice.

Paradigm and Principles of Verification
The methodological nuances which Mott’s application of the eschatological
paradigm to moral theory evokes/expresses with regard to my three principles of
verification (Scripture, Community, and nature o f social involvement) are now explored.

and world o f Old Testament thought and life. For Mott, of course, all this is for sensitive
background understanding in order to open fully the normative nuances o f both the reign
o f God and New Testament social content for contemporary moral theory. Because of
this, some important issues to eschatology— like Christology—may receive what appears
to be cursory or only functional attention in relation to other themes that are important to
Mott’s social analysis o f Scripture and the culture of biblical times. His “The Use o f the
New Testament for Social Ethics” is illustrative o f his sensitivity toward New Testament
themes. His discussion o f the place of status in society and in the message of the New
Testament demonstrates a similarity of approach towards the social context of both
testaments (Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 234-237).
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In doing so, a broad contour o f Mott’s view o f the nature of social involvement is
included.

Role of Scripture
That Mott undertakes the task o f constructing a “biblical basis for implementing
social change”1 is indicative o f the assumed role Scripture has in his moral theory. He
spends no time laboring over whether or how the Bible is to be construed as authoritative,
but simply assumes that it is authoritative for the community of faith and proceeds to
show how it can be applied toward the problems of society.2
Mott is very deliberate, however, in explaining his approach to the social or
political application of the Bible. It is a fourfold methodology which he calls “a
dialogical approach to biblical hermeneutics."3 The process includes the interplay of
Scripture, reason, Christian tradition, and experience.4 Mott does not profess the
sufficiency o f the Bible for ethics. Christian ethics is not synonymous with biblical
ethics. The necessary foundation o f Scriptural understanding requires corroborating and
expanding insights from political theory, sociology, anthropology, economics,

*Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change, vii.
2Hays, 25.
3Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Though t 7.
4Ibid.; Stephen Charles Mott, “Avoiding the Capture o f the Gospel,” Christian
Social Action 6, no. 5 (May 1993): 38; idem, “When the Bible Seems Silent,” Christian
Social Action 4. no. I (January 1991): 39; idem, Biblical Ethics and Social Change, viiix.
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psychology, secular history, as well as theology and church history.1
But the process begins with a fundamental commitment to the primacy and
ultimate authority o f Scripture.2 Practically this means that “the text itself is the
revelation o f God,”3 and that “the authority of the Scriptures lies within the intentionality
o f the passage.”4 It also affirms the essential theological and ethical unity o f the Bible,s
and it assumes the primary orientation of Scripture as historical.6 Each of the other

'Mott, “When the Bible Seems Silent,” 39; idem, A Christian Perspective on
Political Thought. 7.
2Mott, “Avoiding the Capture of the Gospel,” 38; idem, A Christian Perspective
on Political Thought. 7. Mott writes, “We identify the ultimate authority o f the Bible on
the issues that it addresses and the crucial nature of those issues. The Bible is necessary
for both faith and ethics. We do not, however, profess the sufficiency o f the Bible for
ethics” (Mott, “When the Bible Seems Silent,” 39). But even where the Bible does not
address a given issue, “we are not left without biblical guidance and motivation.”
3Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 11. Mott rejects neo
orthodox and feminist hermeneutics which posit the text as a divinely provided context
for encountering the revelation behind the community which produced it, as well as
Barthian hermeneutics which finds revelation occurring as the Spirit speaks from the text
to the modem reader. We find him engaging, as well, fundamentalist, liberal, and
existentialist approaches to the authority of Scripture.
4E.g., what concerns are meant to be addressed by the text, not what is incidental
to them (ibid., 17).
5Mott, “The Use o f the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 227-234. Mott treats
the canon as a vast theological unity (Hays, 25). Practically this means that, “if one views
the whole canon as itself the revelation of God, then one must reflect upon the full
biblical data on a particular issue” (Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the
Bible?” 14).
6Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 7. The historical
dimension of Scripture is the perspective which opens up the social context of Scripture
for Mott, as well as the need for anthropological and sociological understanding of
culture consonant with biblical times. While discussing appropriate and inappropriate
questions for the biblical text, Mott gives two examples of what he refers to as
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aspects o f the dialogue—careful use o f reason, how other Christians have interpreted the
Bible, and personal experience o f society and o f God’s Spirit in our lives—guides the
process or confirms one’s interpretations.1 Mott’s apparent respect for and command of
historical-critical methodology in all this is balanced with his respect for the plenary
inspiration o f the biblical text and thoughtful exegesis. He is well aware of the value and
dangers o f the historical-critical method in relation to the authority o f Scripture.2
O f particular interest is Mott’s concept o f “biblically formed understanding’’3
where the open reading of Scripture both initiates and deepens one’s understanding of our
social world. In the context of this new experience, relevant biblical materials that

“anthropological insensitivity.” “The failures in interpretation labeled as literalism come
not from taking seriously the concreteness o f the text but often from lacking an
anthropological sensitivity in detecting how to translate legitimately the meaning of a
practice from one cultural system to another.. . . Another form of anthropological
insensitivity to the concreteness o f Scripture is to force it to answer questions brought to
the text which are culturally foreign to it” (Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use
the Bible?” 16). It is in this context of using anthropology and sociology that Mott states,
“The best methods o f biblical exegesis must be used to understand what a particular
injunction means within the text and within biblical culture. The authority of the
Scriptures lies within the intentionality of the passage, what concerns are meant to be
addressed by the text, not what is incidental to them” (ibid., 17).
'Mott, “Avoiding the Capture of the Gospel,” 38; idem, A Christian Perspective
on Political Thought. 7.
2"The historical-critical method has value in putting the text at a distance from the
interpreter so that the text can speak to him or her on its own terms. The danger o f the
method is that passages that have the potential of threatening one’s ideology can be
assigned to sources regarded as less authoritative” (Stephen Charles Mott, review of
Slavery. Sabbath. War and Women: Case Issues in Biblical Interpretation, by William M.
Swartley, Horizons In Biblical Theology: An International Dialogue 7, no. 1 (June 1985):
119-122.
3Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change, viii-ix; idem, A Christian Perspective
on Political Thought. 7.
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otherwise might be neglected receive attention. In the process,
modem sociological and ethical categories are applied to the materials of the
Bible to suggest new possibilities o f meaning and to provide a means o f assessing
the applicability of the results o f exegesis to contemporary discussion. When
such terminology does clarify the meaning of Scripture, biblical interpretation
finds new vocabulary with which to address current problems. Sometimes,
however, the categories are dissonant with the text, and analysis makes it apparent
that the passages have little immediate relevance to modem questions. Then for
Scriptural guidance we must depend upon the more general framework o f values
and attitudes in the Biblical w itness.. . . These non-biblical constructs aid the
understanding of Scripture and are tested and refined where the biblical Word
relates to them; where it does not relate, they are set aside.1
This has been Mott’s approach to the social application of the Bible, and can be seen in
the context o f his reading and opening o f Scripture towards the possibilities of meaning
in the two most important themes he has become impressed with for moral theory, e.g.,
social involvement and justice.
While the stated role o f Scripture in Mott’s moral theory is thus clear and forceful,
the concern here for this study relates to whether or how the eschatological paradigm
either influences or is influenced by Mott’s presuppositions or methodology with regard
to Scripture. The following points can be noted from Mott’s use of the eschatological
paradigm in relation to Scripture:

Unity o f Scripture
The reign o f God is inextricably linked with the question o f the unity of Scripture.
Mott notes:
One o f the most critical consequences o f interpreting New Testament ethics in

lMott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change, viii, ix.
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continuity with the Old Testament is the impact it makes upon the concept o f the
reign o f God. The reign o f God is a theme which sums up the hope o f the Old
Testament.1
And again:
A logical progression can be traced from the neglect of the Old Testament context
for New Testament ethics to a denial of the social aspects o f the Reign of God
concept to a dismissal of the social ethics o f the New Testament.2
The unity o f Scripture is fundamental to Mott’s social moral theory in that
“without the Old Testament” the contribution of the New Testament to social ethics is
“incomplete.”3 Mott affirms the Old Testament as the Scripture of Jesus and the early
church, and as such, New Testament ethical topics, raised to meet ad hoc problems, do
not form the entire content of the New Testament church’s ethical belief.4 Behind the
New Testament lies an authoritative text which demonstrates rich social moral content.
For Mott, this theological and ethical unity provides the hermeneutical context for
adequately understanding and articulating the reign o f God and subsequently New
Testament social ethics. Two complementary perspectives are apparent here. One is that
Scripture is informing the social content o f the reign o f God. The other is that the reign
o f God is informing and facilitating an understanding of the social content of Scripture.
While “the most critical consequence o f interpreting New Testament ethics in continuity
with the Old testament is the impact it makes upon the concept of the reign of God," the

'Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 231.
2Ibid., 232.
3Ibid., 227.
4Ibid.
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opposite is functionally true for Mott as well, e.g., a proper understanding and nuancing
of the reign o f God will both affirm the unity of Scripture for moral theory and facilitate
its interpretation in the context o f the New Testament.1 This can be particularly observed
in how Mott traces his leitmotif of justice through Scripture and ascribes it as
fundamental to the meaning o f the reign o f God. The eschatological paradigm, then,
becomes a hermeneutical bridge between testaments.

Meaning and Content of Text and Words
The reign o f God is related to the authoritative meaning and content of the biblical
text and words themselves. Mott notes that the social meaning o f the reign o f God is
obscured when the reign o f God is defined as symbol rather than a concept.2 Symbol is
seen in contrast to concept. Symbol is figurative, invoking meaning and/or experience.
Concept is literal, containing its own truth claim. According to Mott, an existential
symbolic interpretation o f the reign o f God separates it “from its Biblical background and
its social and ethical content.”3 For Mott, Scripture provides objective content in its text
and words,4 and the concept o f a just rule and an ideal order is part of the biblical

'Mott states that the concept of the reign o f God presses us to deal with what is
new in the New Testament in addition to the social tradition it has inherited (Ibid., 233).
2Ibid., 232.
3Ibid., 233.
4Mott is aware, however, that this objective content may be expressed in
symbolism or metaphor. While developing his biblical perspective of prohibiting interest
on loans because it undermines the poor, Mott refers to hand as a metaphor for power.
The Hebrew expression “his hand quivers with you” refers to how the poor person is one
whose power in the community is slipping and who is becoming dependent on others
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portrayal o f reign. The reign o f God, then, is a historical reality with truth claims about
rule, just rule, and an ideal new social order.'

Theological Affirmation of Scripture
The reign o f God is viewed as a basic theological affirmation of Scripture.2 For
Mott, the recognition of the authority o f God in the particular teachings and stories o f the
Bible—concrete injunctions—must be combined with an acknowledgment of the other
ways in which the Bible is authoritative:
The authority o f God in the concrete injunction must be interpreted with attention
to God’s authority in mighty acts, in the theological affirmations, and in the
prevailing ethical principles. And the specific teachings and propositions are
needed to give concrete interpretation of the broad and general truths and actions.3
As one of the theological affirmations o f Scripture, the reign o f God brings broad
conceptual imagery—authoritative truth—which is important in the interpretation of
specific teachings and propositions found in particular passages o f Scripture. It provides

(Stephen Charles Mott, “The Prohibition of Interest on Loans.” Christian Social Action 4.
no. 8 [September 1991]: 37). The exegetical and hermeneutical question at bottom is a
longstanding principle of Evangelical interpretation that the interpreter must
communicate what is intended in the metaphor (Stephen Charles Mott, “Limiting
Masculine References to God,” Christian Social Action 6, no. 7 [July/August 1993]: 38).
But while metaphor and symbol can have intended meaning for Mott, e.g., objective
content, he clearly rejects the notion that the reign o f God falls within this category of
biblical communication.
'Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 232-233.
2"The concept of the Reign o f God is an example o f a basic theological
affirmation, rather than a specific mighty act of God (although it involves such). It is
expressed in many ways in many different portions of Scripture.” Mott, “How Should
Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 10.
3Ibid„ 11.
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an authoritative umbrella for the exegesis and application o f concrete biblical
injunctions.1 But Mott considers the reign o f God a “basic” theological affirmation which
not only provides a context for interpreting concrete injunctions, but ties together and
facilitates the interpretation o f other Scriptural theological themes.2 This study has
already observed this somewhat when it noted above how Mott nuances the
eschatological paradigm through the reign of God leitmotif, e.g., (1) the reign of God
provides a context for God’s universal ethical concerns; (2) the reign of God furnishes a
concept o f history into which other New Testament themes can be placed, etc.

Summary
In each o f the above—unity of Scripture, content and meaning of the biblical texts
and words, and basic theological affirmations—there is indication that Mott consciously
attempts to conceive and articulate the eschatological paradigm from the standpoint of

'It is significant that Mott states that “the specific teachings and propositions are
needed to give interpretation o f the broad and general truths and actions.” This is
important balance for hermeneutical theory which relates to specificity and content in
moral theory. See below pp. 172-181 for more detailed discussion of this principle in
relation to the eschatological paradigm.
2This can be observed in how Mott articulates the reign o f God in relationship to
social emphasis and all of creation. A particular example can be seen in one o f his
reviews: “If within a biblical theology of the reign o f God one relates more closely the
sphere o f creation and the sphere o f eternal personal salvation, one will not desire the
formation of political philosophy to be so clearly separated from the sphere of the church
and its theology. Then political work, while not providing personal salvation and not as
independent human action, is done as a channel o f God’s reign, which is breaking into
history, personally, and socially— although only in part in this age” (Stephen Charles
Mott, review of Everything Is Politics but Politics Is Not Everything, by H. M Kuitert,
The Journal of Religion 68 [July 1988]: 480).
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biblical theology and exegesis. This attempt to articulate the eschatological paradigm
from the standpoint of biblical theology and exegesis can be seen as well in how he both
perceives and nuances the eschatological paradigm. His use of the eschatological
paradigm further appears to use Scripture or influence the use of Scripture in a way in
which Scripture maintains an authoritative, assertive role in the process of application. In
addition, there is evidence that Scripture influences the understanding of the
eschatological paradigm as well as the paradigm influencing the understanding of
Scripture.
It should be noted, however, that while writing in the context of a clearly stated
“eschatological reserve,” Mott’s nuancing of the horizon o f the future appears to share
some philosophical aspects found in the more liberal optimistic eschatological-oriented
ethics.1 And because his leitmotif in eschatology (reign o f God): (1) largely facilitates
his leitmotif for social ethics (justice); (2) is useful in incorporating the imperative for
social responsibility into his moral theory; and (3) sets Christology in the functional role
o f largely facilitating his leitmotif for social ethics, his intended focus on biblical
theological and exegetical methodology appears to blur with aspects of an ethicaloriented eschatology.

Role of Community
For Mott, “the church. . . must be understood in relation to the Reign o f God, the

'E.g., “changing the world in the direction of God’s promises,” etc. (Mott, A
Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 110).
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eschatological order now appearing in history."1 As outlined in chapter 2, the role which
the Church assumes in eschatological ethics has revolved around three fundamental
issues, i.e., (1) as a source o f moral authority; (2) the field of moral operation; and (3) its
linkage with the ethical needs/agenda of the larger human society.2 The role of
community in Mott’s application of the eschatological paradigm in these three areas is for
the most part clear and deliberate.3

Subordinate to Scripture
The Christian community assumes primarily a subordinate, yet vital, source of
moral authority in relation to that o f Scripture. While Mott does not address this question
directly, his four-part “dialogical approach to biblical hermeneutics" brings insight toward
his thinking. His dialogical approach includes the religious source of knowledge found in
Christian tradition and history.4 “The careful use of reason, particularly as theology,
guides the process”5 of interpretation. “The thought and practice o f Christians who went

'Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 129.
2See above, 99-107. Related issues include the dualities o f Christian social and
personal ethics, and the relationship between evangelism and social responsibility in
terms o f the Church’s mission. The role of the Christian community is organically
linked, too, with the question o f social involvement.
3Extended discussions with regard to the role o f community are found in Mott,
Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 82-141; idem, A Christian Perspective on Political
Thought. 42-57.109-112.
4Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 7. See also Mott, “Avoiding
the Capture o f the Gospel,” 38; idem, “When the Bible Seems Silent,” 39; idem, Biblical
Ethics and Social Change, vii-ix.
5Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 7.
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before in the history o f the church, as well as that o f fellow members o f the present
church, confirm one’s interpretation,”1he notes. Furthermore, “the task of interpretation
belongs in the church."2 Since this dialogical process is one where “a great deal of postbiblical information and reflection is needed,”3 and one where “biblical insights pertinent
to a social ethics may form a sociopolitical vision more fully formed than yet expressed
in Scripture,”4 the believing community holds an obvious important and vital role in the
interpretation and application process. And yet, the primacy of Scripture is maintained.

Paradigmatic Social-Ethical Reality
The Christian community is the primary, purposive, and distinct new society
whose victory provides unique visibility for the reign o f God.5 The Church itself is a
unique society, a new realm o f social existence:
The relationships among its members, the ways of dealing with their differences
and needs, and the patterns o f leadership and decision making constitute a discrete
societal structure within the larger society. Thus the church can embody the
patterns o f shared life that God desires for all humanity. Because the church is the
manifestation o f the Reign o f God, the norms that guide it must exemplify the
highest vision o f human community.6

‘Ibid.
2Mott, review o f “Slavery, Sabbath, War and Women: Case Issues in Biblical
Interpretation,” 122.
3Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 241.
4Ibid.
sMott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 129; idem, A Christian Perspective on
Political Thought. 111.
6Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 131.
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From the standpoint of the multiplicity o f groups and the integrity of each type,
the church is one among other groups in the society. From the standpoint of
meaning and coherence, however, the church’s role is unique. Because it is the
channel o f faith that is comprehensive of all life, the church clarifies the
normative purpose o f other groups. It thus must resist identification with them or
itself merely reflecting their understanding.1
The transforming o f human nature, however, a vital and central form o f the Reign,
is present only in the church.2
The Christian community, then, displays in an empirical way the moral reality of
God’s invisible Kingdom. It is a concrete social context that is set apart from society as a
kind of “counter society,”3 a paradigmatic social-ethical reality which prefigures Christ’s
goals in history.4 It is the fundamental field o f moral operation for the reign o f God.
Embodying the presence o f God’s reign, the Christian community “submits itself in
uncompromising faithfulness to its new covenant ethics.”5

'Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 47.
2Ibid., 112.
3"For the church to have a corrective impact on culture it must maintain a separate
and distinct identity from the surrounding society and any new society that it may help
create. Mission is consistent with separation as long as it is kept in mind that the
motivation for that separation is mission, and not separation for its own sake” (Mott,
Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 133).
4"The church is to be the community in which, through its behavior and its
mission, the Reign o f God becomes visible, serving as a precursor and avant-garde o f the
society that will be the fulfillment of all hope. The church is called to represent the Reign
o f God ‘between the times’” (ibid., 106).
sIbid., 133. Mott clarifies the meaning of new covenant ethics: “Jesus’ ethical
precepts are the ethics o f the Reign, not ethics of preparation or of waiting for the Reign.
They are the ethics o f the present Reign of God, or new covenant ethics.. . . Those who
respond to Jesus are to live by the demands of the new age of justice that is breaking into
history” (ibid., 89).
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Primary Social Structure for Change
The Christian community is the primary social structure through which the gospel
works to change other structures.1 Mott begins his discussion o f the Church as a
“counter-community” with the words of John Howard Yoder: “The primary social
structure through which the gospel works to change other structures is that of the
Christian community.”2 While the Christian community is the fundamental field o f moral
operation for the reign o f God, it is only so principally and initially. The Church is to
have a “corrective impact on culture,”3 to "contribute to social change,”4 to “raise the
general moral level in the secular world around it.”5
Mott is writing in the context of the biblical importance of groups and the reality
that groups are channels for influencing society.6 It is a context, too, that affirms that the
scope of God’s “kingdom work" is not confined to the Church.7 Furthermore, “history is
fundamentally one, but its unity will be fully established only at the final reconciliation at

'Ibid., 128.
2Ibid.; Yoder. The Politics o f Jesus. 157.
3Mott. Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 133.
4Ibid.
5Ibid., 136.
6Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 42-49. In this context Mott
notes, “The state cannot be an effective agent for justice until its justice reflects the life of
other groups o f society. Such a group is the church, not only in terms of its own life, but
also in terms o f the meaning it is holding forth for the other groups of the community”
(ibid., 56).
7Ibid., 111.
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the end of history. Nevertheless, glimpses o f that unity appear in the present time.”1
While “the activity o f God outside the presence of the Church must be discerned by the
eyes of faith,"2 and can only be “partial in its realization,"3 the reality o f the Church in the
world not only “provides unique visibility for the reign o f God,”4 but through that
visibility “produces social change in the surrounding society."5 However, the
demonstration of Christian community is only one facet o f social change, it is inadequate
as an expression o f social justice.6 Faithfulness to the demands for justice necessitates
social programs and social struggle.7

'Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 111. Mott cautions here:
“Miguez Bonino correctly rejects the dualistic and monistic solutions to the relationship
between God’s redemptive work and secular history. The dualistic solution o f two
separate histories—one of Israel and the church and the other secular—removes the
Lordship o f God from general history. In the monistic solution, on the other hand, there
is but one history. The history of salvation is identical with the historical struggle for
justice, an accusation made (often falsely) o f liberation theology. This approach removes
the independent significance of Jesus Christ and the church and renders a dangerous
ultimacy to particular struggles” (ibid.).
2Ibid.
3Ibid., 112.
4Ibid., 111. “The Christian community as a city shedding light in the world seems
a fitting picture of the social impact of the Church as an alternative social reality” (Mott,
Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 137).
sMott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 135. “Two movements in the Christian
community help to effect such change. The first is withdrawal of support from practices
contrary to the inbreaking of the Reign. The second is [sic] the example a community
creates when its social relationships are characterized by the new human person that God
is creating” (ibid.).
6Ibid., 139.
7Ibid., 106.
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Summary
The role o f the believing community in Mott’s application of the eschatological
paradigm is clear and deliberate: (1) it is a subordinate, yet vital, source of moral
authority in relation to that o f Scripture; (2) it is the primary, purposive, and distinct new
society which gives unique visibility to the reign o f God; and (3) it is the principal social
structure through which the gospel works to change other structures within the larger
society. In addition, the Christian community’s mission to facilitate the demands for
justice necessitates social programs and social struggle.

Nature of Social involvement
The nature of social involvement for Mott can be capsuled with one pregnant
word, “justice." “Justice, more than any other concept provides the positive meaning o f
politics," he writes in his A Christian Perspective on Political Thought.1 But that could
be said, too, about his social theory in general. “Paths to Justice” is how he outlines the
second part of his Biblical Ethics and Social Change. After building a biblical theology
o f social involvement which revolves largely around the concept o f biblical justice,2 he
develops a variety of ways in which Christians bring about social change. These varied
ways are, in his view, "Paths to Justice." As outlined already above, as an attribute of

'Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 74.
2Chapters 4 and 5— “God’s Justice and Ours” and “The Long March o f God”—
which develop the theme o f biblical justice, comprise nearly half of the first section
(Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 59-106).
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God and a major mandate of Scripture,1biblical justice is Mott’s leitmotif for social
ethics. And by interpreting the reign of God largely through the category o f biblical
justice, Mott facilitates his leitmotif for social ethics. But what practical shape does
biblical justice take in Mott’s moral theory? What is the nature of social involvement as
He perceives it under this eschatological-packaged leitmotif?

Character of Biblical Justice
According to Mott, the comprehensive character of biblical justice is shaped by
several important perspectives:2
1.

Justice must be understood in the context of people as social beings. One’s

conception o f justice corresponds to an understanding of the relationship that the
individual has to society. The biblical view assumes that people are social beings in
contrast to modem liberal views which presupposes that individuals naturally live in
separation from one another. In a social context, then, justice serves to enforce positive
responsibilities o f care for one another as opposed to only preventing one’s exercise of

'Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 74.
2Mott asserts that justice is a common biblical term even though English
translations often veil the frequency and importance of justice in Scripture. According to
Mott, ambiguity arises over the meaning o f the biblical terms righteousness and
judgment. The chief Hebrew and Greek words approximate our term justice. A rule of
thumb is that when one sees righteousness or judgment in the context o f social
responsibility or oppression, one can assume that justice would be a better translation.
See his discussion, Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 59; idem, A Christian
Perspective on Political Thought. 77-78. This is a major presupposition behind Mott’s
leitmotif.
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freedom from causing harm to one another.1
2. Justice is an essential characteristic of the children o f God. “Justice is very
important in the biblical order o f values. It is a central duty o f the children o f God.2 It
shows that they have the true God as the object of their worship and devotion.3
3. Justice must be partial in order to be impartial, and that bias is toward the
weak.4 Biblical justice presupposes that impartial treatment o f all members of the
community requires special attention to the groups of society who are most needy.5
Within the limits of what is due to the poor and oppressed, it is impartial.6 This bias

'Mott, “The Partiality o f Biblical Justice,” 23.
2Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 78. According to Mott, this
mandate can be found in such passages as: “let justice roll down like waters and
righteousness like an overflowing stream” (Amos 5:24 NRSV); “Woe to you, scribes and
Pharisees, hypocrites! For you pay tithe on mint and anise and cumin, and have neglected
the weightier matters o f the Law: justice and mercy and faith” (Matt 23:23 NKJV); and
“He has shown you, O man, what is good; and what does the Lord require of you but to
do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with your God?” (Mic 6:8 NKJV). “Social
justice is a theme that runs through the prophetic literature and into the New Testament,
and it is regarded as so crucial to faith that without it other forms o f piety are worthless”
(Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 74-75).
3Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 79.
4Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 66; idem, “The Partiality of Biblical
Justice,” 23-29.
5The poor had specific claims as members of a needy group (Jer 5:28; Prov 29.7).
6According to Mott, “the difference between scriptural and classical justice lies in
the understanding o f what is to be the normal situation in society. The Scriptures do not
allow the presupposition of a condition in which groups or individuals are denied the
ability to participate fully and equally in the life of the society. For this reason, justice is
primarily spoken o f by the biblical writers as activity on behalf of the disadvantaged”
(Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 65).
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toward the weak means that in the social struggles in which the poor are perennially
victims o f injustice, God and the followers of God take up the cause of the weak.1
4. Justice is “a call to action more than it is a principle of evaluation.”2 Justice is
not so much what we know, as what we are to do. “It goes beyond simply being just in
one’s personal relationships; it implies an active responsibility to see that justice is done
in the community.”3 The activism of the biblical language of justice is striking: “loose the
bonds . . . undo the thongs . . . let the oppressed go free . . . break every yoke” (Isa 58:6-8,
RSV). It means taking upon oneself the cause of those who are weak in their own
defense.4 In this context, justice includes deliverance, i.e., the rectifying of gross social
inequalities o f the disadvantaged, the removal o f oppression, and intervening power to
overcome exploitive power over the weak.s
5. God’s justice is our model of justice oriented to the poor and weak.6 The
justice which characterizes God’s defense of the poor is the same justice which is
demanded o f humanity.7

'In passage after passage the group to whom justice is to be applied is the
oppressed—the widow, the orphan, the resident alien, and the poor.
2Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 79.
3Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 72.
4Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 79.
5Ibid., 80, 21-24; Mott, “The Partiality of Biblical Justice,” 25.
6Mott, “The Partiality of Biblical Justice,” 25.
7Ibid.
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There is a continuity between divine and human justice. Human beings receive
justice from God for their decisions and responsibilities, and they leam justice
from God. It is methodologically necessary to look at the biblical materials
describing God’s social justice to develop the understanding of human
responsibilities injustice.1
6. Justice is a restoration to community and provides the basic conditions for
active participation in community.2 Justice presupposes God’s intention for people to be
in community.3 Community membership means “the ability to share fully within one’s
capacity and potential in each essential aspect o f community."4 This restoration to
community assumes a basic relative equality based on basic needs and rights rather than
wealth, status, birth, education, ability, contract, religion, mathematical uniformity, etc.
There are benefit rights as well as freedom rights:5
When justice is set forth, it is the basic needs for inclusion in community which
are set forth; and these concerns give direction to the economic, social and legal
ordering o f society.6

'Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 80.
2Ibid.; Mott, “The Partiality o f Biblical Justice,” 25.
3Mott, “Justice,” 828.
4Mott, “The Partiality of Biblical Justice,” 25. According to Mott, the spheres of
participation in the community have multiple dimensions, e.g., physical life itself,
political protection and decision making, social interchange and standing, economic
production, education, culture, and religion.
5Mott, “The Contribution of the Bible to Human Rights,” 5-12; idem, “Human
Rights and Christian Thought,” 9-11; idem, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought.
81-85.
6Mott, “The Partiality of Biblical Justice,” 29.
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7. Love is the basis o f biblical justice.1 Biblical justice is frequently found in
close association with love. “Together, love and justice make up the most important and
m ost characteristic component o f biblical ethics."2 Because love is the meaning o f Law,
and Law provides content for love, justice as a major part o f the demand of the Law
provides structure to make love more possible in a social context.3 Love itself cannot
present a reason for preferring the cause of one neighbor over another.4 Justice, then, is
the servant of love. It specifies the meaning of love in the perennial situations o f human
conflict over the goods o f social life.5 Furthermore, love gives justice moral meaning:
Love must persist even after it has propelled us into the realm of justice. ‘Love
can only do more, it can never do less, than justice requires.’ It transcends justice
because it is that which gives justice its moral meaning. Paul wrote, ‘If I divide
up and distribute my possessions . . . and do not have love, it is of no benefit’ (1
Cor. 13.3).6
These characteristics o f biblical justice are set within the context of the reality of
social evil.7 A major component of Mott’s social theory includes the background concept

’Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 92; idem, Biblical Ethics and
Social Change. 48-56.
2Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 59.
3Ibid., 48-54.
4Ibid., 54.
5,1Justice is the guide for reaching a proper equilibrium in the midst of the
conflicting claims upon our love” (Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought.
91, 92).
6Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 54.
7See ibid., 1-21 (these thoughts first appeared in an article by Stephen Charles
Mott titled, “Biblical Faith and the Reality of Social Evil,” Christian Scholar’s Review 9,
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that evil has a social and political character beyond isolated actions o f individuals. Evil is
in the very fabric o f our social existence.1 Furthermore, there is no radical distinction
between the person as an individual and as a social being. Evil exists in the society
outside the individual and exerts an influence upon him or her.2 The dynamic behind this
evil within sociopolitical reality is the evil supernatural powers.3 The implications of this
demonic-inspired evil residing in society concern its powerful influence on our customs,
traditions, thinking, and institutions. And so,
our struggle with evil must correspond to the geography of evil. In combating
evil in the heart through evangelism and Christian nurture we deal with a crucial
aspect of evil, but only one aspect. Dealing with the evil of the social order and
the worldly powers involves social action, action in the world.4
And because we serve a different order, the reign o f God, which comes in contrast
to the prevailing way of life in the social order as supported by the fallen powers, we are
to follow the Lordship o f Christ who judges the world and conquers it.5 Our justice then,
will necessarily include the structures of social reality.

no. 3 [1979/1980]: 225-240); idem, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 26-41.
'Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 4,6.
2Ibid., 5.
3Ibid., 6-10. According to Mott, “the biblical concepts of cosmos and the
supernatural powers comprise an objective social reality which can function for good or
for evil” (ibid., 10).
4Ibid., 16.
5Ibid., 18. “The church is to be engaged in a battle against evils within the social
structure, because they mark the points of these powers’ penetration into our history”
(ibid., 19).
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For Mott, “justice is more than a principle of analysis. It is a rallying point.
Justice is a powerful motivator. One should have a passion for justice.”1 But what
practical shape does this passion for justice take in social involvement?

Paths to Justice
According to Mott, the paths to justice begin with evangelism. Evangelism
contributes significantly to moral change in the members of society, which in turn brings
a leavening influence to society. It is also a major factor in heightening awareness of
moral responsibility and producing social activists.2 But there are limits to evangelism.
The objective reality of social life and social evil are not directly or fully confronted by
the more individualistic dynamics o f evangelism. Paths to justice other than evangelism
must also be followed.3 Evangelism and the implementation o f justice are inseparable,
however, both in Christian conduct and in the goal of God’s work in history. This
interdependence can be seen from three perspectives: (1) witness is hurt when social
action is absent; (2) witness is helped when social action is present; and (3) social action
is needed to protect the fruits o f witness.4 Mott notes that “social ministry and

'Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 74.
2Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 110-112. Mott notes that when revival
and spiritual awakenings have been widespread in a society, they have frequently resulted
in movements o f social concern and reform.
3Ibid., 122.
4Ibid., 122-126.
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evangelical witness exist side by side in Scripture without conflict o f subordination."1
Because of this, there can be no designation of primary and secondary tasks. We need to
render wholehearted obedience to both tasks.2
Beyond evangelical witness, the path to justice for Mott, is comprehensive:
The obligation to do justice makes us responsible for the conduct of society in the
most comprehensive sense. Wherever there is a basic need, we are obliged to help
to the extent o f our ability and opportunity. ‘Do not hold back from those who are
entitled to it, when you possess the power to do it’ (Prov. 3.27) sums up the whole
teaching and how we are to relate it to our varying circumstances. Our power
includes not only our personal resources but also class position and political
opportunities.3
Wherever there is a basic need, help needs to be given to the extent o f our ability or
opportunity. We are to do this within the context o f the understanding o f biblical justice
as outlined above.
This principle, o f course, can be read primarily in the context of individual social
responsibility and involvement. For Mott, though, such individual social responsibility is
very significant in influencing society. While groups, not individuals, formulate public
policy, the individual through associations ‘‘can get a piece o f the action by participating
in the process o f making social decisions:"4
By neglecting the associational involvement o f their members, churches are often
less effective in carrying out their professed mission of providing Christian

'Ibid., 123.
2Ibid., 126-127.
3Ibid., 77.
“Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 47. Mott has in mind here
lobbies, public interest groups, professional and trade associations, etc.
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influence on the institutions o f their society. The churches tend to promote a
merely personal ethic and to ignore nonecclesiastical associational
responsibilities. When members do participate, their associations are often not
those that affect public policy; rather, they are those that are concerned with
sociability.1
Individual Christian social responsibility and influence is thus a significant part of
Mott’s social moral theory. In this context, the Christian community’s responsibility is
one of support and providing the biblical, theological, and ethical resources necessary for
its individual members to intelligently address social and political issues in the context of
their opportunities or calling.2
Mott’s view o f the Church as a "counter-community," however, goes beyond the
action o f its individual members. Because groups are channels for influencing society,3
and individuals are necessarily limited in what they can realistically contribute toward or
oppose,4 the Christian community, as a group within society, must exert its influence
through its own life, word, and deed.5

'Ibid., 47-48. The point here concerns viewing society as a composite o f groups
rather than a composite of individuals. The associational slumber of the churches Mott
refers to reflects “a composite of individuals” view o f society, and overlooks how groups
are channels for influencing society.
2Ibid., 10. No doubt this is what Mott is seeking to do in his social moral theory.
3Ibid., 47.
4Ibid.
5Mott suggests that the Christian community contributes to social change in three
ways: (I) through various forms o f social action and service; (2) though the impact its
nonconforming life has on the surrounding community; and most important (3) the
support it gives to the individual involved in social action and mission (Mott, Biblical
Ethics and Social Change. 133).
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It has already been noted that “the Reign o f God is not a social program, but
faithfulness to its demands for justice necessitates social programs and social struggle.”1
The social programs and social struggle will be consistent with the vision of justice Mott
has articulated, e.g., the economic, social, and legal ordering of the community.2 It will
be necessarily political.3 But through it all, it will show “an eschatological reserve,” and
be a “realistic activism.”4 Mott thus articulates a model of social responsibility that is
inclusive o f the caring functions of the soft revolution, evangelism, and moral protest
and personal influence in the socio-political arena. It is interesting to note here, though,
that the direction o f his political theory strongly leans towards a non-Communist
socialism. In his opinion, this form o f the common life most closely approximates the
Christian vision. It has communal, democratic elements, much like the kibbutz, about
which he has written with considerable conviction. According to Mott, “the hidden
elements o f Christianity in Marxism make many o f its concepts appropriate for an overtly
Christian social philosophy."5

‘Ibid., 106.
2Mott, “The Partiality of Biblical Justice,” 29.
3Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 110, 70.
4Ibid., 108-111.
5Ibid., 197. He adds, “It is also conceivable for a Christian to interpret history by
means o f a dialectical historical analysis subsumed under the Reign of God, never fully in
history” (ibid.). See Mott’s extended positive assessment o f Marxist socialism and
socialism in general, Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 183-218. See
also, Max Lynn Stackhouse, review o f A Christian Perspective on Political Thought, by
Stephen Charles Mott, The Journal of Religion 75, no. 1 (January 1995): 149; and David
Attwood, review o f A Christian Perspective on Political Thought, by Stephen Charles
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Summary
The nature o f social involvement for Mott can be capsuled under the rubric,
“biblical justice." The comprehensive character o f biblical justice is shaped by several
important perspectives, i.e., justice (1) must be understood in the context o f people as
social beings; (2) is an essential characteristic o f the children of God; (3) must be partial
in order to be impartial— biased toward the weak; (4) is a call to action more than a
principle o f evaluation; (5) reflects God’s justice which is our model of justice oriented to
the poor and weak; (6) includes a restoration to active participation in community; (7)
finds its moral meaning in love. The reign o f God is interpreted largely through this
leitmotif for social ethics. In doing so, Mott brings practical shape to his moral theory
through what he terms “paths to justice." These “paths to justice” include a variety of
ways in which Christians can bring about social change, i.e., evangelism, individual
social responsibility and influence, moral protest and personal influence in the socio
political arena, social programs and social struggle. A non-Communist form o f socialism
is envisioned as the form o f the common life most closely approximating the Christian
vision.

Implications for Moral Theory
While the broad outline of Mott’s application o f the eschatological paradigm to
moral theory is now clear, it is important to survey his application of the paradigm’s
ethical implications with respect to the level of moral reflection and its potential for

Mott, Expository Times 105, no. 8 (May 1994): 253.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

170
concrete social content. The issues here deal primarily with questions of specificity and
consistency with respect to the eschatological paradigm’s application. They bring into
practical focus where normative content and guidance lie in the application process, and
the carefulness with which they are used towards concrete ethical exigencies. This
survey includes: (1) the theoretical level of moral reflection which the paradigm appears
to elicit in Mott’s thinking; (2) the meaning and function o f paradigm in Mott’s moral
theory; and (3) Mott’s correlation of the eschatological paradigm to philosophical ethics.

Level of Moral Reflection
As indicated in an earlier chapter, a correspondence can exist between a paradigm
operating on either the macro, meso, or micro level, and the ingredients in the structure of
ethics.1 This correspondence between the levels o f paradigm operation and ethical
structure is only true in the order that has been suggested, i.e., macro/bases,
meso/principles, micro/area rules. The question o f “theoretical level," which this
correspondence facilitates between paradigm operation and moral reflection, enables one
to clarify how concretely the eschatological paradigm might legitimately speak to modem
ethical concerns.
The issue o f “sufficient concreteness” is at the heart o f Mott’s discussion o f the
use o f Scripture in contemporary moral theory.2 His concern is understanding the place

'See above, p. 23, note 1. The ethical categories and terminology used in this
study reflect Holmes’s ingredients for structuring an ethical theory (Holmes, 50-56).
2Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 238-247; idem, “How
Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 719; idem, “The Contribution of the Bible
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o f concrete decision making within different aspects o f ethical thought, and showing how
principles and concrete injunctions relate in Scriptural thought.1 It is within this larger
discussion of the use o f Scripture that the "theoretical level" of the eschatological
paradigm comes into view.

Macro/Bases
For Mott, Scripture is authoritative for ethics in different but complementary
ways. Scripture’s contribution to ethics is found in the mighty acts of God, in prevailing
ethical principles, in theological affirmations, and through particular concrete injunctions
(teachings and stories o f Scripture).2 It is in this context that he states an important
hermeneutical principle:
The authority o f God in the concrete injunction must be interpreted with attention
to God’s authority in mighty acts, in the theological affirmations, and in the
prevailing ethical principles. And the specific teachings and propositions are
needed to give concrete interpretation o f the broad and general truths and actions.
. . . If the concrete commandments are interpreted apart from consideration of the
implications o f the great acts of God recorded in Scripture and its basic
theological affirmations, our ethical response is in danger o f being theologically
vacuous and cut off from the core of Christian life and commitment.3
Mott earlier asserts that “the concept of the Reign o f God is an example o f a basic
theological affirmation, rather than a specific mighty act o f God (although it involves

to Human Rights,” 25-34.
lMott, “The Use o f the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 239.
2Ibid., 243; Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 11.
3Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 11.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

172
such)."1 As a “basic theological affirmation” of Scripture, the reign o f God would be
expected, then, to bring moral reflection from the “macro” level o f paradigm application.
In doing so, it would correspond primarily to the “theological or philosophical bases”
ingredient in the structure of ethics. This is consistent with the broad way in which Mott
does in fact apply the eschatological paradigm toward moral theory. As noted earlier, the
reign o f G od “provides a context for God’s universal ethical concerns,” and it “furnishes a
concept o f history into which other New Testament themes can be placed.”2 There is an
“eschatological vision" that presents “a continuing critique of all that falls short o f it” and
“a normative glimpse of a perfect society.”3 The eschatological paradigm brings
perceptions o f reality, a particular view o f the world which, according to Mott, is an
integral aspect o f interpreting both social reality and Scripture itself.4
As a “basic theological affirmation,” the reign o f God is seen in the hermeneutical
context o f opening the ethical meaning of Scripture, and providing parameters for
interpreting specific concrete injunctions o f Scripture. The bridge between the two
(theological affirmations and specific concrete injunctions) is the reality of their both
yielding normative content of Scripture.

'Ibid., 10.
2Mott, “The Use o f the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 231. See above, 134139.
3Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 15.
4Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 240-241.
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Meso/Underlying Principles
There is evidence, however, that Mott articulates moral reflection from the “meso"
level o f paradigm application as well. In the structure of ethics, this would mean
articulating underlying principles that can be applied in a universal way to various areas
of moral activity.1 His statement that the “concept of the Reign of God is an example of a
basic theological affirmation, rather than a specific mighty act of God (although it
involves such)," yields an important qualification. While the reign o f God is a basic
theological affirmation, rather than a specific mighty act o f God, it nevertheless involves
such. The reign o f God is not just a perception o f reality, or a particular view of the
world, it is the manifestation of God’s reassertion of sovereignty in history.2 For Mott,
what God does is significant, and it is paradigmatic. There is specific moral content in
what God does, toward which one can focus one’s moral reflection. Through God’s acts
one finds moral principles that touch upon life. According to Mott, we learn from God
compassion, love, justice, and social responsibility. Because justice characterizes God’s
reign,3 is an expression of God’s reign,4 and the proclamation o f the reign o f God brings
with it an imperative for justice,5 one is drawn from the broad realm of worldview to the
more concrete level o f underlying principles that can be applied to life.

'See Holmes, 51-53.
2Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 8.
3Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 85.
4Mott, “The Contribution o f the Bible to Human Rights,” 32.
5Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 97, 100.
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Since for Mott, the biblical language (reign, justice) facilitates the merging o f his
leitmotif for eschatology with his leitmotif for social ethics, he is able to outline
prevailing ethical principles which delineate the basic goals, priorities, and concerns of
social life.' This application of the reign o f God from the “meso” level o f moral
reflection (for ethics, underlying principles) illustrates that Mott’s approach to social
ethics is a paradigmatic one, and that eschatology is likewise both perceived and
employed paradigmatically.
It must be remembered that these observations come in the context o f the
important question of how to translate ethical reflection from one level to another.2 It is
important to note, too, that the socalled “basic theological affirmations” receive their
concrete content and interpretation via the specific teachings and propositions found in
concrete injunctions.3 An organic hermeneutical relationship exists between the two
levels o f moral reflection—one that is complementary, dependent, and interpretive.
Concrete injunctions are necessary to interpret theological affirmations, and theological
affirmations are needed to interpret concrete injunctions. Thus, the reign o f God opens

'These have been broadly outlined in the above discussion of the character of
biblical justice.
2I.e., from the macro to the meso to the micro, and from theological/philosophical
bases to underlying principles to area rules. This includes the ability to move oppositely,
i.e., area rules to underlying principles to bases, and micro to meso and macro where
possible.
3For Mott, Scripture provides content for one’s worldview. He writes,
“Scripture’s most important contribution to ethics may be in the content it provides for
one’s world view” (Mott, “The Use o f the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 241).
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the way toward identifiable content and reasonable specificity with respect to application
for moral theory.

Micro/Area Rules
Having surveyed Mott’s use of eschatology in moral theory, two important
questions come to view with respect to the eschatological paradigm and contemporary
praxis, i.e., (1) How does Mott’s application o f the eschatological paradigm relate to
contemporary ethical issues? and (2) How specific or concrete does his application o f the
eschatological paradigm allow him to be with respect to these issues? These questions
bring us to the “micro” level of paradigm application and the corresponding “area rules”
in moral theory.1 Answers to these questions are twofold. One revolves around Mott’s
view o f the nature of Scripture and his hermeneutic which attempts to interpret
organically the different, but complementary, ways Scripture is authoritative for ethics.
The other revolves around the nature o f the themes he addresses as important in the
context o f his moral theory.
Mott reads Scripture “with the expectation o f answers to questions o f social
justice and oppression.”2 This is evidenced in his somewhat topical approach to Scripture
which asks o f Scripture a question that may be commonplace in contemporary Christian

'Area rules are moral rules that apply to various areas of life, i.e., value of fetal
life, truth telling, business transactions, economics, human rights, social justice, etc. (see
Homes, 51, 53-54).
2Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change, viii.
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ethics, but which would likely have been unfamiliar to first-century Christians.1 He thus
tends to produce studies of immediate and concrete relevance. His broad outline of the
nature o f social involvement and social change becomes focused, then, to include a wide
array o f specific contemporary ethical concerns. His “From the Word” column in
Christian Social Action indicates this diversity,2 including such practical topics as interest
on loans, ecological responsibility, capital punishment, homosexuality, centralized
government, legislating religious values, unpaid wages, welfare reform, the
interconnection o f violence and injustice, gambling, and affirmative action.3
Beyond these focused columns, Mott’s larger works also express practical
concerns such as the nature and content o f human rights, civil disobedience, revolutionary

'Verhey, 25.
2M ott’s monthly “From the Word” contribution to Christian Social Action has
been consistent since his first column in the July/August issue, 1990.
3Stephen Charles Mott, “The Prohibition of Interest on Loans,” 37; idem,
“Humankind’s Dual Relationship to the Creation,” Christian Social Action 3, no. 8
(September 1990): 38; idem, “Biblical Injunctions on Capital Punishment.” Christian
Social Action 3, no. 10 (November 1990): 39; idem, “Homosexual Practice and the Bible:
Key Issues.” Christian Social Action 4. no. 2 (February 1991): 38; idem, “Status, Purity,
and the Church’s Discussion o f Homosexuality.” Christian Social Action 5, no. 5 (May
1992): 44; idem, “Samuel’s Warning and Centralized Government,” Christian Social
Action 4. no. 9 (October 1991): 37; idem, “Legislating Religious Values and Abortion,”
Christian Social Action 5, no. 8 (September 1992): 37; idem, “The Land Cries Out
Against Unpaid Wages,” Christian Social Action 6, no. 3 (March 1993): 37; idem,
“Sabbatical Year Principles for Welfare Reform,” Christian Social Action 6, no. 9
(October 1993): 35; idem, “The Pair o f Social Justice and Welfare Reform,” 38; idem,
“Violence and Social Justice,” 39; idem, “Work: The Victim of Gambling,” Christian
Social Action 7, no. 7 (July/August 1994): 34; idem, “Lazarus, Dives, and Affirmative
Action,” 37.
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violence, and economics.1 His comprehensive discussion of politics opens toward the
concrete concerns o f power in society, groups in society, the purpose o f government, a
critique for the evaluation of political ideologies, and the shape o f creative political
reform.2
M ott’s discussion of the homeless is particularly revealing as to how his works
tend to focus ultimately towards practical needs. It is particularly interesting to note how
his lengthy discussion of homelessness in Christian Social Action includes the full range
o f paradigm operation (macro, meso, and micro) and the ingredients of ethical structure
under discussion here (bases, underlying principles, area rules). It presents a clear
example o f his methodology, both in operation and application. After outlining the
realities and causes o f homelessness in the United States, Mott presses for a political
consciousness which goes beyond the relief o f immediate needs or mere financial
assistance to address the root causes found in society-wide patterns. Individuals and
groups o f Christians are called to work with local government agencies that serve as
advocates for the poor and that address issues of empowerment.3 Here Mott’s

'Mott, “The Contribution of the Bible to Human Rights”; idem, “Human Rights
and Christian Thought”; idem. Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 142-166, 167-191;
idem, “Lethal Force in the Context of a Theological Understanding o f Power,” 61-68;
idem, “Pacifism? Come Now!” The Other Side 13, no. 2 (July 1977): 64-69; idem, “The
Politics o f Jesus and Our Responsibilities,” The Reformed Journal 26, no. 2 (February
1976): 7-10; idem, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?”
2See Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought: idem, Biblical Ethics
and Social Change. 192-208.
3Stephen Charles Mott, “Because Jesus Was Homeless for Us: A Biblical Study
on Our Reponsibility to the Homeless,” Christian Social Action 2, no. 2 (February 1989):
4-15.
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eschatological leitmotif—reign o f God—becomes an integral part o f his biblical study of
our responsibility to the homeless by providing a theological base, underlying principles,
concrete content, as well as moral stimulus (compassion and motivation towards ministry
to the homeless).
This focus toward immediate and concrete relevance is not programmatic,
however. While social programs and social struggle are viewed as inevitable realities in
light of the demands for justice which the reign o f God brings,1the “question of strategy”
for implementation is not part of Mott’s focus.2 He offers no easy syllabi for executing
his moral theory. Mott is a theorist. He works primarily on the levels of theological
bases and underlying principles. But he does so with an eye constantly toward concrete
biblical injunctions and specific social needs o f contemporary society. This awareness
pulls him inevitably toward “area rules" in moral theory. Together with his hermeneutic
of relating biblical principles and concrete injunctions, this tending toward “area rules"
enables clear directions for Christian social involvement. This tending toward “area
rules” in moral theory exhibits how paradigm for Mott includes this level o f moral
reflection.

Summary
With the above analysis in view, it is appropriate to conclude that, for Mott, the

'Mott. Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 106.
2Verhey, 26.
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eschatological paradigm facilitates moral reflection across the spectrum of macro, meso,
and micro paradigm operation. Because o f its close proximity to the biblical text, the
eschatological paradigm enables moral reflection that includes theological bases,
underlying principles, and area rules. The different levels of moral reflection are kept in
view and are consciously related to so as to provide conceptual integrity and purposeful
application for contemporary moral exigencies.

Paradigm Role and Function
Paradigm1is an integral part of Mott’s moral theory particularly as it relates to the
question of an interpretive framework for concrete injunctions, finding values,2
overarching principles, and cross-cultural applicability. His discussion o f paradigm
comes in those contexts where he is articulating how principles and concrete injunctions

'While this study uses the concept of paradigm in conjunction with eschatology,
paradigm is used more broadly and generally by both Mott and Ogletree. In order to
understand fully how these two ethicists apply eschatology as a paradigm, it is useful to
observe how they relate to the concept o f paradigm more generally and/or in other areas
thought. For the purpose o f clarification, the term “eschatological paradigm” is used
where this study is focusing principally on their application of eschatology, and
“paradigm” where it is discussing paradigm generally in order to understand how
eschatology as paradigm correspondingly would be viewed or applied.
2The concept o f “values” is introduced here as a component in Mott’s moral
theory, but it is not crucial for the purposes or argumentation of this study. According to
Mott, “one must discover the values in the economic, social, and political systems in the
Bible and in theological reflection upon the Bible and the subsequent history of the
church and indicate the modem arrangements which would best implement those values.
Such a case will require empirical and historical information far beyond that which can be
furnished from the Bible” (Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?”
17). It appears that values thus have a motivational function in both the search for and
application o f principles in the concrete injunctions o f the biblical text.
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relate in Scriptural thought.1
The "concrete materials" o f Scripture have “normative significance.”2 "Scripture
is very concrete because o f God’s care for humanity in its particular material and social
existence.”3 This affirmation about the normative significance of concrete materials
should not, however,
mean a denial o f the differences in our situation from that o f the original reception
o f the biblical passages, nor should it deny the incompleteness of these
commandments for the whole o f ethical guidance. It means that since God’s
revelation does come in concrete forms, every passage and every commandment
o f Scripture should be examined for whatever meaning that they might contain
which would transcend the original situation and relate to the situation of the
reader o f another place and time.4
This search for meaning that would transcend the original situation includes
finding values, overarching principles, and cross-cultural applicability. It means
understanding “the often strange and seemingly archaic concreteness o f Scripture as an
historical expression o f transcendental truth designed for all humanity.” We thus
"approach the Bible anticipating an inexhaustible richness o f meaning." Through valid
exegesis we discover “in the particulars truths of greater universality." Behind specific

'Ibid., 11-15; idem, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 243-246;
idem, “The Bible and Economics,” 26, 31-33; idem, “Limiting Personal Enforcement of
the Law,” 37.
2Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 16.
3Ibid.
4Ibid., 11. “The Bible’s very involvement with the historical moment makes the
injunctions o f the Scripture dated for those who are struggling to be faithful in situations
far removed in time” (ibid., 16).
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injunctions, we look for ethical principles.1 The paradigmatic nature o f specific
commands comes into view against this search for ethical principles:
In addition to general and summary commands, many very specific commands
have within themselves a generalizing character.. . . These specific commands are
paradigmatic. They point to a range o f activity much broader than what is stated.
They model behavior which the hearer, or reader, is expected to identify and to
apply to similar areas o f life .. . . The identification of other applications requires
the hearer at some level o f thought to define a principle o f conduct which unites
the specific commandment to other specific, yet different applications. The
modem reader similarly must identify the principle and determine appropriate
applications in her or his social situation.2
Furthermore, the nature o f Hebrew Law itself is viewed as paradigmatic and
partial.3 It does not attempt to list everything that a law covered, but rather it provides a
prominent example. It was to be applied to other similar examples.4 The role and
function o f paradigm, then, articulate how principles and concrete injunctions relate in
Scriptural thought.
Additionally, paradigmatic injunctions can appeal to imagination rather than
express mere abstract propositions:
Most of Jesus’s injunctions were paradigmatic.. . . As in his parables, Jesus
commands had a dramatic, poetic, and pictorial character. Rather than abstract

'Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 244.
2Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 13.
3Ibid., 14.
“Mott, “Limiting Personal Enforcement o f the Law,” 37. “The Law functioned in
a paradigmatic fashion, providing guidance for the village elders or other ju d g es.. . .
Paradigmatic means that its provisions served as examples and guides for application to
specific cases as they arose. They were not directives to be carried out in exact detail”
(Mott, “The Bible and Economics,” 31).
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principles, they appealed to imagination to stir conscience to look for the
principle.1
While Mott discusses paradigm primarily in the context o f eliciting authoritative
meaning from concrete injunctions, paradigm nevertheless factors largely in his overall
hermeneutic.2 This importance here is not paradigm itself, but the authoritative nature of
Scripture and the broad way in which it can be approached and interpreted. The
normative content—whether in concrete injunction, prevailing ethical principles, mighty
acts o f God, theological affirmations, or enduring values—is not in any paradigmatic
reality itself, but in the text. While the text creates the paradigm, the paradigm opens
back towards the text. Again, the hermeneutical principle Mott articulates is that
The authority of God in the concrete injunction must be interpreted with attention
to God’s authority in mighty acts, in the theological affirmations, and in the

‘Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 245. An example Mott
cites is the command to “turn the other cheek,” which points to a much broader range of
activity than a literal slap on the face. It is paradigmatic in that it is a model of behavior
where the hearer is expected to recognize the principle and apply it. “Even though the
injunction is limited and incomplete, the way it applies its principles sets a pattern for
later Christians to follow in different circumstances which possibly allow a fuller
understanding. Since the controlling factor is the principle of which the injunction is an
example, it allows a flexible adaptation to new historical situations.. . . Although
exemplary, the specific injunction is to be taken seriously. In fact, the argument that,
because the injunction is paradigmatic, it is not law misses the paradigmatic nature of the
Torah. In addition, the fact that the commands of Jesus are difficult to obey or to enforce
does not rule out their character as law. Law has an important symbolic and educative
function even when it does not actually control behavior. It gives expression to social
imagination” (ibid., 245, 246).
2Mott asserts that the Exodus is a paradigm of justice (Mott, “The Bible and
Economics,” 26), and in his view, in interpretation “one seeks to express in social life
meaning which is analogous to the basic acts and affirmations o f the Bible” (Mott, “How
Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 11). God models justice, compassion,
deliverance, etc. (Mott, “The Partiality of Biblical Justice,” 25).
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prevailing ethical principles. And the specific teachings and propositions are
needed to give concrete interpretation o f the broad and general truths and actions.1
These observations are significant for Mott’s application o f the eschatological
paradigm in that the normative content for the eschatological paradigm likewise would
lay primarily in the biblical text. In keeping with his approach to paradigm generally, his
approach to eschatology tends towards specificity and concrete content in the moral
images that the eschatological paradigm (particularly the reign o f God) evokes. In
addition, his application of the eschatological paradigm elicits sustained focus toward
Scripture in the context of its application in moral theory.
It appears that the role and function o f paradigm, for Mott, is primarily that of
facilitating an abstract basic principle which then needs to be translated and applied
towards new situations. However, he also gives evidence that paradigm facilitates the
imprinting o f an inner gripping image which shapes people ethically.2 It appears that his
use o f eschatology as paradigm is consistent with these conclusions. The eschatological
paradigm facilitates abstract principles which need to be translated and applied towards
our contemporary situation. Likewise, the eschatological paradigm has the motivational
dynamic o f imprinting an inner gripping image which shapes people ethically. This is
further indication of Mott’s ability to nuance the eschatological paradigm through all
levels o f paradigm operation and ethical structure. The meso/underlying principles and
micro/area rules levels of moral reflection are important aspects o f M ott’s moral theory.

•Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 11.
2See above discussion, 117-120.
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Relation to Philosophical Ethics
In his writings, Mott appears unconcerned with relating either his moral theory or
the eschatological paradigm to the categories of philosophical ethics. His interests lie
squarely in the area of social ethics. The categories of thought he uses are biblical, social,
economic, and political. He applies modem sociological and ethical categories to the
material o f the Bible to suggest new possibilities of meaning and to provide a means of
assessing the applicability of the results o f exegesis to contemporary discussion.1 Where
normative Scriptural materials relate to the formal components o f social ethics, Mott
seeks to draw upon them in an authoritative manner.2 He does discuss the concept of
prima facie duties, however, in his development o f strategic noncooperation.3 Here he
briefly refers to the principle o f utility and the concept o f the good.

Summary
This survey of Mott’s application of the eschatological paradigm’s ethical
implications has included three important perspectives: (1) the theoretical level of moral
reflection which the paradigm appears to elicit in Mott’s thinking; (2) the meaning and
function o f paradigm in Mott’s moral theory; and (3) M ott’s correlation of the
eschatological paradigm to philosophical ethics. With respect to the level of moral
reflection, Mott nuances the eschatological paradigm through the full range o f paradigm

‘Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change, viii.
2Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 241.
3Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 154-160.
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operation and ethical structure, i.e., macro/bases, meso/underlying principles, and
micro/area rules. The role and function o f paradigm for Mott are primarily that of
facilitating an abstract principle which then needs to be translated and applied towards
new situations. However, there is evidence that the paradigm has the motivational
dynamic o f shaping people ethically through an inner gripping moral image. Finally,
Mott appears unconcerned, generally, with relating either his moral theory or the
eschatological paradigm to the categories of philosophical ethics.

Chapter Summary
M ott’s understanding o f eschatology fits the general contours of the
eschatological paradigm outlined in this study. He both views and articulates this
paradigm within a realist perspective of human nature and the realities of history. While
each o f the components o f the paradigm is evident in his thinking, the reign o f God
becomes his leitmotif for nuancing eschatology toward moral theory. By interpreting the
reign o f God primarily through the category of biblical justice, Mott’s leitmotif for
eschatology largely facilitates his leitmotif for social ethics, i.e., biblical justice. While
Mott consciously perceives and nuances the paradigm from the standpoint of biblical
theology and exegesis, the reign o f God, as a basic theological affirmation o f Scripture,
becomes useful towards interpreting the social content and meaning o f Scripture itself.
And while the Christian community assumes a subordinate, yet vital source of authority
in relation to that o f Scripture, it is the primary field of moral operation for the ethics of
the reign o f God, and the primary structure through which the gospel works to change
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other structures. Furthermore, the nature o f the Church’s social involvement in the larger
society revolves around the character of biblical justice, which is always biased in favor
o f the poor and weak and includes a commitment to their defense.
A fundamental concern in Mott’s hermeneutic is the place of concrete decision
making within different aspects o f ethical thought, and showing how principles and
concrete injunctions relate in Scriptural thought. In this context, the diverse, but
complementary, ways in which Scripture is authoritative for ethics are interpreted
organically. The concrete injunctions must be interpreted with attention to God’s mighty
acts, theological affirmations, and prevailing ethical principles. Likewise, the specific
teachings and propositions are needed to give concrete interpretation of the broad and
general truths and actions. Functionally, this provides the way for responsibly opening
up the ethical meaning of Scripture across different levels of moral reflection and
application. The paradigmatic nature of specific commands further facilitates a close
application of the biblical text toward area rules in corresponding contemporary social
questions. The role and function o f paradigm articulate how principles and concrete
injunctions relate in Scriptural thought and application toward contemporary society.
Paradigmatic injunctions elicit both principle and moral imagination. Throughout, the
normative content lies primarily in the biblical text.
As a basic theological affirmation of Scripture, the reign o f God is seen in the
hermeneutical context of opening the ethical meaning o f Scripture, and providing
parameters for interpreting specific concrete injunctions o f Scripture. The bridge
between the two is the reality of their both yielding normative content of Scripture. In
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addition, the reign o f God receives concrete content through its organic relation to the
concrete biblical injunction. The normative content for the eschatological paradigm thus
lies primarily in the biblical text. In addition, because the reign o f God is an expression
of God’s mighty act to restore creation, His paradigmatic actions facilitate moral
reflection on the meso level o f underlying principles and prevailing ethical values.
Mott is a theorist who works primarily on the levels of theological bases and
underlying principles. But he does so with an eye toward concrete biblical injunctions
and specific social needs of contemporary society. This pulls him inevitably toward “area
rules” in moral theory. This tending toward “area rules" in moral theory exhibits how
paradigm (and specifically the eschatological paradigm) for Mott ultimately includes the
micro level o f moral reflection. With this in view, it is appropriate to conclude that, for
Mott, the eschatological paradigm facilitates moral reflection across the spectrum of
macro, meso, and micro levels of paradigm operation. Because of its close proximity to
the themes and values of the concrete biblical texts, the eschatological paradigm enables
moral reflection that includes theological bases, underlying principles, and area rules.
Mott’s use o f the eschatological paradigm in moral theory is consistent with his
overall hermeneutic, and the use of paradigm in particular. His reign o f God leitmotif is a
determinant ingredient in his hermeneutic.
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CHAPTER 4

THOMAS W. OGLETREE’S USE OF ESCHATOLOGY
IN MORAL THEORY

For Thomas W. Ogletree, “the primary challenge to Christian ethics is to find
suitable ways o f articulating the import of eschatology which figures in the biblical
materials.” 1 Ogletree is concerned with the “troublesome gap between biblical studies
and Christian ethics.”2 He aims to “set forth an approach and a set of hermeneutical
understandings for utilizing biblical materials in Christian ethics.”3 Because the biblical
'Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 177.
2Ibid., xi; 1-14.
3Ibid., 11. As with Mott, the question of hermeneutics and methodology is a
fundamental concern for Ogletree. Ogletree deals with hermeneutical and
methodological issues in major ways, e.g., The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics: idem,
Hospitality to the Stranger: Dimensions of Moral Understanding (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1985); idem, “The Secular City as a Theological Norm,” Religion in Life 36
(Summer 1967): 202-215; idem, “In Quest o f a Common Faith: The Theological Task of
United Methodists,” Quarterly Review 8, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 43-53; idem, “Dimensions
o f Practical Theology: Meaning, Action, Self,” in Practical Theology, ed. Don S.
Browning (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983): 83-101; idem, “Christian Social Ethics
as a Theological Discipline,” in Shifting Boundaries: Contextual Approaches to the
Structure o f Theological Education, ed. Barbara G. Wheeler and Edward Farley
(Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991): 201-239; and idem,
“Interpretation,” The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics (1967), 311.

188
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materials are seen as opening up an “eschatological horizon of moral understanding”1—a
“larger horizon o f meaning which . . . displays the significance and authority of moral
notions”2—Ogletree finds in eschatology an important hermeneutical guide that enables a
“fusion of horizons” between biblical worlds of meaning and those which make up our
sense o f reality.3 And because “biblical ethics is not yet Christian social ethics,”
Ogletree asserts that “understanding requires us to grasp in a new setting, one more
complex, the force o f eschatological promise for social organization of life.”4
Ogletree’s project, however, is more than a mere outline of the contours of an
eschatology-inspired “social organization o f life.” His focus, rather, is on crucial, more
fundamental themes which ethics must consider in relation to biblical materials and
eschatology in particular, i.e., what he calls “the assumptions and critical principles which
inform the reading o f the biblical text.”5 These assumptions and critical principles
include insights drawn from European phenomenology and traditional moral philosophy.
With carefully structured precision, Ogletree lays out a path towards correlating
phenomenology, moral philosophy, and biblical ethics toward contemporary Christian
moral theory. Eschatology as a horizon o f moral understanding provides an important
ingredient for this dialogue between the biblical materials and the critical discourse of
'Ogletree. The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 177-192.
2Ibid., 177.
3Ibid., 175.
4Qgletree. Hospitality to the Stranger. 143.
5Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics, xiii.
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modem society.1
This chapter explores Ogletree’s use of eschatology in moral theory particularly as
it concerns methodology toward application. It (1) describes the way in which Ogletree
both perceives and nuances the eschatological paradigm (including his leitmotif); (2)
outlines the methodological nuances that his application evokes/expresses with regard to
our three principles of verification (Scripture, community, and nature of social
involvement); and (3) surveys his application of the eschatological paradigm’s ethical
implications with respect to level o f moral reflection and social content (macro/bases,
meso/underlying principles, and micro/area rules).
Because Ogletree comes to the question of eschatology and ethics from the
direction o f phenomenology and moral philosophy, the correlation of the eschatological
paradigm to philosophical ethics is treated prior to that of “principles of verification” and
separate from “implications for moral theory.” Placing the discussion o f the correlation
to philosophical ethics earlier facilitates understanding with regard to the other
methodological concerns outlined by this study as important in the application of
eschatology in moral theory.
Furthermore, because The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics and Hospitality to
the Stranger represent Ogletree’s primary and most focused discussion with regard to the
'According to Ogletree, “biblical eschatology presents a profound challenge to
modem thought, a challenge that such thought will, if possible, ignore or dismiss. Yet if
eschatology can become more intelligible within the critical discourse of modem society,
then we will be in a better position to convey in that setting what Scripture has to teach us
about ethics” (Thomas W. Ogletree, New Haven, CT, to Larry L. Lichtenwalter,
September 26, 1996,1).
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use o f eschatology in moral theory, and are viewed by him as methodologically
interdependent companion volumes,1this chapter will draw from them in a principal way
in relation to his other writings.2
‘Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger, xi-xii. Most of the essays in the 1985
volume (Hospitality to the Stranger! had been previously published and were written as
preparatory studies for the 1983 volume (The Use o f the Bible in Christian EthicsL
2Ogletree’s writings express a diversity o f interest in relation to social moral
theory and the use o f Scripture, e.g., (I) biblical materials, history, and historical thinking
(Thomas W. Ogletree, Christian Faith and History: A Critical Comparison of Ernst
Troeltsch and Karl Barth [Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1965]—edited publication of his
Vanderbilt Ph.D. diss, “Christology and History in the Theology of Karl Barth: A Critical
Exposition in Light o f the Historicism o f Ernst Troeltsch,” 1963; idem, “Ideology and
Ethical Reflection,” Working Paper, 1972— copy held at the School of Theology,
University o f the South, Sewanee, TN; idem, “O f Time and History.” Soundings: An
Intersiciplinarv Journal 62, no. 1 [Spring 1979]: 1-8 ); (2) Marxist-Christian dialogue
(idem, “What May Man Really Hope For?” in From Hope to Liberation: Towards a New
Marxist-Christian Dialogue, ed. Nicholas Piediscalzi and Robert G. Thobaben
[Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974], 40-51; idem, “Introduction,” in Openings for
Marxist-Christian Dialogue, ed. Thomas W. Ogletree [Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1968],
11-46); (3) the nature of God (idem, “A Christological Assessment o f Dipolar Theism,”
Journal o f Religion 47 [April 1967]: 87-99; idem, “The Gospel as Power: Explorations
in a Theology of Social Change,” in The Living God, ed. Dow Kirkpatrick [Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1971], 174-206; idem, The Death o f God Controversy [Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1967]); (4) trends in theological reflection (idem, “Contemporary
Emphases in Christian Thought, or How to Be Fashionable in Your Theology.” The
Christian Ministry 1, no. 3 [March 1970]: 34-37; idem, “From Anxiety to Responsibility:
The Shifting Focus o f Theological Reflection,” The Chicago Theological Seminary
Register 58, no. 3 [March 1968]: 1-23; (5) the nature and mission o f the church (idem,
“The Church’s Mission to the World in the Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer” Encounter
25, no. 4 [Autumn 1964]: 457-469; idem, “Renewing Ecumenical Protestant Social
Teaching,” in Justice and the Holv. ed. Douglas A. Knight and Peter J. Paris [Atlanta,
GA: Scholars Press, 1989], 279-296; idem, “The Ecclesial Context of Christian Ethics,”
in The Annual o f the Society of Christian Ethics, ed. Larry L. Rasmussen [Vancouver,
BC: Society o f Christian Ethics, 1984], 1-17; (6) power (idem, “Power and Human
Fulfillment.” Pastoral Psychology 22. no. 216 [September 1971]: 42-53; (7) sexuality
(idem, “The Moral Status o f Gay and Lesbian Partnerships in the Christian Life,”
Working Paper for Discussion in the Yale Divinity School Community March 18, 1994);
as well as (8) hermeneutics and methodology as per above, p. 188, n. 3. The import of
eschatology appears throughout these varied themes, but becomes significantly more
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Eschatological Paradigm and Ethics
The significance o f eschatology in Ogletree’s moral theory can be seen in the
prominence it is given in his companion volumes The Use of the Bible in Christian
Ethics and Hospitality to the Stranger. Both volumes conclude with the horizon o f
meaning which eschatology brings to Christian moral theory, i.e., “The Eschatological
Horizon o f New Testament Social Thought” (chapter 5)1and “The Eschatological
Horizon o f Moral Understanding” (chapter 6).2 In addition, the three chapters in The Use
o f the Bible in Christian Ethics which review the moral understandings of selected
biblical literature each conclude with a statement of how contemporary moral
understanding is thus challenged.3 The challenge can be summed up in one word:
eschatology.4 The review of Synoptic materials is titled, “Synoptic Portrayals of
Eschatological Existence.”5 The discussion o f Pauline moral understanding begins with a
focused in his Hospitality to the Stranger and The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics.
'Ogletree. Hospitality to the Stranger. 127-149.
2Qgletree. The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 177-205. This chapter
actually begins two pages earlier with the title “Toward Common Grounds of
Understanding.” “The Eschatological Horizon o f Moral Understanding” is the first major
section in this discussion. From this point on, eschatology dominates the thrust o f the
“fusion o f horizons” that Ogletree seeks to delineate in his closing discussion o f the use
o f the Bible in Christian moral theory.
3I.e., “The Challenge to Moral Understanding in Israel’s Legacy” (79-82); “The
Challenge to Moral Understanding in the Synoptic Gospels” (127-130); and “The Pauline
Challenge to Moral Understanding” (168-171).
4Gary Comstock, review of The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, by Thomas
W. Ogletree, The Journal o f Religion 66, no. 2 (April 1986): 214.
sOgletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 87-134.
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section titled, “The Primacy o f Promise.”1 Finally, the “Prologue” to Hospitality to the
Stranger sets eschatology as the context in which the hospitality motif is developed.
These are important observations for two reasons: they indicate (1) that Ogletree
intentionally and methodologically incorporates eschatology into his moral theory,2 and
(2) that when he reads the Bible, an intimate connection between ethics and eschatology
emerges.3

Perceiving the Paradigm
Ogletree’s understanding o f eschatology fits the general contours of the
eschatological paradigm which this study has outlined. Each o f the components of the
'Ibid., 138-146.
2Some have critiqued Ogletree for not making clearer how he thinks eschatology
advances some of his constructive theses (L. Gregory Jones, review o f Hospitality to the
Stranger: Dimensions o f Moral Understanding, by Thomas W. Ogletree, Journal of the
American Academy o f Religion 54, no. 4 [Winter 1986]: 192). Others speak o f the
abruptness with which eschatology is introduced into his description o f phenomenology
and moral philosophy, and how it eventually dominates interpretation so that in fact it
becomes the primary category (Robin Scroggs, review o f The Use of the Bible in
Christian Ethics, by Thomas W. Ogletree, Chicago Theological Seminary Register 74, no.
3 [Fall 1984]: 44). The implication of these concerns is that eschatology is an adjunct
theme rather than a ruling one, and that the materials under review do not express
coherent methodology in using eschatology.
3James H. Burtness, review of The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics and
Hospitality to the Stranger, by Thomas W. Ogletree, .Dialog 25, no. 3 (Summer 1986):
240. This intimate connection between ethics and eschatology has been a part of
Ogletree’s Yale class lectures in “Basic Christian Ethics.” In his introductory lectures on
“Christian Ethics as Theological Inquiry,” he includes sections on “The Eschatological
Horizon: The Presence o f God’s Coming Realm o f Peace (Shalom),” “The Divine
Sustenance o f the Fallen World: The Preservation of Order Under Threats of Oppression
and Chaos,” and “The Dialectic of Christian Existence ‘Between the Times’” (Thomas
W. Ogletree, New Haven, CT, to Larry L. Lichtenwalter, March 31, 1993).
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paradigm {already/not yet, reign o f God, horizon o f the future) are thus evident in his
thinking. As with Mott, however, they are not so evident with equal explicit reference or
precise terminology as this study has defined. In fact, the direction from which Ogletree
comes toward eschatology, while a direct one, is considerably more subtle with regard to
particular paradigm components and their implications for moral theory. Standing in a
developing tradition o f reflection on the importance of eschatology for ethics, Ogletree
extends the discussion towards those issues that are of concern to him.1 In the process,
some o f the components o f the eschatological paradigm are more assumed than they are
articulated.

Already/Not Yet
According to Ogletree, “the most salient feature of New Testament eschatology is
the substantive presence o f the new age in the midst of the old. It is existence ‘between
the times,’ better, existence in the dialectical interpenetration o f the times.”2 This
dialectical interplay between the two ages is the essence of what he terms “dialectical
eschatologies” in contrast to that o f “futurist eschatologies” (eschatologies marked by a
fundamental duality).3 In describing “dialectical eschatologies,” Ogletree includes
already/not yet imagery and refers to the “proleptic” fashion in which the new age is
present:
'Sedgwick, 397, 398.
2Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 130-131, n. 4.
3Ibid., 177-182.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

195
They hold that the hoped-for age is already becoming a substantive reality in
selected spheres o f human life despite the general persistence o f the present evil
age. The coming new age is not yet fully actual, not even in limited regions of
experience. It is present only in proleptic fashion. Thus, the coming reality
shows itself in its incompleteness at the same time that it displays its genuine
actuality. Dialectical eschatologies are comprised o f opposing tendencies in
constant interaction. They say at the one and the same time: yea and nay, already
and not yet.1
This dialectical interplay between the ages brings expression to the “indicative of
the gospel” by setting forth some o f the substantive content o f the new age as it is taking
form.2 It expresses, too, the “imperative of the gospel” because “the new age is also a
task and a demand.”3 The gospel calls for works of ministry which give concrete social
reality to its promises. The subtle interplay of the indicative and imperative in the
presentation o f the gospel reflects the fact that the eschatological tension which
characterizes Christian existence cuts into, (1) the believer’s own self-experience,4 (2) the
interface between the church and the institutions of the larger society, as well as (3) the
concrete reality of the church itself.5 Thus, there are interior,6 communal, and social
dimensions o f the tensions figuring in eschatological existence.7
'Ibid., 179 (italics supplied).
2Ibid., 187.
3Ibid.
4Ibid., 147.
5Ibid., 147,187.
6Ibid., 148. “As a person coming to life in Jesus Christ, I continue to be pulled at,
assaulted, and disturbed by the power o f my old self, even though that old self has now
been consigned to death and is passing away” (ibid., 147,148).
7Ibid., 182-187.
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“The task,” Ogletree states, “is to grasp the way in which the world and its claims
present themselves to awareness when existence is determined by such an interplay. It is
to discern how such an awareness impacts our presumptions about the authority of values
which are constitutive o f the present world order.”1 Christians are being summoned to
live for the new age in the midst o f the old, “accepting structures which continue to
embody the old as spheres o f their activity on behalf of the new.’’2 The state and the
economic order are seen as having provisional validity, but only insofar as they provide a
certain order which for the present makes human life possible.3

Reign of God
The concept o f the reign o f God as God’s dynamic rule or government is not
explicit in Ogletree’s writings. At the most, and rather infrequently, he refers to the
“kingdom o f God,” “coming kingdom,” “coming kingdom of God,” “kingdom of
heaven,” or “coming realm o f God.”4 He does, however, refer to the “coming realm of
God” as a “primal image” which provides “an encompassing vision” for the moral
'Ibid., 130-131, n. 4.
2Ibid., 166, 167.
3Ibid., 129.
4Ogletree, “Power and Human Fulfillment,” 44; idem, “What May Man Really
Hope For?” 44; idem, “The Secular City as a Theological Norm,” 213; idem, Hospitality
to the Stranger. 127; idem, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 88, 92-94, 99, 127,
129, 131, n. 5, 132-133, n. 25,135,145; idem, “Christian Social Ethics as a Theological
Discipline,” 212.
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ordering o f values and which specifies a pattern o f life for Christian ethics.1 And as “the
new world coming into being,” the Kingdom of God operates by “a different set o f
ground rules.”2 The presentness o f the Kingdom o f God includes both “promises” and
“demands.”3 There are consequences of not responding faithfully to the “claims” of the
kingdom o f God, consequences o f disobedience.4 Discipleship emerges as the central
category for setting forth the moral life in the Kingdom.5 Discipleship is eschatological
existence. It is existence governed by the realities of the coming new age (the coming
Kingdom o f God), but lived out under the conditions o f the old.6 Discipleship means
being governed in activity and thinking by the presence o f the coming kingdom.7 The
substantive content o f discipleship is radical obedience and steadfast loyalty.8 This
radical obedience “concerns not merely behavioral correctness, but the total self: not
simply purposive resolve, but affections, attitudes, feelings, and desires.”9 Thus the
‘Ogletree, “Christian Social Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 121.
2Ogletree, “Power and Human Fulfillment,” 44.
3Ogletree, “The Secular City as a Theological Norm,” 213.
4Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 131, n. 5.
5Ibid., 92.
6Ibid., 92-94.
7Ibid„ 93.
8Ibid., 93, 95.
9Ibid., 145 (see also, 90-91, 145-146, 168-169). These thoughts represent a
synthesis o f Ogletree’s development of Synoptic and Pauline eschatological emphasis,
i.e., their similarities o f focus (deontological/perfectionist thinking where deontological
thinking is subordinate to and dependent upon perfectionist motifs) and how Paul moves
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concept o f God’s rule or reign is present, but not with the explicit terminology, reign o f
God.

Horizon o f the Future
While Ogletree does not use the terminology horizon o f the future, the nuances o f
this paradigm component are nevertheless significant in his thinking. The concept of
“horizon” is a recurring motif in his two companion volumes. He is searching for an
“interpretive fusion o f horizons” between the thinking o f our contemporary world and
that of the biblical world.1 He posits the “eschatological horizon” as the crucial
ingredient for this “fusion of horizons.”2 This “eschatological horizon of moral
understanding” includes a determinate future ingredient. Ogletree brings this future
ingredient most clearly into focus under the rubric o f “promise.” Promise is futureoriented.3 Promise is a category of the future.4 Promise “expresses the moral creativity
and imagination elicited by the presence of the new age.”5 It is in full accord with Pauline
the discussion of radical obedience to a more fundamental level (i.e., to
deontological/perfectionist thinking founded on grace and centering in promise). The
point here is that, while not mentioned, the reign o f God finds expression in a life of
radical obedience and loyalty that finds expression in the total self.
‘Ibid., 3, 39-41, 175.
2Ibid., 177-192; idem, Hospitality to the Stranger. 127-145.
3Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 199-200; idem, Hospitality to
the. Stranger, 138.
4Ogletree. The Use of the Bible In Christian Ethics. 153.
5Ibid., 200.
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dialectical eschatology1which Ogletree selects as his “paradigm case” for articulating the
full import o f New Testament dialectical eschatology.2 In addition, as a “primal image,”
the “coming realm o f God” provides an “encompassing vision” for a moral ordering of
values which specifies a pattern of life for Christian ethics.3 Finally, as an eschatological
community, “we are to work out new ways of being together as human beings in the
presence o f the unfolding purposes of God.”4 This working out “new ways of being
together” implies Christian thinking about ethics and presupposes a Christian frame of
reference:
Yet an eschatological orientation is by no means closed, nor can it finally be
described as circular. It is the orientation o f a pilgrim people struggling in the
midst o f a hostile environment to enter into the reality of a new order o f the world.
Its logic is dialectical rather than syllogistic, which means it remains ever open to
new discoveries and formations in the concrete interactions which are the stuff of
history. Its basic structure is better represented by an open horizon than a circle.5
This outline o f Ogletree’s use of eschatology reveals how each o f the components
'Ibid. Ogletree includes a section titled “The Primacy of Promise” in his
discussion o f Pauline dialectical eschatology. It is a primacy of promise over law, but the
promise dynamic facilitates an open view towards the future, where the reality o f the
future qualifies and motivates present moral life. In effect, the reality of the
future— which is not—replaces the reality of God’s law and post revelation—which is.
Ogletree is not precise in indicating whether his view o f the reality of the not yet is
ontological or epistemological.
2Scroggs, review o f The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, by Thomas W.
Ogletree, 45.
3OgIetree, “Christian Social Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 212.
4Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context of Christian Ethics,” 13.
sIbid. (italics supplied).
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of the eschatological paradigm are evident in his thinking, though not with equal explicit
reference or precise terminology. His understanding of eschatology fits the general
contours o f the eschatological paradigm that this study has outlined. Like Mott, it is
apparent that Ogletree works within the general assumptions of the eschatological
paradigm and feels no need to re-articulate every aspect as he moves ahead in extending
its implications with respect to his project.

Nuancing the Paradigm
Leitmotif
In The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics . Ogletree highlights two basic types of
eschatology: “futurist eschatologies” and “dialectical eschatologies.”1 He finds these two
basic types o f eschatology apparent in the Old Testament and New Testament biblical
materials, respectively.2 Subvariants of these two types of eschatologies can be identified
in each.3
Ogletree finds “futurist eschatologies” most apparent in exilic and postexilic
literature of the Old Testament.4 Futurist eschatologies “call attention to the alien nature
of the existing world, yet refuse to grant ultimacy to that world.”5 They “generate ethical
'Ogletree. The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 177-182.
2Ibid., 177.
3Ibid.
4Ibid., 177, 69-71, 79-82.
5Ibid., 177.
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perspectives marked by a fundamental duality,”1i.e., “an ethic of hope directed to a world
which is not yet,2 and an ethic o f patient waiting and faithful enduring in the alien
circumstances of the present.”3 Both the hope and patient-waiting features of “futurist
eschatologies” presuppose a faithful community which maintains standards and
perceptions different from the dominant society.4
Ogletree finds “dialectical eschatologies” most apparent in Synoptic and Pauline
literature of the New Testament.5 “Dialectical eschatologies,” while reflecting most of
the features of “futurist eschatologies,” include one important modification. The hopedfor age is already becoming a substantive reality in selected spheres o f human life despite
the general persistence o f the present evil age.6 There is a proleptic presence of the new
age. While incomplete, the new age displays genuine actuality. Like “futurist
eschatologies . . . dialectical eschatologies . . . depend for their social reality on faithful
'Ibid.
2"The ethic o f hope looks to a coming world where human well-being and
fulfillment are genuine possibilities. It nurtures understandings and expectations which
belong to that world, even though they are out of line with presently existing realities. It
refuses to concede the final word to the taken-for-granted dictums of the present age. It is
quite able and willing to expose and resist their oppressive features” (ibid.).
3"The ethic o f patient waiting and faithful enduring concerns ways of coping with
the alien realities o f the present. For this ethic, the issue is fidelity to a manner of life
capable o f sustaining a people in hope in a world which contradicts hope” (ibid.).
'Ibid., 178.
'Ibid., 87-174.
'Ibid., 178-179.
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communities which stand over against the world even as they are situated within it.”1
What is distinctive for “dialectical eschatologies,” however, is that
these communities attest the newness o f the power at work in them to a degree not
so clearly manifest in futurist eschatologies. The people are not simply enduring,
no matter how faithfully: they are also participating in the transforming power of
the age for which they hope.. . . They are working out new understandings and
new ways o f being together which challenge the institutional arrangements o f the
larger society. They are already an eschatological community. The ethic of
dialectical eschatologies is itself dialectical in form.2
While acknowledging that the differences between these two eschatologies can be
overstated, Ogletree asserts that the most salient differences concern the ways in which
the two communities (those futurist or dialectically formed) place themselves in the total
movement of history.3 “At issue is the degree o f continuity perceived to hold between the
past and present and between present and future.”4 “Futurist eschatologies” tend to
accent continuity with a sacral tradition where the redemption offered by the hoped-for
future can be realized only by a qualitative break with present realities.5 For “dialectical
eschatologies,” a decisive break with the past has already occurred, sacral traditions are
significantly modified by new realities coming into being, and an orientation to the
'Ibid., 179.
2Ibid. The dialectical form which the ethic of “dialectical eschatologies” assumes,
on the one hand, seeks appropriate ways of articulating the moral import of the present
reality o f the new age and, on the other hand, reflects the incompleteness of the new age
and the ways its moral import can find articulation in the present.
3Ibid., 181.
4Ibid.
sIbid.
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creation o f the new exists.1 The substantive theological difference between these two
types o f eschatology is the coming of the Messiah and the inauguration of the new age,
though its consummation remains outstanding.2
The purpose o f Ogletree’s contrasting “futurist eschatologies” with “dialectical
eschatologies” is to highlight the larger horizon o f meaning which New Testament
eschatology brings for Christian moral reflection.3 In light o f New Testament biblical
materials, that larger-meaning horizon is seen as “dialectical” in nature. The “heart of
eschatological existence” is “existence ‘between the times,’ better, existence in the
dialectical interpenetration o f the times.”4 It is “participating in a dialectic which presses
toward a creative compromise.”5 Eschatology thus “generates understandings that are
dialectical through and through.”6 While Ogletree works within the general contours of
the eschatological paradigm, it is this already/not yet dialectical which dominates. Nearly
‘Ibid. For Ogletree, this orientation to the creation of the new has a universal
reach and includes a readiness to rethink ancient legacies which permits a new kind of
openness to the plurality o f human cultures and the formation of community with persons
from many nations and races.
2Ibid„ 181.
3Ibid., 176-177. While “futurist eschatologies” reflect primarily an Old Testament
perspective, Christian communities may function in ways that are essentially identical
with characteristics o f the Jewish heritage. When they do not display in their practical
everyday affairs a strong sense of the inauguration o f the messianic age with the openness
to new understandings and associations which that implies, their eschatology assumes a
largely futurist form (ibid., 182).
“Ibid., 130-131, n. 4.
5Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context of Christian Ethics,” 14, 12-13.
6Ogletree to Lichtenwalter, March 31, 1993, 1.
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every perspective o f his eschatologically informed ethic falls within the context of this
dialectical. The already/not yet, then, is Ogletree’s leitmotif for nuancing the
eschatological paradigm.

Hermeneutical Nuances
As Ogletree’s leitmotif for nuancing the moral implications of the eschatological
paradigm, the already/not yet dialectical yields significant hermeneutical value.

Creative context fo r future orientation
The already/not yet provides the creative context for a focused future orientation
in ethical methodology. The import of Ogletree’s contrasting “futurist eschatologies”
with “dialectical eschatologies” is more than simply contrasting New Testament over that
o f Old Testament eschatologies, or in highlighting the most salient feature of New
Testament eschatology as dialectical. It is in nuancing realities o f the “future” in the
context o f this “dialectical.” The casual reader may rightly conclude that, for Christian
ethics, “dialectical” is preferable over that o f “futurist,” but the careful reader will sense
the “consistently future movement” in Ogletree’s use o f “dialectical” and in his ethical
method as a whole.1 His contrasting terminology “futurist” and “dialectical” can be
misleading. “Futurist” is used here primarily with reference to the fundamental duality
some eschatologies imply, together with their orientation to past sacral traditions and an
anticipated radical break between the ages somewhere in the future. Ogletree, however,
is not discussing the reality o f “future” within “dialectical eschatologies,” the horizon o f
'Burtness, 239.
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the future component o f the eschatological paradigm, or theologies of the future within
twentieth-century re-interpreted eschatology.
In reviewing emphases in Christian theology through the 1960s (process
theologies, political theologies, and theologies of the future), Ogletree noted common
motifs o f change, process, novelty, creativity, promise, and the future.1 His discussion of
“theologies of the future” (or the “theologies of hope”) describes how such theologies
“are carried out in openness to the future, in the presence o f new possibility.”2 He further
notes how “theologies of the future were developed in large measure in dialogue with
contemporary Marxist philosophers, especially Ernst Bloch.”3 Moltmann and Pannenberg
are named as principal architects o f theologies of the future.
Ogletree is thus well versed with a very different kind of “future” emphasis with
regard to understanding eschatology than the “futurist eschatologies” he discusses in The
Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. Furthermore, his ethical method displays a
“consistently future movement” in keeping with the broad contours o f theologies o f the
future. In outlining his perspectives on the horizon o f the future, it was noted that the
“eschatological horizon o f moral understanding” includes a determinate future
ingredient.4 This future ingredient is most clearly focused under the rubric of “promise,”
'Ogletree, “Contemporary Emphases in Christian Thought, or How to Be
Fashionable in Your Theology,” 34.
2Ibid., 37.
Tbid.

4See above, 198-200.
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which is said to be “future-oriented,” “a category of the future.” Furthermore, “promise”
“expresses the moral creativity and imagination elicited by the presence of the new age.”1
The basic structure o f the Christian frame of reference is “an open horizon,” a horizon
that is “ever open to new discoveries and formations in the concrete interaction which are
the stuff o f history.”2
This “future” focus finds further expression in his participation in the MarxistChristian dialogue.3 In addressing the question “What May Man Really Hope For?”
Ogletree asserts the need for two levels of hope in order to be realistic: the ultimate
religious hope and concrete historical hope.4 “Christian hope involves (1) an ultimate
religious hope of participation in the divine life, but it also involves (2) ever-new forms of
concrete historical expression o f that ultimate hope.”5 Christian hope must be continually
understood as
a present reality qualifying our life in this world, sustaining us in our secular
existence as we face everyday problems and struggle to overcome very specific
and concrete wrongs by projecting and working to realize alternate historical
futures.6
'Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 200. One problem with
promise as a category is that it becomes a general concept. In Scripture, however,
promise is always concrete. It is the promise of something concrete in space and time
that when fulfilled can be actually verified.
2Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context of Christian Ethics,” 13.
3Ogletree, “What May Man Really Hope For?” 40-51.
4Ibid., 51,43.
sIbid., 43.
6Ibid.
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In other words, “ultimate religious hope can have some very important
consequences for the way we engage in concrete, historical struggles.”1 Ogletree suggests
that Marxists have provided us with a model for giving social reality and substance to the
concrete historical expression o f Christian hope.2 The level o f concrete historical hope,
however, cannot abolish the human significance o f a more ultimate level of hope:3
Christian hope reminds us that man cannot find fulfillment in his total being by
the creation o f any conceivable society. Any society we are able to bring into
being is going to have its own distortions, its own brokenness, its own ambiguity,
its own pain, its own incompleteness.4
Ogletree states that the treatment of eschatology he finds most congenial is
probably that elaborated by Moltmann, though he would not describe his work as
dependent upon Moltmann.5 His views o f eschatology grew out o f his own attempt to
make sense o f biblical materials in conjunction with a dialectical reading of historical
'Ibid., 49.
2Ibid., 51,43, 44,47. Ogletree notes that the import o f Marx’s interpretation of
ideology for ethical reflection includes eschatological, dialectical, and community themes
(Ogletree, “Ideology and Ethical Reflection,” 9,10).
3Ibid.,51.
4Ibid., 43.
5Ogletree to Lichtenwalter, March 31,1993,2. Ogletree writes that, while his
roots are Methodist and Wesleyan, he identifies his perspective with ecumenical
Protestantism and claims rootage in the liberal commitment to the social gospel. He
views the social gospel as a social and institutional articulation o f evangelical
Protestantism (ibid., 2; idem, “Renewing Ecumenical Protestant Social Teaching,” 279296; idem, “In Quest o f a Common Faith: The Theological Task o f United Methodists,”
43-53; idem, “In Quest o f Multi-Cultural Theological Education,” Drew Gateway 59, no.
1 [Fall 1989]: 43-48).
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development.1 In this context, Ernst Troeltch2 and Ernst Bloch3 have both been
contributors.
The point here is that, while “eschatology generates understandings that are
dialectical through and through,”4 Ogletree’s application o f the eschatological paradigm
essentially nuances toward the horizon o f the future component. No doubt, the realities
and import o f “future” are nuanced in the context o f the “dialectical.” Yes, they are
articulated through the “dialectical.” Nevertheless, his ethical method expresses a
consistently future movement in keeping with the broad contours o f theologies of the
future. Ogletree’s dialectical horizon of moral understanding is essentially a horizon o f
the future where moral creativity and imagination are elicited in the context o f the
presence o f the coming new age.5 While the already/not yet dialectical is the determinate
context in which this future movement appears, “future” is, in fact, Ogletree’s functional
emphasis with respect to paradigm application and implications for moral theory.
Though the already/not yet dialectical is the controlling and contextualizing component,
'Ogletree to Lichtenwalter, March 31, 1993,2.
2Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context o f Christian Ethics,” 14; idem, “Christian
Social Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 221; idem, “Renewing Ecumenical Protestant
Social Teaching,” 289,293; idem, Christian Faith and History: A Critical Comparison of
Ernst Troeltsch and Karl Barth: idem, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 17.
3"One o f my favorite Marxists is a man by the name of Ernst Bloch” (Thomas W.
Ogletree, “Response” in From Hope To Liberation: Towards a New Marxist-Christian
Dialogue, ed. Nicholas Piediscalzi and Robert G. Thobaben [Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1974], 61).
4Ogletree to Lichtenwalter, March 31, 1993,1.
sOgletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 200.
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functionally, the horizon o f the future is Ogletree’s determinate emphasis in nuancing the
eschatological paradigm.1 By keeping the horizon o f the future closely linked to and
controlled by the already/not yet dialectical, however, he is able to avoid some o f the
imbalance (and often, extremes) found in most theologies of the future. Were it not for
his repeated and strong emphasis on the “dialectical,” one could easily posit Ogletree’s
methodology as that o f a theology of the future. At the least, his is a strongly futureoriented subvariant o f “dialectical eschatologies.”2

Furnishing a meaning horizon
The already/not yet dialectical furnishes a meaning horizon for Christian moral
consciousness that encompasses the temporal horizon o f human experience. According
to Ogletree,
to speak o f eschatology is to characterize the larger horizon of meaning which in
given traditions displays the significance and authority of moral notions. This
meaning horizon does not directly generate specifically moral notions, but it
profoundly qualifies them and substantially informs the manner in which they
present themselves to consciousness.3
'This point will become clearer as other issues under discussion in this chapter are
developed, i.e., the role o f Scripture, the nature of social involvement, level o f moral
reflection, and concrete content.
2O f course, the notion of “dialectical” is apparent in nearly all theologies o f the
future, but some, by emphasizing the “ontological priority of future,” or the “future of
God as the future o f history,” functionally detach themselves from the biblical notions
and cautions o f that “dialectical.” In so doing, they lose balance and in essence are no
longer really “dialectical” but “futuristic.” It appears that Ogletree is attempting
throughout to maintain “dialectical” balance and avoid the extremes of distorted
eschatologies.
3Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 177.
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Furthermore, “the discussion o f eschatology represents one way of articulating the
question of the meaning o f being.”1 According to Ogletree, the meaning of being “hovers
before all facets of moral awareness.”2 It is a question that “concerns the ultimate sense
and significance of the human pilgrimage.”3 It is the “wider matrix of meaning within
which the moral life itself is situated.”4 In fact, moral life is framed by the question o f the
meaning o f being.s It is the context in which we interpret and assess distinctively moral
notions.6 Furthermore, “our way of apprehending the meaning of being will materially
inform the moral meanings themselves.”7
The meaning o f being for Ogletree is linked to the temporal horizon of human
experience and consciousness, i.e., historical contextualism.8 There is a concrete
historicity to our moral notions, i.e., “all moral notions are relative to specific social and

‘Ibid., 193.
2Ibid., 192.
3Ibid., 38.
4Ibid.
sIbid., 41.
6Ibid„ 35.
7Ibid., 38. “The larger meaning horizon which provides the matrix for our moral
understandings is in no case neutral in its import for the latter” (ibid., 39).
8Ibid., 192,34-41. “Historical contextualism accents the fact that the possibilities
o f moral understanding given with the constitutive structures of human being always
appear in historically determinate forms” (ibid., 35).
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cultural contexts.”1 History gives concreteness to human understandings of moral life.2
According to Ogletree,
the strength of historical contextualism is that it directs us to concrete experience
and to the meanings which form it. In so doing it serves a lively discourse about
what is going on in our common world, and about the proper response to it.3
Two important issues are apparent in the above discussion o f meaning of being
and historical contextualism. One has to do with worldview, metaphysics, and the
ultimate whence. The other has to do with life in the world, concrete history, and the
pertinent and timely. Describing twentieth-century work in Christian ethics as “by and
large, marked by a strong historical consciousness,” Ogletree states, “We no longer seek
the absolute and the final; we search for the pertinent and timely.”4 In other words, in the
end, we seek that which is relevant and practical to temporal human experience.5 Only in
this way can moral theory and the biblical materials become useful in contemporary life.
'Ibid., 35,192-193. Culture historializes the possibilities o f moral understanding
which belong to human being.
2Ibid. According to Ogletree, “moral understandings are always relative to a
particular history, to the possibilities it has actualized, to the limits it sets to further
developments, to the openings for movement and creative growth is has brought into
being” (ibid.).
3Ibid., 38.
4Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger. 97.
5OgIetree’s concern in this context is how often universalized moral principles are
applied without critical awareness of the concrete meanings that should be associated
with them. We are not able in practice to think about concrete moral problems in strictly
universal terms. Critical scholarship and philosophical ethics have gone awry, often
tending toward abstractness and the irrelevant, towards language and logic rather than
concrete experience.
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The already/not yet dialectical provides a meaning horizon for moral
consciousness that includes this temporal horizon of human experience. The dialectical
interplay between the two ages direct us to concrete experience and to the meanings
which form concrete experience. That same dialectical interplay gives a sense of “what is
going on in our common world” and what “proper response” there should be to it.1 The
meaning horizon which the already/not yet dialectical furnishes is that Christian existence
unfolds in the midst of concrete historical life. For Ogletree, the task o f Christian ethics
is to grasp the way in which the world and its claims present themselves to awareness
when existence is determined by the interplay o f existence “between the times.”2 “It is to
discern how such an awareness impacts our presumptions about the authority of values
which are constitutive of the present world order.”3 The already/not yet dialectical
facilitates this kind of awareness and interaction with our world. While presenting a
distinctive worldview, it relates to life in the world. While opening awareness to our
ultimate whence, it is pertinent and timely. It provides a version o f historical
contextualism, a sense of history, and an understanding as to how one should place
1Ogletree’s project seeks to contribute to and carry out the style of thinking
expressed in H. Richard Niebuhr’s proposal for an “ethics of responsibility” (Ogletree,
Hospitality to the Stranger. 99, 100, 121; idem, “Interpretation,” 311). For an ethics of
fitting, Niebuhr contends that “in our responsibility we attempt to answer the question:
‘What shall I do?’ by raising the prior question: ‘What is going on?’” (Niebuhr, The
Responsible Self. 63).
2Qgletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 130-131, n. 4.
3Ibid.
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oneself in the total movement o f history.1

Fusion o f horizons
The already/not yet enables a “fusion o f horizons” between biblical worlds of
meaning and those which make up our sense of reality. Ogletree asserts that there are
larger meanings capable o f binding together contemporary interpreter and ancient text,2
e.g., meanings which provide a point o f contact, meanings which initiate conversation,
meanings that can be shared. These meanings relate to the question o f the meaning of
being and the realities of temporal human experience.3 They extend from a set of
preunderstandings of the moral life which express certain taken-for-granted ideas at work
in moral thought and experience,4 i.e., types of moral reasoning with corresponding
structures of action.5 These meanings are present in the biblical text as well as in
contemporary life.6 The historical situatedness o f the biblical materials implies their
presence. In addition, there is a surplus of meaning in the text beyond what is explicitly
'Ibid., 181, 87-89.
2Ibid., 176.
3Ibid., 192-193.
4Ibid., 175.
5These include: (1) consequentialist thinking, which elicits goal-oriented actions
and relate to the question of values and intentionality; (2) deontological views, which
elicit communicative interactions and relate to the question o f intersubjectivity and one’s
obligations to others; and (3) perfectionism thinking, which elicits processes of self
formation and relate to the question o f virtues (ibid., 16-18,40, 176-177).
6Ibid.
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uttered.1 “This surplus o f meaning stems from that about which the texts speak,”2 i.e., the
“concerns addressed by the biblical texts.”3 It is this subject matter which offers the
possibility o f common ground for understanding biblical worlds o f meaning and those
that make up our sense o f reality.4
Because the already/not yet (1) furnishes a meaning horizon for moral
consciousness that encompasses the temporal horizon of human experience, and (2)
represents one way o f articulating the question of the meaning o f being, it provides a
frame of reference which permits us to engage the biblical texts not simply as artifacts of
an ancient culture but as utterances possibly saying something true about our own reality.5
In doing so it enables a “fusion of horizons” between biblical worlds o f meaning and
those which make up our sense o f reality. In addition, it facilitates a synthesis toward
integrating moral philosophy and biblical ethics into contemporary Christian ethical
theory.

Dialectical nature o f Christian ethics
The already/not yet elucidates the essential dialectical nature o f Christian moral
theory. This fact has already been implied by what has been outlined above. However, it
'Ibid., 2.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., 7.
4Ibid.
5Ibid., 176.
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is important to specifically note that “existence in the dialectical interpenetration o f the
times” brings corresponding dialectical shape to Christian moral theory and methodology.
“The ethic o f dialectical eschatologies is itself dialectical in form.”1 This explicit
dialectical methodology and thinking is to find expression in moral reflection with regard
to the interior, communal, and social dimensions of the tensions figuring in eschatological
existence. In other words, it is to impact the believer’s own self-experience, the concrete
reality o f the church itself, and the interface between the church and the institutions of the
larger society.2 Insofar as this dialectic captures the moral structure of the eschatological
community,3 it opens the way towards understanding (1) the relation between law and
promise,4 (2) the moral import o f the gospel’s indicative and imperatives,5 and (3) the
realities o f social alienation and communal commitment.6

Summary
The import o f eschatology in Ogletree’s moral theory can be seen in the
prominence it is given in his companion volumes The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics

'Ibid., 179.
2See above, 195.
3Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 202.
4Ibid., 202. Ogletree asserts that “law and promise are . . . dialectically related.”
5Ibid., 187, 180.
6I.e., some degree o f alienation from the institutional arrangements of the larger
society, and deep involvement with a community which is engaged in developing
qualitatively distinct alternatives to those arrangements (ibid., 182-187).
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and Hospitality to the Stranger. The thesis he argues is that “the New Testament has
eschatology to teach.”' Like Mott, this eschatology fits the general contours of the
eschatological paradigm that this study has outlined. While he works within the general
contours o f the eschatological paradigm, however, he clearly nuances the already/not yet
component over that o f the reign o f God and the horizon o f the future. The already/not
yet thus becomes his leitmotif for nuancing the moral implications o f the eschatological
paradigm. These hermeneutical nuances include (1) providing the creative context for a
focused-future orientation in ethical methodology; (2) furnishing a meaning horizon for
Christian moral consciousness that encompasses the temporal horizon of human
experience; (3) enabling a “fusion o f horizons” between biblical worlds o f meaning and
those which make up our sense o f reality; and (4) elucidating the essential “dialectical
nature” o f Christian moral theory and methodology. While “eschatology generates
understandings that are dialectical through and through,” application o f this dialectical
within the eschatological paradigm essentially nuances towards the horizon o f the future.
Ogletree’s ethical method thus expresses a consistently future movement in keeping with
the broad contours of theologies o f the future.

Relation to Moral Philosophy
As we undertake a critical engagement with the Bible on the nature of moral
experience, our first task is to gain greater self-awareness about our own takenfor-granted beliefs and convictions. In questioning the Bible about its moral
understandings, or in seeking to uncover the questions to which it presents itself
as an answer, what do we conceive the subject matter o f the inquiry to be? What
preunderstandings guide it? What presuppositions govern our angle of vision on
‘Ibid., 130, n. 4.
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it? What are the bases for these preunderstandings? How sound are they?1
Ogletree’s goal “is to enhance our grasp of the moral life by way of critical
engagement with the biblical texts.”2 If one takes the material o f his companion volumes,
The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics and Hospitality to the Stranger, in the order in
which they were written, looking at the latter volume first, it becomes clear that Ogletree
is very indebted to moral philosophy, and phenomonology in particular, for his
“assumptions and critical principles which inform the reading o f the biblical texts.”3 In
fact, the hermeneutical theory behind his methodology is Gadamer’s phenomenology and
the interpretive fusion o f horizons.4 So much is this so that the title for The Use of the
Bible in Christian Ethics can appear misleading. The book is really concerned with
common ground between the Bible and accounts of the moral life developed in
phenomenology.5 With carefully structured precision, Ogletree lays out a path towards
correlating phenomenology, moral philosophy, and biblical ethics toward contemporary
'Ibid., 15.
2Ibid., xii.
3Burtness, 239; Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, xiii.
4Comstock, 213. Ogletree writes, “The account o f interpreting here being set
forth depends throughout on Gadamer’s accomplishments. See also chap. 1 of The Use
o f the Bible in Christian Ethics, pp. 1-6; idem, Hospitality to the Stranger. 33, n. 26.
There are extensive references to Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jurgen Haermas, Martin
Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, Paul Ricoeur, H. Richard Niebuhr, and Immanuel Levinas.
See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 306-307,
374-375, 397, 576, for his “fusion of horizons” in interpretation theory.
5Sedgwick, 404. Burtness, however, states that Ogletree’s books are not about
phenomenology per se, but rather that he makes use of phenomenology because it helps
him attend to method in his doing ethics (Burtness, 239).
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Christian moral theory.
The “interpretive task” is the achievement o f a common mind, a “fusion of
horizons” between biblical worlds o f meaning and those which make up our sense of
reality.1 “It is to reach a shared understanding o f the subject matter which provides the
common ground between the texts and our own inquiries.”2 According to Ogletree, “we
move toward this fusion o f horizons by making explicit our own preunderstandings of the
subject matter o f the texts.”3 These preunderstandings are “preunderstandings of the
moral life” and “express certain taken-for-granted ideas at work in moral thought and
experience.”4 They are the “plurality of views in our own intellectual context” and
“contemporary culture.”5 These preunderstandings include (1) moral philosophy, (2)
phenomenology, and (3) historical contextualism. Ogletree asserts that his treatment of
these “promising resources for preunderstandings which can equip us to engage the
biblical texts in a discourse about the moral life” have not been “worked out in isolation
from the biblical faith itself.” In unfolding their meaning and significance, he already has
in view “the distinctiveness of the world of the Bible.”6 These three “promising resources
'Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 175, 2-4.
2Ibid., 3.
3Ibid.
4Ibid., 175, 16. According to Ogletree, “they represent fairly advanced stages of
thinking about moral life” (ibid., 5).
5Ibid., 16.
6Ibid., 5. This is an important observation in light of the problem as to how the
questions contemporary culture and experience ask or bring to the biblical text determine
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for preunderstanding” find correlation and biblical orientation through the New
Testament dialectical of eschatology as a horizon o f moral understanding.

Moral Philosophy and Phenomenology
Ogletree’s methodology outlines and analyzes three dominant perspectives of
moral philosophy in Western thought: consequentialist, deontological, and perfectionist
perspectives.1 Because these three perspectives have all found strong philosophical
statement and defense in modem thought, their significance is not simply philosophical.
They have persistent “importance in treatments of ethics because of their relative success
in articulating elemental facets o f concrete moral experience.”2 Neither of these
perspectives, however, is adequate if taken separately. Rather, a synthesis is required for
their effective import for Christian ethics in relation to the biblical materials.3
These three perspectives have persistence in human thought because they are
rooted in fundamental structures which order our being in the world as human beings.
Ogletree’s primary interest is “to display in the structures that make up the life world the
interpretation (and reciprocally, how much the Bible determines interpretation). Ogletree
asserts that, “given the role of the Bible in Western civilization, almost any o f our moral
notions will reflect its impact in some fashion. To its direct influence must be added the
interpretive accomplishments o f many predecessors, especially the great teachers of the
church, and those who have contributed to the mediation of biblical faith in the practical
ordering o f human life” (ibid., 5).
'Ibid., 4.
2Ibid., 4, 5.
3Ibid., 17.
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experiential bases o f these three ethical perspectives.”1 In other words, he is concerned
with the “underlying structures” on which they are founded.2 To accomplish this, he is
guided by phenomenological descriptions of constitutive features of our worldly being,
i.e., intentionality, intersubjectivity, and the implications o f the self.3 Moral philosophy,
then, is viewed and nuanced via phenomenology. Consequentialist, deontological, and
perfectionist perspectives are viewed and nuanced via intentionality, intersubjectivity, and
the implications o f the self, respectively.
It should be noted here that Ogletree sees the task o f phenomenology as describing
“the constitutive features o f the life-world in terms of intentional structure of
consciousness.”4 This perspective entails “making explicit the acts of consciousness
which correspond to the various modalities of sense that present themselves to the
awareness in the life-world.”5 In other words, it deals with the ways of being and acting
in the world. It facilitates a life-world perspective. It puts us in touch with the way the
world actually reveals itself to consciousness, i.e., concrete experience and the meanings
which form it.
'Ibid., 5.
2Ibid., 18.
3Ibid., 18.
4Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger. 15. (Ogletree refers to a “life world” and to
a “life-world.” While there may be a bit of inconsistency here, the former appears to
assert the reality that there is a “life world,” while the latter is his technical term for what
that “life-world” constitutes in terms of ethical perspectives and constituent features.
5Ibid.
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Viewing and nuancing moral philosophy via phenomenology yields, then,
significant insight into the ideas at work in moral thought and experience.
1. Consequentialist theories of the moral life are seen as presupposing and
articulating the intentional structure of human action.1 They express values and goaloriented actions which in turn express the overall meaning of our worldly being.2 In
addition, they articulate what is morally at stake in the intentional structure of action.3
2. Deontological theories are viewed as deriving their force from the
intersubjective structure of action. They focus on the constraints and imperatives of
action which are generated by the presence of other persons in our field of action.4 The
special significance o f deontological perspectives on the moral life is their “ability to
articulate the basic requisites o f human life and dignity.”5
3. Perfectionist theories are seen as highlighting “the personhood o f the moral
actor.”6 They elicit processes o f self-formation and relate to the question o f virtues.7
They point to those aspects of our being that we can most readily subject to explicit moral
'Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 18.
2I.e., values specify what we have come to acknowledge as desirable, as worthy of
the investment o f our energies and devotion (ibid., 19, 21).
3Ibid., 20-22.
4Ibid., 23-24.
5Ibid„ 28.
6Ibid.
7Ibid., 28-31. “For perfectionist theories, it is the fullest realization of virtue by
concrete human persons which is the primary substance of the ethical” (ibid., 32, 33).
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and ethical reflection.1 Furthermore, “the being o f the self as body is crucial to selfidentity.”2 My body locates me in the world, hence, self-identity above all involves
temporality.3

Historical Contextualism
In seeking a theory which encompasses consequentialist/intentionality,
deontological/intersubjectivity, and perfectionist/self-formation perspectives, Ogletree
articulates a framework of thought which grants preeminence to human historicity.4 In
other words, his desired synthesis between the dominant models of moral philosophy is
determined by the temporal horizon o f human experience.5 He labels this view “historical
contextualism.”6 The account o f temporality highlights the larger-meaning horizon which
gives unity and significance to these three basic structures and the modes of
understandings they bear.7 In essence, Ogletree’s hermeneutic is one that is governed by
a life-world perspective.8
‘Ibid., 30.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4Ibid., 5.
5Ibid., 17. “It is chiefly the temporal structure o f experience which leads us to
seek a synthesis o f the dominant models of moral understanding on the basis o f historical
contextualism” (ibid., 18).
6Ibid., 5.
Tbid., 18.

8Ibid., 7, 17.
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Phenomenology, then, leads ultimately to the question of the temporal horizon of
human existence and the meaning o f being.1 As quoted earlier:
The strength o f historical contextualism is that it directs us to concrete experience
and to the meanings which form it. In doing so it serves a lively discourse about
what is going on in our common world, and about the proper response to it.2
The temporal horizon of human experience together with the meaning of being
express two important issues in fundamental ethics: worldview and life in the world. In
other words, it has to do with that which is relevant and practical to temporal human
experience. To sum up,
we have goal-oriented actions, communicative interactions, and processes o f selfformation. To these three aspects o f our practical worldly engagements
correspond three modalities o f meaning: values, obligations, and virtues. These
types o f meanings in their historialized forms make up the substantive content of
the moral life. The moral life in turn is framed by the question o f the meaning of
being. It is the latter question which directs us to the totality of understanding
within which we are able to establish and confirm the significance o f the more
discrete meanings which belong to moral awareness.3

Scripture and Eschatology
The above correlation—of moral philosophy and phenomenology— provides a
“paradigm” that Ogletree believes will help elucidate the moral import o f biblical
materials.4 It encompasses a “set o f preunderstandings of moral life” which guide the

‘Ibid., 34-41.
2Ibid., 38.
3Ibid.,41.
4Robert Giannini, review of The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics, by Thomas
W. Ogletree, Saint Luke’s Journal o f Theology 29 (December 1985): 73.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

224
interpreter in a presentation o f biblical notions and engages the biblical texts in a
discourse about the moral life.1 He attempts, then, “a reconstruction of pivotal themes of
biblical faith, ordered with reference to those preunderstandings.”2
A key presupposition here is that what is being asked by these preunderstandings
and what the biblical texts are actually saying will intersect productively in some fashion,
though perhaps not exactly as one initially supposes.3 This presupposition assumes that
the world of the Bible fundamentally shares the human ways of being and acting in the
world, i.e., the temporal horizon o f human experience and the meaning of being. The
biblical world has a “historical situatedness.”4 “Life situations” shaped the production,
development, and transformation o f materials found in the biblical texts, as well as
provided the context for those concerns addressed by that data.s
It is precisely here, at the temporal horizon of human experience and the meaning
o f being, that the possibility exists for the biblical world of meaning and our world of
meaning to intersect. Because eschatology (1) furnishes a meaning horizon for moral
consciousness that encompasses the temporal horizon o f human experience, and (2)
represents one way o f articulating the question of meaning of being, it opens this
'Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 175, 5.
2Ibid., 4.
3Ibid., 15.
4Ibid., 2.
5Ibid., 6, 7.
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possibility up to actuality.1 The eschatological dimension becomes just what is needed if
we are to move from the philosophical models (Ogletree’s preunderstandings based on
moral philosophy and phenomenology) to the meaning horizon of the biblical materials,
and then, on to a Christian moral theory for today. Because eschatology takes seriously
the “question o f being,” that is, the challenge o f human existence as rooted in a particular
time and place, it provides the means whereby concerns of phenomenology can be
integrated with traditional moral philosophy and biblical ethics into Christian moral
theory.2
Testing the biblical material against this scheme, Ogletree shows that the Old
Testament is predominantly deontological in character, though with a significant element
o f perfectionism in later books.3 He finds the New Testament, however, primarily
perfectionist in character.4 In particular, “eschatology is the basis for the predominance
'See above discussion, 209-215.
2John Barton, review o f The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, by Thomas W.
Ogletree, Hevthrop Journal 29, no. 2 (April 1988): 246.
3Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 47, 48, 76-82, 193. His
analysis o f Old Testament material concentrates on the Pentateuch, especially its legal
traditions, and on the eighth- and seventh-century literary prophets. Ogletree states that
his selection o f Old Testament and New Testament biblical materials for his study was
not arbitrary, but rather reflects the brief nature of his study and a judgment concerning
what is most distinctive and interesting in the Bible so far as contemporary Christian
ethics is concerned (ibid., 10,11).
4Ibid., 89, 90, 194. His analysis of the New Testament material concentrates on
the Synoptic Gospels and the Pauline corpus (ibid., 11). It is interesting that Ogletree
does not include any o f the biblical apocalyptic materials from either testaments.
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of perfectionist themes in the N ew Testament.”1 Deontological thinking, however, is not
absent in the New Testament. Rather, it is subordinated to and dependent upon
perfectionist motifs.2 Laws and commandments function not simply as statements of
what we are to do, but predominantly as specifications of who we are to become.3 Where
deontological themes are present, they are so without the benefit o f the category o f law,4
and are expressed within the context o f ordering the eschatological community where
perfectionist themes predominate with relational emphases.5 Eschatology is seen as
providing the dialectic between law and promise which enables deontological thinking to
work within the purview o f perfectionism.6 Neither testament contains more than the
merest hint o f consequentialism.7

Summary
Unlike Mott, the categories of moral philosophy factor largely in Ogletree’s
eschatologically oriented moral theory. In fact, it is striking to find such a readiness to
see analogies with classical moral theories in the Bible. It is very rare to find any
sustained attempt to relate biblical and philosophical ethics at all, let alone in such a

'Ibid., 90.
2Ibid., 91.
3Ibid., 90.
4Ibid., 199. This notion expresses Pauline views of law and promise.
5Ibid., 194,199-202.
6Ibid., 199-202.
7Ibid., 204,48,91.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

227
creative way, and one which includes the concerns o f phenomenology as well as that of
biblical eschatology.1 Ogletree’s style makes it hard to see, at times, where all this
theoretical discussion is going. Nevertheless, it represents his understanding of the
“interpretive task.” And that is to achieve a common mind, a “fusion o f horizons”
between biblical worlds o f meaning and those which make up our sense of reality. To do
so he focuses on what he considers crucial, more fundamental themes which ethics must
consider in relation to the biblical materials. By (1) viewing and nuancing the dominant
conceptualizations of moral life (consequentialist/vale, deontological/law, and
perfectionist/virtue) via their corresponding constituents o f our worldly being
(intentionality, intersubjectivity, and the implications of self, respectively), and (2) setting
this synthesis within the temporal structure of human experience (historical
contextualism), Ogletree finds a promising resource of preunderstanding with which to
engage the biblical materials in a discourse about the moral life. Because eschatology is
both central to these biblical materials and provides a larger horizon of moral
understanding which takes serious the temporal horizon of human experience and the
question o f the meaning of being, it becomes just what is needed to bring an overall
correlation towards contemporary Christian moral theory.2
'Barton, 245,246.
2My phrase “just what is needed” is not intended here as pejorative as if to convey
a sense o f a fortuitous circumstance or a convenient discovery on the part of Ogletree.
Ogletree is concerned with facilitating dialogue between the biblical materials and the
critical and often abstract notions o f modem philosophical ethics. For him, biblical
eschatology provides the best bridge in that dialogue, one which both conveys what the
Scriptures has to teach us about ethics and which presents a profound challenge to
modem thought.
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Paradigm and Principles of Verification
As we have seen, Ogletree’s work as a whole is guided by a methodology based
on phenomenological investigations.1 It is a methodology governed by a life-world
perspective2 which serves to develop the connections between moral philosophy, biblical
studies, and Christian ethics. In this context eschatology plays a hermeneutical role
toward the overall synthesis. The methodological nuances which this application o f the
eschatological paradigm to moral theory evokes/expresses with regard to our three
principles o f verification (Scripture, community, and the nature of social involvement) are
significant.

Role of Scripture
The important role which Scripture plays in Ogletree’s moral theory is seen in the
fact that he undertakes the task of “setting forth an approach and a set o f hermeneutical
understandings for utilizing biblical materials in Christian ethics.”3 “Christian ethics
soon loses its distinctive power if it cuts itself off from its biblical foundations,”4 he
asserts. Therefore, I want to “venture formulations of the moral life which are congruent
with central features of biblical faith.”5 Furthermore
'Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, xiii.
Tbid., 7.
3Ibid., 11.
4Ibid., xii.
5Ibid., 4.
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if we turn to the Bible in our ethical inquiries, it is because we believe that it can
disclose something important about moral experience. The interest in the Bible is
not simply historical, the attempt to re-present moral notions which are
characteristic of an ancient cultural totality, for the sake, let us say, o f an enlarged
consciousness of the origins o f our own culture. It is existential, the concern to
make sense o f the moral life in relation to possibilities opening up in our own
setting. It is for the sake o f truth and goodness that we turn to the Bible. In
directing our attention to the Bible in this fashion, we presume that it has
something to say to us that we do not already know.1
Like Mott, Ogletree is very deliberate in explaining his approach to Scripture.2
And with Mott, he shares a fourfold methodology in keeping with his Wesleyan and
Methodist heritage. In discussing the place of Scripture among the sources and criteria of
theology in United Methodism, he articulates Scripture, tradition, experience, and reason
as interacting reciprocally, so that each illumines and is illumined by the others.3 The
issue he has in view is the question o f the “primacy of Scripture” in relation to the other
constituent features o f this methodology. “The primacy of Scripture is a reality for us not
apart from the other three resources, but only in and by means of their full operation.”4
He further asserts:
It has been suggested that the emphasis on the primacy of Scripture establishes as
'Ibid., 1.
2Ibid., 1-14; idem, “The Secular City as a Theological Norm,” 213, 214; idem,
“Interpretation,” 311; idem, “In Quest o f a Common Faith: The Theological Task of
United Methodist,” 47-50; idem, “Dimensions of Practical Theology: Meaning, Action,
Self,” 87-90.
3Ogletree, “In Quest o f a Common Faith: The Theological Task of United
Methodists,” 47. This 1988 article in the Methodist Quarterly Review focuses on the
Methodist General Conference Commission Report of a then-proposed new statement on
the theological task o f United Methodists.
4Ibid.
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normative one particular theological option: namely, ‘biblical theology.’ I would
contend instead that any approach to theology is permitted, even encouraged,
which clearly acknowledges the primacy of Scripture and recognizes at the same
time the indispensable role of tradition, experience and reason in appropriating the
biblical witness into our total understanding of reality. Where United Methodists
disagree, is not over the primacy of Scripture, but over the way Scripture is
received and interpreted.1
The issue, then, for Ogletree is not the “primacy o f Scripture” per se, which he
steadfastly affirms, but rather the way in which Scripture is actually “received and
interpreted.” Tradition, experience, and reason are indispensable in appropriating the
biblical witness into our total understanding o f reality. They play an obviously crucial
role in how Scripture is both received and interpreted. In light of his hermeneutic based
on phenomenological investigations, it is clear how important moral philosophy,
phenomenology, and historical contextualism are in this receiving and interpreting
process. They provide the clear assumptions and critical principles which inform the
reading o f the biblical text.2 Furthermore, Ogletree’s methodology shows dependence
upon and an openness toward historical-critical methodology which includes tradition
criticism, form criticism, redaction criticism, and literary criticism in the study o f the
biblical texts.3 Because tradition criticism attends to the life situations underlying the
transmission o f traditions, it provides data of particular interest to a hermeneutic
governed by a life-world perspective.4 The account of life-world structures, which the
'Ibid., 48.
2Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics, xiii.
3Ibid., xi, 6.
4Ibid., 7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

231
traditio-historical school brings, enables one to thematize the religious dimensions of
moral awareness in a fashion that puts them in critical contact with concerns addressed by
the biblical texts.1
In the context o f these observations, three further observations can be made with
regard to Scripture in Ogletree’s moral theory.
1. Ogletree’s view o f the nature of Scripture largely follows that of existential and
quasi-encounter theology.2 As literature, the Bible is made up o f human documents
written in the past against a backdrop of quite different social and cultural milieus.3 Its
fundamental meaning is historical and existential.4 While we must keep its historical
situatedness clearly in view,
its meaning is not reducible to the conscious intentions o f its authors in the
original situations o f production, nor to the senses it had for its initial readers.. . .
There is a surplus o f meaning in texts beyond what is explicitly uttered. This
surplus stems from that about which the texts speak. It is this subject matter
which offers the possibility of common ground for understanding between authors
and interpreters.. . .
'Ibid.
2Ogletree states that his re-presentation o f classical biblical themes draws largely
upon biblical scholarship embodying or depending upon form and tradition criticism. “In
regard to Old Testament texts, the accomplishments of Martin Noth and Gerhard von Rad
will be the central resource. For the New Testament, the studies that presuppose and
build upon the work of Rudolf Bultmann, moving to and including the more recent
redaction criticism, will occupy an analogous position” (ibid., 6, 13, n. 6). Ogletree is
largely dependent upon others for those chapters where he presents textual analysis
(Kenneth R. Himes, “Scripture and Ethics: A Review Essay,” Biblical Theology Bulletin
15 [April 1985]: 66).
3Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 10, 2.
4Ibid., 1,10.
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Interpretation. . . does not consist simply in the exposition o f the original
meanings. It finally involves an enlargement of the understanding o f the
interpreter concerning that about which the texts speak as a result o f an encounter
with the texts----a work o f the productive imagination o f the interpreter. . . will raise what the
texts are saying to a higher level of generality, one capable of expressing the
interpreter’s own sense of the truth. To capture what the texts are saying, we
cannot simply repeat or paraphrase their explicit utterances.. . . We must rather
generate new utterances, new accounts o f the subject matter of the texts, which
also make sense to us. Here we come up against a basic paradox, to say the same
thing as the texts, we must say something different.1
While we presume that the Bible has something to say that we do not already
know, and on this presumption we dare to place our own convictions at risk in our
reading o f the biblical texts,
such receptivity to the world of the Bible does not in itself imply any dogma of
biblical authority. It requires no more than the recognition of a phenomenon: that
the biblical texts have in the course o f our history been able to prove themselves
over and over as saying something true.2
Furthermore, the biblical materials participate formatively in constructing ethical
theory that is intentionally only provisionally held by the believing community. Ongoing
dialogue may alter it further.3 And while an essential thematic unity of the biblical
witness exists, that unity “resides more in the unfolding identity o f a people, and of a
'Ibid., 2, 3.
2Ibid., 1, 2. One can rightly ask Ogletree, “What is the real meaning of the
primacy o f Scripture if it does not in itself imply any dogma of biblical authority?”
Ogletree undoubtedly is reacting here to a fundamentalist, literalistic biblicism.
Nevertheless, his statement does seem to imply that the biblical materials are
authoritative only because they have proven themselves to be so, rather than having any
inherent authority in themselves as God’s inspired revelation to man.
3Ibid., 200-203.
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church arising in relation to that people, than in particular themes, beliefs, or ways o f
thinking as such.” 1
Ogletree’s stated purpose, however, is to “venture formulations o f the moral life
which are congruent with central features o f biblical faith.”2 He is concerned with the
“retrieval o f biblical convictions” about the moral life.3 In conversation with the text, our
preunderstandings themselves are subject to questioning in terms of what the texts say.
We must be prepared to modify them [our preunderstandings] in light o f this
questioning, until we are able to give them a form which links us to the meanings
uttered in the texts. In the process we grant the texts the power to open up and
transform our understanding of the matter under inquiry.4
In his thinking, he already has in view the distinctiveness of the world o f the Bible
when he formulates and begins to apply his preunderstandings of the moral life. He
works them out in the context of biblical faith itself.5 There is the sense that, in the final
analysis, Scripture alone provides direction for Christian moral theory, and that modem
'Ibid., 12.
2Ibid., 4.
3Ibid., 5.
4Ibid., 4. While our preunderstandings will themselves be placed in question, and
be transformed through encounter with the texts, this “transformation does not entail total
surrender to the texts. It does not require us to give up all independent judgment, all
personal responsibility for apprehending and articulating what is true and g o o d .. . . The
paradox o f interpreting is that we are able to say the same thing as the text only by saying
something different” (ibid., 176).
5Ibid., 5.
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and classical moral theory gives only a few analytical tools towards interpretation.1
Still, while Ogletree insists that Scripture is uniquely authoritative for Christian
ethics, it is not because it reveals timeless truths or proposes unchanging ethical
principles. The enduring value of Scripture is not to provide concrete guidance about
current moral issues but to present a horizon of understanding within which very diverse
peoples can identify themselves.
2.

Interpretation is a dialogical process in which we encounter the biblical texts as

pointers to elements o f human experience that may illumine our own historical
experience.2 Interpretation involves three distinct and interrelated processes:3 (a)
exegesis, reading the biblical materials in their own social and cultural settings, aided by
the tools o f historical and literary criticism;4 (b) critical engagement, reading the biblical
‘It would be a mistake to suppose, as some do, that Ogletree has first accepted
philosophical moral theory, phenomenology, and historical contextualism and has then
interpreted Scripture in such a way that it will conform to this secular philosophy.
Rather, Ogletree sees in these categories the very tools which are needed for his own
hermeneutical approach to the use o f the Bible in Christian ethics. He begins with the
premise o f the primacy o f Scripture and the anticipation that Scripture will adjust the
interpreter’s thinking and preunderstandings o f the moral life.
2Hays, 23.
3Ogletree, “Interpretation,” 311.
4The task o f exegesis “is not to understand what the texts of the Bible are saying,
but to understand with the help of the biblical texts the reality which presently concerns
us. Defining the exegetical task in this way does not imply a search for texts which have
something specific to say to situations that parallel more or less exactly those faced by
contemporary man
Instead it indicates the necessity of exploring the richness and
variety o f the biblical materials in relation to the issues which pose most acutely the
challenge to Christian existence in a given situation” (Ogletree, “The Secular City as a
Theological Norm,” 213).
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materials as speaking to questions which are also our questions, and therefore, as possibly
saying something to us;1and (c) constructive appropriation, unfolding a coherent,
contemporary account o f the moral life which contains a reformulation of biblical
notions. In the context of his The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, interpretation
includes:2 (a) an explicit account o f salient preunderstandings of the moral life; (b) a
reconstruction o f pivotal themes o f biblical faith, ordered with reference to those
preunderstandings; and (c) constructive suggestions towards a “fusion” in contemporary
life and thought o f these to worlds of meaning.
3.

There is the practical role which Scripture actually assumes in Ogletree’s

methodology.
a. His reconstruction o f pivotal themes of biblical faith are ordered with
reference to his proposed preunderstandings of the moral life.3 Because o f this,
classical and modem philosophical modes of thinking, rather than Scripture,
provide the conceptual categories for dialogue with Scripture.
b. He asserts that we begin our discourse with Scripture from within our own
'“The successful appropriation o f biblical faith in a new situation implies the
emergence of new meanings and understandings, meanings which do not in the strict
sense embody the intentions of the biblical writers. In the frame of reference a biblically
grounded theology is not one that is restricted to explicit biblical ideas and concerns. It
consists o f understandings which appropriately extend or, better, transform the original
message o f the Bible so as to disclose its meaning in relation to the struggles and
challenges of contemporary . . . existence” (ibid., 213, 214). In this context, Ogletree
acknowledges the clear danger of violating the integrity o f biblical faith that this approach
brings.
2Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 4.
3Ibid., 4.
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life situations, venturing reconstructions o f the questions to which the texts under
study can be read as answers to our preunderstandings.1 Because o f this, our
world o f meaning and our questions, rather than the biblical world o f meaning and
the questions Scripture might ask us, assume the lead toward finding common
ground and a fusion o f horizons.
c.

The biblical materials are viewed as participating formatively in

constructing ethical theory that is intentionally only provisionally held by the
believing community. Ongoing dialogue may alter it further.2 Because o f this.
Scripture functions primarily in a “mentoring” role in relation to the believing
community.
While the stated role o f Scripture in Ogletree’s moral theory is thus clear and
forceful, the concern here for this study relates to whether (or how) the eschatological
paradigm either influences or is influenced by Ogletree’s presuppositions or methodology
with regard to Scripture. The following points can be noted from Ogletree’s use o f the
eschatological paradigm in relation to Scripture:3
'Ibid., 3; idem, “Interpretation,” 311.
2Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 200-203.
3These observations reflect some conclusions drawn from discussions above on
“Eschatological Paradigm and Ethics” (192-216) and “Relation to Moral Philosophy”
(216-227). Because they represent here summaries viewed from the standpoint of
Scripture there is no need for sustained extended development.
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Eschatology to Teach Us
Eschatology is articulated as fundamentally central to the biblical materials and
witness. Ogletree’s thesis is that Scripture, especially the New Testament, has
eschatology to teach us.1 He consciously attempts, then, to conceive and articulate the
eschatological paradigm from the standpoint of biblical theology and exegesis. The fact
that (1) he intentionally and methodologically incorporates eschatology into his moral
theory, and (2) that when he reads the Bible, an intimate connection between ethics and
eschatology emerges,2 both reflect the priority Scripture has with respect to his broad
presuppositions and methodology. Furthermore, the dialectical character which Ogletree
understands New Testament eschatology as having (i.e., his already/not yet leitmotif)
likewise expresses scriptural influence and the essential meaning o f the biblical witness.

Unique Contribution
Eschatology provides the one unique and determinate scriptural contribution to
the equation of conceptual categories in the dialogue between biblical worlds of meaning
and our own sense of reality. The one feature that gives Scripture a quite different flavor
from the various philosophical notions is its concern for history and time in the context o f
dialectical eschatology. This is important for Ogletree in light of twentieth-century style
moral and ethical thinking which has a distinctly historical orientation.3 His proposed
'Ibid., 131, n. 4.
2See above, 188-193.
3Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger. 97,121; idem, “Christian Social Ethics as a
Theological Discipline,” 216, 217.
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methodology implies that our preunderstandings of the moral life cannot remain
unchallenged,1and that when taking up conversation with the text, we must subject the
preunderstandings themselves to questioning in terms of what the texts say. “In the
process we grant the texts the power to open up and transform our understanding of the
matter under inquiry.”2 The three chapters in The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics.
which review the moral understandings o f selected biblical literature, each conclude with
a statement o f how contemporary moral understanding is thus challenged.3 The challenge
can be summed up in one word: biblical eschatology.

Horizon o f Meaning
Eschatology elucidates the larger-meaning context of biblical moral thought by
providing a biblical horizon o f meaning which profoundly qualifies and substantially
informs the manner in which moral notions present themselves to consciousness.4 This
biblical horizon o f meaning is essentially dialectical in character and calls for a
corresponding dialectical in moral thinking. The already/not yet tensions of
eschatological existence are seen as impacting on the believer’s own self-experience, the
concrete reality o f the church itself, and the interface between the church and institutions
'Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 4.
2Ibid.
3See discussion above, 192, n. 3.
4Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 177.
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of the larger society.1 Furthermore, because this meaning horizon encompasses the
temporal horizon o f human experience, and represents one way of articulating the
question o f the meaning o f being, eschatology enables a “fusion of horizons” between
biblical worlds o f meaning and those that make up our sense of reality.
In each of the above—the focus of the biblical witness, the unique contribution of
Scripture to the equation o f conceptual categories, and the biblical horizon o f meaning—
there is indication that Ogletree consciously attempts to conceive and articulate the
eschatological paradigm from the standpoint o f biblical theology and exegesis.
Furthermore, his presuppositions regarding the nature o f Scripture appear to flavor his
understanding of the eschatological paradigm: (1) because the fundamental meaning of
Scripture is understood as historical and existential,2 the important categories for
nuancing the meaning o f the eschatological paradigm are, likewise, historical and
existential (i.e., temporal horizon of human experience, and the meaning o f being);3 (2)
because historical-critical methodology is embraced as providing appropriate tools for
opening up the fundamental meaning of the Scripture,4 the eschatological paradigm,
likewise, becomes explicated within the purview o f the presuppositions o f this
methodology; (3) because the enduring value o f Scripture is found in the surplus of
'See above discussion, 214-216.
2Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 1, 10.
3Ibid., 192, 193.
4Ibid., xi, 7.
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meaning beyond what is uttered in the biblical texts,1and which is in need of higher
levels o f generality in order to find common ground with contemporary society,2 the value
o f the eschatological paradigm, likewise, is found in broad, generalizing horizonal
meanings rather than in generating specifically moral notions.3
On the other hand, Ogletree’s application o f the eschatological paradigm appears
to influence his interpretation and use of Scripture. Since the already/not yet dialectical
o f eschatological existence brings a level of ambiguity, relativity, and contingency to
moral notions,4 the New Testament materials are viewed and articulated from this
perspective. Promise becomes more fundamental than law.5 Cultural pluralism becomes
an informing principle in Christian moral thought.6 Persons of faith remain subject to the
law in a provisional and qualified sense.7 Moral understandings must themselves remain
open to fresh interpretation, even continual renegotiation, in the ongoing life of the people
o f God.8 Deontological themes are articulated without the benefit of the category o f law.9

'Ibid., 2.
2Ibid., 3, 12.
3Ibid., 177.
4Ibid., 166, 167.
5Ibid., 144, 168, 199-203.
6Ibid., 152-159, 171.
7Ibid., 200.
8Ibid., 203.
9Ibid., 199.
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Ethical theory drawn from the biblical materials is seen as only provisionally held by the
believing community, and can be altered through ongoing dialogue.1 Thus, as already
noted above, Scripture functions practically in a “mentoring” role in relation to the
believing community.
Furthermore, because Ogletree’s ethical method expresses a consistently future
movement in keeping with the broad contours of theologies of the future, Scripture is
viewed and articulated from the standpoint o f promise, possibilities, openness, and
creativity with respect to their moral resource. The enduring value of Scripture is found
in its surplus of meaning which is a broad, generalizing, horizonal meaning rather than
specific moral notions or concrete content. The fact that this meaning horizon which
Scripture provides is one o f “meaning” rather than “content,” the fusion o f horizons with
contemporary life will tend toward what is relative, subjective, and existential. There is
existential encounter rather than timeless truths or unchanging ethical principles. Finally,
the eschatological paradigm is viewed as creating the context for the eschatological
community to both understand and use biblical materials in its moral reflection. Scripture
is to be interpreted and nuanced in an ecclesial context.2 This observation is discussed
more fully below in “Role of Community.”

Summary
While the “primacy o f Scripture” is a firmly established principle in Ogletree’s

'Ibid., 200-203.
2Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context of Christian Ethics,” 12-14.
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thinking, the practical role Scripture actually assumes in his methodology reflects the
“primacy” o f philosophical categories o f thinking and the existential questions of our
contemporary life world. Scripture functions primarily in a “mentoring” role in relation
to the believing community. Nevertheless there is indication that Ogletree consciously
attempts to conceive and articulate the eschatological paradigm from the standpoint of
biblical theology and exegesis. Furthermore, his presuppositions regarding the nature of
Scripture flavor his understanding o f the eschatological paradigm, and there are
indications that his application o f the eschatological paradigm influences both his
interpretation and application o f Scripture. The enduring value o f Scripture is found in its
surplus o f meaning which is a broad, generalizing, horizonal meaning rather than specific
moral notions or concrete moral content.

The Role of Community
As outlined in chapter 2, the role which the Christian community assumes in
eschatological ethics has revolved around three fundamental issues: (1) as a source of
moral authority; (2) the field o f moral operation; and (3) its linkage with the ethical
needs/agenda of the larger human society. The role o f community in Ogletree’s
application of the eschatological paradigm in these three areas is for the most part clear
and deliberate.

Interpretive Source of Authority
The Christian community is a vital interpretive source o f moral authority in
relation to that of Scripture. As outlined above, the “primacy o f Scripture” is a firmly
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established principle in Ogletree’s thinking. However, the authoritative role of the
community in both interpreting and applying Scripture is pivotal, almost complementary
and correlative. The dialogical process of interpretation—where Scripture, tradition,
reason, and experience interact reciprocally so that each illumines and is illumined by the
other—is to take place within the context o f the believing community. “Christian
thinking about the moral life requires for its integrity and power an ecclesial context,”1
Ogletree argues. Furthermore, he suggests an ecclesial premise for successful dialogue
between ethics and Scripture.2 This “ecclesial context for Christian ethics” is no less than
the “eschatological community,” for “the way into a Christian critique of ethos . . . is
through eschatology,”3 and “a distinctively Christian ethic has its social location in
eschatological community.”* In other words, it is difficult to practice Christian ethics
while being immersed in non-Christian communities. And in particular, only
eschatologically oriented communities can foster a fusion o f horizons with the
eschatological perspective o f the biblical era. The church, then, is a practical necessity if
the methodological question o f eschatology is to be properly dealt with in the dialogue on
'Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context of Christian Ethics,” 2. According to Ogletree,
“Christian ethical thinking cut off from a lively involvement with ecclesial existence is
abstract and impotent.” He is writing in the context o f how Christian moral reflection has
often been determined by non-Christian materials, secular social and philosophical
categories, issues, and agendas whereby Christian ethics in effect ceases to be Christian at
all.
2Himes, 67.
3Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context of Christian Ethics,” 12.
4Ibid., 13.
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Scripture and ethics. If the fusion o f horizons between the biblical world and the modem
world is to occur, there must be faith communities in the present who are engaged in an
eschatological praxis of gospel living:1
From the standpoint of concrete experience, two things would seem to be crucial:
some degree of alienation from the institutional arrangements o f the larger society,
and deep involvement with a community which is engaged in developing
qualitatively distinct alternatives to those arrangements. The alienation and the
involvement provide points o f contact fo r comprehending what the biblical texts
are saying.2
The interpretive authority o f the believing community in relation to Scripture
finds further practical expression in the law/promise dialectic which eschatology is seen
as creating and which captures the moral structure of the eschatological community:
Law is provisional and relative; yet once its provisional status is recognized and
appreciated, it has genuine authority to regulate human activity. Still, the
provisional and relative standing o f law cannot itself become a fixed principle, or
it would effectively block out the negotiation o f new possibilities in the
community o f faith. Law can serve only to express what is relatively settled, what
is for the present to be taken for granted. It permits the concentration of the moral
imagination on issues in eschatological existence which are most in need of
attention at a given moment. Yet even previously settled matters remain open in
principle to renegotiation. They can once more become objects of special
attention, to be worked out anew with full sensitivity to the concrete
understandings and meanings at play within the community. This account

'Himes, 67.
2Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 182 (italics supplied).
Ogletree writes, “An eschatological orientation requires eschatological communities.. . .
A Christian ethic attentive to the eschatological horizon. . . is an ethic closely linked to
the church and its ministry. It finds central expression in the practice o f ministry. If
Christian ethics is to incorporate the eschatological impulses o f the New Testament, it
must give far more attention than is presently customary to the life of the church and its
ministry. Here the transfer of the New Testament themes to contemporary social realities
can be strong indeed” (ibid., 185).
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subjects law to promise.1
Moral understandings, stated as law and commandment, must themselves be
open to fresh interpretation, even continual renegotiation, in the ongoing life of
the people o f God.2
The eschatological paradigm is viewed as creating the context for the
eschatological community to both understand and use biblical materials in its moral
reflection. Scripture is to be interpreted and nuanced in an ecclesial context. It provides
horizonal meaning more than concrete content. The believing community extends this
horizonal meaning toward contemporary ethical exigencies in determining the
possibilities o f new concrete explication. Finally, the unity of the Bible resides more in
the unfolding identity o f a people, and of a church arising in relation to that people, than
in particular themes, beliefs, or ways of thinking.3

Eschatological Community
Eschatological existence is expressed fundamentally within eschatological
community.4 Ogletree’s basic thesis is that “the radicalism and creativity o f New
Testament social thought relate chiefly to the internal dynamics of the community of
faith. They stem from attempts to devise forms o f communal life appropriate to
'Ibid., 202. In essence this subjects law to the community and to culture.
2Ibid., 203.
3Ibid., 11, 12.
4Ogletree. Hospitality to the Stranger. 128-130, 141-142; idem, The Use o f the
Bible in Christian Ethics. 116, 119, 164, 169, 179.
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eschatological existence.”1 More specifically,
an eschatologically determined ethic gives primary weight to the issues involved
in building up and sustaining eschatological communities, communities bearing
authentic alternatives to the cultural norms and institutional arrangements o f the
larger society.2
Because Christian existence is viewed as essentially ecclesial existence,3 the
church furnishes the social location that defines Christian participation in the life o f the
world.4 It is a new community, oriented to and based upon the new age, which takes form
in the midst o f institutions which remain under the sway o f the old.5 It is self-consciously
oriented to the coming Kingdom of God. It is the fundamental field of moral operation
for the already/not yet dialectic o f New Testament thought.6 “Our primary vocation,”
then, “is to become eschatological community and to attest its promise for the world.”7

Relates Indirectly to Larger Society
The Christian community relates to the ethical needs/agenda of the larger human
society in a way that is primarily indirect and by extension and analogy. While the
'Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger. 128, 142; idem, The Use of the Bible in
Christian Ethics. 116126,152,180-186.
2Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 187.
3Ogletree to Lichtenwalter, March 31,1993,2; idem, The Use of the Bible in
Christian Ethics. 90.
4Ibid.
sOgletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 89.
6Ibid., 179-180.
7Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context o f Christian Ethics,” 13.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

247
Christian community supports public order, the affairs o f the state lie outside o f
substantive Christian concern.1 However, insofar as existing social and cultural forms
function to maintain space for human life, they can be provisionally accepted as spheres
of Christian existence.2 Because eschatological existence is essentially evangelistic and
has a promise to deliver the nations, the possibility is always present that the dynamics of
eschatological existence will set in motion transformative social processes in spheres of
life which previously were almost wholly independent of its central impulses.3 If a
Christian ethic is to make an original contribution to political and economic thought, it
will not be by way o f explicit biblical commentary on the state and its place in human
life. Rather, it will be by elaborating and developing, by analogy, the political and
economic implications o f insights present in the biblical materials’ attention to the
internal affairs o f the eschatological community.4
A distinctively Christian social ethic which reaches beyond concerns internal to
self-conscious communities of faith pre-supposes situations in which the
dynamics o f eschatological existence are beginning to work themselves out in
wider spheres o f social life. Once these dynamics are underway, we are in a
'Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 116-117, 180.

2Ibid., 184.
3Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger. 142.
4O gletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 129, 130. According to

Ogletree, “Christian social thought is a fruit of the social practice of Christian churches
and their affiliated associations and organizations” (Ogletree, “Christian Social Ethics as
a Theological Discipline,” 216). It is through participation in the believing community
that Christians orient themselves to the wider social world.
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position to consider the broader social ramifications of elemental discoveries in
the community of faith itself.1

Summary
Ogletree thus stresses the essential ecclesial nature of an eschatologically
informed Christian ethics.2 The role which the believing community assumes in his
application o f the eschatological paradigm is a leading one, providing the context in
which the “preunderstandings of moral life” are to be viewed in relation to the biblical
materials and the reality o f the already/not yet. The believing community is a vital
interpretive, almost complementary, source of moral authority in relation to Scripture. It
is the fundamental field of moral operation for expressing the ethic of dialectical
eschatology. And it relates to the wider social world indirectly, by extension and by
analogy from its own moral reflection and experience.

Nature of Social Involvement
For Ogletree, the nature of social involvement is fundamentally linked with the
nature and experience of eschatological communities. The New Testament materials
basically provide an ecclesiology, rather than a comprehensive social ethic in the sense of
twentieth-century Christian ethics.3 Furthermore, “the radicalism and creativity o f New
Testament social thought relate chiefly to the internal dynamics of the community of
‘Ogletree. Hospitality to the Stranger. 142.
2Ogletree is viewed, along with Pannenberg and Braaten, as developing the
ecclesiological implications of eschatological ethics (Sedgwick, 398,402-405).
3Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 117.
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faith. They stem from attempts to devise forms of communal life appropriate to
eschatological existence.”1 As noted earlier, the affairs o f the state basically lie outside
substantive Christian concern.2 It is only indirectly, by extension, and by analogy that the
believing community reaches toward the wider social world.
The first task o f the church, then, is to be the church.3 As an essentially religious
community, it can never be a mere instrument o f social change. Rather, its social witness
must be a piece with it spirituality, with its activities in nurturing faith, and with the
character o f its internal fellowship.4 In short, Christian social ethics requires a discrete
social-communal base which inescapably involves congregational development. It is
within the context o f this development and participation within the community that
Christians orient themselves to the wider social world.5 A distinctively Christian social
vision presupposes the possibility of awakening moral commitments which go beyond
interests associated with their own social location.6
“While the first task o f the church is to be the church, being the church includes
public responsibility— at least where Christians have the means to exercise it.”7 This
'Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger. 128.
2Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 117.
3Ogletree, “The Renewing of Ecumenical Protestant Social Teaching,” 290.
4Ibid., 289, 290.
5Ogletree, “Christian Social Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 216.
6Ogletree, “Renewing Ecumenical Protestant Social Teaching,” 290.
7Ibid.
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public responsibility has to do with the genuine power and influence which the believing
community has within society.1 In particular, the task of Christian social ethics is viewed
as twofold: (1) it is to help Christian people reflect on their social roles and their realistic
possibilities for influencing the direction o f social evolution; and (2) it is to discover ways
in which Christians can collaborate with persons of different religious and moral
orientations in working toward a shared vision o f the common good.2 With respect to
these two tasks, Ogletree asserts that the believing community’s “public witness” or
“explicit public vocation” requires critical engagement with the moral ethos o f the larger
secular community, including its diverse religious communities.3 Here he follows
broadly Troeltsch’s concept o f “civilization ethic,” where, in order to address the major
social questions o f contemporary society, the believing community must join its teachings
to the reigning civilizational ethic o f society.4
In secular, pluralistic societies, the church’s social teachings are normally able to
make their way into the public arena only in conjunction with religious and moral
ideas that undergird a normative social order, that is, what Troeltsch called the
“civilizational ethic.”. .. Any effective synthesis of Christian ideas and
civilizational ethic constitutes a ‘compromise,’ that is, an adjustment o f Christian
teaching to the reigning norms of society. However, such a compromise gives
distinctively Christian social thought a share in the authority of the civilizational
ethic. It is by way o f its participation in a civilization ethic, Troeltsch contends,
that Christian teaching has been able to influence social processes and policies.s
'Ibid.
2Ogletree, “Christian Social Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 216.
3Ogletree, “Renewing Ecumenical Protestant Social Teaching,” 293-295.
“Ibid.; idem, “Christian Social Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 226-227, 232.
sOgletree, “Christian Social Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 226, 227.
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Because the “civilizational ethic” furnishes the moral notions that make possible a
public discourse about the common good, an effective public witness is possible only as
the believing community comes to grips with this ethic, criticizing it, extending and
developing it, and, insofar as possible, articulating its (believing community) distinctive
vision in ways that connect with its (civilizational ethic) central tendencies. To renounce
this undertaking is to set aside an explicit public vocation.1 The “compromise” spoken of
here is one of creative synthesis of social and cultural ideas with a Christian social
vision.2 It is the adjustment of Christian teachings to social exigencies.3 Such
compromise is not seen as a dilution o f moral seriousness, but rather as a fitting moral
response to situations o f substantial moral conflict.4 Following Troeltsch, Ogletree
contends that the believing community cannot continue to play a role in social evolution
unless it can maintain and renew such compromises.5
In short, Christians have to develop their social vision in at least two frames of
reference: (1) they must become clear about their own witness and its grounding in
fundamental faith convictions and internal relational dynamics; and (2) they must find
ways o f articulating their distinctive witness that are suited to a public discourse.6 It is
'Ibid., 295.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
5Ogletree, “Christian Social Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 227.
6Ibid., 232.
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the reality that the moral conflicts o f society are replicated within its own internal life that
enables the believing community toward sensitive social vision.1
What internal dynamics o f communal life, though, does Ogletree see as possibly
extending toward the wider social world? According to him, four themes merit attention
with respect to the force o f eschatological promise for the social organization of life.
1. The primacy o f eschatological community over the family opens the way to
communities and societies which are radically, ethnically, sexually, inclusive.2
2. The material basis o f eschatological community expresses the reversal and
obliteration of distinctions in existing patterns o f privilege, power, and wealth in human
community.3 This includes a critique of the individualism and acquisitiveness of modem
society and the social understanding of property. It points to the social accountability and
social use of property relations and in economic activity.
3. The mercy, mutual forbearance, and forgiving love of eschatological
community transcends national, ethnic, and cultural bases of social order as conditions of
a public life in communities and societies, as well as violence as the final court of appeal
in the adjudication o f human conflict.4
4. The common life among persons o f diverse backgrounds and cultures within

'Ibid.
2Ogletree. Hospitality to the Stranger. 143, 128-130; idem, The Use of the Bible
in Christian Ethics. 181.
3Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger. 143-144.
4Ibid., 144.
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the eschatological community brings recognition of the plurality and relativity of human
cultures and social institutions, as well as the possibility o f community among culturally
diverse peoples.1 The relativity o f social institutions permits us to accept them and
function with them as spheres o f our own activity without, at the same time, bestowing
absolute and binding authority upon them.2 This cultural pluralism is founded on the
primacy o f promise over law as the constitutive basis of social existence and the reality
that all human cultures are relative to the Lordship of Jesus Christ.3
These four themes for the social reorganization o f life reflect a more perfectionist,
rather than a deontological, orientation toward the personal moral development of
individuals and the building up o f the community.4 A highly relational dynamic exists in
eschatological communal life. In addition, Ogletree posits “hospitality” as an over
arching metaphor for his moral theory, i.e., “to be moral is to be hospitable to the
stranger.”5 In the context o f Christian eschatology, this hospitality motif is viewed as
expressing at least two unique nuances in relation to the four themes for the social
organization o f life which we have just outlined above:6 (1) the moral import of
intersubjectivity, and (2) the moral significance of pluralism at an elemental level of
'Ibid., 144, 145; idem, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 152-158.
2Ogletree. The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 171.
3Ibid., 152.
4Ibid., 193-202.
5Ogletree. Hospitality to the Stranger. 1.
6Ibid., 7, 8.
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human experience.1 “To offer hospitality to a stranger is to welcome something new,
unfamiliar, and unknown into our life world.”2 Furthermore, there are reciprocal acts of
hospitality, i.e., “My readiness to welcome the other in to my world must be balanced by
my readiness to enter the world o f the other.”3 The importance o f this overarching
metaphor speaks towards an openness to both people and ideas which may be different to
us.
In the context o f these four themes for the social organization o f life, Ogletree
proposes the following pattern o f social responsibility for eschatological communities.4
1. Modem societies are sufficiently alien to the central promises o f the Christian
gospel that the believing community will, in important measure, have to be a community
apart.5 Being a community apart includes two crucial perspectives for the believing
community: some degree o f social alienation from the institutional arrangements of the
'Ibid., 35-59.
2Ibid., 2.
3Ibid., 4.
4This proposal follows his review o f some examples o f social responsibility which
he asserts have some plausibility as contemporary appropriations o f biblical eschatology,
i.e., (1) eschewing direct involvement in the oversight o f the basic economic, political,
and cultural structures o f society, with evangelism as direct witness to larger society, and
moral modeling as indirect influence; (2) individual members taking responsibility for the
whole range o f social positions open in society; (3) the church concerning itself with the
possibility o f encompassing the whole society in the impulses o f the coming new age,
venturing a Christian transformation of social existence; (4) finding in powerful social
and political movements secular equivalents to the eschatological impulses o f Christian
faith (ibid., 188, 189).
5Qgletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 189, 190.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

255
larger society, and deep involvement within the community as it is engaged in developing
qualitatively distinct alternatives o f those arrangements.1
2. The task of the believing community is to bring effective criticism of the basic
institutions o f the larger society lest their alien and oppressive features become obscured
in human consciousness. Such criticism, though guided by distinctive Christian
understandings, will make appropriate use of pertinent social theory.2
3. Christians are free to participate selectively in the basic institutions of modem
society insofar as they recognize the provisional and ambiguous nature of these
institutions and maintain their primary allegiance to the realities taking form in
eschatological community. The participation must, however, be both selective and
qualified.3
4. In many societies, though not all, Christians actually have an opportunity to
help shape policy in basic social institutions. Similarly, or alternatively, they may be able
to relate actively to movements working to bring about morally significant social change,
influencing the determination of goals and objectives, and also decisions about strategy
and tactics.4
Finally, there is the question of the believing community’s relation to the

'Ibid., 182-187.
2Ibid., 190.
3Ibid. “A task of Christian ethics is to assist the community o f faith in its
deliberations on appropriate forms of participation in the life of the larger society” (ibid.).
“Ibid.
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needs/agenda of the larger social world in the setting of world processes and the horizon
o f the future. According to Ogletree,
the reach of eschatological community is toward the whole inhabited world. Its
aim is not the conversion o f all peoples to an established point o f view, but the
negotiation o f shared understandings capable of giving rise to a common world
among women and men from a multiplicity of backgrounds and cultures. Its
summons is to be a people in freedom and community, not apart from but
precisely in relation to our social and cultural origins.1
And because Christian hope involves ever new forms of concrete historical
expression of our ultimate religious hope of participation in the divine life,
if I am going to take seriously the hope o f liberation promised to me in faith, then
I have got to be engaged in concrete liberation struggles in this world. As a matter
of fact, I do not think I can know what the liberation of men in the Kingdom of
God means if I have not been involved in struggling with very specific chains that
enslave people in my own society.2

Summary
For Ogletree, the nature o f social involvement is fundamentally linked with the
nature and experience o f eschatological communities. The radicalism and creativity of
New Testament social thought are focused primarily through the internal dynamics of the
believing community. It is only indirectly, by extension, and by analogy that the
believing community reaches toward the wider social world. Even then its social witness
must be a piece with its spirituality, faith, and internal fellowship. Public responsibility is
assumed where individual Christians or the believing community have means to exercise
it, and where it expresses appropriate forms o f participation in the larger society.
'Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context o f Christian Ethics,” 13, 14.
2Ogletree, “What May Man Really Hope For?” 43,44.
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Evangelism, individual social responsibility and influence, moral protest and personal
influence in the sociopolitical arena, developing social policy, as well as social struggle,
are each viewed as appropriate forms of public responsibility, though with some
qualifications. The nature of social involvement is further viewed from the perspective of
intersubjectivity, relativity and contingency, pluralism as a basic element o f human
experience, and deontologically qualified perfectionist motifs. At bottom, it is a radical
relational vision which encompasses the creation of the new in a universal reach toward
the larger society.

Implications for Moral Theory
The broad outline o f Ogletree’s application of the eschatological paradigm to
moral theory is clear. The question now is his application of the paradigm’s ethical
implications with respect to the level of moral reflection and its potential for concrete
social content. By way of review, the issues here deal primarily with questions of
specificity and consistency with respect to the eschatological paradigm’s application.
They bring into focus where normative content and guidance lie in the application
process, and the carefulness with which it is used towards concrete ethical exigencies.
This section’s survey includes: (1) the theoretical level of moral reflection which the
paradigm appears to elicit in Ogletree’s thinking; and (2) the meaning and function of
paradigm in Ogletree’s moral theory. Ogletree’s correlation of the eschatological
paradigm to moral philosophy has already been examined in a separate section.
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Level of Moral Reflection
By way o f reminder again, this study proposes a correspondence between the
appropriate levels on which paradigms operate and the ingredients in the structure of
ethics, i.e., macro/bases, meso/underlying principles, and micro/area rules. The question
o f “theoretical level,” which this correspondence facilitates, enables one to clarify how
concretely the eschatological paradigm might legitimately speak to modem ethical
concerns.
With Ogletree, the questions of “theoretical level” and “concreteness” are quite
straightforward ones. He essentially announces where he is coming from on the former,
and, in the process, tells us what to expect with regard to the latter. Both companion
volumes—which represent his primary and most focused discussion with regard to the
use o f eschatology in moral theory, and which this chapter has drawn from in a principal
way— are concerned with methodology and elemental aspects of human moral
experience. They are intentionally only preparatory to a more comprehensive treatment
o f Christian ethics.1 The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics relates to methodology in
linking biblical scholarship and Christian ethics.2 Hospitality to the Stranger relates to
methodology in the context o f fundamental ethics, i.e., the central constituents of the
moral life and the manner o f their appearing in concrete human experience.3 It is within
‘Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics, xii-xiii, 4, 7,11, 12, 176, 205;
idem, Hospitality to the Stranger, xi, 29.
2Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics, xii-xiii, 1-14.
3Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger, xi, 10-34.
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this larger framework o f moral theory and ethical methodology that the “theoretical level”
of the eschatological paradigm comes into view.

Macro/Bases
The field o f Christian ethics, as Ogletree views it, has three main divisions:
fundamental ethics, symbolic ethics, and practical ethics.1 Fundamental ethics describes
the elements o f the moral life and then constructs a theory based on the description.2 It is
concerned primarily with the elemental constituents o f worldly being. Symbolic ethics
critically interprets, appropriates, and mediates the traditions which give character to our
moral understanding.3 It is concerned primarily with particular historically relative
configurations o f shared meanings which mold, express, and bestow significance on the
moral life of communities and societies to which we belong. Practical ethics examines
the organic, psychic, social, and cultural dynamics that channel and constrain the moral
life. Here, ethical reflection is in critical conversation with the human sciences
(behavioral and social). The underlying basis for these three distinct inquiries and for
their interconnections is concrete experience itself: the everyday life-world as it presents
itself to awareness. Even if all this gets done, however, according to Ogletree, we still
haven not yet reached applied ethics or concrete moral guidance.4
‘Ibid., 10.
2Ibid., 10, 11.
3Ibid., 11.
4Ibid., 11.
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In the context o f fundamental ethics, Ogletree provides an exposition of some of
the basic features o f phenomenology and moral philosophy in terms of how they explicate
constitutive elemental structures of the life world. These features have already been
outlined in this chapter. Here we want to be reminded that the synthesis of the concerns
o f phenomenology and moral philosophy is to realize preunderstandings of the moral life
in relation to the horizon of meaning which is opened up by the question of the meaning
o f being.1 His proposed structures of moral thought (preunderstandings) are more
elemental than social, economic, and political arrangements of our life world. Because
they are more elemental, they can enable discourse and an interpretive fusion of horizons
with the biblical materials.
Ogletree is clearly working from the bases level o f the structure of ethics. He is
abstract, philosophical, and theoretical in his outline o f the constituent features o f moral
reality in temporal human experience. It is within the purview of this level of theoretical
reflection that Ogletree primarily discusses the contribution of the eschatological
paradigm to Christian moral theory. In doing so, he is nuancing and applying the
eschatology from the bases level of the structure o f ethics, and correspondingly, from the
macro level of paradigm operation. According to Ogletree,
to speak of eschatology is to characterize the larger horizon of meaning which in
given traditions displays the significance and authority of moral notions. This
meaning horizon does not directly generate specifically moral notions, but it
profoundly qualifies them and substantially informs the manner in which they
present themselves to consciousness.2
'Ibid., 24; Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 15-45.
2Qgletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 177.
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In addition, Ogletree asserts that “the discussion of eschatology represents one
way o f articulating the question o f the meaning of being.”1 His focus is toward that
which is general, elemental, and fundamental. With respect to the biblical materials he is
concerned with raising what the texts are saying to a higher level of generality, one
capable o f addressing our own sense of reality via a fusion o f meaning horizons.2
Correspondingly, the import o f eschatology is found in its ability to qualify and inform
moral notions in our consciousness rather than generate specific moral notions. As
outlined in an earlier section of this chapter, the hermeneutical nuances o f the
eschatological paradigm are found in how the already/not yet dialectic: (1) provides the
creative context for a focused future orientation in ethical methodology; (2) furnishes a
meaning horizon for Christian moral consciousness that encompasses the temporal
horizon o f human experience; (3) enables a “fusion of horizons” between biblical worlds
o f meaning and those which make up our sense of reality; and (4) elucidates the essential
dialectical nature of Christian moral theory.

These observations affirm that Ogletree’s

primary application of the eschatological paradigm is from the macro/bases level of moral
reflection.

Meso/Underlying Principles
There is evidence, however, that Ogletree articulates moral reflection from the
“meso” level o f paradigm application as well. In the structure of ethics, this would mean
'Ibid., 193.
2Ibid., 3,12.
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articulating underlying principles that can be applied in a universal way to various areas
of moral activity.
According to Ogletree, symbolic ethics critically interprets, appropriates, and
mediates the traditions which give character to our moral understandings.1 It elucidates
the historically relative configurations of shared meanings which mold, express, and
bestow significance on the moral life of communities and societies to which we belong.
In other words, it explores the meaning horizon found in the historical situatedness of
others in relation to our own sense of reality, i.e., enduring universal principles that
transcend culture and time. In the context of Ogletree’s pursuit of the use of the Bible in
Christian ethics, symbolic ethics explores, interprets, appropriates, and mediates the
biblical worlds o f meaning, i.e., biblical moral notions and principles. Note what he has
to say with regard to eschatology and symbolic ethics:
Only chapter 5 o f this volume, “The Eschatological Horizon o f New Testament
Social Thought,” embodies the inquiries which belong to symbolic ethics. Here I
do not move fully into the systematic task o f symbolic ethics. This is preparatory
work to such an undertaking, the first attempt at a retrieval of New Testament
traditions. Yet I do take into account the central challenge for a constructive
Christian ethics, namely, interpreting the import of New Testament eschatology
for moral understanding. In this respect, chapter 5 may have suggestiveness
beyond its own accomplishments.2
The point here is that Ogletree’s observations from the New Testament materials
with respect to the role o f community and the nature of social involvement encompasses
symbolic ethics. The exploring, interpreting, appropriating, and mediating the biblical
'Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger. 11.
2Ibid., 29, 30.
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worlds o f meaning with respect to the role o f community and the nature of social
involvement, in effect, are expressions o f enduring universal principles. The
eschatological horizon o f New Testament social thought is fundamental to this overall
picture. Ogletree thus articulates moral reflection from the “meso” level of paradigm
application.

Micro/Area Rules
Given the overall force o f Ogletree’s approach and his own stated limits in the
purpose o f his two companion volumes, the micro/area rules level of paradigm
application is the least observable, if not altogether absent. However, since Ogletree
insists on dealing with what he calls “the historical context” of his issues, practical ethics
is always in the picture, even though it is on the periphery.1 In Ogletree’s view, practical
ethics is not yet applied ethics, nor is it the locus o f concrete moral guidance.2 The terms
“applied ethics” and “practical ethics” are often used interchangeably to indicate the
application of ethics to special arenas of human activity, such as business, politics,
medicine, economics, etc.3 In other words, for many, “applied ethics” and “practical
ethics” relate to area rules in the structure o f ethics, which would be our micro level of
paradigm operation. While Ogletree obviously sees a distinction between “practical
‘Charles Courtney, review of Hospitality to the Stranger: Dimensions of Moral
Understanding, by Thomas W. Ogletree. Drew Gateway 58. no. 3 (Spring 1989): 83.
2Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger, 11.
3James F. Childress, “Applied Ethics,” The Westminster Dictionary of Christian
Ethics ( 19861.38.
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ethics” and “applied ethics,” he nonetheless does have areas of human activity or area
rules in mind as he develops his moral theory. These concerns, while on the periphery,
are always in the picture. The full explication of these issues and concerns await his
systematic treatment o f Christian ethics.1 Ogletree relates the eschatological paradigm
broadly towards area rules and micro application throughout his inquiries o f symbolic
ethics in the context o f the biblical worlds of meaning as they relate to our own sense of
reality.

Summary
With the above analysis in view, it is appropriate to conclude that, for Ogletree,
the eschatological paradigm facilitates moral reflection primarily across the spectrum of
macro and meso paradigm operation. This conclusion reflects, however, what he has
written to date. One could rightly conclude from what has been written thus far, that the
eschatological paradigm could/would appropriately be articulated on the micro/area rule
level in any subsequent systematic treatment of Christian ethics. Ogletree’s style and
focus in both theology and ethics have predominantly been toward the theoretical, dealing
with broad sweeping issues, principles, fundamentals, and methodology, rather than
focusing on specific themes or areas of moral concern. This can be observed throughout
his projects through the years. The reality, then, is that specificity and concrete
application in his writings are usually remote and peripheral. This is true with regards to
application of the eschatological paradigm to moral theory as well.
'Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 205, 12.
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Paradigm Role and Function
While the term “paradigm”1 is used only occasionally in Ogletree’s projects, it is
nevertheless an integral part o f his moral theory particularly as it relates to an interpretive
framework for elucidating the meaning of Scripture for Christian ethics or issues o f
theology and methodology. The reality of paradigm, whether explicit or implicit in his
thought, factors largely in his overall hermeneutic. While he has not stated it as such, his
proposed correlation of moral philosophy, phenomenology, and historical contextualism,
as a structure with which to come to an understanding o f ethics in the Bible, is viewed by
others as providing “a paradigm that Ogletree believes will help elucidate the Biblical
data.”2 This observation is affirmed by how his proposed structure is implicitly used
throughout his companion volumes on eschatology and Christian moral theory. Likewise,
while not calling it such, the orientation which he perceives the already/not yet dialectical
o f New Testament eschatology as bringing to Christian moral thought is also viewed and
applied paradigmatically.3 This can be extended to his use of eschatology as a whole,
which he posits as providing an “horizon of moral understanding” which orients and
motivates personal and communal moral life. More specifically, Ogletree refers to
'While this study uses the concept of paradigm in conjunction with eschatology,
paradigm is used more broadly and generally by both Mott and Ogletree. For the
purposes o f clarification, the term “eschatological paradigm” is used where this study is
focusing principally on their application of eschatology, and “paradigm” where it is
discussing paradigm generally in order to understand how eschatology as paradigm
correspondingly would be viewed or applied.
2Giannini, 73.
3Scroggs, review of The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, by Thomas W.
Ogletree, 45; Burtness, 240.
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paradigm in the context o f the meaning of reality which the Christ event brings1and the
moral understandings of specific biblical materials.2 Finally, Ogletree refers to the
“coming realm of God” as a primal image which elicits an encompassing image for the
moral ordering o f values and a pattern of life for personal and communal existence.3
The purpose here is to determine the role and function o f the eschatological
paradigm in Ogletree’s moral theory. Is it primarily that o f facilitating an abstract basic
principle which needs to be translated and applied toward new situations? Or does it
facilitate the imprinting of an inner gripping image which shapes people ethically? Is it
primarily conceptual or motivational? It is both! But Ogletree’s primary orientation is
toward the inner gripping image which motivates and shapes people ethically.
According to Ogletree, paradigmatic roles or paradigmatic happenings provide “a
controlling interpretive role in man’s understanding o f himself and his world.”4 “We find
ourselves claimed by the reality disclosed in a certain set o f happenings . . . before we
have begun to grasp all that it means or implies.”5 The role of reason is to unfold the
'Ogletree, “A Christological Assessment o f Dipolar Theism,” 92-97; idem, “The
Gospel as Power,” 178,184, 196; idem, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 195.
2Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 67.
3Ogletree, “Christian Social Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 212.
4OgIetree, “A Christological Assessment o f Dipolar Theism,” 92.
5Ibid., 93. This discussion of the role and function o f paradigm in Ogletree’s
thinking refers to “paradigmatic happenings” or “paradigmatic events.” These are his
conceptions. While they differ from the use of paradigm presented thus far in this study,
including his view o f the eschatological paradigm, they nevertheless provide insight into
the role and function o f paradigm in Ogletree’s thinking as a whole.
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basic understanding o f reality expressed in a paradigmatic happening.1 Furthermore, the
very logic o f paradigmatic happening pushes us toward universality.2 And, “if a
happening is genuinely paradigmatic, constituting the decisive point of reference for
interpreting the totality of experience, the reality it discloses in some sense encompasses
the reality o f all things.”3 Referring to the model of self-giving presented in the death and
resurrection o f Jesus, Ogletree states that “a single set o f paradigmatic events discloses
both the indicative and the imperative of the gospel.”4 In other words, paradigm brings
both a sense o f identity and moral urgency. In the context of a discussion of value
orientations, he refers to the eschatological import o f the complex o f events associated
with Jesus as the decisive paradigm for theological understanding.5 In other words,
paradigm brings value orientation. The moral ordering of values for a pattern o f personal
and communal life is likewise in view with the encompassing vision which the primal
image o f the coming realm o f God brings.6
This focus toward a broad moral orientation, rather than specific moral principles,
can be seen in Ogletree’s overall use o f the eschatological paradigm in moral theory.
Eschatology is seen as providing horizonal meaning which qualifies and informs the
'Ibid.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., 95.
4Ogletree. The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 195.
5Ogletree, “The Gospel as Power,” 184-196.
6Ogletree, “Christian Social Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 212.
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manner in which moral notions present themselves to our consciousness, rather than
generating specific moral notions.1 The already/not yet dialectical presents the structure
o f eschatological existence and Christian moral reflection.2

Summary
This survey of Ogletree’s application o f the eschatological paradigm’s ethical
implications has included two important perspectives: (1) the theoretical level of moral
reflection which the paradigm appears to elicit in Ogletree’s thinking; and (2) the
meaning and function of paradigm in Ogletree’s moral theory. It has determined that, for
Ogletree, the eschatological paradigm facilitates moral reflection primarily across the
spectrum o f macro and meso paradigm operation. While the micro/area rules level of
paradigm application is the least observable and on the periphery, nevertheless, it is
within Ogletree’s view o f thought, and could/would appropriately be articulated in any
subsequent systematic treatment o f Christian ethics. Specificity and concrete application
are usually remote and peripheral in his projects. With respect to paradigm role and
function, Ogletree’s focus in the use o f the eschatological paradigm in moral theory is
toward broad moral orientation, rather than specific moral principles. This is in keeping
with the overall horizonal sphere o f reflection towards which he draws us and with which
he is concerned in his writings.
‘Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 177.
2Ibid., 179,181.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

269
Chapter Summary
The import o f eschatology in Ogletree’s moral theory can be seen in the
prominence it is given in his writings. Like Mott, his understanding of eschatology fits
the general contours o f the eschatological paradigm that this study has outlined. While he
works within the general contours o f the eschatological paradigm, however, he clearly
nuances the already/not yet component over that o f the reign o f God and the horizon o f
the future. The already/not yet becomes his leitmotif for nuancing the moral implications
of the eschatological paradigm. These hermeneutical nuances include (1) providing the
creative context for a focused future orientation in ethical methodology; (2) furnishing a
meaning horizon for Christian moral consciousness that encompasses the temporal
horizon o f human experience; (3) enabling a “fusion o f horizons” between biblical worlds
of meaning and those which make up our sense o f reality; and (4) elucidating the essential
“dialectical nature” of Christian moral theory. Ogletree’s ethical method expresses a
consistently future movement in keeping with the broad contours o f theologies of the
future.
Unlike Mott, the categories o f moral philosophy factor largely in Ogletree’s
eschatological-oriented moral theory. By viewing and nuancing moral philosophy via the
concerns o f European phenomenology, and setting this synthesis within the temporal
structure o f human experience, Ogletree finds a promising resource o f preunderstandings
with which to engage the biblical materials in a discourse about the moral life. Because
eschatology is both central to these biblical materials and provides a larger horizon o f
moral understanding which takes seriously the temporal horizon o f human experience and
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the question o f the meaning of being (according to his preunderstandings o f moral life), it
facilitates an overall correlation of ideation towards contemporary Christian moral theory.
Ogletree’s work as a whole is guided by a hermeneutic based on phenomenological
investigations. It is a hermeneutic governed by a life-world perspective. In his view, this
life-world perspective brings a level of concreteness to the otherwise abstract and often
remote critical biblical scholarship and philosophical ethics.1
While the “primacy of Scripture” is a firmly established principle in Ogletree’s
thinking, his view o f the nature of Scripture largely follows that of existential/encounter
theology. In addition, the practical role Scripture actually assumes in his methodology
reflects the “primacy” of philosophical categories of thinking and the existential questions
of our contemporary life world. He does not clearly underscore the point that our
“preunderstandings” must never be permitted to control our reading of Scripture. Nor
does his methodology indicate clearly how they can be kept from doing so. While the
ingredients o f the dialogical process of interpretation are similar for Ogletree and Mott
(Scripture, reason, tradition, and experience), the community plays a significantly more
aggressive and determinative role for Ogletree than with Mott. Scripture functions
'Ogletree’s interest in phenomenology is as a useful tool to assist his efforts to
read Scripture faithfully. Phenomenology facilitates his attempts to read Scripture in a
manner that equips him to appropriate its truth in the context of the contemporary world.
This includes giving an account of truth in a form that engages the best critical thinking
of our age. Phenomenology is seen as important for two reasons. First, “it helps us
display the essential abstractness of the empirical sciences so that we can more precisely
specify the limits o f empirical scientific study.” Second, it “helps recast the central
notions o f modem philosophical ethics so that the preoccupation with language and logic
that characterizes those notions can be corrected by a richer account o f concrete
experience.” See Ogletree to Lichtenwalter, September 26, 1996,2; idem, Hospitality to
the Stranger. 97-126.
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primarily in a “mentoring” role in relation to the believing community.
Nevertheless Scripture’s influence in perceiving and nuancing the eschatological
paradigm can be seen in: (1) how eschatology is articulated as fundamentally central to
the biblical materials and witness; (2) how eschatology provides the one unique and
determinate scriptural contribution to the equation o f conceptual categories in the
dialogue between biblical worlds o f meaning and our own sense o f reality; and (3) how
eschatology elucidates the larger-meaning context o f biblical moral thought by providing
a horizon o f meaning which profoundly qualifies and substantially informs the manner in
which moral notions present themselves to consciousness. On the other hand, there are
indications that his application o f the eschatological paradigm influences both his
interpretation and application o f Scripture.
Unlike Mott, who finds authority in the concrete meaning of the biblical text in
themselves, Ogletree finds the enduring value of Scripture in its surplus of meaning
which is a broad, generalizing, horizonal meaning, rather than specific moral notions or
concrete moral content. It should be noted, though, that in his view, this “surplus of
meaning” in the biblical text does not express a movement to a higher level of generality
beyond the concreteness o f the text.' His own application of the meaning of the text is
viewed as “quite specific in its own way.”2 While specific in its own way, however, it
remains more toward the macro level than either of the other levels of critical reflection.
Ogletree stresses the essential ecclesial nature of eschatological ethics. The role
'Ogletree to Lichtenwalter, September 26,1996,2.
2Ibid.
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which the believing community assumes in his application o f the eschatological paradigm
is a leading one, providing the context in which the “preunderstandings o f moral life” are
to be viewed in relation to the biblical materials and the reality o f the already/not yet.
The believing community is a vital, interpretive, almost complementary source o f moral
authority in relation to Scripture. As an alternative community (as with Mott), the
believing community is also the fundamental field of moral operation for expressing the
ethic o f dialectical eschatology. It relates indirectly to the wider social world, however,
by extension and by analogy from its own moral reflection. While Mott would support
this extension by analogy, he is more aggressive and direct than Ogletree with respect to
the role o f community as a change agent in relation to the needs o f the wider social world.
For Ogletree, the nature o f social involvement is fundamentally linked with the nature
and experience of eschatological communities. The radicalism and creativity of New
Testament social thought are focused primarily through the internal dynamics of the
believing community. Social witness and involvement need to be a piece with their
spirituality, faith, and internal fellowship.
Like Mott, Ogletree is a theorist who works primarily on the levels of theological
bases and underlying principles. However, he tends more towards the former than the
latter, and is more philosophical and generalizing in his perspective. His style and focus
in both theology and ethics have predominantly been toward the theoretical, dealing with
broad sweeping issues, principles, fundamentals, and methodology, rather than focusing
on specific themes or concrete areas of moral concern. Specificity and concrete
application in his writings are usually remote and peripheral. This is true, as well, with
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regard to his application of the eschatological paradigm and its implications for moral
theory. In keeping with this broad horizonal perspective on which he tends to work, the
function and role o f paradigm for Ogletree are toward broad moral orientation, rather than
specific moral principles, or more concrete area rules.1
Ogletree’s use o f the eschatological paradigm in moral theory is consistent with
his overall methodology and hermeneutic, his use o f paradigm in particular, and his view
of ecclesiology and the nature o f Scripture. Eschatology is a significant and determinate
ingredient in his hermeneutic.
'It should be noted, however, that while Ogletree’s application o f the
eschatological paradigm is predominantly on the macro level of critical reflection, his
attempt to epitomize biblical eschatology is sincerely intended to be specific in its own
way. Obviously, there can be differing levels o f concreteness or specificity. There can be
concreteness and specificity on the macro level as well as the level of area rules and
underlying principles. To be able to effect a hermeneutical bridge or a fusion o f horizons
between the biblical world of meanings and that o f our contemporary life world in itself
could be viewed as a concrete application of the eschatological paradigm, albeit still quite
abstract. Ogletree’s phenomenology based hermeneutic is an attempt toward
contemporary relevancy in light of the abstract nature of philosophical ethics in general.
See Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger. 97-126.
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CHAPTER 5

EVALUATION, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS

Chapter Orientation
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore and evaluate the implications o f the
methodological application of eschatology as paradigm for developing contemporary
Christian moral theory. It focuses on the interplay of eschatology as a methodological
tool and the ethical system that results from it. More specifically, it seeks to demonstrate
that “this is what happens if you take the eschatological paradigm and apply it this way or
that way.” Mott and Ogletree were chosen as case studies for this endeavor because they
clearly belong to the eschatological movement in contemporary Christian ethics. Having
described and analyzed their use o f eschatology in moral theory,1 this chapter evaluates
and compares the impact that the eschatological paradigm has on their respective projects.
In doing so, we are brought closer to answering the questions that have initiated this
study— “Why does the eschatological paradigm function so differently among Christian
ethicists and theologians? Does it still hold promise as the starting point for a
‘Both Mott’s and Ogletree’s own assessment of this study’s outline and analysis
of their respective use o f eschatology in moral theory have been positive and affirming as
to its overall fairness and accuracy o f description, as well as its being insightful and a
discerning interpretation o f their methodology, meaning, and purposes (Mott to
Lichtenwalter, April 20,1996; Ogletree to Lichtenwalter, September 26, 1996).
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comprehensive approach to moral theory?”
This chapter’s evaluation and comparison o f Mott’s and Ogletree’s use o f
eschatology in moral theory include their similarities and differences with respect to (1)
their perceiving and nuancing the eschatological paradigm and its components, (2) the
role which the principles of verification play for them in relation to the eschatological
paradigm, and (3) the level o f moral reflection and role that paradigm plays in their moral
theory. This chapter also proposes what appears to be the strengths and contributions of
their respective methodology in using eschatology in moral theory. This process enables
us to ascertain how and why the eschatological paradigm can function differently. It
enables us to appraise the problems and issues regarding the use of eschatology in
Christian moral theory. It also enables us to propose the implications that exist for
credibly using the eschatological paradigm in Christian moral theory. Mott’s and
Ogletree’s similarities, differences, strengths, and weaknesses in each o f the areas
outlined above are evaluated together in a flowing discussion rather than being
considered separately.
Before proceeding, however, it is important to orient ourselves by way o f review
o f the context in which Mott and Ogletree are being evaluated and compared. As
participants in the developing tradition o f the eschatological movement in Christian
ethics, they represent the latter, contemporary phase of twentieth-century re-interpreted
eschatology and its application toward moral theory.
Following a checkered history o f the eschatology/ethics relationship throughout
Christian history— one which has often exhibited an “eschatology sans ethics” or an
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“ethics sans eschatology” rather than the vivid biblical eschatology with its corresponding
moral consciousness— the twentieth century has produced a radical renewed interest both
in eschatology and the eschatology/ethics dialogue. Various shades of ethical-oriented
eschatologies and eschatological-oriented ethics have been generated in the course of this
renewed interest in eschatology.1 But the relationship between eschatology and ethics
essentially remained problematic through the first half o f the twentieth century. While
solutions to the tensions and problems were emerging, no final clarification o f their
relationship could be given even by the 1970s. Yet, by the 1970s, a twofold pattern had
emerged. First, eschatology was becoming increasingly recognized for its potential as a
paradigm for Christian ethics. Second, eschatology was being viewed/articulated
primarily through three significant models, i.e., the already/not yet, reign o f God, and the
horizon o f the future. These three models were seen as elucidating the eschatological
paradigm in relation to its biblical primary model, the Kingdom of God. This study has
suggested that these models are like a three-stranded cord forming the components parts
o f a commonly accepted comprehensive eschatological paradigm for Christian ethics.
They are the key theological images which the Kingdom o f God together with its various
supporting models projects within the eschatological paradigm.2
But while a commonly accepted comprehensive eschatological paradigm had both
emerged and crystallized through the 1970s, no final clarification of the relationship of
eschatology and Christian ethics could yet be given. The eschatology/ethics question was
'See above, 33-54.
2See above, 70-78.
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still problematic in the actual application o f the paradigm toward moral theory. Each of
the paradigm’s components generates forceful and specific ethical nuances which are rich
for application toward moral theory. However, determining how these moral nuances are
actually elicited or have themselves been cast with respect to moral theory remains a
challenge. This has become evident when viewed against my designated principles of
verification and the varied ways we have seen that ethicists have perceived them in
relation to the divergent moral nuances projected through the paradigm. The possible
combinations of implications for moral theory are both numerous and complex.1
Furthermore, adequately applying eschatology as paradigm toward moral theory
demands an understanding o f the subtle dynamics of paradigm in relation to its
supporting models, as well as principles and rules. In addition, there are the varied levels
in both the structure of moral thought (bases, principles, area rules) and paradigm
operation (macro, meso, and micro). Together, these several issues press questions of
consistency and concreteness o f application toward moral theory.2 Because of these
numerous and complex interrelated issues and problems, eschatology has remained, for
many, one of those “slippery words” with a “multiplicity o f meanings” which at best is
“ambiguous and makes for looseness of expression and thought.”3 The need has been
recognized for further refinement and development. Clearer principles need to be
outlined with respect to carefulness in the paradigm’s use and consistency of application.
'See above, 79-114.
2See above 114-121.
3Marshall, 264-269.
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This study has suggested that this need for further refinement and development
does not lay in the paradigm per se, but rather in its application for moral theory. How
the application o f the eschatological paradigm toward moral theory facilitates and is
facilitated by the role o f Scripture, the role of community, and the nature of social
involvement remains open for clarification and resolution.
And so I turn to Mott and Ogletree. As ethicists working in the latter,
contemporary phase o f twentieth-century re-interpreted eschatology, they vividly express
the impact that the application of the paradigm is having in contemporary Christian moral
theory and ethical method. They open windows toward working one’s way through the
complex and often subtle nuances expressed between the paradigm’s components in
relation to my stated principles of verification and level o f moral reflection. In addition,
Mott and Ogletree highlight the obvious important role that Scripture has come to play as
ethicists make the important transition from formulating the eschatological paradigm
itself to that o f its actual application for moral theory.
As stated earlier, this study looks developmentally up through the 1970s for the
basic crystallized eschatological paradigm. It looks to the 1980s and 1990s for clearer
methodological application o f the paradigm for moral theory by ethicists. It assumes that
Mott and Ogletree are consciously extending a discussion they consider incomplete and
unfinished with respect to the use of eschatology in Christian moral theory.
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Evaluation of Mott’s and Ogletree’s Use
of Eschatology in Moral Theory
Perceiving and Nuancing the Paradigm
We have seen how both Mott’s and Ogletree’s understanding o f eschatology fit
the general contours o f the eschatological paradigm outlined in this study. We have also
seen that, while the paradigm and each of its components (already/not yet, reign o f God,
horizon o f the future) are evident in their thinking, they clearly nuance the paradigm
differently. Mott chooses the reign o f God as his leitmotif for nuancing eschatology
toward moral theory. For Ogletree, it is the already/not yet. These respective choices
reflect not only the direction o f their interests in moral theory, but how they read the
eschatological paradigm in relation to moral theory and ethical method.
For Mott, the reign o f God provides a context for God’s universal ethical
concerns. It furnishes a concept of history into which other New Testament themes can
be placed. More specifically, the reign o f God elucidates for him the centrality o f biblical
justice as an attribute of God and a major mandate of Scripture, and, in doing so,
incorporates the imperative for social responsibility into God’s goals in history. For
Ogletree, the already/not yet provides the creative context for a focused future orientation
in ethical methodology. It furnishes a “meaning horizon” for Christian moral
consciousness that encompasses the temporal horizon o f human experience. More
specifically, it enables a “fusion of horizons” between biblical worlds o f meaning and
those which make up our sense of reality. Finally, the already/not yet elucidates the
essential “dialectical nature” o f Christian moral theory and methodology.
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Both Mott and Ogletree have issues of universality and integration in view with
respect to moral principles and ethical themes in relation to the biblical witness and
history. And they both perceive eschatology as providing a larger-meaning context for
placing the important issues in moral theory and for facilitating ethical method. Their
differences lay in the fact that universality for Mott has to do with concrete biblical moral
concerns, while, for Ogletree, universality has more to do with generalized “worlds o f
meaning” or “meaning horizons.” Likewise, integration for Mott has to do with specific
biblical themes within the larger biblical moral witness and God’s purposes in history.
For Ogletree, however, integration is viewed in terms of “fusion o f horizons” between
biblical worlds of meaning and our own.
Additionally, Ogletree’s interests are largely methodological. Because of this, the
already/not yet becomes important as his leitmotif. He rightly affirms the already/not yet
as elucidating the essential “dialogical nature” of Christian moral theory and
methodology. This leitmotif, however, is nuanced to facilitate his affinity with theologies
o f the future.1 Mott’s interests, on the other hand, are toward specific biblical themes and
issues that he deems apropos for contemporary Christian ethics. These include biblical
justice and the imperative o f social involvement. By interpreting the reign o f God
primarily through the category o f biblical justice, Mott facilitates his interest in the social
justice dialogue. This rather tight focusing of his moral theory around one integrating
theme tends to homogenize the biblical materials and narrow the scope of influence that
'By doing so, Ogletree essentially undermines the very balance which he intends
to bring to Christian moral theory. He also opens the way toward speculative nuancing of
the eschatological paradigm.
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the reign of God could have toward other issues in Christian moral theory.
Finally, eschatology for Ogletree brings an openness toward moral creativity and
imagination elicited by the presence o f the new age. There is an open horizon which
enables ever new forms of concrete historical expression o f our ultimate hope.
Eschatology for Mott is integrally linked with God and the reality of His righteous reign
both in history and in contemporary Christian life. It focuses moral imagination toward
specific biblically defined moral imagery.
These divergences do not necessarily suggest radical disagreement between Mott
and Ogletree about the use o f eschatology in moral theory. Nor do they imply that the
biblical witness is unimportant to Ogletree or that Mott is not as interested in
methodology. Surely Mott’s project reflects an understanding o f the “dialectical nature”
o f Christian moral theory and methodology, and Ogletree provides some examples of
how moral imagination can be stimulated by specific biblically defined imagery. Rather,
these divergences reflect the direction of their interests in moral theory. They also reflect
how they read the eschatological paradigm in relation to moral theory and ethical method.
Mott’s interests lay in the movement from the concrete principles and themes of biblical
ethics toward the imperative for contemporary social change. Ogletree’s interests lay in
methodological structure that facilitates the use o f Scripture in Christian ethics. Mott is
primarily oriented to the nurture o f believing communities that share, somewhat
uncritically, common traditions o f faith and practice. Ogletree is not so directly pastoral.
In his scholarly writings, he critically distances himself provisionally from the pastoral
calling in order to engage the best thinking of the age, to the degree that such engagement
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is possible.1 Generally speaking, then, Mott reads the eschatological paradigm within
more biblically defined parameters, while Ogletree correlates it with broader
methodological issues of moral theory in general.
In keeping with the direction of these observations, it would be well to insert here
this study’s discussion of Mott’s and Ogletree’s correlation of the eschatological
paradigm to philosophical ethics. Mott, we have learned, appears generally unconcerned
with directly relating either his moral theory or the eschatological paradigm to the
categories or concerns of philosophical ethics. Rather, his interests lie squarely in the
area o f social ethics. The categories of thought he uses are primarily biblical categories.
He does, however, consciously apply modem economic, sociological, and political
categories o f thinking to the materials of the Bible in order to suggest new possibilities of
meaning and to provide a means of assessing the applicability of the results of exegesis to
the formal components o f social ethics.
Unlike Mott, the categories of moral philosophy factor largely in Ogletree’s
perceptions, interests, and methodology. Ogletree, we have learned, comes to the
question o f eschatology and ethics from the direction of phenomenology and moral
philosophy. By viewing and nuancing moral philosophy via the concerns of
phenomenology, and setting this synthesis within the temporal structure of human
experience, Ogletree finds a promising resource o f preunderstandings with which to
engage the biblical materials in a discourse about the moral life. Since eschatology is
both central to these biblical materials and provides a larger horizon of moral
'Ogletree to Lichtenwalter, September 26, 1996, 3.
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understanding in keeping with the temporal structure o f human experience which
phenomenology and moral philosophy delineate, it plays an important hermeneutical role
in bringing an overall correlation of ideation towards contemporary Christian moral
theory.1
The question might be rightly asked, though, “Are they not really doing the same
thing, only differently?” In other words, “Is Mott’s application o f modem economic,
sociological, and political categories of thinking to the biblical materials in order to
suggest new possibilities o f meaning and provide a means o f assessing the applicability of
the results of exegesis really any different from Ogletree’s readiness to see analogies with
classical moral theories in the Bible or his attempts to use moral philosophy and
phenomenology to engage the biblical materials in a discourse about the moral life?”
Viewed broadly, there may not appear to be any substantive difference. In fact, for some,
social, economic, and political categories o f thinking could be viewed broadly as being
concerns accessory to moral philosophy.
The difference, however, lay in the fact that, in principle,2 the contemporary
categories Mott facilitates in his project reflect concrete areas o f life application which
the biblical materials point toward and which exegesis outlines. There is movement from
the biblical record towards the concrete areas of life application which Scripture is
addressing. The categories Mott selects bring contemporary clarity to the issues and
‘See above, 216-227.
2I say “in principle” because it is possible to use these “areas o f application
categories” as “methodological structures” which could in fact restrict or misrepresent the
real meaning o f the biblical materials.
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principles which Scripture elicits with respect to these concrete areas of moral life.
Ogletree’s preunderstandings of the moral life, on the other hand, present
structures of thought which lay outside the apparent purview o f the biblical materials.
Rather than concrete areas o f life application they are an interpretive framework used to
engage the Bible in a discourse about the moral life. In doing so, they essentially bring
the biblical materials toward philosophical perceptions o f reality and moral life rather
than bringing philosophical perceptions of reality and moral life toward the biblical
materials. The biblical materials are interpreted via these philosophical
preunderstandings o f moral life, hence the philosophical preunderstandings have implicit
controlling qualities in the dialogue. This will be discussed again in more detail below.
For now, however, it needs to be noted that Ogletree’s work as a whole is guided by a
hermeneutic based on phenomenological investigations. It is a hermeneutic governed by
a life-world perspective. It differs fundamentally, then, from Mott’s, whose starting point
is biblical imagery, theology, and exegesis. Moral philosophy in reality assumes a more
controlling role in Ogletree’s interpretive task than what he may be consciously
attempting to effect. Again, these divergences reflect directions, interests, and
methodology with respect to application o f the eschatological paradigm in moral theory.
While their differences may appear subtle, the implications for answering the questions o f
this study are significant.1
'Referring to Mott’s rather topical approach to the use of Scripture in Christian
ethics, Verhey writes, “He is profoundly attentive to Scripture as a source of a genuinely
Christian posture in society, and in attending to it he is careful to do justice to the
sociological, historical, and literary contexts o f the biblical materials. His brief but
candid attention to methodological questions concerning the use of Scripture in ethics
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Principles of Verification
This study has proposed that by comparing and evaluating Mott’s and Ogletree’s
use of the eschatological paradigm in relation to our stated principles of verification, we
can get a sense for how effectively the eschatological paradigm answers the long-standing
crisis of “authority” and “relevance” in Christian ethics during this century.1 We can also
observe whether or how the eschatological paradigm influences or is influenced by
presuppositions regarding these significant issues (principles of verification) within
contemporary Christian moral dialogue. In addition, we are able to answer questions of
foundations and presuppositions. In other words, is their use of the eschatological
paradigm rooted in philosophy, philosophical ethics, social moral agenda, biblical
theology, the community (tradition), or some hybrid of these?

Role of Scripture
Both Mott and Ogletree are very deliberate in explaining their approach to
Scripture. Together they share a fourfold methodology in keeping with their Wesleyan
and Methodist tradition, i.e., the dialogical interplay of Scripture, reason, Christian
tradition, and experience. Together they understand that Christian ethics is not
synonymous with biblical ethics, nor is Scripture alone sufficient for Christian ethics.
They share the common goal o f building a responsible bridge between the biblical
materials and contemporary Christian moral theory. And they both steadfastly affirm the
provides an important protection against possible rationalization in using it for this
purpose” (Verhey, 25).
'See above, 19-20.
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“primacy o f Scripture” in relation to the other constituent features of their methodology!
There is divergence, however, in the way they view the nature of Scripture and the
functional role it should have in relation to the other aspects of their methodology.
M ott’s methodology reflects a fundamental commitment to the primacy and
ultimate authority of Scripture.1 Practically, this means that the text itself is the revelation
o f God and that the authority of the Scriptures lies within the intentionality of the given
passage. Scripture is the ultimate authority on the issues that it addresses as well as the
crucial nature o f those issues. Mott shows respect for the plenary inspiration of the
biblical text, and he demonstrates thoughtful exegesis. He also affirms the essential
theological and ethical unity o f the Bible, and assumes that its primary orientation is
historical.
Ogletree rightly notes that divergence with respect to the role of Scripture in
ethical method is usually not over the issue of the “primacy o f Scripture” per se, but “over
the way Scripture is actually received and interpreted.”2 Obviously, one can always assert
the “primacy o f Scripture.” How one actually receives and interprets Scripture, however,
determines the issue of primacy by default. Interestingly, this is what we find with
'Curry notes Mott’s explicit commitment to the primacy of Scripture, "One cannot
but be struck by now consistently the author dares to deal with the primacy of the biblical
text. This work presents the reader with an unmistakable integrity, both in its treatment
o f the scriptural text and in its fair presentation of the various issues illuminated by the
text” (Michael S. Curry, “The Partiality of Justice,” Sojourners 13, no. 3 [March 1984]:
36). See also F. Burton Nelson, review of Biblical Ethics and Social Change, by Stephen
Charles Mott, TSF Bulletin 7, no. 2 (November-December 1983): 24; Hays, 25.
2Ogletree, “In Quest o f a Common Faith: The Theological Task of the United
Methodists,” 48.
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Ogletree. While asserting the “primacy o f Scripture,” Ogletree formulates a way of
receiving and interpreting the biblical materials that functionally undercuts that very
assertion.1 Moral philosophy, phenomenology, and historical-critical method blend
together towards a view of the nature of Scripture that largely follows that of existential
and encounter theology. In the process, Ogletree does not clearly underscore the point
that our “preunderstandings” must never be permitted to control our reading of Scripture.
Nor does his methodology indicate clearly how they can be kept from doing so.
Furthermore, the uniquely authoritative role o f Scripture is found in a horizon of
understanding within which diverse peoples can identify themselves, rather than in
revealing timeless truths or proposing unchanging ethical principles.
The implications of their respective presuppositions regarding the nature and
authority o f Scripture find forceful expression in their use of the eschatological paradigm
in relation to the biblical materials. Mott’s application of the eschatological paradigm,
for the most part, uses Scripture in a way in which the biblical materials maintain an
authoritative, assertive role in the process o f application. The primacy and ultimate
authority o f Scripture can be viewed through his reign o f God leitmotif in such issues as
the theological/ethical unity o f Old and New Testament Scripture, the authoritative
meaning and content of the biblical text and of the words themselves, as well as the
theological affirmations of Scripture, acts o f God, and prevailing ethical principles.
Ogletree’s application of the eschatological paradigm in relation to Scripture is
‘Edward Vacek, review of The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics, by Thomas
W. Ogletree, Theological Studies 45 (December 1984): 753.
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more subtle and complex. On the one hand, eschatology is understood as expressing the
essential meaning o f the biblical witness. It is viewed as the unique contribution of
Scripture to the equation of conceptual categories in his ethical method. And it provides
the biblical horizon o f meaning, which profoundly qualifies and substantially informs the
manner in which moral notions present themselves to consciousness. Here the
eschatological paradigm clearly expresses considerable Scriptural influence.
Furthermore, Ogletree’s already/not yet leitmotif rightly draws upon biblical exegesis and
theology.
On the other hand, Ogletree’s presuppositions regarding Scripture appear to color
his use o f the eschatological paradigm accordingly: (1) because the fundamental meaning
o f Scripture is understood as historical and existential,1the important categories for
nuancing the meaning of the eschatological paradigm are, likewise, historical and
existential (i.e., temporal horizon o f human experience, and the meaning of being);2 (2)
because historical-critical methodology is embraced as providing appropriate tools for
opening up the fundamental meaning of Scripture,3 the eschatological paradigm, likewise,
becomes explicated within the purview o f the presuppositions of this methodology; (3)
because the enduring value of Scripture is found in the surplus of meaning beyond what is
uttered in the biblical texts,4 and which is in need of higher levels of generality in order to
'Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 1, 10.
2Ibid., 192, 193.
3Ibid., xi, 7.
“Ibid., 2.
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find common ground with contemporary society,1the value of the eschatological
paradigm, likewise, is found in broad, generalizing horizonal meanings rather than in
generating specifically moral notions.2

Role of Community
As outlined in chapter 2, the role which the Christian community assumes in
eschatological ethics has revolved around three fundamental issues: (1) as a source of
moral authority; (2) the field of moral operation; and (3) its linkage with the ethical
needs/agenda o f the larger human society. As we have seen, the role of community in
Mott’s and Ogletree’s application of the eschatological paradigm in these three areas is
for the most part clear and deliberate.
For Mott, the Christian community constitutes primarily a subordinate, yet vital,
source of moral authority in relation to that of Scripture. The believing community holds
an obvious important and vital role in the interpretation and application process in
relation to Scripture, but the primacy and ultimate authority of Scripture is an unbending
given. Mott also presents the believing community as the primary, purposeful, and
distinct new society which gives unique, empirical visibility to the reign o f God. It is a
concrete social context that is set apart from society as a kind of “counter society.” It is
the paradigmatic field o f moral operation for the reign o f God. Additionally, the
believing community is viewed as the primary social structure through which the gospel
'Ibid., 3,12.
2Ibid., 177.
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works to change other structures within the larger society. Since the demonstration of
Christian community is only one facet o f social change, it is inadequate as an expression
of social justice toward the world. Faithfulness to the demands for justice necessitates,
then, social programs and social struggle.
For Ogletree, the believing community is a vital interpretive, almost
complementary, source of authority in relation to Scripture. The dialogical process of
interpretation—where Scripture, tradition, reason, and experience interact reciprocally so
that each is illumined by the other— is to take place within what Ogletree terms “an
ecclesial context.” 1 In particular, successful dialogue between ethics and Scripture is
viewed as requiring an ecclesial premise. This “ecclesial context” is no less than the
“eschatological community.” According to Ogletree, the “way into Christian critique of
ethos . . . is through eschatology,” and “a distinctive Christian ethics has its social
location in eschatological community.”2 In other words, it is difficult to practice
Christian ethics while being immersed in non-Christian communities. And in particular,
only eschatologically oriented communities can foster a genuine fusion of horizons with
the eschatological perspective o f the biblical era. The church, then, is a practical
necessity if the methodological question o f eschatology is to be properly dealt with in the
dialogue on Scripture and ethics.3 If fusion of horizons between the biblical world and
the modem world is to occur, there must be faith communities in the present who are
'Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context of Christian Ethics,” 2.
2Ibid., 12, 13.
3Himes, 67.
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engaged in an eschatological praxis of gospel living.1 The eschatological paradigm is
viewed as creating the context for eschatological community to both understand and use
biblical materials in its (eschatological community) moral reflection. Because the biblical
materials participate formatively in constructing ethical theory that is intentionally only
provisionally held by the believing community, and because ongoing dialogue may alter it
further,2 Scripture essentially functions in a “mentoring” role in relation to the believing
community. Furthermore, Scripture provides horizonal meaning more than concrete
content. It is the believing community, then, which extends this horizonal meaning
toward contemporary ethical exigencies in determining the possibilities of concrete
explication. Accordingly, the unity of the Bible is seen as residing more in the unfolding
identity o f a people, and a church arising in relation to that people, than in particular
themes or beliefs.
Because Ogletree views Christian existence as essentially ecclesial existence
(eschatological existence), the believing community furnishes the fundamental social
location that defines Christian participation in the life of the world. The primary task is
building up and sustaining eschatological communities. Eschatological ethics, then, is
expressly directed toward the eschatological community. Accordingly, the Christian
community relates to the ethical needs of the larger human society in a way that is
‘This contention o f Ogletree’s shares some features of liberation theologies that
stress that the locus o f theologizing is the experience of basic Christian communities who
self-consciously understand themselves to be critics of and alternatives to political and
economic systems deemed oppressive (ibid.).
2Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 200-203.
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indirect. It relates to the larger world by extension and by analogy from its own moral
reflection and experience.1
The functional role which Scripture assumes in Mott’s and Ogletree’s
eschatologically informed thinking thus finds some interesting parallels in their respective
perceptions o f the role o f community. While they both affirm the important role o f
community in the dialogical process of ethical method, Mott is unbending in the primacy
and the ultimate authority o f Scripture over that o f the community. Ogletree, however,
places the believing community in a role that essentially qualifies the primacy and
authority o f Scripture in favor o f the reflective community and its eschatological praxis of
gospel living. Ogletree rightly argues for an “ecclesial context” for interpreting Scripture
and doing Christian ethics. He correctly outlines this “ecclesial context” as being
essentially one o f “eschatological community.” He is right, too, in affirming that the
eschatological praxis o f gospel living provides points o f contact for comprehending what
the biblical texts are saying. In other words, only eschatologically oriented communities
can really foster a fusion o f horizons between the biblical world and our modem world.
'But where are such communities of faith? It is unclear which community and/or
tradition Ogletree, or Mott for that matter, has in mind here (Larry Rasmussen, “Bible and
Ethics: A Creative Moment,” review The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics, by Thomas
W. Ogletree, Christianity and Crisis: A Christian Journal o f Opinion 44 (March 19,
1984): 94; Jones, 192). Neither of their ecclesiologies has been developed with sufficient
clarity or precision for it to be clear what historically located community they are
describing as church and how this community does or should relate to the world. While
standing in a common Wesleyan/Methodist tradition, Mott and Ogletree both articulate
the eschatology/ethics question in non-sectarian ways towards the larger theological
ethical dialogue taking place in the Christian community as a whole. While they both
write within the context of an evangelical perspective, Ogletree’s position is more that of
“ecumenical” Protestant perspective (Ogletree, “Renewing Ecumenical Protestant Social
Teaching”; idem, “In Quest of Multi-Cultural Theological Education”).
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However, Ogletree could affirm these important hermeneutical points in a way that better
keeps the primacy and ultimate authority of Scripture fully in view, both in theory and
function.
The relation between Scripture and community in Mott’s and Ogletree’s use of
eschatology in moral theory suggests that a correspondence exists between the functional
authority o f the community and the level of concreteness or generality that the biblical
materials are perceived as capable of engendering. If Scripture is seen as providing only
broad horizonal imagery, then the importance of the reflective community in the
interpretive process rises proportionally. In addition, the task of contemporary
application would of necessity be predominately in the hands of the community. If, on
the other hand, Scripture is viewed as providing substantial, concrete ethical injunctions
or specific prevailing moral principles, then the biblical materials are much more likely to
remain the controlling element in the interpretive process. Scripture would bring both
structure and guidance to the task o f application. It appears that Ogletree’s
presuppositions regarding Scripture largely influence his view o f what the eschatological
paradigm is actually capable of producing for the believing community. Because of this,
the eschatological community competes with the very materials that declare and outline
its own eschatological identity.
While Mott and Ogletree share similar convictions about the believing community
being the fundamental field o f moral operation for eschatological ethics, Ogletree’s
imagery o f “eschatological communities” facilitates a sharper case for defining the
meaning and content o f eschatological ethics. It also points more precisely to
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eschatological ethics as being expressly directed toward the eschatological community.
Mott obviously perceives a more direct line from the ethics o f the community toward the
larger society than Ogletree does. The difference lies in the fact that Ogletree has
Christian ethics more in view, while Mott has social change in mind. Ogletree’s principle
that the Christian community relates to the social/political ethical needs o f the larger
human society in a way that is indirect seems to best reflect the general tenor of the New
Testament eschatology. He is correct in affirming that the biblical materials basically
provide an ethic directed toward the eschatological community.

Nature of Social Involvement
In keeping with his understanding that the affairs o f the state lie basically outside
substantive Christian concern, and that the believing community reaches only indirectly
toward the wider social world, Ogletree, nevertheless, affirms that deliberate public
responsibility is to be assumed. It is to be assumed where individual Christians or the
believing community have means to exercise it. It is to be assumed, too, where it
expresses appropriate forms of participation in the larger society. The church’s public
responsibility has to do with the genuine spiritual/moral power and influence which it has
within the larger society. According to Ogletree, the appropriate forms of this “public
witness” include evangelism, individual social responsibility and influence, moral protest
and personal influence in the sociopolitical arena, developing social policy, as well as
social struggle. These are not without important qualification, however. Any so-called
“public witness” must be expressed within the spirit of the spirituality, faith, and internal
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fellowship o f the eschatological community.
Mott’s broad view of the nature o f social involvement would concur. His “paths
to justice” include a variety of ways in which Christians can bring about social change.
These include evangelism, individual social responsibility and influence, moral protest
and personal influence in the sociopolitical arena, as well as social programs and social
struggle. Like Ogletree, Mott would qualify any said expression o f social involvement. It
must be consistent with the vision o f justice which he outlines as being expressed in the
eschatological reign o f God.

Ogletree qualifies the nature of social involvement

through the imagery of eschatological communal reality. Mott, however, does so via the
imagery o f biblical justice which reflects God’s reign. This diversity not only reflects
their respective interests, but shows again how Mott envisions a more direct line from the
moral focus o f the biblical materials to the larger society than Ogletree does. Both,
however, express balance and “realism” in terms of the extent to which Christian social
involvement can reasonably bring change to the larger society while anticipating the not
yet o f the Kingdom of God.
Mott and Ogletree could both be characterized as articulating models of social
responsibility which critically engage the social/moral reality of the larger society. In
fact, this aspect o f social involvement appears to be an important part of their thinking.
But again, we see diversity. For Ogletree, an effective public witness is possible only as
the eschatological community comes to grips with the contemporary “civilization ethic.”
It does so by criticizing it, extending and developing it, and, insofar as possible,
articulating its (eschatological community) distinctive vision in ways that connect with
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the central tendencies of “civilization ethics.” To do so, the eschatological community
must furnish moral notions that make possible a public discourse about the common
good. This includes creative synthesis o f social and cultural ideas with a Christian social
vision. It means the adjustment of Christian teachings to social exigencies. Such
adjustments are not seen by Ogletree as a dilution o f Christian moral seriousness. Rather,
it is a fitting moral response to situations o f substantial moral conflict. The problem,
though, is that Ogletree does not spell out precisely what he has in mind here. Nor does
he say how this might actually work on a practical level. And he does not indicate, either,
how concrete such critical engagement can really become in complex or unpredictable
situations. He suggests only that we somehow adjust or focus Christian teaching toward
social exigencies.
Ogletree does, however, broadly outline four themes that merit attention with
respect to the force o f eschatological promise for the social organization o f life.1 He
outlines these four themes in the context of an overarching metaphor which he terms
“hospitality.” This “hospitality” is seen as expressing two metaphoric nuances for moral
theory: (1) the moral import of intersubjectivity, and (2) the moral significance of
pluralism at an elemental level of human experience. Together they envision an openness
to both people and ideas which may be different to us. But even here there is no clear
outline o f what he has in mind for engaging the “civilization ethic.” The point here is that
'I.e., (1) ethnic and gender inclusiveness, (2) reversal and obliteration o f privilege,
power, and wealth distinctions, (3) mercy, mutual forbearance, and forgiving love
transcending national, ethnic, and cultural bases of social order, and (4) recognition of
the plurality and relativity o f human cultures and social institutions and the possibility of
community among culturally diverse peoples. See above, 252-256.
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Ogletree remains vague. One can rightly ask him, “In practice, how does the Christian
social vision keep from getting absorbed into the ‘civilization ethic’?” “If eschatological
promise is viewed as articulating openness to people and ideas, and encompassing
plurality and relativity, where are the concrete anchor points?”1 One wishes for that other
volume Ogletree himself says should come to bring clearer application to his
fundamentals.
Mott is a theorist too, but he is decidedly more precise in what he has in mind
with respect to moral protest and engaging the larger social world.2 Not only does he
work within the parameters of a very developed concept o f “biblical justice,” he has gone
on to more fully elaborate the implications of these parameters of “biblical justice”
toward contemporary social/political thought. While not a how-to manual, and still quite
conceptual, M ott’s project presents a clearer image of the nature of social involvement.
He is more precise, too, in terms o f what the issues should be in the context of such social
'Courtney rightly asks, “Is there anything that is not negotiable? And Is there
something unique about Christian negotiating? Finally, what kind of time-bomb is set on
the last page when the author envisages interfaith negotiations which presuppose the
relativity o f constitutive Christian themes?” (Courtney, 88).
2Hays notes that “in many respects, Mott’s argument is a restatement o f Reinhold
Niebuhr’s social ethic, bolstered by much more detailed biblical exegesis and modified by
a slightly more optimistic assessment of human capacity to achieve justice through social
institutions” (Hays, 26). In contrast, Ogletree’s arguments are a restatement o f Ernst
Troeltsch’s social theory—the distinctions and interconnections between social forces and
civilizational values in relation to Christian ethos. Ogletree restates Troeltsch’s social
theory in the context o f the eschatological dialectic which he asserts can lead equally as
well to renewed interest in the church as the ecclesial context of Christian ethics, rather
than away from it as Troeltch ultimately moved in favor o f a larger civilization ethic (see
Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context o f Christian Ethics,” 11, 12; idem, “Christian Social
Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 226-233; idem, “Renewing Ecumenical Protestant
Social Teaching,” 293-296).
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moral protest. His writings reflect a corresponding realism to the issues he outlines with
respect to such practical concerns like power, social status, economics, etc. By
interpreting the reign o f God largely through the notion o f “biblical justice,” Mott works
within an existing outline of thought and imagery which Scripture provides with respect
to his subject matter. His specificity in critical engagement is naturally facilitated by the
extent and specificity of the given biblical material.1 As a result, he also has a clearer
picture o f the non-negotiables in any said adjustments o f Christian teaching to
contemporary social exigencies. Ogletree would argue that, in principle, there are
concrete non-negotiables. His methodology, however, and the categories he articulates in
terms of public witness are less defining, potentially risky, and too fluid where complex,
real life situations demand concrete, relevant application.
In this context, though, Ogletree does provide some very useful discussion relative
to the way one would actually go about determining one’s social responsibility. He
enunciates two basic principles. First, social responsibility is assumed where we have the
means to exercise it. Second, it is assumed where it expresses appropriate forms of
participation in the larger society. Social involvement, then, is selective and qualified. It
is to be expressed where we actually have influence, opportunity, or power. Despite both
its generality and implicit relativity, his discussion about the “civilization ethic” does
accurately outline some o f the issues involved in critically engaging the moral thinking of
the larger society. He is right in asserting that we must find ways of articulating our
'Hays will note a possible hermeneutical weakness with the question, “Is the
‘Reign o f God’ a symbol that we can appropriate as easily and directly as Mott
supposes?” (Hays, 26).
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distinctive witness in a manner that is suited to a public discourse. We must find
common language and engage the world, initially at least, on the level of its own agenda.
For Ogletree, the eschatological community is suited for just such a task.
On this matter, Mott’s prevailing focus on “biblical justice” could be a limiting
factor in effecting broad-based critical engagement with the larger society. The rich
complexity o f the ethics o f biblical materials can easily become homogenized where a
single motif structures one’s ethic. Certainly our contemporary society’s dialogue on
social exigencies is broader than the one prevailing theme or interest o f social justice.1

Authority/Relevance
Mott’s and Ogletree’s use o f eschatology in relation to our stated principles of
verification relate ultimately to the questions of “authority” and “relevance” in Christian
ethics. They have both explicitly addressed these two concerns in their projects and have
contributed significantly towards their resolution, though in different ways and varying
degree.
Broadly speaking, they can both be said to elevate the role that Scripture must
play in eschatological ethics. This is, perhaps, their major contribution to the
eschatology/ethics dialogue. Their respective projects have sharpened the issues around
which the question of the authority o f Scripture revolves. They have shown how
eschatology can be useful in either solving problems of biblical authority or
facilitating/obstructing the authority of Scripture in developing moral theory.
'Milton W. Y. Wan, “A Response to Stephen Mott,” Transformation 4, nos. 3 and
4 (June-September/October-December 1987): 34, 35.
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But while they both consciously seek to elevate the role o f Scripture in Christian
ethics via eschatology, Mott conies the closest to demonstrating how the eschatological
paradigm actually does so. Mott’s application o f the eschatological paradigm, for the
most part, uses Scripture in a way in which the biblical materials maintain an
authoritative, assertive, and defining role in the process of application. This happens
because his presuppositions regarding the nature and authority of Scripture predispose
him in that direction. The eschatological paradigm, then, reciprocates, so to speak, by
eliciting methodology in keeping with those presuppositions. Thus, Scripture influences
the perceptions, nuancing, and application o f eschatology. Correspondingly, eschatology
influences the functional role Scripture actually plays in that very application toward
moral theory.
Ogletree, we have seen, leans largely on moral philosophy and phenomenology
for his orientation to both eschatology and Scripture. While much o f his view of
eschatology finds correspondence with the biblical materials, it is much less precise with
respect to the question of authority. Placing authority in the interpretive “ecclesial
context” o f eschatological praxis makes it too fluid for responsible Christian moral
theory.
The question of “relevance” points us primarily to the nature o f social
involvement, but it includes the role of Scripture and community as well. Ultimately,
Scripture must be seen as relevant to the contemporary situation. Likewise, the believing
community need a sense of their part in social involvement. Mott and Ogletree have used
the eschatological paradigm differently to effect similar views of social involvement.
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They have used it differently, too, to facilitate the relevance of the biblical materials to
contemporary moral exigencies and to help the church know its part in social
involvement. But as noted above, Mott succeeds in being more precise in his moral
theory. Because o f this, he becomes more immediately relevant. Because he is working
within parameters defined more closely by the biblical materials themselves, Mott is able
to present a clearer picture o f where he is going. He is closer to finishing, so to speak,
what he has started. He does not have as large a leap to take from his understanding of
eschatology to contemporary praxis. He is able to demonstrate both theoretically and
practically (through his discussion o f area rules) how the eschatological paradigm really
looks in contemporary moral theory and social involvement.1
Ogletree’s orientation in moral philosophy and phenomenology puts his beginning
point further away from praxis and demands daunting precision in order to effect even
theoretical relevance. He himself acknowledges that further steps are needed to move
him from fundamentals to symbolic ethics to practical ethics, and then on to applied
ethics. His project, then, is only relatively relevant.2 A firm bridge from the biblical
'"His style is lucid and his manner of relating theory to practice is both pertinent
and convincing” (Ivy George, review of Biblical Ethics and Social Change, by Stephen
Charles Mott, Christian Scholar’s Review 15, no. 1 (1985): 93.
2Ogletree does not write for the general reader. His project is particularly
complex and concise with the level o f reflection/study abstract and remote for those
looking for concrete or practical solutions to moral or social problems (Paul D. Simmons,
review o f Hospitality to the Stranger: Dimensions o f Moral Understanding, by Thomas
W. Ogletree, Review and Expositor 85, no. 3 [Summer 1988]: 577; Giannini, 74).
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materials to social involvement is not erected,1except perhaps for the eschatological
community itself. On this point, we find one o f Ogletree’s strengths. His concept o f the
eschatological community—the ecclesial context for doing ethics and reaching toward the
larger world—yields the promise o f realizing that bridge. This assumes, o f course, that
the believing community is attentive to the biblical materials. Ogletree’s point here
would be much stronger, however, if Scripture were given the same kind o f primacy and
authority found in Mott. Nevertheless, the things Ogletree expresses on this matter are
relevant for the believing community in knowing, generally at least, how they should live
together and then reach toward the larger world. There is no doubt that both Mott’s and
Ogletree’s discussion about the need for and ways o f effecting critical engagement with
the moral thinking o f the larger society demonstrates how the eschatological paradigm is
relevant to the question of the nature of social involvement and how it facilitates such
dialogue.
This comparison and evaluation of Mott’s and Ogletree’s use of eschatology in
relation to our principles o f verification gives us a fair sense for how effectively the
eschatological paradigm has come to answer the long-standing crisis of “authority” and
“relevance” in Christian ethics during this century. In some respects, their use of the
eschatological paradigm reveals that the issue o f “authority” and “relevance” still very
much exists. The fact that Mott and Ogletree position the role of the believing
'Scroggs, review o f The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 45; Jones, 192.
Attwood suggests that some crucial steps in Ogletree’s arguments about eschatology have
not been adequately demonstrated and that he “has failed to make certain links hold”
(Attwood, 156).
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community differently with reference to that o f Scripture, and that both have differing
approaches in nuancing and defining the nature of social involvement, suggests as much.
Additionally, there is the reality that they both deal quite largely on theoretical levels. In
other respects, though, their use o f the eschatological paradigm exhibits refinements that
make the eschatological paradigm more useful toward answering the concerns of
“authority” and “relevance” in Christian ethics.

Level of Reflection/Paradigm Function
An integral part of this study’s analysis and evaluation has been Mott’s and
Ogletree’s application of the paradigm’s ethical implications with respect to the level of
moral reflection and its potential for concrete social content. This study proposes a
correspondence between the appropriate level on which paradigms operate and the
ingredients o f ethics, i.e., m acn^ases, meso/underlying principles, and micro/area rules.
The question o f “theoretical level,” which this correspondence facilitates, enables one to
clarify how concretely the eschatological paradigm might legitimately speak to modem
ethical concerns. Closely related to the question of “theoretical level” is the meaning and
function o f paradigm. This study has outlined how paradigms serve either to facilitate an
abstract principle which needs to be translated and applied towards new situations, or to
imprint an inner gripping moral image which shapes people ethically. The issues here
deal with questions of specificity and consistency with respect to the eschatological
paradigm’s application. They bring into practical focus where normative content and
guidance lay in the application process. They reveal, too, the carefulness with which the
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eschatological paradigm is applied towards concrete ethical exigencies.

Level of Moral Reflection
This study’s analysis has concluded that, for Mott, the eschatological paradigm
substantially facilitates moral reflection across the full spectrum of paradigm operation.
We observe Mott drawing moral imagery from each o f the macro, meso, and micro
levels. In addition, his use of the eschatological paradigm reflects application in the
corresponding ingredients in the structure o f ethics, i.e., philosophical/theological bases,
underlying principles, and area rules.
For Ogletree, the eschatological paradigm primarily facilitates the macro and
meso levels o f paradigm operation. The micro level is somewhat in view on the
periphery in terms o f proposed subsequent systematic treatment o f Christian ethics. In
other words, the micro level is potentially there for Ogletree, although his current projects
do not reflect it as such. Correspondingly, his use of the eschatological paradigm reflects
application in the bases and underlying principles ingredients in the structure o f ethics.
Unlike Mott, Ogletree’s style and focus in both theology and ethics have been
predominately toward the theoretical. They primarily deal with broad sweeping issues,
principles, fundamentals, and methodology, rather than focusing on specific themes or
concrete areas o f moral concern. The reality, then, is that specificity and concrete
application in his writings are usually remote and peripheral. This is true with regard to
his application o f the eschatological paradigm to moral theory.
The questions o f “theoretical level,” specificity, and consistency come in the
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context o f the important question o f how to credibly translate ethical reflection from one
level to another. Obviously, this has to do with the comprehensiveness of a given
paradigm and the nature o f the imagery it provides. Not all paradigms are capable of
operating across the full spectrum o f the macro, meso, and micro. That the eschatological
paradigm does so, raises two important questions, “Why?” and “How?” Part of the
answer, as we have seen, lies in the fact that the eschatological paradigm’s component
models {already/not yet, reign o f God, and horizon o f the future) as well as its primary
model (kingdom o f God) facilitate such movement. Because these components offer all
three levels, they facilitate a comprehensive biblical paradigm that encompasses the
macro/bases, meso/underlying principles, and micro/area rules.
In addition, there is the eschatological paradigm’s important relation to the
biblical materials themselves, and, relatedly, one’s presuppositions with regard to the
nature o f Scripture. The reason “why” and “how” the eschatological paradigm operates
across the spectrum of paradigm operation is found in the fact that the biblical materials
relate the moral imagery o f eschatology across the spectrum of what this study has
outlined as paradigm operation and the corresponding ingredients in the structure of
ethics. One can credibly translate ethical reflection from one level to another because the
biblical materials themselves provide both the conceptual structure and the example to do
so. Mott’s use o f the eschatological paradigm exhibits this very point.
Mott is concerned with understanding the place of concrete decision making
within different aspects of ethical thought. He is interested in showing how principles
and concrete injunctions relate in Scriptural thought. In other words, he is concerned
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with the question o f how to credibly translate ethical reflection from one level to another.
In this context, Mott interprets organically the diverse, but complementary, ways in which
Scripture is authoritative for ethics. According to him, the concrete biblical injunctions
must be interpreted with attention to God’s mighty acts, theological affirmations, and
prevailing ethical principles. Likewise, the specific teachings and propositions are
needed to give concrete interpretation o f the broad and general truths and actions.
Functionally, this provides the way for responsibly opening up the ethical meaning of
Scripture across different levels of moral reflection and application. We see Mott
demonstrating this approach with his application o f the eschatological paradigm in moral
theory.1 In fact, we see his use of the eschatological paradigm actually facilitating this
hermeneutical principle, not just applying it. The eschatological paradigm is an integral
part of his consistently translating ethical reflection from one level to another.
Ogletree’s use o f the eschatological paradigm exhibits similar movement from
one level o f ethical reflection to another. He does so somewhat differently, however, and
not as precisely or coherently as Mott does. Mott translates ethical reflection from one

'Middlemann worries, however, that Mott’s search for paradigms is more
important than textual accuracy and that his generalizations at times are so broad that
important passages have to be abandoned in order to keep ideology alive. He rightly
muses, “If the context o f the present human situation becomes the text for our action, the
Bible can only furnish us with paradigms, symbols, parallels or activism. I suggest we
need more than that—namely, God’s deliberate information. His text, not the human
context, must inform us. Otherwise, anyone from whatsoever ideological background,
will be free to find his or her paradigms about any current concern in various historical
realities o f the Bible” (Middlemann, 37). While Mott may be myopic at times with
respect to his biblical justice leitmotif, he nevertheless demonstrates, for the most part,
the close relation between paradigm and text that I am outlining here.
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level to another because he sees Scripture as providing the structure and the example of
doing so. He is simply trying to organically interpret the biblical materials. Ogletree
makes this cross-level movement because moral philosophy calls for such (fundamental
ethics, symbolic ethics, and practical ethics), and because one can find corresponding
materials in Scripture to make the bridge. This may be a subtle difference that reflects
differing interests more than substantive differences, but the fact remains that
presuppositions about Scripture lie behind their respective approaches. Ogletree’s view
of the nature o f Scripture places the movement between levels of moral reflection within
the organic structure o f his philosophical methodology, while Mott’s view places this
movement within the context o f the biblical materials and how they organically cohere
and interrelate. Because o f this subtle difference, Ogletree’s movement, as far as the
biblical materials are concerned, will always appear arbitrary and open to question.1 This
will be so even though the actual movement itself may correspond to what one actually
finds in Scripture. In the end, it comes back to the question, "Is it the biblical materials or
moral philosophy that determines why we are doing what we are doing with the
eschatological paradigm?”
Having said all this, we need to affirm the fact that Ogletree’s use o f the
eschatological paradigm does in fact facilitate the movement of ethical reflection from
one level to another. Like Mott, the eschatological paradigm is an integral part o f his

'Attwood suggests that “the actual moves which Ogletree makes to apply and use
the Bible are not the decisive test o f the book’s (The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics')
value” (Attwood, 156).
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translating ethical reflection from one level to another. However, he is not as precise or
consistent as Mott. The point here is that, if the conceptual structure and example for
movement between levels of moral reflection are rooted in the biblical materials, then the
question o f consistency is gauged by one’s use o f the biblical materials themselves. If it
is found somewhere beyond the biblical materials themselves, then consistency is gauged
by that other point of reference. I would add that Mott’s project suggests that the bridge
between the differing levels of moral reflection is the reality of their each yielding
normative content o f Scripture.

Paradigm Role/Function
I now turn to the question of paradigm role and function. Paradigm, as we have
seen, is an integral part of both Mott’s and Ogletree’s moral theory. This study began
with the assumption that they embraced a paradigmatic approach to moral theory. This
assumption implied that the eschatological paradigm (as with any paradigm that
identifies, structures, and determines methodology) has become for Mott and Ogletree
their ethical method. The ensuing analysis o f their projects has affirmed the validity of
this assumption.
For Mott, paradigm relates to an interpretive framework for concrete injunctions,
finding values, overarching principles, and cross-cultural applicability. His discussion of
paradigm comes primarily in those contexts where he is articulating how principles and
concrete injunctions relate in Scriptural thought. Paradigm functions similarly with
Ogletree. It is an interpretive framework for elucidating the meaning of Scripture for
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Christian ethics, value formation, or issues of theology and methodology. They differ
only in the fact that the role and function of paradigm for Mott are primarily that of
facilitating specific moral principles which then need to be translated and applied towards
new situations. For Ogletree, it is primarily toward broad moral orientation. However,
paradigm facilitates broad moral orientation for Mott, too. This focus toward broad
moral orientation or specific moral principles can be seen in their respective overall use
of the eschatological paradigm in moral theory. The presence o f both qualities of
paradigm role and function in Mott’s use of paradigm undoubtedly facilitates his ability
to nuance the eschatological paradigm through all levels o f paradigm operation and
ethical structure.
This leads one to the question of the specificity and concreteness of interpretation
and application. Because Mott discusses the role and function o f paradigm primarily in
the context o f eliciting authoritative meaning from concrete biblical injunctions, he
provides significant insight as to the how and why the eschatological paradigm can move
from broad horizonal moral orientation to specific moral principles and even area rules
for everyday life. For Mott, the importance of a paradigm is not the paradigm itself, but
the authoritative nature o f Scripture and the broad way in which it can be approached and
interpreted. The normative content—whether in concrete injunctions, prevailing ethical
principles, mighty acts o f God, theological affirmations, or enduring values—is not in any
paradigmatic reality itself, but in the text. While the text creates the paradigm, the
paradigm opens back toward the text. It can never move away from the text and operate
on its own.
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These observations are significant for Mott’s application of the eschatological
paradigm in that the normative content o f the eschatological paradigm likewise would lay
primarily in the biblical text. We see this operating in his reign o f God leitmotif. As a
basic theological affirmation of Scripture, the reign o f God is seen in the hermeneutical
context o f both opening the ethical meaning of Scripture and providing parameters for
interpreting specific concrete injunctions o f Scripture. The bridge between the two is the
reality o f their both yielding normative content o f Scripture. In addition, the reign o f God
receives concrete content through its organic relation to the concrete biblical injunction.
The normative content for the eschatological paradigm thus lies primarily in the biblical
text. In addition, because the reign o f God is an expression of God’s mighty act to restore
creation, His paradigmatic actions facilitate moral reflection on the meso level of
underlying principles and prevailing ethical values.
Finally, one would expect that a paradigm created or composed o f components
will find its moral specificity or abstraction through or from the moral clarity of those
components. By extension, the moral specificity or abstraction of a given component part
is likewise determined by the moral clarity o f the biblical witness with which it is
defined. If the eschatological paradigm is seen as built on only broad principles or
generalized abstractions from Scripture, it will not be able to either produce moral
specificity or bring sustained focus toward Scripture in the context of its application in
moral theory. On the other hand, if the eschatological paradigm is seen as reflecting
comprehensive Scriptural/moral focus through the structuring of its components, it will
tend toward greater specificity/content in the moral images it evokes. In addition, it will

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

311
elicit sustained focus toward Scripture in the context of its application in moral theory.
Obviously, the meaning and function of paradigm in the mind o f the theologian or ethicist
will significantly influence his perceptions of the potential application o f the
eschatological paradigm. We have seen this divergence in Mott’s and Ogletree’s use of
the eschatological paradigm in moral theory. And we can understand better why Mott’s
project tends to be more specific and biblical oriented than Ogletree’s.

Strengths and Contributions
This study has looked developmentally up through the 1970s for the basic
crystallized eschatological paradigm that has emerged in Christian theology during this
century. It has then looked to the 1980s and 1990s for clearer methodological application
of the paradigm for moral theory by Christian ethicists. In this process, it has been noted
that, because o f numerous and complex interrelated issues and problems, no final
clarification o f the relationship between eschatology and Christian ethics could really be
given through the 1970s. Clearer principles were needed with respect to the
eschatological paradigm’s application in moral theory. This study has suggested that
Mott and Ogletree have consciously extended this discussion, which they have considered
incomplete and unfinished with respect to the use of eschatology in Christian moral
theory. It is appropriate, then, for us to consider their strengths and contributions in light
o f the comparison and evaluations we have just concluded. It is appropriate, too, for us to
ask whether or not their projects suggest that the eschatological paradigm has become a
more stable framework for doing Christian ethics.
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Viewed together, Mott and Ogletree have both brought significant contributions to
the eschatology/ethics dialogue and the question o f applying the eschatological paradigm
to Christian moral theory. Their major contribution lies in elevating the role that
Scripture must play in eschatological ethics. Their respective projects have sharpened the
issues around which the authority of Scripture revolves. They have shown how
eschatology can be useful in either solving problems of biblical authority or
facilitating/obstructing the authority of Scripture in developing eschatological moral
theory. Similarly, their projects have proven useful in clarifying more precisely the role
o f community and the nature of social involvement in Christian moral theory. Together
they have extended the eschatological paradigm toward more useful and defining issues
in ethics, i.e., justice, moral protest, ecclesial context, etc.. Finally, they provide
significant contemporary examples of what happens if you take the eschatological
paradigm and apply it this way or apply it that way. Their respective interests and
methodologies present graphic windows though which one can observe how
presuppositions and agendas determine the way the eschatological paradigm is
approached and practically applied.
Mott’s contributions in applying the eschatological paradigm emerge in the way
he successfully works to bring the relevancy and clarity o f Scripture towards ethics. One
does not read Mott long without sensing a positive love for Scripture and a profound
sense of its authority and primacy. This contrasts sharply with Ogletree’s apparent
detachment (although not intentional) from Scripture. In particular, Mott’s contribution,
here, lays in the way he demonstrates how the normative content of the eschatological
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paradigm lies in the biblical texts themselves, and how the bridge between the differing
levels o f moral reflection (paradigm operation and ingredients in ethical structure) is the
reality o f their each yielding normative content of Scripture. He also demonstrates why
and how one can credibly and consistently translate ethical reflection from one level to
another.1 It is possible because the biblical materials themselves provide both the
conceptual structure and the example to do so. Additionally, Mott gives examples of how
the eschatological paradigm, if seen as reflecting a comprehensive Scriptural/moral focus
through the structuring of its components, will tend toward greater specificity/content in
'This is not suggesting that Mott necessarily does it right every time or that his
conclusions or directions in the nature of his social involvement are necessarily always
valid. Atkinson rightly notes that Mott exhibits “a tendency to over generalization
without rigorous analysis. In places there is too rapid a move from the OT to the NT.
And there are some places that are just weak” (David Atkinson, “Biblical Social Ethics,”
Expository Times 94, no. 7 [April 1983]: 214). Verhey will agree, noting that “appeals to
Scripture are somewhat less convincing” where questions o f strategy for implementation
are in view than where questions o f the basis for social involvement are being developed
(Verhey, 26). Topel will add that, while Mott is well read across the spectrum of
exegetical literature, and judicious in its use, “still, an exegete will notice many lacunae
or even errors” (L. John Topel, review of Biblical Ethics and Social Change, by Stephen
Charles Mott, The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 46 [January 1984]: 173). And Sundberg
writes that “his tendency is to make of the Bible an answer book for contemporary
questions while ignoring the original contexts faced in biblical epochs” (Walter
Sundberg, review of A Christian Perspective on Political Thought, by Stephen Charles
Mott, Word & World 14, no. 1 [Winter 1994]: 103). And one can be rightly troubled by
the particular direction Mott takes in his A Christian Perspective on Political
Thought—non-Communist socialism is that form o f common life that most closely
approximates the Christian vision. It has communal, democratic elements, very much
like the kibbutz, about which he has written with considerable conviction. According to
Mott, “the hidden elements o f Christianity in Marxism make many of its concepts
appropriate for an overtly Christian social philosophy” (Mott, A Christian Perspective on
Political Thought. 197). See Mott’s extended positive assessment of Marxist socialism
and socialism in general: Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 183-218;
Stackhouse, review of A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 149; and Attwood,
review o f A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 253.
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the moral images it evokes. It will accordingly elicit sustained focus toward Scripture in
the context o f its application in moral theory. Because of these hermeneutical insights,
Mott is able to elicit a higher degree o f concreteness and specificity in his moral theory.
And he can do so with a corresponding degree of credibility and consistency. As a result,
Mott becomes more immediately relevant.
Because he is working within parameters defined more closely by the biblical
materials, Mott is able to present a clearer picture of where he is going. Furthermore, he
can demonstrate both theoretically and practically how the eschatological paradigm really
looks in contemporary moral theory and social involvement. In other words, Mott’s
methodological use of the eschatological paradigm in moral theory shows strong potential
to work. The only cloud in all this is the risk Mott takes in harmonizing and
homogenizing the rich complexity o f the ethics of biblical materials under the rubric of
“biblical justice,” and how his hermeneutic is governed by his purpose in finding
mandates for social change in the texts.1 Any correction on M ott’s part here, though,
would only strengthen the contributions I have just described.
Ogletree’s contributions in applying the eschatological paradigm emerge in his
monumental attempt to bridge, via moral philosophy and phenomenology, the moral
nuances o f the biblical materials and contemporary Christian ethics. It is striking to find
such a readiness to see analogies with classical moral theories and the Bible. It is very
rare to find any sustained attempt to relate biblical and philosophical ethics at all.2 While
‘Goldsmith, 520; Verhey, 26; Middleman, 39.
2Barton, 245, 246.
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this study has been critical of both his process and the degree o f his success in all this,
nevertheless, his very attempt to do so serves to sharpen, and actually demonstrate, the
issues around which the application o f the eschatological paradigm have revolved in this
century. On the one hand, Ogletree shows how eschatology can provide a conceptual
ingredient for merging what appears to be contrasting and diverse views o f reality and
ways o f approaching moral thinking. On the other hand, he shows how eschatology can
bring some important critical distance needed for engaging what he terms as the
contemporary “civilization ethic.” In fact, one could call his The Use of the Bible in
Christian Ethics an example o f what he means by critically engaging the reigning
“civilization ethic.” Through moral philosophy and phenomenology, he articulates
contemporary notions of reality, and then structures biblical notions within the same kind
o f conceptual language, though with a different view of reality.
Ogletree is right in asserting that moral philosophy revolves largely around
consequentialist/value, deontological/rule, and perfectionist/virtue conceptual
frameworks, and that issues of intentionality, intersubjectivity, and self-formation are key
concepts as well. His attempts to show the relevancy of the biblical materials through
these categories are useful, though not necessarily accurate in terms o f exegesis or
theology.1 One only wonders how much different some of his conclusions might be if he
tried to find analogies with classical moral theories and the Bible against a markedly
different backdrop of presuppositions regarding the nature and authority o f Scripture.
'Keith Ward, review of The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, by Thomas W.
Ogletree, Journal of Theological Studies 37 (April 1986): 296; Verhey, 26, 27; Hays, 23,
24; Comstock, 214.
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Would he still argue that eschatology presents deontological themes without the category
o f law? Or for the predominance o f freedom, open future, and relativity in moral
thinking? Because philosophy, rather than Scripture, is his framework for developing
theological ethics, Ogletree’s methodology presents a problem o f distance and
detachment from the message o f the biblical materials. It expresses a degree of
speculation and irresponsibility by way of relative relevance and abstraction. It is a risk
that anyone dealing in philosophical categories opens oneself to.
Ogletree’s main contributions, however, are found (1) in the forceful way he
articulates the eschatological paradigm as presenting the essential dialectical nature of
Christian moral theory and method, and (2) in the strong way he essentially argues that
there is no straight line between the ethics o f the eschatological community and the
social/moral agenda o f the larger society. His imagery of “eschatological communities”
facilitates a sharp case for defining the meaning and content o f eschatological ethics. It
also points to eschatological ethics as being expressly directed toward the eschatological
community.1 His notion of an “ecclesial context” for approaching the moral witness of
Scripture presents forceful argumentation for (1) the practical role the believing
community actually plays in interpreting Scripture, (2) how the eschatological praxis of
gospel living provides experiential points o f contact for comprehending what the biblical
materials are saying, and (3) that only eschatologically oriented communities can really
foster a fusion o f horizons between the biblical world and our own modem world. These
’Some would argue, however, that Ogletree does not adequately demonstrate why
and in precisely what sense a contemporary Christian ethic must be eschatological
(Attwood, 156).
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three points would be undoubtedly stronger if presented within the context of a higher
view o f the nature and authority of Scripture.

Why Diverse Applications of
Eschatological Paradigm
The foregoing process o f (1) outlining this century’s re-interpretation of
eschatology as paradigm for Christian ethics, (2) describing and analyzing Mott’s and
Ogletree’s use o f this eschatological paradigm in their moral theory, and (3) this chapter’s
comparison and evaluation o f their respective application o f the paradigm enable us now
to better ascertain how and why the eschatological paradigm creates such diverse and
often contradictory imagery for moral reflection. They also enable us to appraise the
problems and issues so as to propose the implications that exist for using the
eschatological paradigm more credibly and consistently in contemporary Christian moral
theory.
This study’s outline o f the principal characteristics of twentieth-century re
interpreted eschatology has provided the profile of a comprehensive paradigm for
Christian moral theory. The contours o f this comprehensive paradigm include three
conceptually interwoven and complementary component models {already/not yet, reign o f
God, and horizon o f the future). Together they embrace the range o f possible theological
and moral conceptions of the Kingdom o f God.1 It has been shown that each o f the
paradigm’s components generates forceful and specific ethical nuances which are rich for
1As indicated in the introduction, the “eschatological paradigm” is understood as
being the overall integrating worldview generated by the New Testament Kingdom of
God.
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application toward moral theory. It has been shown, too, that a challenge remains in
determining ju st how these moral nuances are actually elicited and/or have themselves
been cast with respect to moral theory. This has become evident when viewed against
this study’s designated principles o f verification and the varied ways we have seen that
ethicists have perceived them in relation to the divergent moral nuances projected through
the eschatological paradigm. The possible combinations o f implications for moral theory
are subtle, numerous, and complex. It was further noted that adequately applying
eschatology as paradigm toward moral theory demands an understanding o f the subtle
dynamics o f paradigm in relation to models, principles and laws, levels o f operation, and
the ingredients o f ethical structure. In short, we have a very complex situation with subtle
nuances that demands thoughtful balance and a clear understanding o f one’s own
presuppositions and theological/moral agenda.
The fact o f the matter is that the eschatological paradigm can be taken in any
number o f possible directions. If you nuance the horizon o f the future with philosophical
presuppositions and an existential view of the nature of Scripture, you will likely express
affinities with theologies of the future. If you nuance the reign o f God where the
Christian community is viewed as only the initial field of moral operation, you will likely
envision some form of Christianized society. And so on!1 The point here is that one
needs to be aware of the complex and often subtle interplay that exists between these
various ingredients, as well as one’s own presuppositions and agendas, if the
lSee above discussion on the “Implications for Moral Theory,” 78-121; Snyder,
Models o f the Kingdom.
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eschatological paradigm is to operate effectively and truly reflect the biblical materials.
Mott and Ogletree have served to more clearly define the nature of the complex
and often subtle interplay that exists between the various ingredients involved in the
question o f the use o f eschatology as paradigm in Christian ethics and the ever-present
presuppositions or agendas we might have as we seek to apply the eschatological
paradigm. Their very diversity suggests that the question o f the use of eschatology in
Christian moral theory remains an open one, even as the twentieth century draws to its
close. They have, however, served to highlight the important role that Scripture
ultimately plays in the whole equation. They graphically illustrate how the role o f
Scripture continues to be the most critical issue in the eschatology/ethics discussion.
After all, the role o f Scripture was at the very core o f their own question as to the use of
eschatology in Christian moral theory. As we have observed, Mott’s and Ogletree’s
contrasting orientation to this important question o f the nature and authority of Scripture
has resulted in marked contrasts with respect to consistency, specificity, and relevancy of
eschatological paradigm application. Their projects suggest that the question of the role
o f Scripture alone gives promise of eventually bringing some degree of stability to the use
o f the eschatological paradigm in Christian moral theory.

Perspectives for Using Eschatology
as Paradigm
In view of these observations, I would propose the following when applying the
eschatological paradigm toward moral theory.
1. One must come to the eschatological paradigm with a view of the nature and
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authority o f Scripture that allows for its primacy and authority to be functionally
operative as normative content throughout the various ways the biblical materials present
themselves (concrete injunctions, prevailing principles, mighty acts o f God, theological
affirmations, stories, etc.).
2. One needs to identify and nuance the eschatological paradigm exclusively
within the purview of the conceptual imagery that Scripture provides with respect to it.
3. The three component models of the eschatological paradigm (already/not yet,
reign o f God, and horizon o f the future) need to be kept within their proper biblically
defined dynamic interplay in order for their combined imagery to bring the balancing
control that is needed for credible, consistent biblical application toward moral theory.
4. One needs to be candid about one’s own presuppositions and theological/moral
agenda (especially with regard to the role of Scripture, community, and the nature of
social involvement) and how their biases might materially influence their effective use of
the eschatological paradigm.
5. There needs to be sensitivity to the differing levels of moral reflection that
paradigms elicit, and clearly defined principles for consistent, credible, and biblically
congruous movement from one level to the other.
6. It needs to work! The end product must be successful in bringing Scripture
functionally, concretely, and practically toward Christian ethics, and, in the end, keep
eschatology what it is expected to be—an integrating worldview that brings gripping
spiritual/moral formation, and provides sufficient concrete guidance to adequately meet
the demands o f particular contemporary moral exigencies.
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Relation to Other Paradigms
The twentieth century has seen eschatology emerge as a “new paradigm” in
contemporary Christian moral thought. And, not surprisingly, it has been indicating new
directions for Christian ethics. But how does it relate to other paradigms being used in
Christian moral theory? Is it complementary? Is it more comprehensive? Can it become,
as some would suggest, the sole integrating paradigm through which all other paradigms
find their meaning and ultimate contribution to Christian moral theory? Or does it make
other paradigms obsolete? Now that I have identified the principal characteristics of the
eschatological paradigm and have evaluated its effectiveness and usefulness for Christian
moral theory, these kinds o f questions seem appropriate and press us for answers. Here
lie, no doubt, some considerations for further research into the viability of the
eschatological paradigm for Christian moral theory. A further study could evaluate the
eschatological paradigm against other paradigms being used in contemporary Christian
ethics. One could compare their respective effectiveness and usefulness in developing
Christian moral theory. One could also indicate and compare what possible aspects of
moral theory may be articulated by each paradigm. Because not all paradigms may
operate comprehensively across the full spectrum of paradigm operation, one could assess
the possibility of prioritizing, complementing, and/or integrating paradigms. Likewise,
because not all paradigms may correspond fully or directly with the different levels o f
moral reflection which the biblical materials communicate, one could assess which
paradigms open up the biblical materials more completely. Certainly, such comparison
and evaluation o f the eschatological paradigm against other paradigms assume that these
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other paradigms have, likewise, been clearly identified and evaluated.
For purposes o f illustration, let us broadly lay the eschatological paradigm against
just two other twentieth-century paradigms in Christian moral theory, i.e., “divine
command” and “love.” The divine command paradigm would posit that we live
worthwhile lives by following the divine will.1 What pleases God, what God
commands— that is the definition o f right. What displeases God, what He forbids—that
is the definition of wrong. What God wills and what is right coincide. These commands
may be in keeping with the moral laws discovered by reason or they may appear
unreasonable and arbitrary. Whatever the case might be, Christian faith and moral
responsibility require trusting obedience.
The divine command paradigm highlights several important issues for Christian
ethics, i.e., the authority of God, the nature and authority of Scripture, the frame of
reference in which we reflect morally, where the source of moral norms is located, the
dynamic and importance o f faith obedience, the nature and work o f God, as well as
motivation for moral action. It seems to me that this paradigm—while affirming the
authority o f Scripture, concrete commands, and an overarching frame o f reference for
moral reflection across the full spectrum o f paradigm operation, etc.— operates primarily
on a vertical level and does not adequately address horizontal questions of time and
history as clearly as the eschatological paradigm does. Nor does it articulate clearly a
‘Porter, 320; Glenn C. Graber, “Divine Command Morality,” Westminster
Dictionary o f Christian Ethics (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986), 159-160. Emil
Brunner and C. H. F. Henry provide examples of the divine command paradigm (Henry,
Christian Personal Ethics. 209-218; Emil Brunner, The Divine Imperative [Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1947], 114-459; White, 344-350).
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vision o f the future or the responsibility o f the moral agent in complex moral dilemmas in
a fallen world. In the context of a trusting relationship with God and a vision of His good
action, it could, however, provide a motivating dynamic that grips the inner self with
moral vision and purpose. It could thus answer issues of intentionality and motive,
something which the eschatological paradigm does not address directly. The notion of
divine command fits logically, it would appear, under the eschatological paradigm’s reign
o f God component model.
Love in Christian ethics remains a pervasive subject in recent writing.1 As a
paradigm for ethics it indicates both internal and external elements of Christian morality.
It indicates a particular kind of feeling. It is also a verb which emphasizes how we should
behave. The internal aspect focuses on emotion, disposition, and motive. The external
aspect focuses on volition, choices, action, and a way o f life. The two must be present for
biblical love to be complete. In Scripture, love is defined by description and by
demonstration. The objects o f love include God, others, one’s self, and things. The
importance o f love is highlighted in the character of God, God’s image in man, and as the
source and summary of all virtue. It is God’s revelation o f what He wills us to be and do.
It would seem to me that, as a paradigm, love could function across the full
spectrum o f paradigm operation and the ingredients in the structure o f ethics. In fact,
'Gene Outka, “Love,” Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1986), 354-359; Robertson McQuilkin, Biblical Ethics (Wheaton, IL:
Tyndale House Publishers, 1989); Henry. Christian Personal Ethics. 219-236. Paul
Ramsey provides an example of the love paradigm (Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1950); James T. Johnson and David H. Smith, eds.,
Love and Society: Essavs in the Ethics o f Paul Ramsev (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press,
1974).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

324
Scripture provides a broad spectrum of intersection on this subject with each o f these
levels. But love is not so much a worldview as it is a way of living within a worldview
where love is integral to the total reality. While love expresses a reciprocal vertical
dimension o f the divine/human relationship, it deals primarily with the horizontal level of
personal and social relationships. And like divine command, it does not deal so directly
with horizontal flow in terms o f time and history as the eschatological paradigm does.
Like divine command, it seems to fit logically under the reign o f God component of the
eschatological paradigm, although the “conflicts o f love” present in this present age
would serve to elucidate the moral dilemmas implied by the already not yet. Love also
provides a vision o f the future in keeping with the moral direction o f the eschatological
paradigm.
These are the kind o f comparisons that could be made between the eschatological
paradigm and the other paradigms current in contemporary Christian moral theory. My
observations here are only cursory, and yet the possibilities are significant for more indepth study. Just these two brief comparisons highlight the significant role the
eschatological paradigm plays in overall moral theory. But they enumerate, as well, the
reality that moral theory is complex and that a lot o f issues need consideration and
balance. A balanced comprehensive view of biblically informed Christian moral life
reflects, no doubt, the moral imagery from several such paradigms. This is so, even if
one, like eschatology, appears to be able to integrate and cohere the imagery o f many
others.
Besides comparing the eschatological paradigm against other moral paradigms,
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further useful studies could include (1) how the moral implications o f the eschatological
paradigm fits with, obstructs, or is adjusted by unique sectarian eschatologies, and (2)
how the eschatological paradigm is nuanced by or nuances the moral implications of
biblical apocalyptic literature.1

Conclusion
This study has been about ethical method. Its purpose has been to explore and
evaluate the implications o f the methodological application of eschatology as paradigm
for developing contemporary moral theory. It has focused on the interplay o f eschatology
as a methodological tool and the ethical system that results from it. More specifically, it
has sought to demonstrate that “this is what happens if you take the eschatological
paradigm and apply it this way or that way.” These concerns were set in the context of
the ongoing problem o f significant and often contradictory divergence among Christian
ethicists in the way the application o f the eschatological paradigm influences moral
theory and nuances ethical method. These considerable divergences imply that the issue
o f its methodological application still needs exploring. Mott and Ogletree were chosen as
case studies for this endeavor because they belong to the eschatological movement in
contemporary Christian ethics. They represent the latter, contemporary phase of
twentieth-century re-interpreted eschatology and its application toward moral theory. The
ultimate purpose o f this study was to determine whether or not the eschatological
paradigm, in spite o f the various ways in which it has been understood, still held promise
'It is significant that neither Mott nor Ogletree draw much from apocalyptic
literature in their projects (a fact that Verhey notes about Ogletree [Verhey, 26]).
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as the starting point for a comprehensive approach to moral theory. Could the
eschatological paradigm produce a methodological integration? Is it focused and
coherent enough to produce an ethical system? Is it broad enough to include the
significant contemporary issues in Christian moral life?
To explore these concerns and propose answers to these questions, I proposed a
helpful set o f analytical distinctions that encompassed the significant issues that the
application o f the eschatological paradigm revolves around. These issues include: (1) the
role and function o f paradigm, (2) the levels o f paradigm operation (macro, meso, and
micro), and (3) the levels in the ingredients in the structure o f ethics (philosophical/
theological bases, underlying principles, and area rules). In addition, there are (4) the
three components o f the eschatological paradigm (already/not yet, reign o f God, and
horizon o f the future),1 and (5) three principles o f verification (role of Scripture, role of
community, and the nature of social involvement). I proposed that these three principles
o f verification would enable us to relate to issues o f authority and relevance which have
been in considerable question in Christian ethics during this century.
A significant feature o f my procedure was the suggestion that a correspondence
exists between the levels o f paradigm operation and the levels of ingredients in the
structure o f ethics. Another aspect o f this procedure was the suggestion that there is a
complex interplay and nuancing between the paradigm’s components and the principles
o f verification which highlight the methodological nuances that the paradigm
'As seen in relation to the eschatological paradigm’s primary model—the
Kingdom of God.
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evokes/expresses with regard to the principles o f verification. The methodology I
outlined thus proposed the presence of a complex set o f interacting variables in the
application of the eschatological paradigm toward Christian moral theory. A
diagrammatic overview o f these interacting variables in figure 1 provide a visual and
conceptual grasp o f the subtle interplay that this study suggests exists between the
eschatological paradigm and each of the areas impacting the question of its application to
moral theory. Together, this set of analytical distinctions and procedural suggestions
provided an extensive framework where we could see in a comparative fashion where an
ethicist begins, where he moves, and where he ends in terms of using eschatology as
paradigm in Christian moral theory. At the same time, we could observe where the real
issues lie in trying to bring credible structure for applying the eschatological paradigm in
Christian ethics.
This study has demonstrated the validity of this set of analytical distinctions by
the concrete and insightful ways it has allowed us to focus on the question of eschatology
and ethics.1 I believe it also contributes to the larger ethical method dialogue by outlining
and demonstrating the correspondence that exists between the levels of paradigm
operation and the ingredients in the structure o f ethics. It contributes, too, in outlining
how the biblical materials can provide both the structure and example for credibly and
consistently translating moral reflection between these differing levels of paradigm
‘Mott notes that these categories of analysis “produce a significant discussion”
(Mott to Lichtenwalter, April 20,1996,1). While not addressing them directly, Ogletree
nevertheless speaks o f “seeing the whole o f my writings in ways that surprised me”
(Ogletree to Lichtenwalter, September 26, 1996,1).

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

328
operation and their corresponding ingredients in ethical structure. Furthermore, it has
contributed to the dialogue by suggesting how a paradigm created or composed of
components will find its moral specificity or abstraction through or from the moral clarity
o f its components—and by extension, how the moral specificity or abstraction o f a given
component part is likewise determined by the moral clarity of the biblical witness with
which it is defined.
There are other paradigms that will come under consideration in moral theory.
This study has produced a useful tool towards exploring their validity as well as
methodological procedures and presuppositions with respect to them. In the context of
most paradigms focused toward Christian moral theory, there will be in view, at the least,
(1) the three principles of verification, (2) the levels of paradigm operation, and (3) the
ingredients in the structure of ethics. New elements in the equation would be the
conceptual imagery stemming from the paradigm’s supporting and primary models, and
any other concerns pertinent to the subject at hand.
In conclusion, there is the question toward which this study has been moving. Do
either M ott’s or Ogletree’s eschatologically defined moral theory suggest that the
eschatological paradigm has become a more stable framework for doing Christian ethics?
Given this study’s analysis and evaluation, I would say “yes!” I would say “yes!” if we
have M ott’s application of eschatology as paradigm in view, but I would qualify my “yes”
for Ogletree. Mott’s example o f the prevailing role that Scripture must play in the
application o f eschatology as paradigm in moral theory demonstrates where that stability
is to be found. On the other hand, Ogletree’s example of the prevailing role that moral
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philosophy, phenomenology, and critical method can play in its application highlights
where instability still resides.
This study would indicate that the eschatological paradigm functions well or best
if it expresses biblical ethics. It becomes elusive, however, and open to speculation if it
expresses philosophical ethics. Mott’s more direct link between the eschatological
paradigm and the moral witness of the biblical materials provides a moral theory that is
more “user friendly,” relevant, clear, concrete, and more immediately applicable. It also
provides a responsible framework for credibly translating moral reflection across the
differing levels of paradigm operation and the corresponding ingredients in ethical
structure. M ott’s example of the use of eschatology provides a basis for measuring
consistency in its application across the levels o f critical reflection because it highlights
how the biblical materials present both the structure and example of doing so. He also
delineates how the bridge between the differing levels of moral reflection (paradigm
operation and ingredients in ethical structure) is the reality of their each yielding
normative content o f Scripture. In short, the eschatological paradigm becomes a stable
framework for doing ethics in proportion to its correlation with the biblical witness and
its affinity with the structure and examples within the biblical materials themselves. To
step outside the realm of this clearly defined biblical framework is to render the
eschatological paradigm a slippery tool open to any kind of nuancing which, in fact, we
have seen throughout this century.
Ogletree’s use o f the eschatological paradigm, while providing several positive
and important contributions, nonetheless, merely reduplicates many o f the weaknesses
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that rendered the eschatological paradigm fluid and unstable through the 1970s.
Mott’s use of the eschatological paradigm, while not the full answer and still open
to considerable, valid criticism in several areas, nevertheless suggests the way towards
assuring that the eschatological paradigm becomes more stable for Christian moral theory
in the twenty-first century.
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